Book Twelve

1. That the nature of the angels, both good and bad, is one and the same.

1. Good and bad angels share the same nature.

It has already, in the preceding book, been shown how the two cities originated among the angels. Before I speak of the creation of man, and show how the cities took their rise, so far as regards the race of rational mortals, I see that I must first, so far as I can, adduce what may demonstrate that it is not incongruous and unsuitable to speak of a society composed of angels and men together; so that there are not four cities or societies,—two, namely, of angels, and as many of men,—but rather two in all, one composed of the good, the other of the wicked, angels or men indifferently.

In the previous book, I showed how the two cities began among the angels. Before discussing the creation of human beings, I must explain something else. I will later show how the cities arose among rational mortals. First, I must show, as far as I can, that it makes sense to speak of a society made up of both angels and human beings. There are not four cities or societies, two of angels and two of human beings. Rather, there are only two in all. One is made up of the good and the other of the wicked, whether angels or human beings.

That the contrary propensities in good and bad angels have arisen, not from a difference in their nature and origin, since God, the good Author and Creator of all essences, created them both, but from a difference in their wills and desires, it is impossible to doubt. While some stedfastly continued in that which was the common good of all, namely, in God Himself, and in His eternity, truth, and love; others, being enamoured rather of their own power, as if they could be their own good, lapsed to this private good of their own, from that higher and beatific good which was common to all, and, bartering the lofty dignity of eternity for the inflation of pride, the most assured verity for the slyness of vanity, uniting love for factious partisanship, they became proud, deceived, envious. The cause, therefore, of the blessedness of the good is adherence to God. And so the cause of the others' misery will be found in the contrary, that is, in their not adhering to God. Wherefore, if when the question is asked, why are the former blessed, it is rightly answered, because they adhere to God; and when it is asked, why are the latter miserable, it is rightly answered, because they do not adhere to God,—then there is no other good for the rational or intellectual creature save God only. Thus, though it is not every creature that can be blessed (for beasts, trees, stones, and things of that kind have not this capacity), yet that creature which has the capacity cannot be blessed of itself, since it is created out of nothing, but only by Him by whom it has been created. For it is blessed by the possession of that whose loss makes it miserable. He, then, who is blessed not in another, but in himself, cannot be miserable, because he cannot lose himself.

There can be no doubt about why good and bad angels have opposite inclinations. The difference does not come from their nature or origin. God, the good author and creator of all beings, created both. Rather, the difference comes from their wills and desires. Some remained steadfast in what was the common good of all: God himself, and his eternity, truth, and love. Others became enamored of their own power, as if they could be their own good. They fell away from that higher, blessed good shared by all, turning instead to their own private good. They traded the lofty dignity of eternity for the swelling of pride, certain truth for the cunning of vanity, and unifying love for divisive loyalty to their own faction. They became proud, deceived, and envious. The good angels are blessed because they remain close to God. The others are miserable for the opposite reason: they do not remain close to God. If we ask why the first are blessed, the right answer is that they remain close to God. If we ask why the others are miserable, the right answer is that they do not. It follows that God alone is the good of any rational or intellectual creature. Not every creature can be blessed. Beasts, trees, stones, and things of that kind have no such capacity. But a creature capable of being blessed cannot achieve this by itself, since it was created out of nothing. It can be blessed only by the one who created it. It is blessed by possessing what would make it miserable to lose. God, then, who is blessed in himself and not in another, cannot be miserable, because he cannot lose himself.

Accordingly we say that there is no unchangeable good but the one, true, blessed God; that the things which He made are indeed good because from Him, yet mutable because made not out of Him, but out of nothing. Although, therefore, they are not the supreme good, for God is a greater good, yet those mutable things which can adhere to the immutable good, and so be blessed, are very good; for so completely is He their good, that without Him they cannot but be wretched. And the other created things in the universe are not better on this account, that they cannot be miserable. For no one would say that the other members of the body are superior to the eyes, because they cannot be blind. But as the sentient nature, even when it feels pain, is superior to the stony, which can feel none, so the rational nature, even when wretched, is more excellent than that which lacks reason or feeling, and can therefore experience no misery. And since this is so, then in this nature which has been created so excellent, that though it be mutable itself, it can yet secure its blessedness by adhering to the immutable good, the supreme God; and since it is not satisfied unless it be perfectly blessed, and cannot be thus blessed save in God,—in this nature, I say, not to adhere to God, is manifestly a fault.⁵²⁰ Now every fault injures the nature, and is consequently contrary to the nature. The creature, therefore, which cleaves to God, differs from those who do not, not by nature, but by fault; and yet by this very fault the nature itself is proved to be very noble and admirable. For that nature is certainly praised, the fault of which is justly blamed. For we justly blame the fault because it mars the praiseworthy nature. As, then, when we say that blindness is a defect of the eyes, we prove that sight belongs to the nature of the eyes; and when we say that deafness is a defect of the ears, hearing is thereby proved to belong to their nature;—so, when we say that it is a fault of the angelic creature that it does not cleave to God, we hereby most plainly declare that it pertained to its nature to cleave to God. And who can worthily conceive or express how great a glory that is, to cleave to God, so as to live to Him, to draw wisdom from Him, to delight in Him, and to enjoy this so great good, without death, error, or grief? And thus, since every vice is an injury of the nature, that very vice of the wicked angels, their departure from God, is sufficient proof that God created their nature so good, that it is an injury to it not to be with God.

Therefore, we say that only the one true and blessed God is unchangeably good. The things he made are good because they come from him. Yet they can change because he made them from nothing, not from himself. They are not the supreme good, because God is a greater good. Yet those changeable things that can remain close to the unchangeable good and so be blessed are very good. He is so completely their good that without him they cannot help being miserable. Other created things in the universe are not better because they cannot be miserable. No one would say that the other parts of the body are better than the eyes because they cannot go blind. A being that can feel is better than a stone, even when it feels pain. The stone can feel no pain. In the same way, a rational being is more excellent than one that lacks reason or feeling, even when miserable. A being without reason or feeling can experience no misery. God created rational nature so excellent that, though changeable, it can be blessed by remaining close to the unchangeable good, the supreme God. It is not satisfied unless it is perfectly blessed. It cannot be perfectly blessed except in God. Therefore, in such a nature, not remaining close to God is clearly a fault.⁵²⁰ Every fault harms a nature and is therefore contrary to it. A creature that remains close to God differs from those that do not, not in nature, but in fault. Yet this very fault proves that its nature is noble and admirable. A nature is surely worthy of praise when its fault is justly blamed. We rightly blame the fault because it damages a nature worthy of praise. When we say that blindness is a defect of the eyes, we show that sight belongs to their nature. When we say that deafness is a defect of the ears, we show that hearing belongs to their nature. In the same way, we say that an angelic creature is at fault when it does not remain close to God. By saying this, we make it very clear that remaining close to God belongs to its nature. Who can fully conceive or express how glorious it is to remain close to God? Such a creature lives for him, draws wisdom from him, and delights in him. It enjoys this great good without death, error, or grief. Every vice harms a nature. The vice of the wicked angels was to turn away from God. This alone proves that God created their nature so good that being apart from him harms it.

2. That there is no entity⁵²¹ contrary to the divine, because nonentity seems to be that which is wholly opposite to Him who supremely and always is.

2. Nothing exists⁵²¹ that is contrary to God, because nonexistence seems to be the complete opposite of him who supremely and always exists.

This may be enough to prevent any one from supposing, when we speak of the apostate angels, that they could have another nature, derived, as it were, from some different origin, and not from God. From the great impiety of this error we shall disentangle ourselves the more readily and easily, the more distinctly we understand that which God spoke by the angel when He sent Moses to the children of Israel: "I am that I am."⁵²² For since God is the supreme existence, that is to say, supremely is, and is therefore unchangeable, the things that He made He empowered to be, but not to be supremely like Himself. To some He communicated a more ample, to others a more limited existence, and thus arranged the natures of beings in ranks. For as from sapere comes sapientia, so from esse comes essentia,—a new word indeed, which the old Latin writers did not use, but which is naturalized in our day,⁵²³ that our language may not want an equivalent for the Greek οὐσία. For this is expressed word for word by essentia. Consequently, to that nature which supremely is, and which created all else that exists, no nature is contrary save that which does not exist. For nonentity is the contrary of that which is. And thus there is no being contrary to God, the Supreme Being, and Author of all beings whatsoever.

This should be enough to prevent anyone from thinking that the apostate angels have a different nature, from some source other than God. We can free ourselves from this deeply impious error more readily and easily if we clearly understand what God said through the angel he sent to Moses for the children of Israel: "I am that I am."⁵²² God is supreme existence. That is, he exists supremely and is therefore unchangeable. He gave the things he made the power to exist, but not to exist supremely as he does. He gave some a fuller existence and others a more limited one. In this way, he arranged the natures of beings in ranks. Just as sapientia comes from sapere, so essentia comes from esse. Essentia is indeed a new word, which the old Latin writers did not use. But it has become established in our day,⁵²³ so that our language has an equivalent for the Greek οὐσία. For essentia is a word-for-word equivalent of it. Therefore, only what does not exist is contrary to the nature that exists supremely and created everything else that exists. For nonexistence is the opposite of existence. Thus, no being is contrary to God, the Supreme Being and creator of all beings whatsoever.

3. That the enemies of God are so, not by nature but by will, which, as it injures them, injures a good nature; for if vice does not injure, it is not vice.

3. God’s enemies are his enemies by choice, not by nature. Their choices harm them and thus harm a good nature. For if vice does not harm, it is not vice.

In Scripture they are called God's enemies who oppose His rule, not by nature, but by vice; having no power to hurt Him, but only themselves. For they are His enemies, not through their power to hurt, but by their will to oppose Him. For God is unchangeable, and wholly proof against injury. Therefore the vice which makes those who are called His enemies resist Him, is an evil not to God, but to themselves. And to them it is an evil, solely because it corrupts the good of their nature. It is not nature, therefore, but vice, which is contrary to God. For that which is evil is contrary to the good. And who will deny that God is the supreme good? Vice, therefore, is contrary to God, as evil to good. Further, the nature it vitiates is a good, and therefore to this good also it is contrary. But while it is contrary to God only as evil to good, it is contrary to the nature it vitiates, both as evil and as hurtful. For to God no evils are hurtful; but only to natures mutable and corruptible, though, by the testimony of the vices themselves, originally good. For were they not good, vices could not hurt them. For how do they hurt them but by depriving them of integrity, beauty, welfare, virtue, and, in short, whatever natural good vice is wont to diminish or destroy? But if there be no good to take away, then no injury can be done, and consequently there can be no vice. For it is impossible that there should be a harmless vice. Whence we gather, that though vice cannot injure the unchangeable good, it can injure nothing but good; because it does not exist where it does not injure. This, then, may be thus formulated: Vice cannot be in the highest good, and cannot be but in some good. Things solely good, therefore, can in some circumstances exist; things solely evil, never; for even those natures which are vitiated by an evil will, so far indeed as they are vitiated, are evil, but in so far as they are natures they are good. And when a vitiated nature is punished, besides the good it has in being a nature, it has this also, that it is not unpunished.⁵²⁴ For this is just, and certainly everything just is a good. For no one is punished for natural, but for voluntary vices. For even the vice which by the force of habit and long continuance has become a second nature, had its origin in the will. For at present we are speaking of the vices of the nature, which has a mental capacity for that enlightenment which discriminates between what is just and what is unjust.

