To the Epicurean Administrator of the Free Cities

When the administrator⁴⁷⁰ came to visit him, and the man was an Epicurean, Epictetus said, It is proper for us who are not philosophers to inquire of you who are philosophers,⁴⁷¹ as those who come to a strange city inquire of the citizens and those who are acquainted with it, what is the best thing in the world, in order that we also after inquiry may go in quest of that which is best and look at it, as strangers do with the things in cities. For that there are three things which relate to man, soul, body, and things external, scarcely any man denies. It remains for you philosophers to answer what is the best. What shall we say to men? Is the flesh the best? and was it for this that Maximus⁴⁷² sailed as far as Cassiope in winter (or bad weather) with his son, and accompanied him that he might be gratified in the flesh? When the man said that it was not, and added, Far be that from him.—Is it not fit then, Epictetus said, to be actively employed about the best? It is certainly of all things the most fit. What then do we possess which is better than the flesh? The soul, he replied. And the good things of the best, are they better, or the good things of the worse? The good things of the best. And are the good things of the best within the power of the will or not within the power of the will? They are within the power of the will. Is then the pleasure of the soul a thing within the power of the will? It is, he replied. And on what shall this pleasure depend? On itself? But that can not be conceived: for there must first exist a certain substance or nature (οὐσία) of good, by obtaining which we shall have pleasure in the soul. He assented to this also. On what then shall we depend for this pleasure of the soul? for if it shall depend on things of the soul,⁴⁷³ the substance (nature) of the good is discovered; for good can not be one thing, and that at which we are rationally delighted another thing; nor if that which precedes is not good, can that which comes after be good, for in order that the thing which comes after may be good, that which precedes must be good. But you would not affirm this, if you are in your right mind, for you would then say what is inconsistent both with Epicurus and the rest of your doctrines. It remains then that the pleasure of the soul is in the pleasure from things of the body: and again that those bodily things must be the things which precede and the substance (nature) of the good.

When the administrator⁴⁷⁰ came to visit him, Epictetus spoke to him, knowing that he was an Epicurean. “It is right for us who are not philosophers to ask you who are philosophers⁴⁷¹ what is best in the world. We are like visitors to a strange city who ask its citizens and others who know it. Once we have asked, we too can go in search of what is best and see it, as visitors do with a city’s sights. Hardly anyone denies that three things concern human beings: the soul, the body, and external things. It remains for you philosophers to tell us which is best. “What shall we tell people? Is the flesh best? Is that why Maximus⁴⁷² sailed as far as Cassiope in winter (or bad weather) with his son? Did he accompany his son so that Maximus might enjoy bodily pleasure?” “No,” the man replied. “Far be that from him.” “Then isn’t it right,” Epictetus said, “to devote ourselves actively to what is best?” “Of all things, it is certainly the most right.” “What do we possess that is better than the flesh?” “The soul,” he replied. “Are the good things of what is best better than the good things of what is worse?” “The good things of what is best are better.” “And are the good things of what is best within the power of the will, or not?” “They are within the power of the will.” “Then is the soul’s pleasure within the power of the will?” “It is,” he replied. “And what does this pleasure depend on? On itself? That is impossible to imagine. For there must first be a certain substance or nature (οὐσία) of good. Only by obtaining it can we have pleasure in the soul.” The man agreed to this too. “Then what does the soul’s pleasure depend on? If it depends on things of the soul,⁴⁷³ we have discovered the substance (nature) of the good. For the good cannot be one thing and the thing we rationally delight in another. Nor can what comes after be good if what comes before is not good. For what comes before must be good for what comes after to be good. “But you would not affirm this if you were in your right mind. You would be saying something inconsistent with Epicurus and the rest of your doctrines. It follows, then, that the soul’s pleasure lies in pleasure from things of the body. And those bodily things must be what comes first and the substance (nature) of the good.”

