Book 1, Chapter 22
Preconceptions.[154]
Praecognitions are common to all men, and praecognition is not contradictory to praecognition. For who of us does not assume that Good is useful and eligible, and in all circumstances that we ought to follow and pursue it? And who of us does not assume that Justice is beautiful and becoming? When then does the contradiction arise? It arises in the adaptation of the praecognitions to the particular cases. When one man says, He has done well: he is a brave man, and another says, "Not so; but he has acted foolishly;" then the disputes arise among men. This is the dispute among the Jews and the Syrians and the Egyptians and the Romans; not whether holiness should be preferred to all things and in all cases should be pursued, but whether it is holy to eat pig's flesh or not holy. You will find this dispute also between Agamemnon and Achilles; for call them forth. What do you say, Agamemnon? ought not that to be done which is proper and right? Certainly. Well, what do you say, Achilles? do you not admit that what is good ought to be done? I do most certainly. Adapt your praecognitions then to the present matter. Here the dispute begins. Agamemnon says, I ought not to give up Chryseis to her father. Achilles says, You ought. It is certain that one of the two makes a wrong adaptation of the praecognition of "ought" or "duty." Further, Agamemnon says, Then if I ought to restore Chryseis, it is fit that I take his prize from some of you. Achilles replies, "Would you then take her whom I love?" Yes, her whom you love. Must I then be the only man who goes without a prize? and must I be the only man who has no prize? Thus the dispute begins.
Preconceptions are common to all people, and one preconception does not contradict another. Who among us does not assume that the good is useful and worth choosing? Who does not assume that we ought to follow and pursue it in all circumstances? And who does not assume that justice is beautiful and fitting? When, then, does contradiction arise? It arises when we apply these preconceptions to particular cases. One man says, He has done well. He is a brave man. Another says, "No, he has acted foolishly." That is how disputes arise among people. This is the dispute among the Jews, Syrians, Egyptians, and Romans. They do not dispute whether holiness should be preferred to everything else and pursued in every case. They dispute whether eating pig's flesh is holy or not. You will also find this dispute between Agamemnon and Achilles. Let us call them before us. What do you say, Agamemnon? Should we not do what is proper and right? Certainly. Well, what do you say, Achilles? Do you not agree that we should do what is good? I certainly do. Then apply your preconceptions to the matter at hand. Here the dispute begins. Agamemnon says, I ought not to give Chryseis back to her father. Achilles says, You ought to. Clearly, one of them is applying the preconception of "ought" or "duty" wrongly. Agamemnon goes on to say, If I ought to return Chryseis, then I should take a prize from one of you. Achilles replies, "Would you take the woman I love?" Yes, the woman you love. Must I then be the only man who goes without a prize? Must I be the only man who has no prize? That is how the dispute begins.
The word is ὅσιον, which is very difficult to translate. We can take an example from our own experience. There is general agreement about integrity and the worship of the supreme being. But people differ remarkably over whether certain business practices are consistent with integrity. They differ even more remarkably over whether certain forms of worship are consistent with religion.
Horace, Epp. i. 2.
Iliad, i. Achilles and Agamemnon quarrel over returning Chryseis to her father.
John Smith translates “Praecognitions” (προλήψεις) as Praecognita in Select Discourses, p. 4. Cicero says (Topica, 7): "Notionem appello quod Graeci tum ἔννοιαν, tum πρόληψιν dicunt. Ea est insita et ante percepta cujusque formae cognitio, enodationis indigens." In the De Natura Deorum (i. 16) he says: "Quae est enim gens aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem quandam deorum, quam appellat πρόληψιν Epicurus? id est, anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nec intelligi quidquam nec quaeri nec disputari potest." As Cicero says in the following chapter (17), Epicurus was the first to use πρόληψις in this sense. Cicero applies it to what he calls the ingrained, or rather innate, knowledge that gods exist. He assumes that this knowledge is universal, but I do not know whether it is. See i. c. 2; Tuscul. i. 24; De Fin. iii. 6, and πρόληψις in iv. 8. 6.
