How to Apply Preconceptions to Specific Cases

What is the first business of him who philosophizes? To throw away self-conceit (οἴησις).³⁵³ For it is impossible for a man to begin to learn that which he thinks that he knows. As to things then which ought to be done and ought not to be done, and good and bad, and beautiful and ugly, all of us talking of them at random go to the philosophers; and on these matters we praise, we censure, we accuse, we blame, we judge and determine about principles honourable and dishonourable. But why do we go to the philosophers? Because we wish to learn what we do not think that we know. And what is this? Theorems.³⁵⁴ For we wish to learn what philosophers say as being something elegant and acute; and some wish to learn that they may get profit from what they learn. It is ridiculous then to think that a person wishes to learn one thing, and will learn another; or further, that a man will make proficiency in that which he does not learn. But the many are deceived by this which deceived also the rhetorician Theopompus,³⁵⁵ when he blames even Plato for wishing everything to be defined. For what does he say? Did none of us before you use the words Good or Just, or do we utter the sounds in an unmeaning and empty way without understanding what they severally signify? Now who tells you, Theopompus, that we had not natural notions of each of these things and preconceptions (προλήψεις)? But it is not possible to adapt preconceptions to their correspondent objects if we have not distinguished (analyzed) them, and inquired what object must be subjected to each preconception. You may make the same charge against physicians also. For who among us did not use the words healthy and unhealthy before Hippocrates lived, or did we utter these words as empty sounds? For we have also a certain preconception of health,³⁵⁶ but we are not able to adapt it. For this reason one says, abstain from food; another says, give food; another says, bleed; and another says, use cupping. What is the reason? is it any other than that a man cannot properly adapt the preconception of health to particulars?

What is the first task of anyone who studies philosophy? To give up self-conceit (οἴησις).³⁵³ For no one can begin to learn what they think they already know. We all go to philosophers talking carelessly about what we should and should not do, good and bad, beauty and ugliness. On these matters, we praise, criticize, accuse, blame, judge, and decide what principles are honorable or dishonorable. But why do we go to philosophers? Because we want to learn what we do not think we know. And what is that? Theorems.³⁵⁴ We want to learn what philosophers say because their ideas are elegant and clever. Some also want to profit from what they learn. It is ridiculous, then, to think that someone who wants to learn one thing will learn another. It is also ridiculous to think that anyone will make progress in something they do not study. But many people are misled by the same mistake that misled the rhetorician Theopompus.³⁵⁵ He even criticizes Plato for wanting everything defined. What does he say? Did none of us use the words Good or Just before Plato? Did we utter empty, meaningless sounds, without understanding what each word meant? But who tells you, Theopompus, that we had no natural notions and preconceptions (προλήψεις) of these things? We cannot apply these preconceptions to the things they correspond to unless we first distinguish and analyze them. We must also ask what things belong under each preconception. You could make the same accusation against physicians. Who among us did not use the words healthy and unhealthy before Hippocrates lived? Did we utter these words as empty sounds? We have a certain preconception of health,³⁵⁶ but we cannot apply it. For this reason, one person says to abstain from food, while another says to give food. One says to bleed the patient, while another says to use cupping. Why is this? Is it not because a person cannot properly apply the preconception of health to particular cases?

So it is in this matter also, in the things which concern life. Who among us does not speak of good and bad, of useful and not useful; for who among us has not a preconception of each of these things? Is it then a distinct and perfect preconception? Show this. How shall I show this? Adapt the preconception properly to the particular things. Plato, for instance, subjects definitions to the preconception of the useful, but you to the preconception of the useless. Is it possible then that both of you are right? How is it possible? Does not one man adapt the preconception of good to the matter of wealth, and another not to wealth, but to the matter of pleasure and to that of health? For, generally, if all of us who use those words know sufficiently each of them, and need no diligence in resolving (making distinct) the notions of the preconceptions, why do we differ, why do we quarrel, why do we blame one another?

The same is true of matters concerning life. Who among us does not speak of good and bad, of what is useful and what is not? Who does not have a preconception of each of these things? But is that preconception clear and complete? Show that it is. How can I show it? Apply the preconception properly to particular things. Plato, for example, applies the preconception of what is useful to definitions. But you apply the preconception of what is useless to them. Can you both be right? How could you be? Does not one person apply the preconception of good to wealth, while another applies it to pleasure and health instead? If all of us who use these words understand each of them well enough, why do we disagree? If we need not work to clarify our preconceptions, why do we quarrel and blame one another?

