Against the Epicureans and Academics

The propositions which are true and evident are of necessity used even by those who contradict them: and a man might perhaps consider it to be the greatest proof of a thing being evident that it is found to be necessary even for him who denies it to make use of it at the same time. For instance, if a man should deny that there is anything universally true, it is plain that he must make the contradictory negation, that nothing is universally true. What, wretch, do you not admit even this? For what else is this than to affirm that whatever is universally affirmed is false? Again if a man should come forward and say: Know that there is nothing that can be known,³⁸⁹ but all things are incapable of sure evidence; or if another say, Believe me and you will be the better for it, that a man ought not to believe any thing; or again, if another should say, Learn from me, man, that it is not possible to learn any thing; I tell you this and will teach you, if you choose. Now in what respect do these differ from those? Whom shall I name? Those who call themselves Academics? 'Men, agree [with us] that no man agrees [with another]: believe us that no man believes anybody.'

Even people who deny true and obvious claims must use them. Perhaps the strongest proof that a claim is obvious is that even someone who denies it must use it. For example, suppose someone denies that anything is universally true. Clearly, he must assert the opposite: that nothing is universally true. What, you fool, won't you even admit this? For isn't this just an assertion that every universal claim is false? Or suppose someone comes forward and says: Know that nothing can be known,³⁸⁹ and that nothing can be established with certainty. Or another says: Believe me, and you will be better off for it, that a person should not believe anything. Or yet another says: Learn from me, man, that it is impossible to learn anything. I tell you this and will teach you, if you choose. Now how do these people differ from the others? Whom shall I name? Those who call themselves Academics? 'People, agree [with us] that no one agrees [with anyone else]. Believe us that no one believes anyone.'

Thus Epicurus³⁹⁰ also, when he designs to destroy the natural fellowship of mankind, at the same time makes use of that which he destroys. For what does he say? 'Be not deceived, men, nor be led astray, nor be mistaken: there is no natural fellowship among rational animals; believe me. But those who say otherwise, deceive you and seduce you by false reasons.'—What is this to you? Permit us to be deceived. Will you fare worse, if all the rest of us are persuaded that there is a natural fellowship among us, and that it ought by all means to be preserved? Nay, it will be much better and safer for you. Man, why do you trouble yourself about us? Why do you keep awake for us? Why do you light your lamp? Why do you rise early? Why do you write so many books, that no one of us may be deceived about the gods and believe that they take care of men; or that no one may suppose the nature of good to be other than pleasure? For if this is so, lie down and sleep, and lead the life of a worm, of which you judged yourself worthy eat and drink, and enjoy women, and ease yourself, and snore.³⁹¹ And what is it to you, how the rest shall think about these things, whether right or wrong? For what have we to do with you? You take care of sheep because they supply us with wool and milk, and last of all with their flesh. Would it not be a desirable thing if men could be lulled and enchanted by the Stoics, and sleep and present themselves to you and to those like you to be shorn and milked? For this you ought to say to your brother Epicureans: but ought you not to conceal it from others, and particularly before every thing to persuade them, that we are by nature adapted for fellowship, that temperance is a good thing; in order that all things may be secured for you?³⁹² Or ought we to maintain this fellowship with some and not with others? With whom then ought we to maintain it? With such as on their part also maintain it, or with such as violate this fellowship? And who violate it more than you who establish such doctrines?

Epicurus³⁹⁰ also tries to destroy the natural fellowship of mankind. Yet in doing so, he makes use of the very fellowship he denies. What does he say? 'Do not be deceived, men. Do not be led astray or mistaken. There is no natural fellowship among rational beings, believe me. Those who say otherwise deceive you and lead you astray with false arguments.' What is that to you? Let us be deceived. Will you be worse off if the rest of us believe in natural fellowship? What if we believe we must preserve it by every means? No, you will be much better off and safer. Man, why do you concern yourself with us? Why do you stay awake for us? Why do you light your lamp? Why do you get up early? Why do you write so many books? Is it so that none of us will be deceived about the gods and believe they care for men? Is it so that none of us will think that good is anything other than pleasure? If that is so, lie down and sleep. Live the life of a worm, the life you thought yourself worthy of. Eat and drink, enjoy women, relieve yourself, and snore.³⁹¹ What does it matter to you whether the rest of us think rightly or wrongly about these things? What do we have to do with you? You take care of sheep because they supply us with wool and milk, and finally with their flesh. Wouldn't it be desirable if the Stoics could lull men to sleep and enchant them? They could then present themselves to you and people like you to be shorn and milked. You ought to say this to your fellow Epicureans. But shouldn't you hide it from everyone else? Above all, shouldn't you persuade them that we are naturally suited to fellowship, and that self-control is good? Then everything would be secure for you.³⁹² Or should we maintain this fellowship with some people and not others? With whom, then, should we maintain it? With those who also maintain it, or with those who violate it? And who violates fellowship more than you, who put forward such teachings?

