Rebellion and Unrest

SHEPHERDS of people, had need know the calendars of tempests in state; which are commonly greatest, when things grow to equality; as natural tempests are greatest about the Equinoctia. And as there are certain hollow blasts of wind, and secret swellings of seas before a tempest, so are there in states:

LEADERS of a people need to know when political storms are likely to strike. These are usually greatest when opposing forces become equal, just as natural storms are greatest around the equinoxes. Before a storm, there are hollow gusts of wind and hidden swells in the sea. So too there are warning signs in states:

Libels and licentious discourses against the state, when they are frequent and open; and in like sort, false news often running up and down, to the disadvantage of the state, and hastily embraced; are amongst the signs of troubles. Virgil, giving the pedigree of Fame, saith, she was sister to the Giants:

Frequent, open slander and unrestrained attacks on the state are among the signs of unrest. So are false reports that spread widely, harm the state, and are quickly believed. Virgil, describing the ancestry of Fame, says she was the sister of the Giants:

Illam Terra parens, irra irritata deorum, Extremam (ut perhibent) Coeo Enceladoque sororem Progenuit.

Mother Earth, angered by the gods, gave birth to her. She was, they say, the youngest sister of Coeus and Enceladus.

As if fames were the relics of seditions past; but they are no less, indeed, the preludes of seditions to come. Howsoever he noteth it right, that seditious tumults, and seditious fames, differ no more but as brother and sister, masculine and feminine; especially if it come to that, that the best actions of a state, and the most plausible, and which ought to give greatest contentment, are taken in ill sense, and traduced: for that shows the envy great, as Tacitus saith; conflata magna invidia, seu bene seu male gesta premunt. Neither doth it follow, that because these fames are a sign of troubles, that the suppressing of them with too much severity, should be a remedy of troubles. For the despising of them, many times checks them best; and the going about to stop them, doth but make a wonder long-lived. Also that kind of obedience, which Tacitus speaketh of, is to be held suspected: Erant in officio, sed tamen qui mallent mandata imperantium interpretari quam exequi; disputing, excusing, cavilling upon mandates and directions, is a kind of shaking off the yoke, and assay of disobedience; especially if in those disputings, they which are for the direction, speak fearfully and tenderly, and those that are against it, audaciously.

As if rumors were merely the remains of past rebellions. In fact, they are no less the preludes to rebellions yet to come. Still, he rightly observes that rebellious unrest and rebellious rumors differ only as brother and sister, male and female. This is especially true when a state's best and most welcome actions are misunderstood and slandered. These are the very actions that should bring the greatest satisfaction. Such reactions reveal great resentment, as Tacitus says. Once intense resentment has built up, good and bad actions alike bring condemnation. Yet rumors being a sign of trouble does not mean that suppressing them too harshly will cure the trouble. Often, ignoring them is the best way to check them. Trying to silence them only keeps the sensation alive longer. The kind of obedience Tacitus describes should also arouse suspicion. They performed their duties, yet preferred to interpret their rulers' commands rather than carry them out. Arguing over orders, making excuses, and finding petty faults with instructions are ways of throwing off authority and testing disobedience. This is especially true when supporters of an order speak timidly and cautiously, while its opponents speak boldly.

Also, as Machiavel noteth well, when princes, that ought to be common parents, make themselves as a party, and lean to a side, it is as a boat, that is overthrown by uneven weight on the one side; as was well seen, in the time of Henry the Third of France; for first, himself entered league for the extirpation of the Protestants; and presently after, the same league was turned upon himself. For when the authority of princes, is made but an accessory to a cause, and that there be other bands, that tie faster than the band of sovereignty, kings begin to be put almost out of possession.

As Machiavelli rightly notes, rulers should act as parents to all their people. When they instead join a faction and take sides, they resemble a boat capsized by uneven weight on one side. This was clearly seen during the reign of Henry III of France. First, he joined a league to wipe out the Protestants. Soon afterward, that same league turned against him. When rulers lend their authority to a cause, that authority becomes merely a supporting force. If other loyalties bind people more strongly than loyalty to their sovereign, kings almost lose their hold on power.