Scripture calls those who oppose God’s rule his enemies. They oppose him because of vice, not because of their nature. They have no power to harm him, only themselves. They are his enemies because they will to oppose him, not because they can harm him. God is unchanging and cannot be injured. So the vice that makes his enemies resist him is an evil for them, not for God. It is evil for them only because it corrupts the good in their nature. Therefore, it is vice, not nature, that is contrary to God. Evil is contrary to good, and who would deny that God is the supreme good? So vice is contrary to God, as evil is contrary to good. The nature that vice corrupts is also good, so vice is contrary to it as well. But vice is contrary to God only as evil is contrary to good. It is contrary to the nature it corrupts both because it is evil and because it causes harm. No evil can harm God. Evil can harm only natures that can change and be corrupted. Yet their very vices show that these natures were originally good. If they were not good, vices could not harm them. Vices harm them by depriving them of wholeness, beauty, well-being, virtue, and every other natural good that vice diminishes or destroys. But if there is no good to take away, no injury can occur. And if there is no injury, there can be no vice. A harmless vice is impossible. We can therefore conclude that vice cannot injure the unchanging good, but it can injure only what is good. Vice does not exist where it causes no injury. We can put it this way: vice cannot exist in the highest good, and it can exist only in something good. So things that are entirely good can exist under some circumstances. But things that are entirely evil can never exist. Even natures corrupted by an evil will are evil only insofar as they are corrupted. Insofar as they are natures, they are good. When a corrupted nature is punished, it has another good besides the good it has as a nature. It is not left unpunished.⁵²⁴ This is just, and everything just is certainly good. No one is punished for natural vices, but only for voluntary ones. Even a vice that has become second nature through long habit began in the will. Here we are speaking of vices in a nature whose mind can be enlightened to distinguish justice from injustice.

4. Of the nature of irrational and lifeless creatures, which in their own kind and order do not mar the beauty of the universe.

4. On the nature of creatures without reason or life, which do not spoil the beauty of the universe in their own kind and order.

But it is ridiculous to condemn the faults of beasts and trees, and other such mortal and mutable things as are void of intelligence, sensation, or life, even though these faults should destroy their corruptible nature; for these creatures received, at their Creator's will, an existence fitting them, by passing away and giving place to others, to secure that lowest form of beauty, the beauty of seasons, which in its own place is a requisite part of this world. For things earthly were neither to be made equal to things heavenly, nor were they, though inferior, to be quite omitted from the universe. Since, then, in those situations where such things are appropriate, some perish to make way for others that are born in their room, and the less succumb to the greater, and the things that are overcome are transformed into the quality of those that have the mastery, this is the appointed order of things transitory. Of this order the beauty does not strike us, because by our mortal frailty we are so involved in a part of it, that we cannot perceive the whole, in which these fragments that offend us are harmonized with the most accurate fitness and beauty. And therefore, where we are not so well able to perceive the wisdom of the Creator, we are very properly enjoined to believe it, lest in the vanity of human rashness we presume to find any fault with the work of so great an Artificer. At the same time, if we attentively consider even these faults of earthly things, which are neither voluntary nor penal, they seem to illustrate the excellence of the natures themselves, which are all originated and created by God; for it is that which pleases us in this nature which we are displeased to see removed by the fault,—unless even the natures themselves displease men, as often happens when they become hurtful to them, and then men estimate them not by their nature, but by their utility; as in the case of those animals whose swarms scourged the pride of the Egyptians. But in this way of estimating, they may find fault with the sun itself; for certain criminals or debtors are sentenced by the judges to be set in the sun. Therefore it is not with respect to our convenience or discomfort, but with respect to their own nature, that the creatures are glorifying to their Artificer. Thus even the nature of the eternal fire, penal though it be to the condemned sinners, is most assuredly worthy of praise. For what is more beautiful than fire flaming, blazing, and shining? What more useful than fire for warming, restoring, cooking, though nothing is more destructive than fire burning and consuming? The same thing, then, when applied in one way, is destructive, but when applied suitably, is most beneficial. For who can find words to tell its uses throughout the whole world? We must not listen, then, to those who praise the light of fire but find fault with its heat, judging it not by its nature, but by their convenience or discomfort. For they wish to see, but not to be burnt. But they forget that this very light which is so pleasant to them, disagrees with and hurts weak eyes; and in that heat which is disagreeable to them, some animals find the most suitable conditions of a healthy life.

It is ridiculous to condemn faults in animals, trees, and other mortal, changeable things, even those without intelligence, sensation, or life. This is true even when those faults destroy their perishable nature. At their Creator’s will, these creatures received an existence suited to them. They pass away and give place to others, securing the lowest form of beauty, the beauty of the seasons. In its proper place, this beauty is a necessary part of the world. Earthly things were not meant to be equal to heavenly things. Yet, though inferior, they were not to be left out of the universe entirely. Where such things belong, some perish to make way for others that are born in their place. Lesser things give way to greater things, and the things overcome take on the qualities of what overcomes them. This is the appointed order of things that pass away. We do not see its beauty because our mortal weakness keeps us so caught up in one part of it. We cannot see the whole, where the fragments that offend us fit together with the greatest precision and beauty. Therefore, where we cannot clearly perceive the Creator’s wisdom, we are rightly told to believe in it. Otherwise, in our vain human rashness, we might presume to find fault with the work of so great a Maker. Still, if we look carefully at these faults in earthly things, faults that are neither chosen nor punishments, they show the excellence of those things’ natures. All these natures originate with God and are created by him. What displeases us is that a fault removes something we like in a thing’s nature. Sometimes, however, people dislike the things themselves, especially when they harm them. Then people judge them not by their nature, but by their usefulness. This happened with the animals whose swarms punished the pride of the Egyptians. By that standard, people might find fault with the sun itself. For judges sentence certain criminals or debtors to be exposed to the sun. Creatures bring glory to their Maker because of their own nature, not because they make us comfortable or uncomfortable. Even the nature of eternal fire is certainly worthy of praise, though it punishes condemned sinners. What is more beautiful than fire as it flames, blazes, and shines? What is more useful for warming, restoring, and cooking? Yet nothing is more destructive than fire as it burns and consumes. The same thing, used one way, is destructive. Used appropriately, it is highly beneficial. Who can find words to describe all its uses throughout the world? We should not listen to those who praise the light of fire but find fault with its heat. They judge it not by its nature, but by their own comfort or discomfort. They want to see, but not to be burned. Yet they forget that the light they find so pleasant troubles and hurts weak eyes. And some animals find the best conditions for healthy life in the heat that others find unpleasant.

5. That in all natures, of every kind and rank, God is glorified.

5. God is glorified in all things, of every kind and rank.

All natures, then, inasmuch as they are, and have therefore a rank and species of their own, and a kind of internal harmony, are certainly good. And when they are in the places assigned to them by the order of their nature, they preserve such being as they have received. And those things which have not received everlasting being, are altered for better or for worse, so as to suit the wants and motions of those things to which the Creator's law has made them subservient; and thus they tend in the divine providence to that end which is embraced in the general scheme of the government of the universe. So that, though the corruption of transitory and perishable things brings them to utter destruction, it does not prevent their producing that which was designed to be their result. And this being so, God, who supremely is, and who therefore created every being which has not supreme existence (for that which was made of nothing could not be equal to Him, and indeed could not be at all had He not made it), is not to be found fault with on account of the creature's faults, but is to be praised in view of the natures He has made.

All things, insofar as they exist, are certainly good. Each has its own rank and kind, and a kind of inner harmony. When they occupy the places assigned to them by their nature’s order, they preserve the existence they have received. Things that have not received everlasting existence change for better or worse. They change to serve the needs and movements of those things to which the Creator’s law has made them subject. In this way, divine providence directs them toward the end included in the overall government of the universe. The decay of temporary and perishable things may destroy them completely. Yet it does not prevent them from producing the result intended for them. God, who exists supremely, created every being that does not have supreme existence. What was made from nothing could not be equal to him. Indeed, it could not exist at all if he had not made it. God is therefore not to be blamed for the faults of creatures. Rather, he is to be praised for the natures he has made.

6. What the cause of the blessedness of the good angels is, and what the cause of the misery of the wicked.

6. What causes the good angels to be blessed, and what causes the wicked angels to be miserable.

Thus the true cause of the blessedness of the good angels is found to be this, that they cleave to Him who supremely is. And if we ask the cause of the misery of the bad, it occurs to us, and not unreasonably, that they are miserable because they have forsaken Him who supremely is, and have turned to themselves who have no such essence. And this vice, what else is it called than pride? For "pride is the beginning of sin."⁵²⁵ They were unwilling, then, to preserve their strength for God; and as adherence to God was the condition of their enjoying an ampler being, they diminished it by preferring themselves to Him. This was the first defect, and the first impoverishment, and the first flaw of their nature, which was created, not indeed supremely existent, but finding its blessedness in the enjoyment of the Supreme Being; whilst by abandoning Him it should become, not indeed no nature at all, but a nature with a less ample existence, and therefore wretched.

The true cause of the good angels’ blessedness is that they cling to him who supremely exists. If we ask why the bad angels are miserable, a reasonable answer comes to mind. They are miserable because they have abandoned him who supremely exists. They have turned instead to themselves, who have no such existence. What else is this vice called but pride? For "pride is the beginning of sin."⁵²⁵ They were unwilling, then, to keep their strength for God. By remaining close to God, they enjoyed a fuller existence. By preferring themselves to him, they diminished it. This was the first defect, the first impoverishment, and the first flaw in their nature. They were not created with supreme existence, but found their blessedness in enjoying the Supreme Being. By abandoning him, they did not cease to have a nature altogether. Instead, their nature had a less full existence, and so they became wretched.

