Why We Should Not Be Angry With Others, and What Matters Little and Greatly to People[193]

What is the cause of assenting to any thing? The fact that it appears to be true. It is not possible then to assent to that which appears not to be true. Why? Because this is the nature of the understanding, to incline to the true, to be dissatisfied with the false, and in matters uncertain to withhold assent. What is the proof of this? Imagine (persuade yourself), if you can, that it is now night. It is not possible. Take away your persuasion that it is day. It is not possible. Persuade yourself or take away your persuasion that the stars are even in number.¹⁹⁴ It is impossible. When then any man assents to that which is false, be assured that he did not intend to assent to it as false, for every soul is unwillingly deprived of the truth, as Plato says; but the falsity seemed to him to be true. Well, in acts what have we of the like kind as we have here truth or falsehood? We have the fit and the not fit (duty and not duty), the profitable and the unprofitable, that which is suitable to a person and that which is not, and whatever is like these. Can then a man think that a thing is useful to him and not choose it? He cannot. How says Medea?¹⁹⁵—¹⁹³

Why do we accept something as true? Because it appears to be true. We cannot accept something as true when it does not appear to be true. Why not? Because the mind is naturally inclined to accept what is true and reject what is false. When it is uncertain, it withholds judgment. What proves this? Imagine, or persuade yourself, if you can, that it is night now. You cannot. Stop believing that it is day. You cannot. Persuade yourself that the stars are even in number, or stop believing that they are.¹⁹⁴ You cannot. So when someone accepts something false as true, be sure he did not intend to accept it as false. As Plato says, every soul is deprived of the truth against its will. Rather, the falsehood seemed true to him. In our actions, what corresponds to truth and falsehood? We have what is fitting and what is not, what is our duty and what is not. We also have what is profitable and what is not, what is suitable for a person and what is not, and similar distinctions. Can a person think something is useful to him and not choose it? He cannot. What does Medea say?^{195 193}

She thought that to indulge her passion and take vengeance on her husband was more profitable than to spare her children. It was so; but she was deceived. Show her plainly that she is deceived, and she will not do it; but so long as you do not show it, what can she follow except that which appears to herself (her opinion)? Nothing else. Why then are you angry with the unhappy woman that she has been bewildered about the most important things, and is become a viper instead of a human creature? And why not, if it is possible, rather pity, as we pity the blind and the lame, so those who are blinded and maimed in the faculties which are supreme?

She thought that giving in to her passion and taking revenge on her husband would benefit her more than sparing her children. That was what she thought, but she was mistaken. Show her plainly that she is mistaken, and she will not do it. But as long as you do not show her, what can she follow except what seems right to her (her opinion)? Nothing else. So why are you angry with this unhappy woman? She has become confused about the most important things and has turned into a viper instead of a human being. Why not instead pity those whose highest faculties are blinded and crippled, if you can, just as we pity the blind and the lame?

Whoever then clearly remembers this, that to man the measure of every act is the appearance (the opinion),—whether the thing appears good or bad: if good, he is free from blame; if bad, himself suffers the penalty, for it is impossible that he who is deceived can be one person, and he who suffers another person—whoever remembers this will not be angry with any man, will not be vexed at any man, will not revile or blame any man, nor hate nor quarrel with any man.

A person judges every action by how it appears to them, whether good or bad. If it appears good, they are free from blame. If it appears bad, they themselves suffer the penalty. For the person who is deceived cannot be one person and the person who suffers another. Anyone who clearly remembers this will not be angry or upset with anyone. They will not insult or blame anyone, or hate or quarrel with anyone.

So then all these great and dreadful deeds have this origin, in the appearance (opinion)? Yes, this origin and no other. The Iliad is nothing else than appearance and the use of appearances. It appeared¹⁹⁶ to Alexander to carry off the wife of Menelaus: it appeared to Helene to follow him. If then it had appeared to Menelaus to feel that it was a gain to be deprived of such a wife, what would have happened? Not only would the Iliad have been lost, but the Odyssey also. On so small a matter then did such great things depend? But what do you mean by such great things? Wars and civil commotions, and the destruction of many men and cities. And what great matter is this? Is it nothing?—But what great matter is the death of many oxen, and many sheep, and many nests of swallows or storks being burnt or destroyed? Are these things then like those? Very like. Bodies of men are destroyed, and the bodies of oxen and sheep; the dwellings of men are burnt, and the nests of storks. What is there in this great or dreadful? Or show me what is the difference between a men's house and a stork's nest, as far as each is a dwelling; except that man builds his little houses of beams and tiles and bricks, and the stork builds them of sticks and mud. Are a stork and a man then like things? What say you?—In body they are very much alike.

So all these great and dreadful deeds have their origin in appearances (opinions)? Yes, that is their only origin. The Iliad is nothing but appearances and the use we make of them. It seemed right¹⁹⁶ to Alexander to carry off the wife of Menelaus. It seemed right to Helene to follow him. Suppose Menelaus had thought it a gain to be rid of such a wife. What would have happened? Not only would the Iliad have been lost, but the Odyssey too. So such great things depended on such a small matter? But what do you mean by such great things? Wars and civil unrest, and the destruction of many people and cities. And what is so great about that? Is it nothing? But what is so great about the death of many oxen and sheep? Or about the burning or destruction of many swallows’ or storks’ nests? Are those things alike, then? Very alike. Human bodies are destroyed, and so are the bodies of oxen and sheep. Human homes are burned, and so are storks’ nests. What is great or dreadful about that? Show me the difference between a human home and a stork’s nest, as far as each is a dwelling. The only difference is that humans build their little houses from beams, tiles, and bricks. Storks build theirs from sticks and mud. Are a stork and a human alike, then? What do you say? In body, they are very much alike.