Also, when discords, and quarrels, and factions are carried openly and audaciously, it is a sign the reverence of government is lost. For the motions of the greatest persons in a government, ought to be as the motions of the planets under primum mobile; according to the old opinion: which is, that every of them, is carried swiftly by the highest motion, and softly in their own motion. And therefore, when great ones in their own particular motion, move violently, and, as Tacitus expresseth it well, liberius quam ut imperantium meminissent; it is a sign the orbs are out of frame. For reverence is that, wherewith princes are girt from God; who threateneth the dissolving thereof; Solvam cingula regum.

Also, when disputes, quarrels, and factions become open and brazen, it shows that respect for government has been lost. The actions of the most powerful people in government should resemble the planets’ movements under the primum mobile. According to the old theory, this outermost sphere carries every planet swiftly along, while each moves slowly on its own. So when powerful people act violently in pursuing their own interests, something is wrong. As Tacitus puts it well, they act “too freely to remember those who govern them.” This is a sign that the heavenly spheres are out of order. For reverence is the belt God puts around rulers, and he threatens to loosen it. “I will loosen the belts of kings.”

So when any of the four pillars of government, are mainly shaken, or weakened (which are religion, justice, counsel, and treasure), men had need to pray for fair weather. But let us pass from this part of predictions (concerning which, nevertheless, more light may be taken from that which followeth); and let us speak first, of the materials of seditions; then of the motives of them; and thirdly of the remedies.

When any of government’s four pillars is badly shaken or weakened, people need to pray for fair weather. These pillars are religion, justice, counsel, and the treasury. But let us move on from predictions, though what follows may shed more light on them. Let us first discuss the conditions that give rise to rebellions, then their motives, and thirdly their remedies.

Concerning the materials of seditions. It is a thing well to be considered; for the surest way to prevent seditions (if the times do bear it) is to take away the matter of them. For if there be fuel prepared, it is hard to tell, whence the spark shall come, that shall set it on fire. The matter of seditions is of two kinds: much poverty, and much discontentment. It is certain, so many overthrown estates, so many votes for troubles. Lucan noteth well the state of Rome before the Civil War,

The causes of rebellion deserve careful consideration. The surest way to prevent rebellions, if circumstances allow, is to remove their causes. If fuel is ready, it is hard to tell where the spark that ignites it will come from. Rebellions have two main causes: widespread poverty and widespread discontent. Certainly, every ruined fortune adds another vote for unrest. Lucan describes Rome’s condition before the Civil War well,

This same multis utile bellum, is an assured and infallible sign, of a state disposed to seditions and troubles. And if this poverty and broken estate in the better sort, be joined with a want and necessity in the mean people, the danger is imminent and great. For the rebellions of the belly are the worst. As for discontentments, they are, in the politic body, like to humors in the natural, which are apt to gather a preternatural heat, and to inflame. And let no prince measure the danger of them by this, whether they be just or unjust: for that were to imagine people, to be too reasonable; who do often spurn at their own good: nor yet by this, whether the griefs whereupon they rise, be in fact great or small: for they are the most dangerous discontentments, where the fear is greater than the feeling. Dolendi modus, timendi non item. Besides, in great oppressions, the same things that provoke the patience, do withal mate the courage; but in fears it is not so. Neither let any prince, or state, be secure concerning discontentments, because they have been often, or have been long, and yet no peril hath ensued: for as it is true, that every vapor or fume doth not turn into a storm; so it is nevertheless true, that storms, though they blow over divers times, yet may fall at last; and, as the Spanish proverb noteth well, The cord breaketh at the last by the weakest pull.