If the further question be asked, What was the efficient cause of their evil will? there is none. For what is it which makes the will bad, when it is the will itself which makes the action bad? And consequently the bad will is the cause of the bad action, but nothing is the efficient cause of the bad will. For if anything is the cause, this thing either has or has not a will. If it has, the will is either good or bad. If good, who is so left to himself as to say that a good will makes a will bad? For in this case a good will would be the cause of sin; a most absurd supposition. On the other hand, if this hypothetical thing has a bad will, I wish to know what made it so; and that we may not go on for ever, I ask at once, what made the first evil will bad? For that is not the first which was itself corrupted by an evil will, but that is the first which was made evil by no other will. For if it were preceded by that which made it evil, that will was first which made the other evil. But if it is replied, "Nothing made it evil; it always was evil," I ask if it has been existing in some nature. For if not, then it did not exist at all; and if it did exist in some nature, then it vitiated and corrupted it, and injured it, and consequently deprived it of good. And therefore the evil will could not exist in an evil nature, but in a nature at once good and mutable, which this vice could injure. For if it did no injury, it was no vice; and consequently the will in which it was, could not be called evil. But if it did injury, it did it by taking away or diminishing good. And therefore there could not be from eternity, as was suggested, an evil will in that thing in which there had been previously a natural good, which the evil will was able to diminish by corrupting it. If, then, it was not from eternity, who, I ask, made it? The only thing that can be suggested in reply is, that something which itself had no will, made the will evil. I ask, then, whether this thing was superior, inferior, or equal to it? If superior, then it is better. How, then, has it no will, and not rather a good will? The same reasoning applies if it was equal; for so long as two things have equally a good will, the one cannot produce in the other an evil will. Then remains the supposition that that which corrupted the will of the angelic nature which first sinned, was itself an inferior thing without a will. But that thing, be it of the lowest and most earthly kind, is certainly itself good, since it is a nature and being, with a form and rank of its own in its own kind and order. How, then, can a good thing be the efficient cause of an evil will? How, I say, can good be the cause of evil? For when the will abandons what is above itself, and turns to what is lower, it becomes evil—not because that is evil to which it turns, but because the turning itself is wicked. Therefore it is not an inferior thing which has made the will evil, but it is itself which has become so by wickedly and inordinately desiring an inferior thing. For if two men, alike in physical and moral constitution, see the same corporal beauty, and one of them is excited by the sight to desire an illicit enjoyment, while the other stedfastly maintains a modest restraint of his will, what do we suppose brings it about, that there is an evil will in the one and not in the other? What produces it in the man in whom it exists? Not the bodily beauty, for that was presented equally to the gaze of both, and yet did not produce in both an evil will. Did the flesh of the one cause the desire as he looked? But why did not the flesh of the other? Or was it the disposition? But why not the disposition of both? For we are supposing that both were of a like temperament of body and soul. Must we, then, say that the one was tempted by a secret suggestion of the evil spirit? As if it was not by his own will that he consented to this suggestion and to any inducement whatever! This consent, then, this evil will which he presented to the evil suasive influence,—what was the cause of it, we ask? For, not to delay on such a difficulty as this, if both are tempted equally, and one yields and consents to the temptation, while the other remains unmoved by it, what other account can we give of the matter than this, that the one is willing, the other unwilling, to fall away from chastity? And what causes this but their own wills, in cases at least such as we are supposing, where the temperament is identical? The same beauty was equally obvious to the eyes of both; the same secret temptation pressed on both with equal violence. However minutely we examine the case, therefore, we can discern nothing which caused the will of the one to be evil. For if we say that the man himself made his will evil, what was the man himself before his will was evil but a good nature created by God, the unchangeable good? Here are two men who, before the temptation, were alike in body and soul, and of whom one yielded to the tempter who persuaded him, while the other could not be persuaded to desire that lovely body which was equally before the eyes of both. Shall we say of the successfully tempted man that he corrupted his own will, since he was certainly good before his will became bad? Then, why did he do so? Was it because his will was a nature, or because it was made of nothing? We shall find that the latter is the case. For if a nature is the cause of an evil will, what else can we say than that evil arises from good, or that good is the cause of evil? And how can it come to pass that a nature, good though mutable, should produce any evil—that is to say, should make the will itself wicked?

If someone asks what brought their evil will into being, the answer is that nothing did. What makes a will bad, when it is the will itself that makes an action bad? A bad will causes a bad action, but nothing brings the bad will into being. Suppose something did cause it. That thing would either have a will or not. If it had a will, that will would be either good or bad. If it were good, who could be so misguided as to say that a good will makes a will bad? A good will would then be the cause of sin, which is absurd. But suppose this thing has a bad will. I want to know what made it bad. To avoid going on forever, I ask at once: What made the first evil will bad? A will corrupted by another evil will is not the first. The first is the one made evil by no other will. If another will came before it and made it evil, that other will was the first. Suppose someone replies, "Nothing made it evil. It was always evil." I ask whether it existed in some nature. If not, it did not exist at all. If it did, it damaged, corrupted, and injured that nature. It therefore deprived the nature of some good. So the evil will could not exist in an evil nature. It existed in a nature that was both good and changeable, one that this defect could injure. If it caused no injury, it was no defect. In that case, the will affected by it could not be called evil. But if it did cause injury, it did so by taking away or reducing good. So an evil will could not have existed from eternity, as suggested, in that thing. For the thing had a natural good beforehand, which the evil will could reduce by corrupting it. If the evil will was not eternal, I ask, who made it? The only answer left is that something without a will made the will evil. Was this thing higher, lower, or equal to the will? If it was higher, it was better. How, then, could it lack a will rather than have a good one? The same reasoning applies if it was equal. As long as two things have equally good wills, one cannot produce an evil will in the other. This leaves the possibility that something lower and without a will corrupted the angelic nature that first sinned. But even if that thing is of the lowest and most earthly kind, it is certainly good. It is a nature and a being, with its own form and place in its own kind and order. How, then, can a good thing bring an evil will into being? How can good cause evil? When the will abandons what is above it and turns toward what is lower, it becomes evil. This is not because the thing it turns to is evil, but because the turning itself is wicked. So a lower thing has not made the will evil. Rather, the will has become evil by wickedly and excessively desiring a lower thing. Suppose two men are alike in body and character and see the same physical beauty. The sight stirs one to desire forbidden pleasure. The other firmly keeps his will under modest restraint. What explains why one has an evil will and the other does not? What produces it in the man who has it? It is not the physical beauty. Both men saw it equally, yet it did not produce an evil will in both. Did the first man's flesh cause his desire as he looked? Then why did the other's flesh not do the same? Was it his disposition? Then why not the disposition of both? For we are supposing that both had the same temperament of body and soul. Must we say that an evil spirit tempted the first man with a secret suggestion? But surely it was by his own will that he agreed to this suggestion, or to any other inducement. What, then, caused this consent, this evil will he brought to the evil influence urging him on? To avoid lingering over this difficulty, suppose both men are tempted equally. One yields and agrees to the temptation, while the other remains unmoved. What else can we say except that one is willing to abandon chastity and the other is not? What causes this except their own wills, at least in cases like this, where their temperaments are identical? Both saw the same beauty equally. The same secret temptation pressed on both with equal force. However closely we examine the case, we can find nothing that caused one man's will to become evil. Suppose we say that the man himself made his will evil. Before his will became evil, what was he but a good nature created by God, the unchanging good? The two men were alike in body and soul before the temptation. One yielded to the tempter's persuasion. The other could not be persuaded to desire the lovely body equally visible to both. Shall we say that the man who yielded corrupted his own will? He was certainly good before his will became bad. Then why did he do it? Was it because his will was a nature, or because it was made from nothing? We will find that it was because it was made from nothing. For if a nature causes an evil will, what can we say except that evil comes from good, or that good causes evil? How can a nature, though good and changeable, produce any evil? How can it make the will itself wicked?

7. That we ought not to expect to find any efficient cause of the evil will.

7. Why we should not expect to find an efficient cause of the evil will.

Let no one, therefore, look for an efficient cause of the evil will; for it is not efficient, but deficient, as the will itself is not an effecting of something, but a defect. For defection from that which supremely is, to that which has less of being,—this is to begin to have an evil will. Now, to seek to discover the causes of these defections,—causes, as I have said, not efficient, but deficient,—is as if some one sought to see darkness, or hear silence. Yet both of these are known by us, and the former by means only of the eye, the latter only by the ear; but not by their positive actuality,⁵²⁶ but by their want of it. Let no one, then, seek to know from me what I know that I do not know; unless he perhaps wishes to learn to be ignorant of that of which all we know is, that it cannot be known. For those things which are known not by their actuality, but by their want of it, are known, if our expression may be allowed and understood, by not knowing them, that by knowing them they may be not known. For when the eyesight surveys objects that strike the sense, it nowhere sees darkness but where it begins not to see. And so no other sense but the ear can perceive silence, and yet it is only perceived by not hearing. Thus, too, our mind perceives intelligible forms by understanding them; but when they are deficient, it knows them by not knowing them; for "who can understand defects?"⁵²⁷

Let no one, then, look for an efficient cause of an evil will. Its cause is not efficient but deficient. The evil will itself does not bring something into being, but is a defect. To turn away from what supremely is toward what has less being is to begin to have an evil will. To seek the causes of these turnings away is like trying to see darkness or hear silence. As I have said, these causes are not efficient but deficient. Yet we know both darkness and silence. We know darkness only through the eye and silence only through the ear. We know them not by their actual presence,⁵²⁶ but by its absence. Let no one ask me to explain what I know I do not know. Perhaps someone wishes to learn to be ignorant of something we know only to be unknowable. Some things are known not by their presence, but by its absence. If I may put it this way, we know them by not knowing them, so that by knowing them we may not know them. When our eyes survey visible objects, they see darkness only where they begin not to see. Likewise, only the ear can perceive silence, yet it perceives silence only by not hearing. In the same way, our minds perceive intelligible forms by understanding them. But when those forms are deficient, the mind knows them by not knowing them. For "who can understand defects?"⁵²⁷

8. Of the misdirected love whereby the will fell away from the immutable to the mutable good.

8. On the misdirected love that led the will away from unchanging good toward changeable good.

This I do know, that the nature of God can never, nowhere, nowise be defective, and that natures made of nothing can. These latter, however, the more being they have, and the more good they do (for then they do something positive), the more they have efficient causes; but in so far as they are defective in being, and consequently do evil (for then what is their work but vanity?), they have deficient causes. And I know likewise, that the will could not become evil, were it unwilling to become so; and therefore its failings are justly punished, being not necessary, but voluntary. For its defections are not to evil things, but are themselves evil; that is to say, are not towards things that are naturally and in themselves evil, but the defection of the will is evil, because it is contrary to the order of nature, and an abandonment of that which has supreme being for that which has less. For avarice is not a fault inherent in gold, but in the man who inordinately loves gold, to the detriment of justice, which ought to be held in incomparably higher regard than gold. Neither is luxury the fault of lovely and charming objects, but of the heart that inordinately loves sensual pleasures, to the neglect of temperance, which attaches us to objects more lovely in their spirituality, and more delectable by their incorruptibility. Nor yet is boasting the fault of human praise, but of the soul that is inordinately fond of the applause of men, and that makes light of the voice of conscience. Pride, too, is not the fault of him who delegates power, nor of power itself, but of the soul that is inordinately enamoured of its own power, and despises the more just dominion of a higher authority. Consequently he who inordinately loves the good which any nature possesses, even though he obtain it, himself becomes evil in the good, and wretched because deprived of a greater good.

