What a Person Making Progress Should Practice[452] and Our Neglect of What Matters Most

There are three things (topics, τόποι) in which a man ought to exercise himself who would be wise and good.⁴⁵³ The first concerns the desires and the aversions, that a man may not fail to get what he desires, and that he may not fall into that which he does not desire.⁴⁵⁴ The second concerns the movements (towards an object) and the movements from an object, and generally in doing what a man ought to do, that he may act according to order, to reason, and not carelessly. The third thing concerns freedom from deception and rashness in judgment, and generally it concerns the assents (συγκαταθέσεις). Of these topics the chief and the most urgent is that which relates to the affects (τὰ πάθη, perturbations); for an affect is produced in no other way than by a failing to obtain that which a man desires or falling into that which a man would wish to avoid. This is that which brings in perturbations, disorders, bad fortune, misfortunes, sorrows, lamentations, and envy; that which makes men envious and jealous; and by these causes we are unable even to listen to the precepts of reason. The second topic concerns the duties of a man; for I ought not to be free from affects (ἀπαθῆ) like a statue, but I ought to maintain the relations (σχέσεις) natural and acquired, as a pious man, as a son, as a father, as a citizen.⁴⁵²

Anyone who wants to be wise and good should practice in three areas (topics, τόποι).⁴⁵³ The first concerns desires and aversions. A person should practice so that they do not fail to get what they desire or encounter what they wish to avoid.⁴⁵⁴ The second concerns movements toward and away from an object, and generally doing what one ought to do. A person should act in an orderly and reasonable way, not carelessly. The third concerns freedom from deception and hasty judgment, and generally concerns the giving of assent (συγκαταθέσεις). Of these topics, the most important and urgent concerns the passions (τὰ πάθη, disturbances). A passion arises only when a person fails to get what they desire or encounters what they wish to avoid. This brings disturbances, disorder, bad fortune, misfortunes, sorrow, lamentation, and envy. It makes people envious and jealous. Because of these things, we cannot even listen to the guidance of reason. The second topic concerns a person's duties. I should not be free from passions (ἀπαθῆ) like a statue. Rather, I should maintain my natural and acquired relationships (σχέσεις), as a pious person, a son, a father, and a citizen.⁴⁵²

The third topic is that which immediately concerns those who are making proficiency, that which concerns the security of the other two, so that not even in sleep any appearance unexamined may surprise us, nor in intoxication, nor in melancholy. This, it may be said, is above our power. But the present philosophers neglecting the first topic and the second (the affects and duties), employ themselves on the third, using sophistical arguments (μεταπίπτοντας), making conclusions from questioning, employing hypotheses, lying. For a man must, as it is said, when employed on these matters, take care that he is not deceived. Who must? The wise and good man. This then is all that is wanting to you. Have you successfully worked out the rest? Are you free from deception in the matter of money? If you see a beautiful girl, do you resist the appearance? If your neighbour obtains an estate by will, are you not vexed? Now is there nothing else wanting to you except unchangeable firmness of mind (ἀμεταπτωσία)? Wretch, you hear these very things with fear and anxiety that some person may despise you, and with inquiries about what any person may say about you. And if a man come and tell you that in a certain conversation in which the question was, Who is the best philosopher, a man who was present said that a certain person was the chief philosopher, your little soul which was only a finger's length stretches out to two cubits. But if another who is present says, You are mistaken; it is not worth while to listen to a certain person, for what does he know? he has only the first principles, and no more? then you are confounded, you grow pale, you cry out immediately, I will show him who I am, that I am a great philosopher.—It is seen by these very things: why do you wish to show it by others? Do you not know that Diogenes pointed out one of the sophists in this way by stretching out his middle finger?⁴⁵⁵ And then when the man was wild with rage, This, he said, is the certain person: I have pointed him out to you. For a man is not shown by the finger, as a stone or a piece of wood; but when any person shows the man's principles, then he shows him as a man.