When war benefits many, it is a sure and unmistakable sign that a state is prone to rebellion and unrest. If poverty and financial ruin among the upper ranks combine with hardship among ordinary people, the danger is immediate and great. For rebellions driven by hunger are the worst. Public discontent is like the bodily fluids once thought to govern health. These can build up unnatural heat and cause inflammation. No ruler should judge the danger of discontent by whether it is justified. That would assume people are too reasonable, for they often reject what is good for them. Nor should rulers judge it by whether the grievances behind it are actually great or small. The most dangerous discontent arises when fear exceeds actual suffering. Pain has limits, but fear does not. Besides, under severe oppression, the very things that test people's patience also crush their courage. Fear does not have this effect. No ruler or state should feel safe because discontent has appeared often, or lasted long, without causing danger. It is true that not every vapor or cloud becomes a storm. Yet storms may pass over many times and still strike at last. As the Spanish proverb rightly observes, the cord finally breaks at the weakest pull.

The causes and motives of seditions are, innovation in religion; taxes; alteration of laws and customs; breaking of privileges; general oppression; advancement of unworthy persons; strangers; dearths; disbanded soldiers; factions grown desperate; and what soever, in offending people, joineth and knitteth them in a common cause.

Rebellions arise from changes in religion, taxes, changes to laws and customs, violations of privileges, and widespread oppression. Other causes include promoting unworthy people, foreigners, food shortages, disbanded soldiers, and factions driven to desperation. Anything that angers people and unites them in a common cause can also lead to rebellion.

For the remedies; there may be some general preservatives, whereof we will speak: as for the just cure, it must answer to the particular disease; and so be left to counsel, rather than rule.

As for remedies, there may be some general preventive measures, which we will discuss. The proper cure must suit the particular disease. It should therefore be left to individual judgment rather than fixed rules.

The first remedy or prevention is to remove, by all means possible, that material cause of sedition whereof we spake; which is, want and poverty in the estate. To which purpose serveth the opening, and well-balancing of trade; the cherishing of manufactures; the banishing of idleness; the repressing of waste, and excess, by sumptuary laws; the improvement and husbanding of the soil; the regulating of prices of things vendible; the moderating of taxes and tributes; and the like. Generally, it is to be foreseen that the population of a kingdom (especially if it be not mown down by wars) do not exceed the stock of the kingdom, which should maintain them. Neither is the population to be reckoned only by number; for a smaller number, that spend more and earn less, do wear out an estate sooner, than a greater number that live lower, and gather more. Therefore the multiplying of nobility, and other degrees of quality, in an over proportion to the common people, doth speedily bring a state to necessity; and so doth likewise an overgrown clergy; for they bring nothing to the stock; and in like manner, when more are bred scholars, than preferments can take off.

The first remedy, or means of prevention, is to remove by every possible means the material cause of rebellion already discussed. That cause is hardship and poverty in the country. This requires opening up trade and keeping it well balanced, encouraging manufacturing, and putting an end to idleness. It also requires curbing waste and extravagance through laws limiting luxury spending, and improving and carefully managing farmland. Other measures include regulating the prices of goods for sale, keeping taxes and levies moderate, and similar policies. In general, care must be taken that a kingdom’s population does not exceed the resources available to support it. This is especially important if wars have not cut down the population. Nor should population be measured by numbers alone. Fewer people who spend more and earn less exhaust a country’s resources sooner than more people who live simply and accumulate more. Therefore, increasing the nobility and other privileged ranks out of proportion to the common people quickly impoverishes a state. An excessively large clergy does the same, since they add nothing to the country’s resources. The same is true when more people are educated as scholars than available posts can employ.

It is likewise to be remembered, that forasmuch as the increase of any estate must be upon the foreigner (for whatsoever is somewhere gotten, is somewhere lost), there be but three things, which one nation selleth unto another; the commodity as nature yieldeth it; the manufacture; and the vecture, or carriage. So that if these three wheels go, wealth will flow as in a spring tide. And it cometh many times to pass, that materiam superabit opus; that the work and carriage is more worth than the material, and enricheth a state more; as is notably seen in the Low-Countrymen, who have the best mines above ground, in the world.

