Book 2, Chapter 6

Indifference.[261]

5 min

The hypothetical proposition is indifferent: the judgment about it is not indifferent, but it is either knowledge or opinion or error. Thus life is indifferent: the use is not indifferent. When any man then tells you that these things also are indifferent, do not become negligent; and when a man invites you to be careful (about such things), do not become abject and struck with admiration of material things. And it is good for you to know your own preparation and power, that in those matters where you have not been prepared, you may keep quiet, and not be vexed, if others have the advantage over you. For you too in syllogisms will claim to have the advantage over them; and if others should be vexed at this, you will console them by saying, 'I have learned them, and you have not.' Thus also where there is need of any practice, seek not that which is acquired from the need (of such practice), but yield in that matter to those who have had practice, and be yourself content with firmness of mind.

A hypothetical proposition is indifferent. But your judgment about it is not indifferent. That judgment is either knowledge, opinion, or error. In the same way, life is indifferent, but how you use it is not. So when someone tells you that these things are indifferent too, do not become careless. And when someone urges you to take care with them, do not become servile or awestruck by material things. It is good to know your own training and ability. Then, where you lack training, you can keep quiet and not be upset if others have the advantage over you. After all, you will claim to have the advantage over them in syllogisms. If they are upset by this, you will console them by saying, 'I have learned them, and you have not.' In the same way, when something requires practice, do not seek what practice would give you. Yield instead to those who have practiced, and be content with your own firmness of mind.

The conditional, p. 93.

This discussion is with a young philosopher who planned to return from Nicopolis to Rome. He feared the tyranny of Domitian, who was particularly harsh toward philosophers. See also the note on i. 24. 3. Schweig. Compare Plin. Epp. i. 12, and Corellius Rufus's description of the detestable villain, the emperor Domitian. The title 'of Indifference' means 'of the indifference of things;' that is, things that are neither good nor bad.

Go and salute a certain person. How? Not meanly.—But I have been shut out, for I have not learned to make my way through the window; and when I have found the door shut, I must either come back or enter through the window.—But still speak to him.—In what way? Not meanly. But suppose that you have not got what you wanted. Was this your business, and not his? Why then do you claim that which belongs to another? Always remember what is your own, and what belongs to another; and you will not be disturbed. Chrysippus therefore said well, So long as future things are uncertain, I always cling to. those which are more adapted to the conservation of that which is according to nature; for God himself has given me the faculty of such choice. But if I knew that it was fated (in the order of things) for me to be sick, I would even move towards it; for the foot also, if it had intelligence, would move to go into the mud. For why are ears of corn produced? Is it not that they may become dry? And do they not become dry that they may be reaped? for they are not separated from communion with other things. If then they had perception, ought they to wish never to be reaped? But this is a curse upon ears of corn, to be never reaped. So we must know that in the case of men too it is a curse not to die, just the same as not to be ripened and not to be reaped. But since we must be reaped, and we also know that we are reaped, we are vexed at it; for we neither know what we are nor have we studied what belongs to man, as those who have studied horses know what belongs to horses. But Chrysantas when he was going to strike the enemy checked himself when he heard the trumpet sounding a retreat: so it seemed better to him to obey the general's command than to follow his own inclination. But not one of us chooses, even when necessity summons, readily to obey it, but weeping and groaning we suffer what we do suffer, and we call them 'circumstances.' What kind of circumstances, man? If you give the name of circumstances to the things which are around you, all things are circumstances; but if you call hardships by this name, what hardship is there in the dying of that which has been produced? But that which destroys is either a sword, or a wheel, or the sea, or a tile, or a tyrant. Why do you care about the way of going down to Hades? All ways are equal. But if you will listen to the truth, the way which the tyrant sends you is shorter. A tyrant never killed a man in six months: but a fever is often a year about it. All these things are only sound and the noise of empty names.

Go and greet someone. How? Not in a servile way. But I have been shut out because I have not learned to get in through a window. When I find the door shut, I must either come back or enter through the window. But speak to him anyway. How? Not in a servile way. But suppose you did not get what you wanted. Was granting it your business, and not his? Why, then, do you claim what belongs to someone else? Always remember what is yours and what belongs to someone else, and you will not be disturbed. Chrysippus was right to say: As long as the future is uncertain, I always choose what best preserves what is according to nature. For God himself has given me the power to make such a choice. But if I knew I was fated to be sick, I would even move toward sickness. For a foot, if it had intelligence, would move to step into the mud. Why are ears of corn produced? Is it not so that they may dry? And do they not dry so that they may be harvested? For they are not separate from the rest of the world. If they could perceive, should they wish never to be harvested? But never to be harvested is a curse on ears of corn. So we must understand that, for human beings too, not dying is a curse. It is just like never ripening and never being harvested. But we must be harvested, and we know it, so we are troubled by it. For we do not know what we are. Nor have we studied what belongs to human beings, as those who have studied horses know what belongs to horses. Chrysantas was about to strike an enemy when he heard the trumpet sounding a retreat. He stopped himself, because he thought it better to obey the general's command than to follow his own wishes. But not one of us chooses to obey readily, even when necessity calls. Instead, we weep and groan as we suffer what we must, and we call these things 'circumstances.' What kind of circumstances, man? If you call the things around you circumstances, then all things are circumstances. But if you use the name for hardships, what hardship is there in something that has been born dying? The thing that destroys it may be a sword, a wheel, the sea, a tile, or a tyrant. Why do you care how you go down to Hades? All ways are equal. But if you will hear the truth, the way a tyrant sends you is shorter. A tyrant never killed a man in six months, but a fever often takes a year. All these things are only sounds and the noise of empty names.