Does a man then differ in no respect from a stork? Don't suppose that I say so; but there is no difference in these matters (which I have mentioned). In what then is the difference? Seek and you will find that there is a difference in another matter. See whether it is not in a man the understanding of what he does, see if it is not in social community, in fidelity, in modesty, in steadfastness, in intelligence. Where then is the great good and evil in men? It is where the difference is. If the difference is preserved and remains fenced round, and neither modesty is destroyed, nor fidelity, nor intelligence, then the man also is preserved; but if any of these things is destroyed and stormed like a city, then the man too perishes; and in this consist the great things. Alexander, you say, sustained great damage then when the Hellenes invaded and when they ravaged Troy, and when his brothers perished. By no means; for no man is damaged by an action which is not his own; but what happened at that time was only the destruction of storks' nests: now the ruin of Alexander was when he lost the character of modesty, fidelity, regard to hospitality, and to decency. When was Achilles ruined? Was it when Patroclus died? Not so. But it happened when he began to be angry, when he wept for a girl, when he forgot that he was at Troy not to get mistresses, but to fight. These things are the ruin of men, this is being besieged, this is the destruction of cities, when right opinions are destroyed, when they are corrupted.

Does a man differ from a stork in no way? Do not suppose I am saying that. But there is no difference in the matters I have mentioned. Where, then, is the difference? Look, and you will find that it lies elsewhere. See whether it lies in a man's understanding of what he does. See whether it lies in social life, loyalty, modesty, steadfastness, and intelligence. Where, then, are the greatest good and evil for men? They are found where the difference lies. If that difference is preserved and protected, the man is preserved too. This means that modesty, loyalty, and intelligence must not be destroyed. But if any of these is destroyed and overrun like a city, the man perishes too. These are the things that matter most. You say that Alexander suffered great harm when the Hellenes invaded and ravaged Troy, and when his brothers died. Not at all. No man is harmed by an action that is not his own. What happened then was only the destruction of storks' nests. Alexander was ruined when he lost his modesty, loyalty, respect for hospitality, and sense of decency. When was Achilles ruined? Was it when Patroclus died? No. He was ruined when he began to rage and weep for a girl. He forgot that he was at Troy not to take mistresses, but to fight. These things are the ruin of men. This is what it means to be besieged. This is the destruction of cities, when right opinions are destroyed and corrupted.

When then women are carried off, when children are made captives, and when the men are killed, are these not evils? How is it then that you add to the facts these opinions? Explain this to me also.—I shall not do that; but how is it that you say that these are not evils?—Let us come to the rules: produce the praecognitions (προλήψεις): for it is because this is neglected that we can not sufficiently wonder at what men do. When we intend to judge of weights, we do not judge by guess: where we intend to judge of straight and crooked, we do not judge by guess. In all cases where it is our interest to know what is true in any matter, never will any man among us do anything by guess. But in things which depend on the first and on the only cause of doing right or wrong, of happiness or unhappiness, of being unfortunate or fortunate, there only we are inconsiderate and rash. There is then nothing like scales (balance), nothing like a rule: but some appearance is presented, and straightway I act according to it. Must I then suppose that I am superior to Achilles or Agamemnon, so that they by following appearances do and suffer so many evils: and shall not the appearance be sufficient for me?¹⁹⁷—And what tragedy has any other beginning? The Atreus of Euripides, what is it? An appearance.¹⁹⁸ The Oedipus of Sophocles, what is it? An appearance. The Phoenix? An appearance. The Hippolytus? An appearance. What kind of a man then do you suppose him to be who pays no regard to this matter? And what is the name of those who follow every appearance? They are called madmen. Do we then act at all differently?

When women are carried off, children taken captive, and men killed, are these not evils? How is it that you add these judgments to the facts? Explain that to me too. “I will not, but how can you say these are not evils?” Let us turn to our standards. Bring forward the praecognitions (προλήψεις). We can never wonder enough at what people do, because they neglect these standards. When we judge weights, we do not guess. When we judge whether something is straight or crooked, we do not guess. Whenever it matters to us to know the truth about anything, none of us ever acts on a guess. Yet we are careless and rash about matters that depend on the first and only cause of right and wrong, happiness and unhappiness, good and bad fortune. In these matters, we have nothing like a balance or a ruler. Instead, an appearance presents itself, and I immediately act on it. Must I suppose, then, that I am superior to Achilles or Agamemnon? They do and suffer so many evils by following appearances. Will an appearance not be enough to lead me astray too?¹⁹⁷ What tragedy has any other beginning? What is the Atreus of Euripides? An appearance.¹⁹⁸ What is the Oedipus of Sophocles? An appearance. The Phoenix? An appearance. The Hippolytus? An appearance. What sort of person, then, do you suppose someone is who pays no attention to this? And what do we call those who follow every appearance? We call them madmen. Do we act any differently?