For this reason Maximus acted foolishly if he made the voyage for any other reason than for the sake of the flesh, that is, for the sake of the best. And also a man acts foolishly if he abstains from that which belongs to others, when he is a judge (δικαστής) and able to take it. But, if you please, let us consider this only, how this thing may be done secretly, and safely, and so that no man will know it. For not even does Epicurus himself declare stealing to be bad,⁴⁷⁴ but he admits that detection is; and because it is impossible to have security against detection, for this reason he says, Do not steal. But I say to you that if stealing is done cleverly and cautiously, we shall not be detected: further also we have powerful friends in Rome both men and women, and the Hellenes (Greeks) are weak, and no man will venture to go up to Rome for the purpose (of complaining). Why do you refrain from your own good? This is senseless, foolish. But even if you tell me that you do refrain, I will not believe you. For as it is impossible to assent to that which appears false, and to turn away from that which is true, so it is impossible to abstain from that which appears good. But wealth is a good thing, and certainly most efficient in producing pleasure. Why will you not acquire wealth? And why should we not corrupt our neighbor's wife, if we can do it without detection? and if the husband foolishly prates about the matter, why not pitch him out of the house? If you would be a philosopher such as you ought to be, if a perfect philosopher, if consistent with your own doctrines, [you must act thus]. If you would not, you will not differ at all from us who are called Stoics; for we also say one thing, but we do another: we talk of the things which are beautiful (good), but we do what is base. But you will be perverse in the contrary way, teaching what is bad, practising what is good.⁴⁷⁵

For this reason, Maximus was foolish if he made the voyage for any reason other than the flesh, that is, the greatest good. A man is also foolish to refrain from taking what belongs to others when he is a judge (δικαστής) and can take it. But let us consider only how to do this secretly and safely, so that no one will know. Even Epicurus himself does not say that stealing is bad.⁴⁷⁴ He admits that being caught is bad. And because it is impossible to be certain you will not be caught, he says, Do not steal. But I say that if we steal cleverly and cautiously, we will not be caught. Besides, we have powerful friends in Rome, both men and women. The Hellenes (Greeks) are weak, and no one will dare go to Rome to complain. Why do you deny yourself what is good for you? That is senseless and foolish. But even if you tell me that you do deny yourself, I will not believe you. It is impossible to accept what seems false or reject what seems true. In the same way, it is impossible to abstain from what seems good. But wealth is a good thing, and it certainly produces pleasure very effectively. Why will you not acquire wealth? And why should we not seduce our neighbor's wife if we can do it without being caught? If her husband foolishly complains about it, why not throw him out of the house? If you want to be the philosopher you ought to be, a perfect philosopher, consistent with your own doctrines, [you must act this way]. If you do not, you will be no different from us who are called Stoics. We too say one thing and do another. We talk about what is beautiful (good), but we do what is base. But you will be perverse in the opposite way, teaching what is bad and practicing what is good.⁴⁷⁵

In the name of God,⁴⁷⁶ are you thinking of a city of Epicureans? [One man says], 'I do not marry.'—'Nor I, for a man ought not to marry; nor ought we to beget children, nor engage in public matters.' What then will happen? whence will the citizens come? who will bring them up? who will be governor of the youth, who preside over gymnastic exercises? and in what also will the teacher instruct them? will he teach them what the Lacedaemonians were taught, or what the Athenians were taught? Come take a young man, bring him up according to your doctrines. The doctrines are bad, subversive of a state, pernicious to families, and not becoming to women. Dismiss them, man. You live in a chief city: it is your duty to be a magistrate, to judge justly, to abstain from that which belongs to others; no woman ought to seem beautiful to you except your own wife, and no youth, no vessel of silver, no vessel of gold (except your own). Seek for doctrines which are consistent with what I say, and by making them your guide you will with pleasure abstain from things which have such persuasive power to lead us and overpower us. But if to the persuasive power of these things, we also devise such a philosophy as this which helps to push us on towards them and strengthens us to this end, what will be the consequence? In a piece of toreutic⁴⁷⁷ art which is the best part? the silver or the workmanship? The substance of the hand is the flesh; but the work of the hand is the principal part (that which precedes and leads the rest). The duties then are also three:⁴⁷⁸ those which are directed towards the existence of a thing; those which are directed towards its existence in a particular kind; and third, the chief or leading things themselves. So also in man we ought not to value the material, the poor flesh, but the principal (leading things, τὰ προηγούμενα). What are these? Engaging in public business, marrying, begetting children, venerating God, taking care of parents, and generally, having desires, aversions (ἐκκλίνειν), pursuits of things and avoidances, in the way in which we ought to do these things, and according to our nature. And how are we constituted by nature? Free, noble, modest: for what other animal blushes? what other is capable of receiving the appearance (the impression) of shame? and we are so constituted by nature as to subject pleasure to these things, as a minister, a servant, in order that it may call forth our activity, in order that it may keep us constant in acts which are conformable to nature.⁴⁷⁹