What then was it that waked Epicurus from his sleepiness, and compelled him to write what he did write? What else was it than that which is the strongest thing in men, nature, which draws a man to her own will though he be unwilling and' complaining? For since, she says, you think that there is no community among mankind, write this opinion and leave it for others, and break your sleep to do this, and by your own practice condemn your own opinions. Shall we then say that Orestes was agitated by the Erinyes (Furies) and roused from his deep sleep, and did not more savage Erinyes and Pains rouse Epicurus from his sleep and not allow him to rest, but compelled him to make known his own evils, as madness and wine did the Galli (the priests of Cybele)? So strong and invincible is man's nature, For how can a vine be moved not in the manner of a vine, but in the manner of an olive tree? or on the other hand how can an olive tree be moved not in the manner of an olive tree, but in the manner of a vine? It is impossible: it cannot be conceived. Neither then is it possible for a man completely to lose the movements (affects) of a man; and even those who are deprived of their genital members are not able to deprive themselves of man's desires.³⁹³ Thus Epicurus also mutilated all the offices of a man, and of a father of a family, and of a citizen and of a friend, but he did not mutilate human desires, for he could not; not more than the lazy Academics can cast away or blind their own senses, though they have tried with all their might to do it. What a shame is this? when a man has received from nature measures and rules for the knowing of truth, and does not strive to add to these measures and rules and to improve³⁹⁴ them, but just the contrary, endeavours to take away and destroy whatever enables us to discern the truth?

What woke Epicurus from his drowsiness and compelled him to write what he wrote? What else but nature, the strongest force in human beings? Nature draws a person to do her will, even if he resists and complains. For nature says: Since you think there is no community among human beings, write down this opinion and leave it for others. Give up your sleep to do it, and by your own actions condemn your own beliefs. Shall we say that the Erinyes (Furies) tormented Orestes and roused him from deep sleep? Did not even more savage Erinyes and Pains rouse Epicurus and keep him from resting? They compelled him to reveal his own evils, just as madness and wine did the Galli (the priests of Cybele). Human nature is so strong and impossible to overcome. How can a vine behave not like a vine, but like an olive tree? Or how can an olive tree behave not like an olive tree, but like a vine? It is impossible. We cannot even imagine it. Likewise, a person cannot completely lose human impulses. Even those deprived of their genitals cannot rid themselves of human desires.³⁹³ So Epicurus also cut away all the duties of a human being, a father, a citizen, and a friend. But he did not cut away human desires, for he could not. Nor can the lazy Academics throw away or blind their own senses, though they have tried with all their might. What a shame! A person receives from nature standards and rules for knowing the truth. Yet, instead of striving to add to and improve³⁹⁴ them, he does just the opposite. He tries to remove and destroy whatever enables us to discern the truth.

What say you philosopher? piety and sanctity, what do you think that they are? If you like, I will demonstrate that they are good things. Well, demonstrate it, that our citizens may be turned and honour the deity and may no longer be negligent about things of the highest value. Have you then the demonstrations?—I have, and I am thankful.—Since then you are well pleased with them, hear the contrary: That there are no Gods, and, if there are, they take no care of men, nor is there any fellowship between us and them; and that this piety and sanctity which is talked of among most men is the lying of boasters and sophists, or certainly of legislators for the purpose of terrifying and checking wrong doers.³⁹⁵—Well done, philosopher, you have done something for our citizens, you have brought back all the young men to contempt of things divine.—What then, does not this satisfy you? Learn now, that justice is nothing, that modesty is folly, that a father is nothing, a son nothing.—Well done, philosopher, persist, persuade the young men, that we may have more with the same opinions as you and who say the same as you. From such principles as these have grown our well constituted states; by these was Sparta founded: Lycurgus fixed these opinions in the Spartans by his laws and education, that neither is the servile condition more base than honourable, nor the condition of free men more honourable than base, and that those who died at Thermopylae³⁹⁶ died from these opinions; and through what other opinions did the Athenians leave their city?³⁹⁷ Then those who talk thus, marry and beget children, and employ themselves in public affairs and make themselves priests and interpreters. Of whom? of gods who do not exist: and they consult the Pythian priestess that they may hear lies, and they report the oracles to others. Monstrous impudence and imposture.

What do you say, philosopher? What do you think piety and sanctity are? If you like, I will prove that they are good things. Well, prove it, so that our citizens may change their ways and honor the deity. Then they may no longer neglect things of the highest value. Do you have the proofs? I do, and I am thankful for them. Since you are pleased with them, now hear the opposite: There are no Gods. If there are, they take no care of humans, and there is no fellowship between us and them. And the piety and sanctity most people talk about are lies told by boasters and sophists. Or at any rate, they are lies told by legislators to frighten and restrain wrongdoers.³⁹⁵ Well done, philosopher. You have done something for our citizens. You have brought all the young men back to contempt for divine things. What, does that not satisfy you? Now learn that justice is nothing, that modesty is foolishness, that a father is nothing, and a son nothing. Well done, philosopher. Keep going and persuade the young men, so that more of us will share your opinions and say what you say. Our well-governed states grew from principles like these. Sparta was founded on them. Through his laws and education, Lycurgus instilled these opinions in the Spartans: that being in servitude is no more shameful than honorable, and being free is no more honorable than shameful. And those who died at Thermopylae³⁹⁶ died because of these opinions. What other opinions led the Athenians to leave their city?³⁹⁷ Yet those who talk this way marry and have children. They take part in public affairs and become priests and interpreters. Of whom? Of gods who do not exist. They consult the Pythian priestess so that they may hear lies, and they report the oracles to others. What monstrous impudence and fraud.