This I know: God’s nature can never be defective, anywhere or in any way. But natures made from nothing can be defective. The more being they have, and the more good they do, the more they have causes that bring something into being. For in doing good, they bring about something real. But insofar as they lack being and consequently do evil, they have causes that fail to bring something about. For what does their work then amount to but emptiness? I also know that the will could not become evil unless it were willing to do so. Its failings are therefore justly punished, because they are voluntary, not necessary. The will does not turn away toward evil things. Rather, its turning away is itself evil. It does not turn toward things that are evil by nature and in themselves. Its turning away is evil because it goes against the order of nature. It abandons what has supreme being for what has less being. For greed is not a fault in gold. It is a fault in the person who loves gold excessively, at the expense of justice. Justice deserves incomparably greater regard than gold. Likewise, excessive indulgence is not a fault in lovely and charming things. It is a fault in the heart that loves sensual pleasures excessively and neglects self-control. Self-control binds us to things more lovely because they are spiritual, and more delightful because they cannot decay. Nor is boasting a fault in human praise. It is a fault in the soul that loves people’s applause excessively and pays little attention to conscience. Pride, too, is not a fault in the one who grants power, or in power itself. It is a fault in the soul that loves its own power excessively and despises a higher authority’s more just rule. Therefore, anyone who loves excessively the good that any nature possesses becomes evil in that good, even if he obtains it. He also becomes miserable because he is deprived of a greater good.

9. Whether the angels, besides receiving from God their nature, received from Him also their good will by the Holy Spirit imbuing them with love.

9. Whether the angels received not only their nature from God, but also their good will, through the Holy Spirit filling them with love.

There is, then, no natural efficient cause, or, if I may be allowed the expression, no essential cause, of the evil will, since itself is the origin of evil in mutable spirits, by which the good of their nature is diminished and corrupted; and the will is made evil by nothing else than defection from God,—a defection of which the cause, too, is certainly deficient. But as to the good will, if we should say that there is no efficient cause of it, we must beware of giving currency to the opinion that the good will of the good angels is not created, but is co-eternal with God. For if they themselves are created, how can we say that their good will was eternal? But if created, was it created along with themselves, or did they exist for a time without it? If along with themselves, then doubtless it was created by Him who created them, and, as soon as ever they were created, they attached themselves to Him who created them, with the love He created in them. And they are separated from the society of the rest, because they have continued in the same good will; while the others have fallen away to another will, which is an evil one, by the very fact of its being a falling away from the good; from which, we may add, they would not have fallen away had they been unwilling to do so. But if the good angels existed for a time without a good will, and produced it in themselves without God's interference, then it follows that they made themselves better than He made them. Away with such a thought! For without a good will, what were they but evil? Or if they were not evil, because they had not an evil will any more than a good one (for they had not fallen away from that which as yet they had not begun to enjoy), certainly they were not the same, not so good, as when they came to have a good will. Or if they could not make themselves better than they were made by Him who is surpassed by none in His work, then certainly, without His helpful operation, they could not come to possess that good will which made them better. And though their good will effected that they did not turn to themselves, who had a more stinted existence, but to Him who supremely is, and that, being united to Him, their own being was enlarged, and they lived a wise and blessed life by His communications to them, what does this prove but that the will, however good it might be, would have continued helplessly only to desire Him, had not He who had made their nature out of nothing, and yet capable of enjoying Him, first stimulated it to desire Him, and then filled it with Himself, and so made it better?

There is, then, no natural cause that produces an evil will. If I may use the expression, it has no essential cause. The evil will itself is the source of evil in changeable spirits. Through it, the goodness of their nature is diminished and corrupted. Nothing makes the will evil except its turning away from God. The cause of that turning away is itself certainly deficient. But what about the good will? If we say that nothing causes it, we must be careful. We must not encourage the belief that the good angels’ good will is uncreated and eternal alongside God. For if the angels themselves were created, how can we say their good will was eternal? But if it was created, was it created with them? Or did they exist for a time without it? If it was created with them, then surely it was created by the one who created them. As soon as they were created, they joined themselves to their creator with the love he created in them. They are separated from the company of the others because they have continued in the same good will. The others fell away into a different will, an evil one. It is evil precisely because it is a falling away from what is good. And they would not have fallen away if they had been unwilling to do so. But suppose the good angels existed for a time without a good will. Suppose, too, that they produced it in themselves without God’s help. It would follow that they made themselves better than he made them. Away with such a thought! For without a good will, what were they but evil? Or perhaps they were not evil, since they had neither an evil will nor a good one. They had not fallen away from what they had not yet begun to enjoy. Even so, they were certainly not the same as they became, nor as good as they became, when they acquired a good will. Or suppose they could not make themselves better than the one whose work no one surpasses had made them. Then, without his help, they certainly could not acquire the good will that made them better. Their good will led them to turn, not toward themselves, whose existence was more limited, but toward him who supremely exists. United to him, they gained a fuller existence. Through what he shared with them, they lived a wise and blessed life. But what does this prove? However good their will might have been, it would have remained powerless, able only to desire him. For he made their nature from nothing, yet made it capable of enjoying him. He first stirred it to desire him, then filled it with himself and so made it better.

Besides, this too has to be inquired into, whether, if the good angels made their own will good, they did so with or without will? If without, then it was not their doing. If with, was the will good or bad? If bad, how could a bad will give birth to a good one? If good, then already they had a good will. And who made this will, which already they had, but He who created them with a good will, or with that chaste love by which they cleaved to Him, in one and the same act creating their nature, and endowing it with grace? And thus we are driven to believe that the holy angels never existed without a good will or the love of God. But the angels who, though created good, are yet evil now, became so by their own will. And this will was not made evil by their good nature, unless by its voluntary defection from good; for good is not the cause of evil, but a defection from good is. These angels, therefore, either received less of the grace of the divine love than those who persevered in the same; or if both were created equally good, then, while the one fell by their evil will, the others were more abundantly assisted, and attained to that pitch of blessedness at which they became certain they should never fall from it,—as we have already shown in the preceding book.⁵²⁸ We must therefore acknowledge, with the praise due to the Creator, that not only of holy men, but also of the holy angels, it can be said that "the love of God is shed abroad in their hearts by the Holy Ghost, which is given unto them."⁵²⁹ And that not only of men, but primarily and principally of angels it is true, as it is written, "It is good to draw near to God."⁵³⁰ And those who have this good in common, have, both with Him to whom they draw near, and with one another, a holy fellowship, and form one city of God—His living sacrifice, and His living temple. And I see that, as I have now spoken of the rise of this city among the angels, it is time to speak of the origin of that part of it which is hereafter to be united to the immortal angels, and which at present is being gathered from among mortal men, and is either sojourning on earth, or, in the persons of those who have passed through death, is resting in the secret receptacles and abodes of disembodied spirits. For from one man, whom God created as the first, the whole human race descended, according to the faith of Holy Scripture, which deservedly is of wonderful authority among all nations throughout the world; since, among its other true statements, it predicted, by its divine foresight, that all nations would give credit to it.

We must also ask whether the good angels made their own will good with or without willing it. If they did it without willing it, then it was not their doing. If they did it by willing it, was their will good or bad? If it was bad, how could a bad will produce a good one? If it was good, then they already had a good will. Who made the good will they already had? It was surely he who created them with a good will, with the pure love that bound them to him. In one act, he created their nature and gave it grace. We are therefore led to believe that the holy angels never existed without a good will or love for God. The angels who are now evil, although they were created good, became evil by their own will. Their good nature did not make their will evil. Rather, their will became evil by voluntarily turning away from good. Good is not the cause of evil. Turning away from good is. These angels, then, either received less of the grace of divine love than those who remained in it. Or, if both were created equally good, the first fell through their evil will. The others received greater help and reached a state of blessedness where they were certain they would never fall. We have already shown this in the preceding book.⁵²⁸ We must therefore acknowledge, with due praise to the Creator, that this can be said of holy angels as well as holy people: “The love of God is shed abroad in their hearts by the Holy Ghost, which is given unto them.”⁵²⁹ And what is written is true not only of people, but first and foremost of angels: “It is good to draw near to God.”⁵³⁰ Those who share this good have a holy fellowship with him, to whom they draw near, and with one another. They form one city of God, his living sacrifice and his living temple. I have now spoken of the rise of this city among the angels. It is time to speak of the origin of the part that will one day join the immortal angels. It is now being gathered from among mortal people. Its members are either living temporarily on earth or have passed through death. Those who have died rest in the hidden places and dwelling places of spirits without bodies. The whole human race descended from one man, whom God created first. This is what Holy Scripture teaches. It rightly holds wonderful authority among all nations throughout the world. For among its other true statements, it predicted through divine foresight that all nations would believe it.

10. Of the falseness of the history which allots many thousand years to the world's past.

10. On the false history that assigns many thousands of years to the world's past.

Let us, then, omit the conjectures of men who know not what they say, when they speak of the nature and origin of the human race. For some hold the same opinion regarding men that they hold regarding the world itself, that they have always been. Thus Apuleius says when he is describing our race, "Individually they are mortal, but collectively, and as a race, they are immortal."⁵³¹ And when they are asked, how, if the human race has always been, they vindicate the truth of their history, which narrates who were the inventors, and what they invented, and who first instituted the liberal studies and the other arts, and who first inhabited this or that region, and this or that island? they reply⁵³² that most, if not all lands, were so desolated at intervals by fire and flood, that men were greatly reduced in numbers, and from these, again, the population was restored to its former numbers, and that thus there was at intervals a new beginning made, and though those things which had been interrupted and checked by the severe devastations were only renewed, yet they seemed to be originated then, but that man could not exist at all save as produced by man. But they say what they think, not what they know.

Let us set aside the guesses of people who do not know what they are talking about when they discuss human nature and origins. Some believe that the human race has always existed, just as they believe the world has always existed. Thus Apuleius says of our race, "As individuals, they are mortal, but together, as a race, they are immortal."⁵³¹ But history tells us who invented things, and what they invented. It also tells us who first established the liberal studies and the other arts. It tells us who first inhabited various regions and islands. How, then, can they defend the truth of this history if the human race has always existed? They reply⁵³² that fire and flood periodically devastated most, if not all, lands. These disasters greatly reduced the number of people, but the population was restored from those who survived. In this way, they say, a new beginning was made from time to time. Things interrupted and halted by the terrible devastation were only renewed, though they seemed to have originated then. They say that humans could not exist at all unless born from other humans. But they are saying what they think, not what they know.