We should also remember that any nation's increase in wealth must come at the expense of foreigners. Whatever is gained somewhere is lost elsewhere. There are only three things one nation sells to another: raw materials, manufactured goods, and transport. If these three wheels keep turning, wealth will flow in like a rising spring tide. It often happens that the finished work surpasses the material in value. Manufacturing and transport are worth more than the raw material and do more to enrich a nation. This is clearly seen among the people of the Low Countries, who have the world's best mines above ground.

Above all things, good policy is to be used, that the treasure and moneys, in a state, be not gathered into few hands. For otherwise a state may have a great stock, and yet starve. And money is like muck, not good except it be spread. This is done, chiefly by suppressing, or at least keeping a strait hand, upon the devouring trades of usury, ingrossing great pasturages, and the like.

Above all, sound policies must ensure that a nation's wealth and money do not gather in too few hands. Otherwise, a nation may have great wealth and yet starve. Money is like manure, useful only when spread around. This is done chiefly by suppressing exploitative practices, or at least keeping them under strict control. These include lending at excessive interest, concentrating large areas of pastureland in a few hands, and similar practices.

For removing discontentments, or at least the danger of them; there is in every state (as we know) two portions of subjects; the noblesse and the commonalty. When one of these is discontent, the danger is not great; for common people are of slow motion, if they be not excited by the greater sort; and the greater sort are of small strength, except the multitude be apt, and ready to move of themselves. Then is the danger, when the greater sort, do but wait for the troubling of the waters amongst the meaner, that then they may declare themselves. The poets feign, that the rest of the gods would have bound Jupiter; which he hearing of, by the counsel of Pallas, sent for Briareus, with his hundred hands, to come in to his aid. An emblem, no doubt, to show how safe it is for monarchs, to make sure of the good will of common people. To give moderate liberty for griefs and discontentments to evaporate (so it be without too great insolency or bravery), is a safe way. For he that turneth the humors back, and maketh the wound bleed inwards, endangereth malign ulcers, and pernicious imposthumations.

To remove discontent, or at least its dangers, we must recognize two groups in every state, the nobles and the common people. When only one group is discontented, the danger is not great. Common people are slow to act unless stirred up by the nobles. The nobles have little power unless the people are willing and ready to act on their own. The danger comes when the nobles merely wait for unrest among the common people before openly taking their side. The poets tell how the other gods planned to bind Jupiter. When he heard of this, he followed Pallas’s advice and summoned Briareus, with his hundred hands, to help him. This story clearly shows how much safety monarchs gain by securing the goodwill of the common people. Allowing people some freedom to vent their grievances and discontent is a safe course. But this must not involve excessive insolence or defiance. Anyone who forces these unhealthy fluids back into the body and makes a wound bleed inward risks dangerous ulcers and deadly abscesses.

The part of Epimetheus mought well become Prometheus, in the case of discontentments: for there is not a better provision against them. Epimetheus, when griefs and evils flew abroad, at last shut the lid, and kept hope in the bottom of the vessel. Certainly, the politic and artificial nourishing, and entertaining of hopes, and carrying men from hopes to hopes, is one of the best antidotes against the poison of discontentments. And it is a certain sign of a wise government and proceeding, when it can hold men's hearts by hopes, when it cannot by satisfaction; and when it can handle things, in such manner, as no evil shall appear so peremptory, but that it hath some outlet of hope; which is the less hard to do, because both particular persons and factions, are apt enough to flatter themselves, or at least to brave that, which they believe not.

In dealing with discontent, Prometheus could well have followed Epimetheus’s example. There is no better way to guard against it. When sorrows and evils flew out into the world, Epimetheus finally shut the lid, keeping hope inside the vessel. Certainly, skillfully nurturing hopes and leading people from one hope to another is among the best antidotes to discontent’s poison. It is a sure sign of wise government when it can hold people’s loyalty through hope when satisfaction is impossible. The same is true when it manages affairs so that no evil seems final, but leaves some opening for hope. This is easier because both individuals and factions readily deceive themselves with hopes. Or at least they boldly profess hopes they do not believe in.