And why do I now allege this contention with one another and speak of it? If you yourself properly adapt your preconceptions, why are you unhappy, why are you hindered? Let us omit at present the second topic about the pursuits (ὅρμας) and the study of the duties which relate to them. Let us omit also the third topic, which relates to the assents (συγκαταθέσεις): I give up to you these two topics. Let us insist upon the first, which presents an almost obvious demonstration that we do not properly adapt the preconceptions.³⁵⁷ Do you now desire that which is possible and that which is possible to you? Why then are you hindered? why are you unhappy? Do you not now try to avoid the unavoidable? Why then do you fall in with any thing which you would avoid? Why are you unfortunate? Why, when you desire a thing, does it not happen, and, when you do not desire it, does it happen? For this is the greatest proof of unhappiness and misery: I wish for something, and it does not happen. And what is more wretched than I?³⁵⁸

Why do I bring up this conflict between people? If you apply your preconceptions correctly, why are you unhappy? Why are you hindered? For now, let us leave aside the second topic, concerning pursuits (ὅρμας) and the study of our duties in pursuing them. Let us also leave aside the third topic, concerning assent (συγκαταθέσεις). I will give you those two topics. Let us focus on the first. It shows almost self-evidently that we do not apply our preconceptions correctly.³⁵⁷ Do you desire what is possible, and what is possible for you? If so, why are you hindered? Why are you unhappy? Do you not try to avoid what cannot be avoided? Why, then, do you encounter anything you want to avoid? Why are you unfortunate? Why, when you desire something, does it not happen? And why, when you do not desire it, does it happen? This is the greatest proof of unhappiness and misery: I wish for something, and it does not happen. Who could be more wretched than I?³⁵⁸

It was because she could not endure this that Medea came to murder her children: an act of a noble spirit in this view at least, for she had a just opinion what it is for a thing not to succeed which a person wishes. Then she says, 'Thus I shall be avenged on him (my husband) who has wronged and insulted me; and what shall I gain if he is punished thus? how then shall it be done? I shall kill my children, but I shall punish myself also: and what do I care?'³⁵⁹ This is the aberration of soul which possesses great energy. For she did not know wherein lies the doing of that which we wish; that you cannot get this from without, nor yet by the alteration and new adaptation of things. Do not desire the man (Jason, Medea's husband), and nothing which you desire will fail to happen: do not obstinately desire that he shall live with you: do not desire to remain in Corinth; and in a word desire nothing than that which God wills.—And who shall hinder you? who shall compel you? No man shall compel you any more than he shall compel Zeus.

Because Medea could not bear this, she murdered her children. In one respect, at least, this was the act of a noble spirit. She understood what it means when a person’s wishes are frustrated. Then she says, 'This way I shall take revenge on my husband, who has wronged and insulted me. But what shall I gain if he is punished this way? How shall I do it, then? I shall kill my children, but I shall punish myself too. What do I care?'³⁵⁹ This is a soul gone astray, but with great energy. For Medea did not know what it takes to achieve what we wish. You cannot achieve it through outside things, or by changing and rearranging them. Do not desire the man (Jason, Medea's husband), and none of your desires will be frustrated. Do not insist on wanting him to live with you. Do not desire to stay in Corinth. In short, desire nothing except what God wills. And who can stop you? Who can force you? No one can force you, any more than anyone can force Zeus.

When you have such a guide³⁶⁰ and your wishes and desires are the same as his, why do you still fear disappointment? Give up your desire to wealth and your aversion to poverty, and you will be disappointed in the one, you will fall into the other. Well give them up to health, and you will be unfortunate give them up to magistracies, honours, country, friends, children, in a word to any of the things which are not in man's power (and you will be unfortunate). But give them up to Zeus and to the rest of the gods; surrender them to the gods, let the gods govern, let your desire and aversion be ranged on the side of the gods, and wherein will you be any longer unhappy?³⁶¹ But if, lazy wretch, you envy, and complain, and are jealous, and fear, and never cease for a single day complaining both of yourself and of the gods, why do you still speak of being educated? What kind of an education, man? Do you mean that you have been employed about sophistical syllogisms (συλλογισμοὺς μεταπίπτοντας)?³⁶² Will you not, if it is possible, unlearn all these things and begin from the beginning, and see at the same time that hitherto you have not even touched the matter; and then commencing from this foundation, will you not build up all that comes after, so that nothing may happen which you do not choose, and nothing shall fail to happen which you do choose? Give me one young man who has come to the school with this intention, who is become a champion for this matter and says, 'I give up every thing else, and it is enough for me if it shall ever be in my power to pass my life free from hindrance and free from trouble, and to stretch out (present) my neck to all things like a free man, and to look up to heaven as a friend of God and fear nothing that can happen.' Let any of you point out such a man that I may say, 'Come, young man, into the possession of that which is your own, for it is your destiny to adorn philosophy: yours are these possessions, yours these books, yours these discourses.' Then when he shall have laboured sufficiently and exercised himself in this part of the matter (τόπον), let him come to me again and say, 'I desire to be free from passion and free from perturbation; and I wish as a pious man and a philosopher and a diligent person to know what is my duty to the gods, what to my parents, what to my brothers, what to my country, what to strangers.' (I say) 'Come also to the second matter (τόπον): this also is yours.'—'But I have now sufficiently studied the second part (τόπον) also, and I would gladly be secure and unshaken, and not only when I am awake, but also when I am asleep, and when I am filled with wine, and when I am melancholy.' Man, you are a god, you have great designs.