They are deceived, too, by those highly mendacious documents which profess to give the history of many thousand years, though, reckoning by the sacred writings, we find that not 6000 years have yet passed.⁵³³ And, not to spend many words in exposing the baselessness of these documents, in which so many thousands of years are accounted for, nor in proving that their authorities are totally inadequate, let me cite only that letter which Alexander the Great wrote to his mother Olympias,⁵³⁴ giving her the narrative he had from an Egyptian priest, which he had extracted from their sacred archives, and which gave an account of kingdoms mentioned also by the Greek historians. In this letter of Alexander's a term of upwards of 5000 years is assigned to the kingdom of Assyria; while in the Greek history only 1300 years are reckoned from the reign of Bel himself, whom both Greek and Egyptian agree in counting the first king of Assyria. Then to the empire of the Persians and Macedonians this Egyptian assigned more than 8000 years, counting to the time of Alexander, to whom he was speaking; while among the Greeks, 485 years are assigned to the Macedonians down to the death of Alexander, and to the Persians 233 years, reckoning to the termination of his conquests. Thus these give a much smaller number of years than the Egyptians; and indeed, though multiplied three times, the Greek chronology would still be shorter. For the Egyptians are said to have formerly reckoned only four months to their year;⁵³⁵ so that one year, according to the fuller and truer computation now in use among them as well as among ourselves, would comprehend three of their old years. But not even thus, as I said, does the Greek history correspond with the Egyptian in its chronology. And therefore the former must receive the greater credit, because it does not exceed the true account of the duration of the world as it is given by our documents, which are truly sacred. Further, if this letter of Alexander, which has become so famous, differs widely in this matter of chronology from the probable credible account, how much less can we believe these documents which, though full of fabulous and fictitious antiquities, they would fain oppose to the authority of our well-known and divine books, which predicted that the whole world would believe them, and which the whole world accordingly has believed; which proved, too, that it had truly narrated past events by its prediction of future events, which have so exactly come to pass!

They are also deceived by deeply dishonest documents that claim to record the history of many thousands of years. Yet, according to the sacred writings, not even 6,000 years have passed.⁵³³ I will not spend much time exposing the baselessness of these accounts or proving that their sources are entirely unreliable. Instead, I will cite a letter Alexander the Great wrote to his mother Olympias.⁵³⁴ In it, he recounts what an Egyptian priest told him, drawing on Egypt’s sacred archives. The account described kingdoms also mentioned by Greek historians. In Alexander’s letter, the kingdom of Assyria is said to have lasted more than 5,000 years. But Greek history counts only 1,300 years from the reign of Bel himself. Both Greek and Egyptian accounts name him as the first king of Assyria. The Egyptian also assigned more than 8,000 years to the empires of the Persians and Macedonians, counting down to Alexander’s time. The Greeks, however, assign 485 years to the Macedonians, down to Alexander’s death. They assign 233 years to the Persians, counting down to the end of Alexander’s conquests. Thus, the Greek figures are much lower than the Egyptian ones. Even if multiplied by three, the Greek chronology would still be shorter. The Egyptians are said to have once counted only four months as a year.⁵³⁵ By the fuller and more accurate reckoning now used by both them and us, one year would contain three of their old years. Yet, even with this adjustment, Greek history does not agree with Egyptian chronology. The Greek account must therefore be given greater credit. It does not exceed the true age of the world given in our documents, which are truly sacred. Alexander’s letter has become very famous, yet its chronology differs greatly from the account we can reasonably believe. How much less, then, can we believe these other documents? They are full of fabulous and invented accounts of ancient times, yet people would like to set them against the authority of our well-known divine books. These books predicted that the whole world would believe them, and the whole world has indeed believed them. They also showed that they had truly recorded past events by predicting future events, which have come to pass exactly as foretold.

There are some, again, who, though they do not suppose that this world is eternal, are of opinion either that this is not the only world, but that there are numberless worlds, or that indeed it is the only one, but that it dies, and is born again at fixed intervals, and this times without number;⁵³⁶ but they must acknowledge that the human race existed before there were other men to beget them. For they cannot suppose that, if the whole world perish, some men would be left alive in the world, as they might survive in floods and conflagrations, which those other speculators suppose to be partial, and from which they can therefore reasonably argue that a few men survived whose posterity would renew the population; but as they believe that the world itself is renewed out of its own material, so they must believe that out of its elements the human race was produced, and then that the progeny of mortals sprang like that of other animals from their parents.

There are others who do not believe that this world is eternal. Some think that this is not the only world, but that there are countless worlds. Others think it is the only one, but that it dies and is born again at fixed intervals, endlessly.⁵³⁶ Yet they must admit that the human race existed before there were other humans to give birth to them. They cannot suppose that some people would remain alive in the world if the whole world perished. People might survive floods and fires, which the other thinkers believe destroy only part of the world. Those thinkers can therefore reasonably argue that a few people survived, and their descendants repopulated the world. But those who believe that the world itself is renewed from its own material must also believe that the human race was produced from its elements. Afterward, humans, like other animals, were born from parents.

12. How these persons are to be answered, who find fault with the creation of man on the score of its recent date.

12. How to answer those who criticize the creation of humanity because it happened so recently.

As to those who are always asking why man was not created during these countless ages of the infinitely extended past, and came into being so lately that, according to Scripture, less than 6000 years have elapsed since he began to be, I would reply to them regarding the creation of man, just as I replied regarding the origin of the world to those who will not believe that it is not eternal, but had a beginning, which even Plato himself most plainly declares, though some think his statement was not consistent with his real opinion.⁵³⁷ If it offends them that the time that has elapsed since the creation of man is so short, and his years so few according to our authorities, let them take this into consideration, that nothing that has a limit is long, and that all the ages of time being finite, are very little, or indeed nothing at all, when compared to the interminable eternity. Consequently, if there had elapsed since the creation of man, I do not say five or six, but even sixty or six hundred thousand years, or sixty times as many, or six hundred or six hundred thousand times as many, or this sum multiplied until it could no longer be expressed in numbers, the same question could still be put, Why was he not made before? For the past and boundless eternity during which God abstained from creating man is so great, that, compare it with what vast and untold number of ages you please, so long as there is a definite conclusion of this term of time, it is not even as if you compared the minutest drop of water with the ocean that everywhere flows around the globe. For of these two, one indeed is very small, the other incomparably vast, yet both are finite; but that space of time which starts from some beginning, and is limited by some termination, be it of what extent it may, if you compare it with that which has no beginning, I know not whether to say we should count it the very minutest thing, or nothing at all. For, take this limited time, and deduct from the end of it, one by one, the briefest moments (as you might take day by day from a man's life, beginning at the day in which he now lives, back to that of his birth), and though the number of moments you must subtract in this backward movement be so great that no word can express it, yet this subtraction will some time carry you to the beginning. But if you take away from a time which has no beginning, I do not say brief moments one by one, nor yet hours, or days, or months, or years even in quantities, but terms of years so vast that they cannot be named by the most skilful arithmetician,—take away terms of years as vast as that which we have supposed to be gradually consumed by the deduction of moments,—and take them away not once and again repeatedly, but always, and what do you effect, what do you make by your deduction, since you never reach the beginning which has no existence? Wherefore, that which we now demand after five thousand odd years, our descendants might with like curiosity demand after six hundred thousand years, supposing these dying generations of men continue so long to decay and be renewed, and supposing posterity continues as weak and ignorant as ourselves. The same question might have been asked by those who have lived before us, and while man was even newer upon earth. The first man himself, in short, might, the day after, or the very day of his creation, have asked why he was created no sooner. And no matter at what earlier or later period he had been created, this controversy about the commencement of this world's history would have had precisely the same difficulties as it has now.

Some people keep asking why humanity was not created during the countless ages of the infinite past. They ask why we came into being so recently. According to Scripture, fewer than 6,000 years have passed since humanity began to exist. I would answer them as I answered those who refuse to believe that the world had a beginning and is not eternal. Plato himself states this most plainly, though some think his statement did not reflect his true opinion.⁵³⁷ If they object that so little time has passed since humanity was created, according to our authorities, let them consider this. Nothing that has a limit is long. All the ages of time are finite. Compared with endless eternity, they are very little, or indeed nothing at all. Suppose that not five or six thousand years had passed since humanity was created, but sixty or six hundred thousand. Suppose it were sixty times as many, or six hundred or six hundred thousand times as many. Suppose that number were multiplied until it could no longer be expressed in numbers. The same question could still be asked. Why was humanity not created earlier? The boundless eternity before creation, during which God did not create humanity, is so vast that no finite span can compare with it. Choose any vast and countless number of ages, as long as that span has a definite end. Comparing it with eternity is not even like comparing the smallest drop of water with the ocean that surrounds the whole earth. One of these is very small, and the other is incomparably vast, yet both are finite. But consider a span of time that starts with a beginning and is limited by an end, no matter how long it is. Compared with what has no beginning, I do not know whether to call it the smallest thing imaginable or nothing at all. Take this limited span of time and subtract the briefest moments from its end, one by one. You might do the same with a person's life, counting backward day by day from today to the day of birth. The number of moments you must subtract may be too great to express in words. Even so, this subtraction will eventually bring you to the beginning. Now consider a span of time that has no beginning. Subtract from it not brief moments one by one, nor even hours, days, months, or years in large quantities. Instead, subtract periods of years so vast that even the most skilled mathematician cannot name them. Make each period as vast as the finite span we imagined gradually consuming by subtracting moments. Subtract them not just once or repeatedly, but always. What do you accomplish by this subtraction? You never reach the beginning, because there is none. We ask this question now, after a little more than five thousand years. Our descendants could ask it with the same curiosity after six hundred thousand years. That assumes that generations of people continue to die and be replaced for that long, and that our descendants remain as weak and ignorant as we are. Those who lived before us, when humanity was even newer to the earth, could have asked the same question. In short, the first man himself could have asked why he was not created sooner. He could have asked it the day after his creation, or even on the very day. No matter how much earlier or later he had been created, this controversy about the beginning of the world's history would have presented exactly the same difficulties it does now.

This controversy some philosophers have seen no other approved means of solving than by introducing cycles of time, in which there should be a constant renewal and repetition of the order of nature;⁵³⁸ and they have therefore asserted that these cycles will ceaselessly recur, one passing away and another coming, though they are not agreed as to whether one permanent world shall pass through all these cycles, or whether the world shall at fixed intervals die out, and be renewed so as to exhibit a recurrence of the same phenomena—the things which have been, and those which are to be, coinciding. And from this fantastic vicissitude they exempt not even the immortal soul that has attained wisdom, consigning it to a ceaseless transmigration between delusive blessedness and real misery. For how can that be truly called blessed which has no assurance of being so eternally, and is either in ignorance of the truth, and blind to the misery that is approaching, or, knowing it, is in misery and fear? Or if it passes to bliss, and leaves miseries for ever, then there happens in time a new thing which time shall not end. Why not, then, the world also? Why may not man, too, be a similar thing? So that, by following the straight path of sound doctrine, we escape, I know not what circuitous paths, discovered by deceiving and deceived sages.

