Book 1, Chapter 15
What Philosophy Promises
When a man was consulting him how he should persuade his brother to cease being angry with him, Epictetus replied, Philosophy does not propose to secure for a man any external thing. If it did (or, if it were not, as I say), philosophy would be allowing something which is not within its province. For as the carpenter's material is wood, and that of the statuary is copper, so the matter of the art of living is each man's life.—What then is my brother's?—That again belongs to his own art; but with respect to yours, it is one of the external things, like a piece of land, like health, like reputation. But Philosophy promises none of these. In every circumstance I will maintain, she says, the governing part conformable to nature. Whose governing part? His in whom I am, she says.
When a man asked Epictetus how he could persuade his brother to stop being angry with him, Epictetus replied: “Philosophy does not promise to secure anything external for a person. If it did (or if philosophy were not as I say it is), it would be taking on something outside its field. Just as wood is the carpenter’s material and copper is the sculptor’s, each person’s life is the material for the art of living. “What about my brother’s life?” “That belongs to his own art of living. As far as your art is concerned, his life is an external thing, like land, health, or reputation. Philosophy promises none of these. It says, ‘In every circumstance, I will keep the governing part in harmony with nature.’ Whose governing part? Philosophy says, ‘The governing part of the person in whom I am.’”
This is τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, a word Antoninus often uses (ii. 2; vi. 8).
How then shall my brother cease to be angry with me? Bring him to me and I will tell him. But I have nothing to say to you about his anger.
How can I get my brother to stop being angry with me? Bring him to me and I will tell him. But I have nothing to say to you about his anger.
When the man, who was consulting him, said, I seek to know this, How, even if my brother is not reconciled to me, shall I maintain myself in a state conformable to nature? Nothing great, said Epictetus, is produced suddenly, since not even the grape or the fig is. If you say to me now that you want a fig, I will answer to you that it requires time: let it flower first, then put forth fruit, and then ripen. Is then the fruit of a fig-tree not perfected suddenly and in one hour, and would you possess the fruit of a man's mind in so short a time and so easily? Do not expect it, even if I tell you.
The man consulting Epictetus said, “I want to know how to live in harmony with nature, even if my brother refuses to reconcile with me.” Epictetus replied, “Nothing great comes about suddenly. Not even a grape or a fig does. If you tell me now that you want a fig, I will tell you that it takes time. The tree must first blossom, then bear fruit, and then the fruit must ripen. A fig does not mature suddenly, in a single hour. So would you expect to develop the fruits of a person’s mind so quickly and easily? Do not expect it, even if I tell you otherwise.”
"The philosopher had forgot that fig-trees do not blossom" (Mrs. Carter). Fig flowers grow inside the fleshy receptacle that becomes the fruit. Schweig. prints μὴ δ᾽ ἂν, ἐγώ σοι λέγω, προσδόκα. In his Latin version, he prints: "Id vero, ego tibi dico, ne expectes." I understand neither his punctuation nor his translation. Wolf translates it as "Etsi ego tibi dixero (virtutem brevi parari posse), noli credere". That is correct. Wolf connects ἄν with λέγω.