When you have such a guide³⁶⁰ and your wishes and desires are the same as his, why do you still fear disappointment? Give yourself over to desiring wealth and avoiding poverty, and you will fail to gain wealth and fall into poverty. Give yourself over to desiring health and avoiding illness, and you will be unhappy. Give yourself over to public office, honors, country, friends, children, or anything outside a person's control, and you will be unhappy. But give your desires and aversions over to Zeus and the other gods. Surrender them to the gods, and let the gods govern. Let your desires and aversions be on the side of the gods. Then how could you still be unhappy?³⁶¹ But suppose, you lazy wretch, that you envy, complain, feel jealous, and fear. Suppose you never stop complaining about yourself and the gods for a single day. Why, then, do you still speak of being educated? What kind of education do you mean? Do you mean that you have spent your time on sophistical syllogisms (συλλογισμοὺς μεταπίπτοντας)?³⁶² If possible, won't you unlearn all this and begin again? Won't you see that until now you haven't even touched the subject? Then, starting from this foundation, won't you build everything else? In this way, nothing will happen that you do not choose, and nothing you do choose will fail to happen. Show me one young man who has come to the school with this intention. Show me one who has become a champion of this aim and says, 'I give up everything else. It is enough for me if I can one day live free from obstacles and trouble. I want to offer my neck to everything like a free man, look up to heaven as a friend of God, and fear nothing that can happen.' Let any of you point out such a man, so that I may say, 'Come, young man, and take possession of what is yours. It is your destiny to bring honor to philosophy. These possessions, these books, and these discourses are yours.' Then, when he has worked and trained enough in this area (τόπον), let him come to me again. Let him say, 'I want to be free from passion and disturbance. As a devout man, a philosopher, and a diligent person, I want to know my duty to the gods and to my parents. I also want to know my duty to my brothers, my country, and strangers.' I say, 'Come to the second area (τόπον) as well. This too is yours.' Then he says, 'But I have now studied the second area (τόπον) enough too. I would be glad to be secure and unshaken, not only when I am awake, but also when I am asleep, drunk, or melancholy.' Man, you are a god. You have great ambitions.

No: but I wish to understand what Chrysippus says in his treatise of the Pseudomenos³⁶³ (the Liar).—Will you not hang yourself, wretch, with such your intention? And what good will it do you? You will read the whole with sorrow, and you will speak to others trembling. Thus you also do. "Do you wish me,³⁶⁴ brother, to read to you, and you to me"?—You write excellently, my man; and you also excellently in the style of Xenophon, and you in the style of Plato, and you in the style of Antisthenes. Then having told your dreams to one another you return to the same things: your desires are the same, your aversions the same, your pursuits are the same, and your designs and purposes, you wish for the same things and work for the same. In the next place you do not even seek for one to give you advice, but you are vexed if you hear such things (as I say). Then you say, "An ill-natured old fellow: when I was going away, he did not weep nor did he say, Into what danger you are going: if you come off safe, my child, I will burn lights.³⁶⁵ This is what a good natured man would do." It will be a great thing for you if you do return safe, and it will be worth while to burn lights for such a person: for you ought to be immortal and exempt from disease.

No, but I want to understand what Chrysippus says in his treatise on the Pseudomenos³⁶³ (the Liar). Won't you hang yourself, wretch, with an aim like that? What good will it do you? You will read the whole thing unhappily, and you will speak to others trembling. This is what you do too. "Brother, do you want me³⁶⁴ to read to you, and you to read to me?" You write excellently, my friend. And you write excellently in the style of Xenophon, and you in the style of Plato, and you in the style of Antisthenes. Then, after telling one another your dreams, you return to the same things. Your desires, aversions, pursuits, plans, and purposes are the same. You want the same things and work for the same things. And then you do not even look for someone to advise you. Instead, you are annoyed when you hear things like what I say. Then you say, "What an ill-natured old fellow. When I was leaving, he did not weep or say, You are going into such danger. If you return safely, my child, I will burn lights.³⁶⁵ That is what a good-natured man would do." It will be a great thing if you do return safely. It will be worth burning lights for such a person. After all, you ought to be immortal and free from disease.

Casting away then, as I say, this conceit of thinking that we know something useful, we must come to philosophy as we apply to geometry, and to music: but if we do not, we shall not even approach to proficiency though we read all the collections³⁶⁶ and commentaries of Chrysippus and those of Antipater and Archedemus.³⁶⁷

So, as I say, we must give up the idea that we know something useful. We must approach philosophy as we approach geometry and music. Otherwise, we will not even come close to proficiency, though we read all the collections³⁶⁶ and commentaries of Chrysippus, Antipater, and Archedemus.³⁶⁷

ut alter Alterius sermone meros audiret honores— Discedo Alcaeus puncto illius? ille meo quis? Quis nisi Callimachus?

So that each hears nothing but praise from the other. Do I come away as Alcaeus by his vote? Who is he by mine? Who but Callimachus?