Some philosophers saw only one acceptable way to resolve this controversy. They proposed cycles of time in which the order of nature would constantly renew and repeat itself.⁵³⁸ They therefore claimed that these cycles would recur endlessly, with one passing away and another beginning. But they disagreed about whether one lasting world would pass through all these cycles. Some thought instead that the world would die out at fixed intervals and be renewed. The same events would then recur, so that what had happened before would coincide with what was yet to come. They do not exempt even the immortal soul that has attained wisdom from this fanciful cycle of change. They condemn it to endless transmigration between illusory happiness and real misery. But how can a soul truly be called happy if it has no assurance that its happiness will last forever? Either it does not know the truth and is blind to the misery ahead, or it knows and lives in misery and fear. But suppose it passes into bliss and leaves its miseries behind forever. Then something new happens in time that time will never bring to an end. Why, then, should the world not be such a thing? Why should the same not be true of human beings? By following the straight path of sound teaching, we escape these strange, winding paths discovered by sages who deceive and are deceived.

Some, too, in advocating these recurring cycles that restore all things to their original, cite in favour of their supposition what Solomon says in the book of Ecclesiastes: "What is that which hath been? It is that which shall be. And what is that which is done? It is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun. Who can speak and say, See, this is new? It hath been already of old time, which was before us."⁵³⁹ This he said either of those things of which he had just been speaking—the succession of generations, the orbit of the sun, the course of rivers,—or else of all kinds of creatures that are born and die. For men were before us, are with us, and shall be after us; and so all living things and all plants. Even monstrous and irregular productions, though differing from one another, and though some are reported as solitary instances, yet resemble one another generally, in so far as they are miraculous and monstrous, and, in this sense, have been, and shall be, and are no new and recent things under the sun. However, some would understand these words as meaning that in the predestination of God all things have already existed, and that thus there is no new thing under the sun. At all events, far be it from any true believer to suppose that by these words of Solomon those cycles are meant, in which, according to those philosophers, the same periods and events of time are repeated; as if, for example, the philosopher Plato, having taught in the school at Athens which is called the Academy, so, numberless ages before, at long but certain intervals, this same Plato, and the same school, and the same disciples existed, and so also are to be repeated during the countless cycles that are yet be be,—far be it, I say, from us to believe this. For once Christ died for our sins; and, rising from the dead, He dieth no more. "Death hath no more dominion over Him;"⁵⁴⁰ and we ourselves after the resurrection shall be "ever with the Lord,"⁵⁴¹ to whom we now say, as the sacred Psalmist dictates, "Thou shalt keep us, O Lord, Thou shalt preserve us from this generation."⁵⁴² And that too which follows, is, I think, appropriate enough: "The wicked walk in a circle;" not because their life is to recur by means of these circles, which these philosophers imagine, but because the path in which their false doctrine now runs is circuitous.

Some who defend these recurring cycles, which restore all things to their original state, cite Solomon’s words in Ecclesiastes. They offer them as support for their belief: “What has been? It is what will be. What has been done? It is what will be done. There is nothing new under the sun. Can anyone say, ‘Look, this is new’? It already existed long ago, before our time.”⁵³⁹ He said this either about the things he had just discussed, the succession of generations, the sun’s orbit, and the course of rivers, or about all kinds of creatures that are born and die. People lived before us, live alongside us, and will live after us. The same is true of all living things and plants. Even monstrous and unusual creatures generally resemble one another, insofar as they are miraculous and monstrous. This is true though they differ from one another and some are reported as unique instances. In this sense, they have existed and will exist, and they are nothing new or recent under the sun. Some, however, understand these words to mean that all things have already existed in God’s predestination. In that sense, there is nothing new under the sun. In any case, no true believer should suppose that Solomon’s words refer to those cycles imagined by the philosophers. According to them, the same periods and events recur. They claim, for example, that Plato taught at the school in Athens called the Academy. Then, at long but fixed intervals through countless ages before, the same Plato, school, and disciples existed. They claim that these same things will also recur through the countless cycles yet to come. We must not believe this. For Christ died once for our sins. After rising from the dead, he dies no more. “Death no longer has dominion over him.”⁵⁴⁰ And after the resurrection, we ourselves shall be “with the Lord forever.”⁵⁴¹ To him we now say, as the sacred Psalmist teaches, “You will keep us, O Lord. You will preserve us from this generation.”⁵⁴² What follows also seems fitting to me: “The wicked walk in a circle.” This is not because their lives will recur through the cycles these philosophers imagine. Rather, the path their false teaching now follows is circular.

14. Of the creation of the human race in time, and how this was effected without any new design or change of purpose on God's part.

14. The creation of the human race in time, and how it happened without any new plan or change of purpose on God's part.

What wonder is it if, entangled in these circles, they find neither entrance nor egress? For they know not how the human race, and this mortal condition of ours, took its origin, nor how it will be brought to an end, since they cannot penetrate the inscrutable wisdom of God. For, though Himself eternal, and without beginning, yet He caused time to have a beginning; and man, whom He had not previously made, He made in time, not from a new and sudden resolution, but by His unchangeable and eternal design. Who can search out the unsearchable depth of this purpose, who can scrutinize the inscrutable wisdom, wherewith God, without change of will, created man, who had never before been, and gave him an existence in time, and increased the human race from one individual? For the Psalmist himself, when he had first said, "Thou shalt keep us, O Lord, Thou shalt preserve us from this generation for ever," and had then rebuked those whose foolish and impious doctrine preserves for the soul no eternal deliverance and blessedness, adds immediately, "The wicked walk in a circle." Then, as if it were said to him, "What then do you believe, feel, know? Are we to believe that it suddenly occurred to God to create man, whom He had never before made in a past eternity,—God, to whom nothing new can occur, and in whom is no changeableness?" the Psalmist goes on to reply, as if addressing God Himself, "According to the depth of Thy wisdom Thou hast multiplied the children of men." Let men, he seems to say, fancy what they please, let them conjecture and dispute as seems good to them, but Thou hast multiplied the children of men according to the depth of thy wisdom, which no man can comprehend. For this is a depth indeed, that God always has been, and that man, whom He had never made before, He willed to make in time, and this without changing His design and will.

Is it any wonder that, trapped in these circles, they can find neither a way in nor a way out? They do not know how the human race and our mortal condition began, or how they will end. They cannot grasp the unfathomable wisdom of God. Though God is eternal and has no beginning, he caused time to begin. He made man in time, although he had never made him before. He did this not by a new and sudden decision, but according to his unchanging and eternal plan. Who can fathom the unfathomable depth of this purpose? Who can examine the wisdom beyond understanding by which God created man without changing his will? Man had never existed before, yet God gave him existence in time and multiplied the human race from one person. The Psalmist himself first said, "You will keep us, O Lord. You will preserve us from this generation forever." He then rebuked those whose foolish and impious teaching leaves the soul no lasting deliverance or blessedness. Immediately afterward, he adds, "The wicked walk in a circle." Then the Psalmist goes on to reply, as if someone had asked him, "What then do you believe, feel, and know? Are we to believe that God suddenly thought of creating man, whom he had never made throughout past eternity? Can anything new occur to God, who never changes?" The Psalmist replies as if addressing God himself: "According to the depth of your wisdom, you have multiplied the children of men." He seems to say, let people imagine whatever they please. Let them guess and argue as they see fit. But you have multiplied the children of men according to the depth of your wisdom, which no one can understand. This is indeed a profound mystery. God has always existed, yet he willed to make man in time, though he had never made him before. And he did this without changing his plan or his will.

For my own part, indeed, as I dare not say that there ever was a time when the Lord God was not Lord,⁵⁴³ so I ought not to doubt that man had no existence before time, and was first created in time. But when I consider what God could be the Lord of, if there was not always some creature, I shrink from making any assertion, remembering my own insignificance, and that it is written, "What man is he that can know the counsel of God? or who can think what the will of the Lord is? For the thoughts of mortal men are timid, and our devices are but uncertain. For the corruptible body presseth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weigheth down the mind that museth upon many things."⁵⁴⁴ Many things certainly do I muse upon in this earthly tabernacle, because the one thing which is true among the many, or beyond the many, I cannot find. If, then, among these many thoughts, I say that there have always been creatures for Him to be Lord of, who is always and ever has been Lord, but that these creatures have not always been the same, but succeeded one another (for we would not seem to say that any is co-eternal with the Creator, an assertion condemned equally by faith and sound reason), I must take care lest I fall into the absurd and ignorant error of maintaining that by these successions and changes mortal creatures have always existed, whereas the immortal creatures had not begun to exist until the date of our own world, when the angels were created; if at least the angels are intended by that light which was first made, or, rather, by that heaven of which it is said, "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth."⁵⁴⁵ The angels at least did not exist before they were created; for if we say that they have always existed, we shall seem to make them co-eternal with the Creator. Again, if I say that the angels were not created in time, but existed before all times, as those over whom God, who has ever been Sovereign, exercised His sovereignty, then I shall be asked whether, if they were created before all time, they, being creatures, could possibly always exist. It may perhaps be replied, Why not always, since that which is in all time may very properly be said to be "always?" Now, so true is it that these angels have existed in all time, that even before time was, they were created; if at least time began with the heavens, and the angels existed before the heavens. And if time was even before the heavenly bodies, not indeed marked by hours, days, months, and years,—for these measures of time's periods which are commonly and properly called times, did manifestly begin with the motion of the heavenly bodies, and so God said, when He appointed them, "Let them be for signs, and for seasons, and for days, and for years,"⁵⁴⁶—if, I say, time was before these heavenly bodies by some changing movement, whose parts succeeded one another and could not exist simultaneously, and if there was some such movement among the angels which necessitated the existence of time, and that they from their very creation should be subject to these temporal changes, then they have existed in all time, for time came into being along with them. And who will say that what was in all time, was not always?