What then is education? Education is the learning how to adapt the natural praecognitions to the particular things conformably to nature; and then to distinguish that of things some are in our power, but others are not: in our power are will and all acts which depend on the will; things not in our power are the body, the parts of the body, possessions, parents, brothers, children, country and generally, all with whom we live in society. In what then should we place the good? To what kind of things (οὐσίᾳ) shall we adapt it? To the things which are in our power? Is not health then a good thing, and soundness of limb, and life? and are not children and parents and country? Who will tolerate you if you deny this?
What, then, is education? It is learning how to apply our natural preconceptions to particular things in accordance with nature. It is also learning to distinguish between things that are in our power and things that are not. Our will and all acts that depend on it are in our power. Our body, its parts, our possessions, parents, brothers, children, and country are not. Nor are all the people with whom we live in society. Where, then, should we look for the good? To what kind of things (οὐσίᾳ) does it belong? To the things in our power? But aren’t health, sound limbs, and life good things? Aren’t children, parents, and country good things too? Who will put up with you if you deny this?
Let us then transfer the notion of good to these things. Is it possible then, when a man sustains damage and does not obtain good things, that he can be happy? It is not possible. And can he maintain towards society a proper behaviour? He can not. For I am naturally formed to look after my own interest. If it is my interest to have an estate in land, it is my interest also to take it from my neighbour. If it is my interest to have a garment, it is my interest also to steal it from the bath. This is the origin of wars, civil commotions, tyrannies, conspiracies. And bow shall I be still able to maintain my duty towards Zeus? for if I sustain damage and am unlucky, he takes no care of me; and what is he to me if he cannot help me; and further, what is he to me if he allows me to be in the condition in which I am? I now begin to hate him. Why then do we build temples, why set up statues to Zeus, as well as to evil daemons, such as to Fever; and how is Zeus the Saviour, and how the giver of rain, and the giver of fruits? And in truth if we place the nature of Good in any such things, all this follows.
Let us then put our idea of what is good in these things. Can a person be happy if he suffers harm and does not get good things? No. And can he behave properly toward society? No. For I am naturally made to look after my own interests. If owning land is in my interest, then taking it from my neighbor is also in my interest. If having a garment is in my interest, then stealing it from the bath is also in my interest. This is the origin of wars, civil unrest, tyrannies, and conspiracies. And how can I still do my duty toward Zeus? If I suffer harm and have bad luck, he takes no care of me. What does he mean to me if he cannot help me? And what does he mean to me if he lets me remain in this condition? I begin to hate him. Why, then, do we build temples and set up statues to Zeus, as we do to evil spirits such as Fever? How is Zeus the Savior, the giver of rain, and the giver of fruits? In truth, if we put the nature of Good in any such things, all of this follows.
The bath was a popular gathering place, where a thief could steal a bather's clothes. Social disorder springs from people's desire for what they do not have and will not work for. This is said in the epistle of James, c. iv., v. 1, to which Mrs. Carter refers.
See i. 19. 6, note 2.
What should we do then? This is the inquiry of the true philosopher who is in labour. Now I do not see [7] what the Good is nor the Bad. Am I not mad? Yes. But suppose that I place the good somewhere among the things which depend on the will: all will laugh at me. There will come some greyhead wearing many gold rings on his fingers, and he will shake his head and say, Hear, my child. It is right that you should philosophize; but you ought to have some brains also: all this that you are doing is silly. You learn the syllogism from philosophers; but you know how to act better than philosophers do.—Man, why then do you blame me, if I know? What shall I say to this slave? If I am silent, he will burst. I must speak in this way: Excuse me, as you would excuse lovers: I am not my own master: I am mad.
What should we do, then? This is the question of the true philosopher who is struggling to give birth. Right now, I do not see [7] what is good or bad. Am I not mad? Yes. But suppose I say that the good lies somewhere among the things that depend on our will. Everyone will laugh at me. Some gray-haired man with many gold rings on his fingers will come along. He will shake his head and say, Listen, my child. It is right for you to study philosophy, but you should use some common sense too. Everything you are doing is silly. You learn the syllogism from philosophers, but you know how to act better than they do. Man, if I know how to act, why do you blame me? What shall I say to this slave? If I stay silent, he will burst. I must say this: Forgive me, as you would forgive lovers. I am not my own master. I am mad.