Book 1, Chapter 12
Contentment
With respect to gods, there are some who say that a divine being does not exist: others say that it exists, but is inactive and careless, and takes no forethought about any thing; a third class say that such a being exists and exercises forethought, but only about great things and heavenly things, and about nothing on the earth; a fourth class say that a divine being exercises forethought both about things on the earth and heavenly things, but in a general way only, and not about things severally. There is a fifth class to whom Ulysses and Socrates belong, who say: "I move not without thy knowledge" (Iliad, x. 278).
People hold different views about the gods. Some say that no divine being exists. Others say that a divine being exists, but is inactive, cares about nothing, and watches over nothing. A third group says that a divine being exists and watches over things, but only great and heavenly things, not earthly ones. A fourth group says that a divine being watches over both earthly and heavenly things, but only in general, not individually. A fifth group, which includes Ulysses and Socrates, says: "I do not move without your knowledge" (Iliad, x. 278).
The line comes from Ulysses's prayer to Athena: "Hear me child of Zeus, thou who standest by me always in all dangers, nor do I even move without thy knowledge." Socrates said that the gods know everything that is said, done, and thought (Xenophon, Mem. i. 1, 19). Compare Cicero, De Nat. Deorum, i. 1, 2, and Dr. Price's Dissertation on Providence, sect. i. Epictetus lists the various opinions about the gods in ancient times. The reader may consult the notes in Schweighaeuser's edition.
Opinions about God among modern nations, which are called civilized and are so to varying degrees, seem less varied than in ancient times. But the contrasts between modern opinions are striking. These opinions range from denial of a God, though perhaps few people deny one, to superstitious beliefs about God and his rule of the world. Teachers, both learned and ignorant, teach these superstitions. They have great power over the minds of people who cannot or dare not use their reason.
Before all other things then it is necessary to inquire about each of these opinions, whether it is affirmed truly or not truly. For if there are no gods, how is it our proper end to follow them? And if they exist, but take no care of anything, in this case also how will it be right to follow them? But if indeed they do exist and look after things, still if there is nothing communicated from them to men, nor in fact to myself, how even so is it right (to follow them)? The wise and good man then after considering all these things, submits his own mind to him who administers the whole, as good citizens do to the law of the state. He who is receiving instruction ought to come to be instructed with this intention, How shall I follow the gods in all things, how shall I be contented with the divine administration, and how can I become free? For he is free to whom every thing happens according to his will, and whom no man can hinder. What then is freedom madness? Certainly not: for madness and freedom do not consist. But, you say, I would have every thing result just as I like, and in whatever way I like. You are mad, you are beside yourself. Do you not know that freedom is a noble and valuable thing? But for me inconsiderately to wish for things to happen as I inconsiderately like, this appears to be not only not noble, but even most base. For how do we proceed in the matter of writing? Do I wish to write the name of Dion as I choose? No, but I am taught to choose to write it as it ought to be written. And how with respect to music? In the same manner. And what universally in every art or science? Just the same. If it were not so, it would be of no value to know anything, if knowledge were adapted to every man's whim. Is it then in this alone, in this which is the greatest and the chief thing, I mean freedom, that I am permitted to will inconsiderately? By no means; but to be instructed is this, to learn to wish that every thing may happen as it does. And how do things happen? As the disposer has disposed them? And he has appointed summer and winter, and abundance and scarcity, and virtue and vice, and all such opposites for the harmony of the whole; and to each of us he has given a body, and parts of the body, and possessions, and companions.
First, then, we must examine each of these beliefs and ask whether it is true. If there are no gods, how can our proper aim be to follow them? And if they exist but care for nothing, how can it be right to follow them? But suppose they exist and care for things. If they communicate nothing to human beings, or to me personally, how can it be right to follow them? After considering all this, the wise and good man submits his own mind to the ruler of the whole. He does so just as good citizens submit to the law of the state. Anyone seeking instruction should come with this intention: How can I follow the gods in everything? How can I be content with the way the gods govern things? And how can I become free? A person is free when everything happens as he wishes and no one can stop him. What then? Is freedom madness? Certainly not, for madness and freedom cannot exist together. But you say, I want everything to turn out just as I like, in whatever way I like. You are mad. You are out of your mind. Don't you know that freedom is noble and valuable? But suppose I thoughtlessly wish for things to happen just as I thoughtlessly want them to. That seems not only less than noble, but utterly base. How do we go about writing? Do I want to write the name Dion any way I choose? No, I am taught to choose to write it as it should be written. And what about music? It is the same. And what about every art or science? Exactly the same. If this were not so, knowledge would have no value, since it would be shaped to fit each person's whims. Is freedom alone an exception? Is it only here, in the greatest and most important matter, that I am allowed to wish thoughtlessly? Not at all. To be instructed is to learn to wish for everything to happen as it does. And how do things happen? They happen as the one who orders them has arranged them. He has appointed summer and winter, abundance and scarcity, virtue and vice, and all such opposites for the harmony of the whole. And he has given each of us a body, its parts, possessions, and companions.