For my part, I dare not say that there was ever a time when the Lord God was not Lord.⁵⁴³ Likewise, I should not doubt that human beings did not exist before time and were first created in time. But what could God have been Lord of if there had not always been some creature? When I consider this, I hesitate to make any claim. I remember how insignificant I am and what is written: "What man can know God's counsel? Who can understand the Lord's will? The thoughts of mortal people are timid, and our plans are uncertain. The perishable body weighs down the soul, and this earthly dwelling burdens the mind as it considers many things."⁵⁴⁴ I certainly consider many things in this earthly dwelling. For I cannot find the one truth among the many things, or beyond them. Suppose, then, that among these many thoughts I say that creatures have always existed for God to be Lord of. He is Lord always and has always been Lord. But suppose I say that these creatures have not always been the same, but have succeeded one another. For we do not want to suggest that any creature is co-eternal with the Creator. Both faith and sound reason condemn that claim. Then I must be careful not to fall into an absurd and ignorant error. I must not claim that, through these successions and changes, mortal creatures have always existed. For that would mean that immortal creatures did not begin to exist until our own world began, when the angels were created. This assumes that the angels are meant by the light that was made first, or rather by the heaven mentioned here: "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth."⁵⁴⁵ In any case, the angels did not exist before they were created. If we say they have always existed, we will seem to make them co-eternal with the Creator. Suppose, instead, that I say the angels were not created in time, but existed before all times. They would then be those over whom God, who has always been sovereign, exercised his sovereignty. I shall then be asked whether, as creatures, they could possibly always have existed, even if created before all time. Perhaps one might reply, why not always? Surely what exists in all time may properly be said to exist "always." Indeed, the angels have existed in all time, for they were created even before time existed. This is true if time began with the heavens and the angels existed before the heavens. But perhaps time existed even before the heavenly bodies. It was not then marked by hours, days, months, and years. These measures of time, which are commonly and properly called times, clearly began with the movement of the heavenly bodies. When God appointed them, he said, "Let them be for signs, and for seasons, and for days, and for years."⁵⁴⁶ Suppose, then, that time existed before these heavenly bodies because of some changing movement. Its parts would have followed one another and could not have existed at the same time. Suppose also that some such movement among the angels made time necessary. From their very creation, they would have been subject to these changes in time. In that case, they have existed in all time, for time came into being along with them. And who will say that what existed in all time did not always exist?

But if I make such a reply, it will be said to me, How, then, are they not co-eternal with the Creator, if He and they always have been? How even can they be said to have been created, if we are to understand that they have always existed? What shall we reply to this? Shall we say that both statements are true? that they always have been, since they have been in all time, they being created along with time, or time along with them, and yet that also they were created? For, similarly, we will not deny that time itself was created, though no one doubts that time has been in all time; for if it has not been in all time, then there was a time when there was no time. But the most foolish person could not make such an assertion. For we can reasonably say there was a time when Rome was not; there was a time when Jerusalem was not; there was a time when Abraham was not; there was a time when man was not, and so on: in fine, if the world was not made at the commencement of time, but after some time had elapsed, we can say there was a time when the world was not. But to say there was a time when time was not, is as absurd as to say there was a man when there was no man; or, this world was when this world was not. For if we are not referring to the same object, the form of expression may be used, as, there was another man when this man was not. Thus we can reasonably say there was another time when this time was not; but not the merest simpleton could say there was a time when there was no time. As, then, we say that time was created, though we also say that it always has been, since in all time time has been, so it does not follow that if the angels have always been, they were therefore not created. For we say that they have always been, because they have been in all time; and we say they have been in all time, because time itself could no wise be without them. For where there is no creature whose changing movements admit of succession, there cannot be time at all. And consequently, even if they have always existed, they were created; neither, if they have always existed, are they therefore co-eternal with the Creator. For He has always existed in unchangeable eternity; while they were created, and are said to have been always, because they have been in all time, time being impossible without the creature. But time passing away by its changefulness, cannot be co-eternal with changeless eternity. And consequently, though the immortality of the angels does not pass in time, does not become past as if now it were not, nor has a future as if it were not yet, still their movements, which are the basis of time, do pass from future to past; and therefore they cannot be co-eternal with the Creator, in whose movement we cannot say that there has been that which now is not, or shall be that which is not yet. Wherefore, if God always has been Lord, He has always had creatures under His dominion,—creatures, however, not begotten of Him, but created by Him out of nothing; nor co-eternal with Him, for He was before them, though at no time without them, because He preceded them, not by the lapse of time, but by His abiding eternity. But if I make this reply to those who demand how He was always Creator, always Lord, if there were not always a subject creation; or how this was created, and not rather co-eternal with its Creator, if it always was, I fear I may be accused of recklessly affirming what I know not, instead of teaching what I know. I return, therefore, to that which our Creator has seen fit that we should know; and those things which He has allowed the abler men to know in this life, or has reserved to be known in the next by the perfected saints, I acknowledge to be beyond my capacity. But I have thought it right to discuss these matters without making positive assertions, that they who read may be warned to abstain from hazardous questions, and may not deem themselves fit for everything. Let them rather endeavour to obey the wholesome injunction of the apostle, when he says, "For I say, through the grace given unto me, to every man that is among you, not to think of himself more highly than he ought to think; but to think soberly, according as God hath dealt to every man the measure of faith."⁵⁴⁷ For if an infant receive nourishment suited to its strength, it becomes capable, as it grows, of taking more; but if its strength and capacity be overtaxed, it dwines away in place of growing.

But if I give this answer, someone will ask me, “How, then, are they not co-eternal with the Creator, if he and they have always existed? How can they even be called created, if we understand that they have always existed?” What shall we say in reply? Shall we say that both claims are true? They have always existed because they have existed throughout all time. They were created along with time, or time along with them. Yet they were still created. Similarly, we will not deny that time itself was created. Yet no one doubts that time has existed throughout all time. If it had not, there would have been a time when there was no time. But even the most foolish person could not make that claim. We can reasonably say there was a time when Rome did not exist. There was a time when Jerusalem did not exist. There was a time when Abraham did not exist. There was a time when human beings did not exist, and so on. Finally, if the world was made after some time had passed, rather than at the beginning of time, we can say there was a time when the world did not exist. But it is absurd to say that there was a time when time did not exist. It is like saying that a man existed when no man existed, or that this world existed when it did not exist. If we are not referring to the same thing, we can use this form of expression. We can say, “There was another man when this man did not exist.” Likewise, we can reasonably say there was another time when this time did not exist. But not even the simplest person could say there was a time when no time existed. We say, then, that time was created, though we also say it has always existed. We say this because time has existed throughout all time. In the same way, it does not follow that the angels were not created if they have always existed. We say they have always existed because they have existed throughout all time. And we say they have existed throughout all time because time itself could not exist without them. Where no creature exists whose changing movements allow one thing to follow another, there can be no time at all. Therefore, even if the angels have always existed, they were created. Nor are they co-eternal with the Creator simply because they have always existed. He has always existed in unchanging eternity. They, however, were created. They are said to have always existed because they have existed throughout all time, and time is impossible without creatures. But time passes away through its changes. It cannot be co-eternal with unchanging eternity. The angels’ immortality does not pass away in time. It does not become past, as though it no longer existed. Nor does it have a future, as though it did not yet exist. Still, their movements, which are the basis of time, do pass from future to past. Therefore, they cannot be co-eternal with the Creator. We cannot say that anything in his movement once existed but no longer does, or will exist but does not yet exist. Therefore, if God has always been Lord, he has always had creatures under his rule. These creatures, however, were not begotten by him. He created them out of nothing. Nor are they co-eternal with him. He was before them, though he was never without them at any time. He came before them not through the passage of time, but through his enduring eternity. But suppose I give this answer to those who ask how he was always Creator and Lord if creation was not always subject to him. They also ask how creation was created, rather than co-eternal with its Creator, if it always existed. If I answer them this way, I fear I may be accused of recklessly asserting what I do not know, instead of teaching what I know. I therefore return to what our Creator has seen fit for us to know. I acknowledge that other things are beyond my understanding. He has allowed more capable people to know some of these things in this life. He has reserved others to be known by the perfected saints in the next life. Yet I have thought it right to discuss these matters without making definite claims. Readers may then be warned to avoid hazardous questions and not consider themselves capable of understanding everything. Instead, let them try to obey the apostle’s sound instruction: “For through the grace given to me, I tell everyone among you not to think more highly of himself than he ought, but to think soberly, according to the measure of faith God has given each person.”⁵⁴⁷ If an infant receives nourishment suited to its strength, it grows and becomes able to take more. But if its strength and capacity are overtaxed, it wastes away instead of growing.

16. How we are to understand God's promise of life eternal, which was uttered before the "eternal times."

16. How to understand God's promise of eternal life, made before the "eternal times."

I own that I do not know what ages passed before the human race was created, yet I have no doubt that no created thing is co-eternal with the Creator. But even the apostle speaks of time as eternal, and this with reference, not to the future, but, which is more surprising, to the past. For he says, "In hope of eternal life, which God that cannot lie promised before the eternal times, but hath in due times manifested His word."⁵⁴⁸ You see he says that in the past there have been eternal times, which, however, were not co-eternal with God. And since God before these eternal times not only existed, but also "promised" life eternal, which He manifested in its own times (that is to say, in due times), what else is this than His word? For this is life eternal. But then, how did He promise; for the promise was made to men, and yet they had no existence before eternal times? Does this not mean that, in His own eternity, and in His co-eternal word, that which was to be in its own time was already predestined and fixed?

I admit that I do not know how many ages passed before the human race was created. Yet I have no doubt that no created thing is co-eternal with the Creator. Even the apostle speaks of time as eternal. Surprisingly, he refers not to the future, but to the past. He says, "In hope of eternal life, which God that cannot lie promised before the eternal times, but hath in due times manifested his word."⁵⁴⁸ You see that he says eternal times existed in the past, though they were not co-eternal with God. Before these eternal times, God not only existed but also "promised" eternal life. He revealed it in its own time, that is, at the proper time. What else is this eternal life but his word? For his word is eternal life. But how did he make this promise? It was made to human beings, yet they did not exist before eternal times. Does this not mean that, in his own eternity and in his co-eternal word, he had already predestined and fixed what would come to pass in its own time?