Also the foresight and prevention, that there be no likely or fit head, whereunto discontented persons may resort, and under whom they may join, is a known, but an excellent point of caution. I understand a fit head, to be one that hath greatness and reputation; that hath confidence with the discontented party, and upon whom they turn their eyes; and that is thought discontented, in his own particular: which kind of persons, are either to be won, and reconciled to the state, and that in a fast and true manner; or to be fronted with some other, of the same party, that may oppose them, and so divide the reputation. Generally, the dividing and breaking, of all factions and combinations that are adverse to the state, and setting them at distance, or at least distrust, amongst themselves, is not one of the worst remedies. For it is a desperate case, if those that hold with the proceeding of the state, be full of discord and faction, and those that are against it, be entire and united.

It is also a familiar but excellent precaution to prevent any likely or suitable leader from emerging among the discontented. Such a leader would give them someone to rally around and unite under. By a suitable leader, I mean someone with power and reputation, whom the discontented trust and look to for leadership. He must also be thought to have personal grievances. Such people must either be won over and firmly and sincerely reconciled to the state, or face a rival. That rival should come from their own party, oppose them, and divide their influence. In general, dividing and breaking up all factions and alliances hostile to the state is far from the worst remedy. They should be kept apart, or at least made to distrust one another. For the situation is desperate when supporters of the state's policies are divided by conflict and faction, while its opponents remain wholly united.

I have noted, that some witty and sharp speeches, which have fallen from princes, have given fire to seditions. Caesar did himself infinite hurt in that speech, Sylla nescivit literas, non potuit dictare; for it did utterly cut off that hope, which men had entertained, that he would at one time or other give over his dictatorship. Galba undid himself by that speech, legi a se militem, non emi; for it put the soldiers out of hope of the donative. Probus likewise, by that speech, Si vixero, non opus erit amplius Romano imperio militibus; a speech of great despair for the soldiers. And many the like. Surely princes had need, in tender matters and ticklish times, to beware what they say; especially in these short speeches, which fly abroad like darts, and are thought to be shot out of their secret intentions. For as for large discourses, they are flat things, and not so much noted.

I have noticed that some witty, sharp remarks by rulers have sparked rebellions. Caesar did himself immense harm when he said, “Sulla did not know his letters, so he could not dictate.” This completely destroyed people’s hope that he would eventually give up his dictatorship. Galba ruined himself by saying, “I choose my soldiers, I do not buy them.” This ended the soldiers’ hope of receiving a cash gift. Probus likewise harmed himself by saying, “If I live, the Roman Empire will no longer need soldiers.” These words left the soldiers in deep despair. There are many similar examples. Rulers certainly need to watch what they say about sensitive matters and in unsettled times. This is especially true of short remarks, which spread like darts. People believe they reveal the rulers’ hidden intentions. Long speeches, by contrast, are dull and attract less notice.

Lastly, let princes, against all events, not be without some great person, one or rather more, of military valor, near unto them, for the repressing of seditions in their beginnings. For without that, there useth to be more trepidation in court upon the first breaking out of troubles, than were fit. And the state runneth the danger of that which Tacitus saith; Atque is habitus animorum fuit, ut pessimum facinus auderent pauci, plures vellent, omnes paterentur. But let such military persons be assured, and well reputed of, rather than factious and popular; holding also good correspondence with the other great men in the state; or else the remedy, is worse than the disease.

Finally, princes should always keep one prominent person of military courage close by, or preferably more than one. This prepares them for any turn of events and allows them to suppress rebellions as they begin. Without such people, the first outbreak of trouble usually causes more panic at court than it should. The state then risks what Tacitus describes. “Such was the mood that a few dared the worst crime, more wanted it, and all tolerated it.” But these military figures should be trustworthy and respected, rather than leaders of factions or popular favorites. They should also maintain good relations with the other powerful men in the state. Otherwise, the remedy is worse than the disease.