"To follow God," is a Stoic expression. Antoninus, x. 11.
This means that we should learn to be satisfied with everything that happens, in fact with the will of God. According to Epictetus, this is part of education. But this lesson does not appear as plainly in our systems of education as it does here. Antoninus (iv. 23): "Everything harmonizes with me, which is harmonious to thee, O universe. Nothing for me is too early nor too late, which is in due time for thee."
Upton collected the passages that mention this doctrine. One is in Gellius (vi. 1), from the fourth book of Chrysippus on Providence. Chrysippus says: "nothing is more foolish than the opinions of those who think that good could have existed without evil." Schweighaeuser wishes that Epictetus had discussed the nature and origin of Evil more fully. For a treatment of this subject, he refers to the commentary of Simplicius on the Encheiridion of Epictetus, c. 13 (8), and 34 (27).
Epictetus (Encheiridion, c. 27) says that "as a mark is not set up for the purpose of missing it, so neither does the nature of evil exist in the universe." Simplicius observes (p. 278, ed. Schweig.): "The Good is that which is according to each thing's nature, wherein each thing has its perfection: but the Bad is the disposition contrary to its nature of the thing which contains the bad, by which disposition it is deprived of that which is according to nature, namely, the good. For if the Bad as well as the Good were a disposition and perfection of the form (εἴδους) in which it is, the bad itself would also be good and would not then be called Bad."
Remembering then this disposition of things, we ought to go to be instructed, not that we may change the constitution of things,—for we have not the power to do it, nor is it better that we should have the power,—but in order that, as the things around us are what they are and by nature exist, we may maintain our minds in harmony with the things which happen. For can we escape from men? and how is it possible? And if we associate with them, can we change them? Who gives us the power? What then remains, or what method is discovered of holding commerce with them? Is there such a method by which they shall do what seems fit to them, and we not the less shall be in a mood which is conformable to nature? But you are unwilling to endure and are discontented: and if you are alone, you call it solitude; and if you are with men, you call them knaves and robbers; and you find fault with your own parents and children, and brothers and neighbours. But you ought when you are alone to call this condition by the name of tranquillity and freedom, and to think yourself like to the gods; and when you are with many, you ought not to call it crowd, nor trouble, nor uneasiness, but festival and assembly, and so accept all contentedly.
Remembering how things are arranged, we should seek instruction. Our aim is not to change the order of things. We have no power to do that, and it would not be better if we did. Instead, we should learn to keep our minds in harmony with what happens. For the things around us are what they are, and exist as they do by nature. Can we escape from other people? How could we? And if we associate with them, can we change them? Who gives us that power? What, then, is left? What way can we find to deal with them? Is there a way for them to do as they see fit while we remain in a state of mind that accords with nature? But you are unwilling to put up with things, and you are discontented. If you are alone, you call it solitude. If you are with others, you call them scoundrels and robbers. You find fault with your own parents and children, brothers and neighbors. But when you are alone, you should call it peace and freedom, and think of yourself as like the gods. When you are with many people, you should not call it a crowd, a bother, or a source of unease. Instead, call it a festival and a gathering, and accept everything contentedly.
The word is ὑποθέσεις. What follows explains it.