Man what are you doing?³⁹⁸ are you refuting yourself every day; and will you not give up these frigid attempts? When you eat, where do you carry your hand to? to your mouth or to your eye? when you wash yourself, what do you go into? do you ever call a pot a dish, or a ladle a spit? If I were a slave of any of these men, even if I must be flayed by him daily, I would rack him. If he said, 'Boy, throw some olive oil into the bath,' I would take pickle sauce and pour it down on his head. What is this? he would say—An appearance was presented to me, I swear by your genius, which could not be distinguished from oil and was exactly like it—Here give me the barley-drink (tisane), he says—I would fill and carry him a dish of sharp sauce—Did I not ask for the barley drink? Yes, master: this is the barley drink? Take it and smell; take it and taste. How do you know then if our senses deceive us?—If I had three or four fellow-slaves of the same opinion, I should force him to hang himself through passion or to change his mind. But now they mock us by using all the things which nature gives, and in words destroying them.

Man, what are you doing?³⁹⁸ You contradict yourself every day. Won't you give up these stale arguments? When you eat, where do you put your hand? In your mouth or in your eye? When you wash yourself, what do you get into? Do you ever call a pot a dish, or a ladle a spit? If I were a slave of one of these men, I would torment him, even if he whipped me daily. Suppose he said, 'Boy, pour some olive oil into the bath.' I would take pickle sauce and pour it over his head. “What is this?” he would say. “I swear by your guardian spirit, it looked exactly like oil. I couldn't tell the difference.” “Here, give me the barley drink,” he says. I would fill a dish with sharp sauce and bring it to him. “Didn't I ask for the barley drink?” “Yes, master. This is the barley drink. Take it and smell it. Take it and taste it. How can you tell, if our senses deceive us?” If three or four of my fellow slaves shared my view, I could force him to hang himself in anger or change his mind. But as things stand, these men mock us. They use everything nature gives them, while denying it all in words.

Grateful indeed are men and modest, who, if they do nothing else, are daily eating bread and yet are shameless enough to say, we do not know if there is a Demeter or her daughter Persephone or a Pluto;³⁹⁹ not to mention that they are enjoying the night and the day, the seasons of the year, and the stars, and the sea and the land and the co-operation of mankind, and yet they are not moved in any degree by these things to turn their attention to them; but they only seek to belch out their little problem (matter for discussion), and when they have exercised their stomach to go off to the bath. But what they shall say, and about what things or to what persons, and what their hearers shall learn from this talk, they care not even in the least degree, nor do they care if any generous youth after hearing such talk should suffer any harm from it, nor after he has suffered harm should lose all the seeds of his generous nature; nor if we⁴⁰⁰ should give an adulterer help towards being shameless in his acts; nor if a public peculator should lay hold of some cunning excuse from these doctrines; nor if another who neglects his parents should be confirmed in his audacity by this teaching.—What then in your opinion is good or bad? This or that?—Why then should a man say any more in reply to such persons as these, or give them any reason or listen to any reason from them, or try to convince them? By Zeus one might much sooner expect to make catamites change their mind than those who are become so deaf and blind to their own evils.⁴⁰¹

How grateful and modest these men are! If they do nothing else, they eat bread every day. Yet they are shameless enough to say, “We do not know if there is a Demeter or her daughter Persephone or a Pluto.”³⁹⁹ And that is not all. They enjoy night and day, the seasons, the stars, the sea and the land, and the cooperation of other people. Yet none of this moves them in the least to pay attention to these things. They only want to belch out their little problem for discussion. Then, having exercised their stomachs, they go off to the bath. They do not care in the least what they say, what they talk about, or whom they address. Nor do they care what their listeners learn from their talk. They do not care if a generous young man is harmed by it and loses all the seeds of his generous nature. Nor do they care if we⁴⁰⁰ help an adulterer become shameless in his actions. Nor do they care if someone who steals public funds finds a cunning excuse in these doctrines. Nor do they care if this teaching makes someone else bolder in neglecting his parents. “What, then, do you think is good or bad? This or that?” Why say anything more in reply to such people? Why give them reasons, listen to their reasons, or try to convince them? By Zeus, one might sooner expect to change the minds of catamites than of people who have become so deaf and blind to their own faults.⁴⁰¹

Stranger, go tell the Spartans, Here we lie Obedient to those who bade us die.

Stranger, go tell the Spartans: Here we lie, having obeyed those who ordered us to die.