In the name of God,⁴⁷⁶ are you imagining a city of Epicureans? [One man says], 'I do not marry.' 'Nor do I, for a man should not marry. Nor should we have children or take part in public affairs.' What will happen then? Where will the citizens come from? Who will raise them? Who will oversee the young, and who will supervise their physical training? What will their teacher teach them? Will he teach them what the Lacedaemonians were taught, or what the Athenians were taught? Come, take a young man and raise him according to your doctrines. Those doctrines are bad. They undermine the state, ruin families, and are unbecoming to women. Give them up, man. You live in a great city. It is your duty to serve as a magistrate, judge justly, and leave other people's property alone. No woman should seem beautiful to you except your own wife. Nor should any young man, silver vessel, or gold vessel seem beautiful to you, except your own. Look for doctrines that agree with what I say. If you let them guide you, you will gladly resist things that have such power to tempt and overcome us. But what will happen if we add to their power a philosophy that pushes us toward them and encourages us? In a work of metal art,⁴⁷⁷ which is the better part, the silver or the craftsmanship? The hand is made of flesh, but its work is the most important part. The work comes first and guides the rest. Duties, then, are also of three kinds:⁴⁷⁸ those directed toward a thing's existence, those directed toward its existence in a particular form, and third, the chief or leading things themselves. So too, in a human being, we should value not the material, the poor flesh, but the leading things (τὰ προηγούμενα). What are these? Taking part in public affairs, marrying, having children, honoring God, and caring for parents. More generally, they are desiring and shunning (ἐκκλίνειν), pursuing and avoiding things as we should, and in keeping with our nature. And what is our nature? We are free, noble, and modest. What other animal blushes? What other animal can feel an impression of shame? Our nature also makes pleasure subordinate to these things, as a helper and servant. Pleasure is meant to stir us to action and keep us steady in acts that accord with nature.⁴⁷⁹

But I am rich and I want nothing.—Why then do you pretend to be a philosopher? Your golden and your silver vessels are enough for you. What need have you of principles (opinions)? But I am also a judge (κριτής) of the Greeks.—Do you know how to judge? Who taught you to know? Caesar wrote to me a codicil.⁴⁸⁰ Let him write and give you a commission to judge of music; and what will be the use of it to you? Still how did you become a judge? whose hand did you kiss? the hand of Symphorus or Numenius? Before whose bed-chamber have you slept?⁴⁸¹ To whom have you sent gifts? Then do you not see that to be a judge is just of the same value as Numenius is? But I can throw into prison any man whom I please.—So you can do with a stone.—But I can beat with sticks whom I please. So you may an ass. This is not a governing of men. Govern us as rational animals: show us what is profitable to us, and we will follow it: show us what is unprofitable, and we will turn away from it. Make us imitators of yourself, as Socrates made men imitators of himself. For he was like a governor of men, who made them subject to him their desires, their aversion, their movements towards an object and their turning away from it.—Do this: do not do this: if you do not obey, I will throw you into prison.—This is not governing men like rational animals. But I (say): As Zeus has ordained, so act: if you do not act so, you will feel the penalty, you will be punished. What will be the punishment?—Nothing else than not having done your duty: you will lose the character of fidelity, modesty, propriety. Do not look for greater penalties than these.

But I am rich and need nothing. Why, then, do you pretend to be a philosopher? Your gold and silver vessels are enough for you. What need do you have for principles (opinions)? But I am also a judge (κριτής) of the Greeks. Do you know how to judge? Who taught you? Caesar sent me a commission.⁴⁸⁰ Suppose he gives you a commission to judge music. What use would that be to you? Still, how did you become a judge? Whose hand did you kiss? Symphorus's or Numenius's? Outside whose bedroom did you sleep?⁴⁸¹ To whom did you send gifts? Don't you see, then, that being a judge is worth just as much as Numenius is? But I can throw anyone I please into prison. You can do the same with a stone. But I can beat anyone I please with sticks. You can do the same to an ass. This is not how to govern people. Govern us as rational creatures. Show us what benefits us, and we will follow it. Show us what harms us, and we will turn away from it. Make us imitate you, as Socrates made people imitate him. For he was like a ruler of people. He brought their desires, aversions, impulses to pursue things, and impulses to turn away from them under his authority. Do this. Don't do that. If you don't obey, I will throw you into prison. This is not governing people as rational creatures. But I say: Act as Zeus has ordained. If you do not, you will suffer the penalty. You will be punished. What will the punishment be? Nothing other than failing to do your duty. You will lose your character as a faithful, modest, and proper person. Do not look for greater penalties than these.