Book 1, Chapter 8
Faculties[69] Are Unsafe for the Uninstructed
In as many ways as we can change things which are equivalent to one another, in just so many ways we can change the forms of arguments (ἐπιχειρήματα) and enthymemes (ἐνθυμήματα) in argumentation. This is an instance: if you have borrowed and not repaid, you owe me the money you have not borrowed and you have not repaid; then you do not owe me the money. To do this skilfully is suitable to no man more than to the philosopher; for if the enthymeme is an imperfect syllogism, it is plain that he who has been exercised in the perfect syllogism must be equally expert in the imperfect also.
We can change the forms of arguments (ἐπιχειρήματα) and enthymemes (ἐνθυμήματα) in argumentation in as many ways as we can exchange equivalent things. Here is an example: If you have borrowed money and not repaid it, you owe me the money. You have not borrowed it and you have not repaid it. Therefore, you do not owe me the money. No one is better suited than the philosopher to do this skillfully. For an enthymeme is an incomplete syllogism. Clearly, then, someone trained in complete syllogisms must be equally skilled in incomplete ones.
“Things” means "propositions" and "terms." See Aristot. Analyt. Prior. i. 39, δεῖ δὲ καὶ μεταλαμβάνειν, &c. Ἐπιχειρήματα are arguments of any kind used to attack (ἐπιχειρεῖν) an opponent.
Aristotle defines the enthymeme as: ἐνθύμημα μὲν οὖν ἐστι συλλογισμὸς ἐξ εἰκότων ἢ σημείων (Anal. Prior. ii. c. 27). He explains what he means by εἰκός and σημεῖον in the first part of this chapter. See also De Morgan's Formal Logic, p. 237, and P. C. Organon, p. 6, note.
As Wolf says, the faculties are the abilities to speak and argue. He also says that these abilities make men arrogant and careless when they lack solid knowledge. This agrees with Bion's maxim, ἡ γὰρ οἴησις ἐγκοπὴ τῆς προκοπῆς ἐστιν, "arrogance (self-conceit) is a hindrance to improvement." See viii. 8.
Why then do we not exercise ourselves and one another in this manner? Because, I reply, at present, though we are not exercised in these things and not distracted from the study of morality, by me at least, still we make no progress in virtue. What then must we expect if we should add this occupation? and particularly as this would not only be an occupation which would withdraw us from more necessary things, but would also be a cause of self-conceit and arrogance, and no small cause. For great is the power of arguing and the faculty of persuasion, and particularly if it should be much exercised, and also receive additional ornament from banguage: and so universally, every faculty acquired by the uninstructed and weak brings with it the danger of these persons being elated and inflated by it. For by what means could one persuade a young man who excels in these matters, that he ought not to become an appendage to them, but to make them an appendage to himself? Does he not trample on all such reasons, and strut before us elated and inflated, not enduring that any man should reprove him and remind him of what he has neglected and to what he has turned aside?
Why, then, do we not practice these skills ourselves and with one another? I answer that even now we make no progress in virtue. This is so even though we do not practice these skills and I, at least, do not distract you from studying morality. What, then, should we expect if we added this occupation? It would not only draw us away from more necessary things. It would also be a major cause of conceit and arrogance. The power to argue and persuade is great, especially when it is practiced often and further enhanced by polished language. Indeed, any skill acquired by the uninstructed and weak risks making them proud and inflated. How could anyone persuade a young man who excels in these skills that he should not become their appendage? How could anyone persuade him to make them an appendage to himself instead? Does he not trample on all such arguments and strut before us, proud and inflated? He will not tolerate anyone correcting him or reminding him what he has neglected and what he has turned to instead.
As Wolf explains, a man should not make public speaking his greatest skill. He should use it to highlight something more important.
What then was not Plato a philosopher? I reply, and was not Hippocrates a physician? but you see how Hippocrates speaks. Does Hippocrates then speak thus in respect of being a physician? Why do you mingle things which have been accidentally united in the same men? And if Plato was handsome and strong, ought I also to set to work and endeavour to become handsome or strong, as if this was necessary for philosophy, because a certain philosopher was at the same time handsome and a philosopher? Will you not choose to see and to distinguish in respect to what men become philosophers, and what things belong to them in other respects? And if I were a philosopher, ought you also to be made lame? What then? Do I take away these faculties which you possess? By no means; for neither do I take away the faculty of seeing. But if you ask me what is the good of man, I cannot mention to you anything else than that it is a certain disposition of the will with respect to appearances.
But wasn’t Plato a philosopher? I reply, wasn’t Hippocrates a physician? Yet you see how Hippocrates speaks. Does he speak that way because he is a physician? Why do you mix together things that happen to be found in the same men? If Plato was handsome and strong, should I also try to become handsome or strong? Should I act as if these qualities were necessary for philosophy, just because a philosopher happened to have them? Won’t you see the difference between what makes men philosophers and what belongs to them in other respects? And if I were a philosopher, should you also become lame? What then? Am I taking away these abilities you possess? Not at all. I am no more taking them away than I am taking away your ability to see. But if you ask me what is good for a human being, I can only give you one answer. It is a certain attitude of the will toward appearances.
Plato was eloquent, and the opponent asks whether that means he cannot be a philosopher. The reply is that Hippocrates was both a physician and an eloquent speaker, but his eloquence was not part of his work as a physician.
Epictetus had difficulty walking.
In i. 20, 15, Epictetus defines the being (οὐσία), or nature, of good as the proper use of appearances. In i. 29, 1, he also says that good and evil are each a kind of will (προαίρεσις ποιά). But Schweighaeuser cannot understand how the "good of man" can be "a certain will with regard to appearances." He suggests that Arrian may have written, "a certain will which makes use of appearances."