Sec. ii. 5, 24.

Epictetus refers to verses from the Hypsipyle of Euripides. Compare Antoninus (vii. 40): 'Life must be reaped like the ripe ears of corn: one man is born; another dies.' Cicero (Tuscul. Disp. iii. 25) translated six verses from Euripides, including these two:

The story appears near the beginning of Xenophon's Cyropaedia (IV.). Cyrus says he called Chrysantas by name. As Upton notes, Epictetus quotes from memory.

So Anaxagoras said that the road to the other world (ad inferos) is the same from all places. (Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i. 43). What follows is one example of an extravagant claim by Epictetus. A tyrant may kill someone slowly, as a fever does. I suppose Epictetus would have some answer to that. Except to a Stoic, the ways of dying do matter. Some are painful, and even someone who can endure them with fortitude would prefer an easy death.

I am in danger of my life from Caesar. And am not I in danger who dwell in Nicopolis, where there are so many earthquakes: and when you are crossing the Hadriatic, what hazard do you run? Is it not the hazard of your life? But I am in danger also as to opinion. Do you mean your own? how? For who can compel you to have any opinion which you do not choose? But is it as to another man's opinion? and what kind of danger is yours, if others have false opinions? But I am in danger of being banished. What is it to be banished? To be somewhere else than at Rome? Yes: what then if I should be sent to Gyara? If that suits you, you will go there; but if it does not, you can go to another place instead of Gyara, whither he also will go, who sends you to Gyara, whether he choose or not. Why then do you go up to Rome as if it were something great? It is not worth all this preparation, that an ingenuous youth should say, It was not worth while to have heard so much and to have written so much and to have sat so long by the side of an old man who is not worth much. Only remember that division by which your own and not your own are distinguished: never claim any thing which belongs to others. A tribunal and a prison are each a place, one high and the other low; but the will can be maintained equal, if you choose to maintain it equal in each. And we shall then be imitators of Socrates, when we are able to write paeans in prison. But in our present disposition, consider if we could endure in prison another person saying to us, Would you like me to read Paeans to you?—Why do you trouble me? do you not know the evils which hold me? Can I in such circumstances (listen to paeans)?—What circumstances?—I am going to die.—And will other men be immortal?

“My life is in danger from Caesar.” And isn’t my life in danger too? I live in Nicopolis, where there are so many earthquakes. And when you cross the Hadriatic, what risk do you run? Isn’t your life at risk? “But my opinions are also in danger.” Do you mean your own opinions? How? Who can force you to hold an opinion you don’t choose to hold? Or do you mean someone else’s opinion? What danger are you in if others hold false opinions? “But I am in danger of being banished.” What does it mean to be banished? To be somewhere other than Rome? “Yes, but what if I am sent to Gyara?” If that suits you, you will go there. But if it doesn’t, you can go somewhere else instead of Gyara. The man who sends you to Gyara will go there too, whether he wants to or not. Why, then, do you go to Rome as if it were such a great thing? Rome isn’t worth all this preparation. It isn’t worth having an honest young man say, “It wasn’t worth listening and writing so much. It wasn’t worth sitting so long beside an old man who isn’t worth much.” Just remember the distinction between what is yours and what is not. Never claim anything that belongs to others. A tribunal and a prison are both places, one high and the other low. But you can keep your will the same in each, if you choose to. We will imitate Socrates when we can write paeans in prison. But consider our present state of mind. Could we bear it if someone in prison said to us, “Would you like me to read Paeans to you?” “Why are you bothering me? Don’t you know the troubles I’m in? Can I listen to paeans in these circumstances?” “What circumstances?” “I’m going to die.” “And will other people live forever?”

The text has ἐπὶ Καίσαρος, but ἐπὶ should perhaps be ὑπό or ἀπó.

See i. 25, note 4.

In his life of Socrates, Diogenes Laertius reports that Socrates wrote a paean in prison. He gives its first line, which addresses Apollo and Artemis.

tum vita omnibus Metenda ut fruges: sic jubet necessitas.

Then everyone’s life must be harvested like a crop. Necessity demands it.