The third topic directly concerns those who are making progress. It concerns the security of the other two, so that no impression catches us unprepared, even in sleep, drunkenness, or melancholy. One might say that this is beyond our power. But today’s philosophers neglect the first and second topics, the emotions and duties, and occupy themselves with the third. They use sophistical arguments (μεταπίπτοντας), draw conclusions from questions, and deal in hypotheses and lies. For, as they say, anyone engaged in these matters must take care not to be deceived. Who must? The wise and good man. So is this all you still lack? Have you succeeded with everything else? Are you free from deception when it comes to money? If you see a beautiful girl, do you resist the impression she makes? If your neighbor inherits an estate, are you not upset? Is there nothing else you lack except unwavering firmness of mind (ἀμεταπτωσία)? You wretch, even as you hear these words, you are afraid and anxious that someone may despise you. You wonder what people may say about you. Suppose someone tells you about a conversation where people asked who the best philosopher was. One person there said that a certain man was the greatest philosopher. Your little soul, which was only a finger’s length, stretches to two cubits. But suppose someone else there says, “You are mistaken. That man is not worth listening to. What does he know? He knows only the first principles, and nothing more.” Then you are shaken, you turn pale, and you immediately cry out, “I will show him who I am. I am a great philosopher.” These very reactions show who you are. Why do you want to show it in other ways? Do you not know how Diogenes pointed out one of the sophists? He stretched out his middle finger.⁴⁵⁵ When the man flew into a rage, Diogenes said, “This is the man. I have pointed him out to you.” For you cannot show what a man is by pointing at him, as you might point at a stone or a piece of wood. But when you show his principles, you show what kind of man he is.

Let us look at your principles also. For is it not plain that you value not at all your own will (προαίρεσις), but you look externally to things which are independent of your will? For instance, what will a certain person say? and what will people think of you? will you be considered a man of learning; have you read Chrysippus or Antipater? for if you have read Archedemus⁴⁵⁶ also, you have every thing [that you can desire]. Why are you still uneasy lest you should not show us who you are? Would you let me tell you what manner of man you have shown us that you are? You have exhibited yourself to us as a mean fellow, querulous, passionate, cowardly, finding fault with every thing, blaming every body, never quiet, vain: this is what you have exhibited to us. Go away now and read Archedemus; then if a mouse should leap down and make a noise, you are a dead man. For such a death awaits you as it did⁴⁵⁷—what was the man's name?—Crinis; and he too was proud, because he understood Archedemus.

Let us look at your principles too. Isn’t it clear that you place no value on your own will (προαίρεσις)? Instead, you look to external things that are beyond your will. For example, what will a certain person say? What will people think of you? Will they think you are learned? Have you read Chrysippus or Antipater? If you have read Archedemus⁴⁵⁶ too, you have everything you could desire. Why are you still worried that you won’t show us who you are? Will you let me tell you what kind of man you have shown us? You have shown yourself to be petty, complaining, bad-tempered, cowardly, critical of everything, and ready to blame everyone. You are never at peace, and you are vain. That is what you have shown us. Go away now and read Archedemus. Then, if a mouse jumps down and makes a noise, you are a dead man. For such a death awaits you, just as it did⁴⁵⁷ someone else. What was the man’s name? Crinis. He too was proud because he understood Archedemus.

Wretch, will you not dismiss these things that do not concern you at all? These things are suitable to those who are able to learn them without perturbation, to those who can say: "I am not subject to anger, to grief, to envy: I am not hindered, I am not restrained. What remains for me? I have leisure, I am tranquil: let us see how we must deal with sophistical arguments;⁴⁵⁸ let us see how when a man has accepted an hypothesis he shall not be led away to any thing absurd." To them such things belong. To those who are happy it is appropriate to light a fire, to dine; if they choose, both to sing and to dance. But when the vessel is sinking, you come to me and hoist the sails.⁴⁵⁹

You wretch, won’t you leave these things alone? They don’t concern you at all. They are for people who can study them without being disturbed, people who can say: "I am not subject to anger, grief, or envy. I am not hindered or held back. What remains for me? I have leisure and peace of mind. Let us see how to deal with sophistical arguments.⁴⁵⁸ Let us see how someone who has accepted a premise can avoid being led to an absurd conclusion." Such things are for them. Happy people can light a fire and dine. If they choose, they can sing and dance too. But when the ship is sinking, you come to me and raise the sails.⁴⁵⁹