What then is the punishment of those who do not accept? It is to be what they are. Is any person dissatisfied with being alone? let him be alone. Is a man dissatisfied with his parents? let him be a bad son, and lament. Is he dissatisfied with his children? let him be a bad father. Cast him into prison. What prison? Where he is already, for he is there against his will; and where a man is against his will, there he is in prison. So Socrates was not in prison, for he was there willingly—Must my leg then be lamed? Wretch, do you then on account of one poor leg find fault with the world? Will you not willingly surrender it for the whole? Will you not withdraw from it? Will you not gladly part with it to him who gave it? And will you be vexed and discontented with the things established by Zeus, which he with the Moirae (fates) who were present and spinning the thread of your generation, defined and put in order? Know you not how small a part you are compared with the whole. I mean with respect to the body, for as to intelligence you are not inferior to the gods nor less; for the magnitude of intelligence is not measured by length nor yet by height, but by thoughts.
What, then, is the punishment for those who do not accept things? It is to be what they are. Is someone unhappy being alone? Let him be alone. Is a man unhappy with his parents? Let him be a bad son and lament. Is he unhappy with his children? Let him be a bad father. Throw him into prison. What prison? The one he is already in, for he is there against his will. Wherever a man is against his will, he is in prison. So Socrates was not in prison, for he was there willingly. Must my leg then be crippled? Wretch, do you find fault with the world because of one poor leg? Will you not willingly give it up for the sake of the whole? Will you not let it go? Will you not gladly give it back to him who gave it? Will you be angry and dissatisfied with what Zeus has established? He ordained and arranged these things with the Moirae (fates), who were there spinning the thread of your birth. Do you not know how small a part you are compared with the whole? I mean in body. For in intelligence you are neither inferior to the gods nor less than they are. The size of intelligence is not measured by length or height, but by thoughts.
"Et quota pars homo sit terrai totius unus." Lucret. vi. 652, and Antoninus, ii. 4.
The original word is δόγμασι. Latin translators render it as "decretis," and Mrs. Carter as "principles." I don't understand either choice. I have translated the word as "thoughts." That is vague, but I can do no better. The Stoics held that human intelligence is a particle of the divine. Mrs. Carter calls this "one of the Stoic extravagancies, arising from the notion that human souls were literally parts of the Deity." But that is hardly an accurate account of the Stoic doctrine.
Will you not then choose to place your good in that in which you are equal to the gods?—Wretch that I am to have such a father and mother.—What then, was it permitted to you to come forth and to select and to say: Let such a man at this moment unite with such a woman that I may be produced? It was not permitted, but it was a necessity for your parents to exist first, and then for you to be begotten. Of what kind of parents? Of such as they were. Well then, since they are such as they are, is there no remedy given to you? Now if you did not know for what purpose you possess the faculty of vision, you would be unfortunate and wretched if you closed your eyes when colours were brought before them; but in that you possess greatness of soul and nobility of spirit for every event that may happen, and you know not that you possess them, are you not more unfortunate and wretched? Things are brought close to you which are proportionate to the power which you possess, but you turn away this power most particularly at the very time when you ought to maintain it open and discerning. Do you not rather thank the gods that they have allowed you to be above these things which they have not placed in your power, and have made you accountable only for those which are in your power? As to your parents, the gods have left. you free from responsibility; and so with respect to your brothers, and your body, and possessions, and death and life. For what then have they made you responsible? For that which alone is in your power, the proper use of appearances. Why then do you draw on yourself the things for which you are not responsible? It is, indeed, a giving of trouble to yourself.
Will you not choose to place your good in what makes you equal to the gods? “How wretched I am to have such a father and mother.” But were you allowed to come forward and choose your parents? Could you say, “Let this man unite with this woman now, so that I may be born”? You were not allowed to do that. Your parents had to exist first, and only then could you be conceived. What kind of parents were they? They were what they were. Since they are as they are, have you been given no remedy? Suppose you did not know what your eyesight was for. You would be unfortunate and wretched if you closed your eyes when colors appeared before you. But you possess greatness of soul and nobility of spirit for whatever may happen. If you do not know you possess them, are you not even more unfortunate and wretched? You are faced with things that match the power you possess. Yet you turn this power away just when you should keep it open and discerning. Instead, should you not thank the gods? They have allowed you to rise above the things they have not placed in your power. They have made you responsible only for what is in your power. The gods have freed you from responsibility for your parents, your brothers, your body, your possessions, death, and life. What, then, have they made you responsible for? The only thing in your power: the proper use of appearances. Why, then, do you take responsibility for things that are not yours to answer for? You are only making trouble for yourself.