Of this, too, I have no doubt, that before the first man was created, there never had been a man at all, neither this same man himself recurring by I know not what cycles, and having made I know not how many revolutions, nor any other of similar nature. From this belief I am not frightened by philosophical arguments, among which that is reckoned the most acute which is founded on the assertion that the infinite cannot be comprehended by any mode of knowledge. Consequently, they argue, God has in His own mind finite conceptions of all finite things which He makes. Now it cannot be supposed that His goodness was ever idle; for if it were, there should be ascribed to Him an awakening to activity in time, from a past eternity of inactivity, as if He repented of an idleness that had no beginning, and proceeded, therefore, to make a beginning of work. This being the case, they say it must be that the same things are always repeated, and that as they pass, so they are destined always to return, whether amidst all these changes the world remains the same,—the world which has always been, and yet was created,—or that the world in these revolutions is perpetually dying out and being renewed; otherwise, if we point to a time when the works of God were begun, it would be believed that He considered His past eternal leisure to be inert and indolent, and therefore condemned and altered it as displeasing to Himself. Now if God is supposed to have been indeed always making temporal things, but different from one another, and one after the other, so that He thus came at last to make man, whom He had never made before, then it may seem that He made man not with knowledge (for they suppose no knowledge can comprehend the infinite succession of creatures), but at the dictate of the hour, as it struck Him at the moment, with a sudden and accidental change of mind. On the other hand, say they, if those cycles be admitted, and if we suppose that the same temporal things are repeated, while the world either remains identical through all these rotations, or else dies away and is renewed, then there is ascribed to God neither the slothful ease of a past eternity, nor a rash and unforeseen creation. And if the same things be not thus repeated in cycles, then they cannot by any science or prescience be comprehended in their endless diversity. Even though reason could not refute, faith would smile at these argumentations, with which the godless endeavour to turn our simple piety from the right way, that we may walk with them "in a circle." But by the help of the Lord our God, even reason, and that readily enough, shatters these revolving circles which conjecture frames. For that which specially leads these men astray to prefer their own circles to the straight path of truth, is, that they measure by their own human, changeable, and narrow intellect the divine mind, which is absolutely unchangeable, infinitely capacious, and, without succession of thought, counting all things without number. So that saying of the apostle comes true of them, for, "comparing themselves with themselves, they do not understand."⁵⁴⁹ For because they do, in virtue of a new purpose, whatever new thing has occurred to them to be done (their minds being changeable), they conclude it is so with God; and thus compare, not God,—for they cannot conceive God, but think of one like themselves when they think of Him,—not God, but themselves, and not with Him, but with themselves. For our part, we dare not believe that God is affected in one way when He works, in another when He rests. Indeed, to say that He is affected at all, is an abuse of language, since it implies that there comes to be something in His nature which was not there before. For he who is affected is acted upon, and whatever is acted upon is changeable. In His leisure, therefore, is no laziness, indolence, inactivity; as in His work is no labour, effort, industry. He can act while He reposes, and repose while He acts. He can begin a new work with (not a new, but) an eternal design; and what He has not made before, He does not now begin to make because He repents of His former repose. But when one speaks of His former repose and subsequent operation (and I know not how men can understand these things), this "former" and "subsequent" are applied only to the things created, which formerly did not exist, and subsequently came into existence. But in God the former purpose is not altered and obliterated by the subsequent and different purpose, but by one and the same eternal and unchangeable will He effected regarding the things He created, both that formerly, so long as they were not, they should not be, and that subsequently, when they began to be, they should come into existence. And thus, perhaps, He would show in a very striking way, to those who have eyes for such things, how independent He is of what He makes, and how it is of His own gratuitous goodness He creates, since from eternity He dwelt without creatures in no less perfect a blessedness.

I also have no doubt that, before the first man was created, there had never been any man at all. Neither had this same man returned through some cycles, after going through some unknown number of revolutions. Nor had there been any other man of the same nature. Philosophical arguments do not frighten me away from this belief. The sharpest of these arguments rests on the claim that no kind of knowledge can comprehend infinity. From this, philosophers argue that God has finite conceptions in his own mind of all the finite things he makes. They say we cannot suppose that his goodness was ever idle. If it were, he would have begun to act in time after an eternity of inactivity. It would be as if he regretted an idleness that had no beginning and therefore began to work. This being so, they say, the same things must always be repeated. As they pass away, they must always be destined to return. This would be true whether the world remains the same through all these changes, a world that has always existed and yet was created, or whether it continually dies and is renewed through these cycles. Otherwise, if we point to a time when God’s works began, people would believe that he regarded his past eternal rest as inactive and lazy. They would think that he therefore condemned it as displeasing to himself and changed it. Suppose, on the other hand, that God had always been making things in time, each different from the last. Suppose that he finally came to make man, whom he had never made before. Then it might seem that he made man without knowledge. For these philosophers suppose that no knowledge can comprehend an infinite succession of creatures. Instead, it would seem that he acted as the moment demanded, on a sudden impulse and through an accidental change of mind. But if we accept these cycles, they say, the same temporal things are repeated. The world either remains the same through every cycle or dies away and is renewed. In that case, we attribute neither a lazy eternity of past ease to God nor a reckless, unforeseen act of creation. They say that, unless the same things are repeated in cycles, their endless variety cannot be comprehended by any knowledge or foreknowledge. Even if reason could not refute these arguments, faith would smile at them. The godless use them to draw our simple devotion away from the right path, so that we may walk with them "in a circle." But with the help of the Lord our God, reason itself readily shatters these revolving circles devised by speculation. What especially leads these men astray is that they measure the divine mind by their own human minds, which are changeable and limited. So they prefer their circles to the straight path of truth. But the divine mind is absolutely unchangeable and infinitely capacious. Without moving from one thought to another, it counts all things without number. Thus the apostle’s saying comes true of them: "comparing themselves with themselves, they do not understand."⁵⁴⁹ Because their minds change, they form a new intention whenever they think of something new to do. They conclude that it is the same with God. They do not compare God with themselves, for they cannot conceive of God. When they think of him, they think of someone like themselves. So they compare themselves, not with him, but with themselves. For our part, we dare not believe that God is affected one way when he works and another when he rests. Indeed, it is misleading to say that he is affected at all. That would imply that something comes into his nature that was not there before. Anyone who is affected is acted upon, and whatever is acted upon can change. So there is no laziness, idleness, or inactivity in his rest. Nor is there any labor, effort, or exertion in his work. He can act while he rests and rest while he acts. He can begin a new work according to an eternal design, not a new one. When he makes something he has not made before, he does not begin because he regrets his former rest. But when we speak of his earlier rest and later action, and I do not know how people can understand these things, "earlier" and "later" apply only to created things. They did not exist before, and afterward they came into existence. In God, an earlier purpose is not changed or erased by a different, later purpose. By one and the same eternal and unchanging will, he brought about both that the things he created should not exist before they came to be and that they should come into existence when they began to be. Perhaps in this way he shows, very clearly to those who can see it, how independent he is of what he makes. He also shows that he creates out of his own freely given goodness, since he lived without creatures from eternity in a blessedness no less perfect.

18. Against those who assert that things that are infinite⁵⁵⁰ cannot be comprehended by the knowledge of God.

18. Against those who claim that God cannot know things that are infinite⁵⁵⁰_.​_

As for their other assertion, that God's knowledge cannot comprehend things infinite, it only remains for them to affirm, in order that they may sound the depths of their impiety, that God does not know all numbers. For it is very certain that they are infinite; since, no matter at what number you suppose an end to be made, this number can be, I will not say, increased by the addition of one more, but however great it be, and however vast be the multitude of which it is the rational and scientific expression, it can still be not only doubled, but even multiplied. Moreover, each number is so defined by its own properties, that no two numbers are equal. They are therefore both unequal and different from one another; and while they are simply finite, collectively they are infinite. Does God, therefore, not know numbers on account of this infinity; and does His knowledge extend only to a certain height in numbers, while of the rest He is ignorant? Who is so left to himself as to say so? Yet they can hardly pretend to put numbers out of the question, or maintain that they have nothing to do with the knowledge of God; for Plato,⁵⁵¹ their great authority, represents God as framing the world on numerical principles; and in our books also it is said to God, "Thou hast ordered all things in number, and measure, and weight."⁵⁵² The prophet also says, "Who bringeth out their host by number."⁵⁵³ And the Saviour says in the Gospel, "The very hairs of your head are all numbered."⁵⁵⁴ Far be it, then, from us to doubt that all number is known to Him "whose understanding," according to the Psalmist, "is infinite."⁵⁵⁵ The infinity of number, though there be no numbering of infinite numbers, is yet not incomprehensible by Him whose understanding is infinite. And thus, if everything which is comprehended is defined or made finite by the comprehension of him who knows it, then all infinity is in some ineffable way made finite to God, for it is comprehensible by His knowledge. Wherefore, if the infinity of numbers cannot be infinite to the knowledge of God, by which it is comprehended, what are we poor creatures that we should presume to fix limits to His knowledge, and say that unless the same temporal things be repeated by the same periodic revolutions, God cannot either foreknow His creatures that He may make them, or know them when He has made them? God, whose knowledge is simply manifold, and uniform in its variety, comprehends all incomprehensibles with so incomprehensible a comprehension, that though He willed always to make His later works novel and unlike what went before them, He could not produce them without order and foresight, nor conceive them suddenly, but by His eternal foreknowledge.

As for their other claim, that God’s knowledge cannot grasp infinite things, they have only one step left. To reach the depths of their impiety, they must claim that God does not know all numbers. It is certain that numbers are infinite. Whatever number you choose as the last, it can be increased. I do not mean merely by adding one. However great the number, and however vast the quantity it expresses exactly, it can be doubled or even multiplied. Each number also has its own distinct properties, so no two numbers are equal. They are therefore unequal and different from one another. Each number is finite, but taken together they are infinite. Does God therefore fail to know numbers because they are infinite? Does his knowledge of numbers reach only so far, leaving him ignorant of the rest? Who is so abandoned to his own folly as to say this? Yet they can hardly set numbers aside or claim that they have nothing to do with God’s knowledge. Plato,⁵⁵¹ their great authority, describes God as forming the world according to numerical principles. In our books too, God is told, "You have ordered all things by number, measure, and weight."⁵⁵² The prophet also says, "He brings out their host by number."⁵⁵³ And the Savior says in the Gospel, "Even the hairs of your head are all numbered."⁵⁵⁴ So let us never doubt that all numbers are known to him whose "understanding is infinite," as the Psalmist says.⁵⁵⁵ Although infinite numbers cannot be counted, their infinity is not beyond the grasp of him whose understanding is infinite. Suppose that everything a knower grasps is defined or made finite by that knowledge. Then all infinity is made finite to God in some indescribable way, because his knowledge grasps it. The infinity of numbers, then, cannot be infinite to God’s knowledge, since his knowledge grasps it. Who are we poor creatures to presume to set limits on his knowledge? How can we say that the same events in time must recur in the same cycles? They claim that without such repetition, God cannot foreknow his creatures in order to make them. Nor, they claim, can he know them after he has made them. God’s knowledge is both simple and manifold, and constant in its variety. With an understanding beyond our grasp, he grasps everything beyond our grasp. Even if he always chose to make his later works new and unlike those before them, he could not produce them without order and foresight. Nor could he conceive them suddenly, but only through his eternal foreknowledge.

19. Of worlds without end, or ages of ages.⁵⁵⁶

19. On worlds without end, or ages of ages.⁵⁵⁶

I do not presume to determine whether God does so, and whether these times which are called "ages of ages" are joined together in a continuous series, and succeed one another with a regulated diversity, and leave exempt from their vicissitudes only those who are freed from their misery, and abide without end in a blessed immortality; or whether these are called "ages of ages," that we may understand that the ages remain unchangeable in God's unwavering wisdom, and are the efficient causes, as it were, of those ages which are being spent in time. Possibly "ages" is used for "age," so that nothing else is meant by "ages of ages" than by "age of age," as nothing else is meant by "heavens of heavens" than by "heaven of heaven." For God called the firmament, above which are the waters, "Heaven," and yet the psalm says, "Let the waters that are above the heavens praise the name of the Lord."⁵⁵⁷ Which of these two meanings we are to attach to "ages of ages," or whether there is not some other and better meaning still, is a very profound question; and the subject we are at present handling presents no obstacle to our meanwhile deferring the discussion of it, whether we may be able to determine anything about it, or may only be made more cautious by its further treatment, so as to be deterred from making any rash affirmations in a matter of such obscurity. For at present we are disputing the opinion that affirms the existence of those periodic revolutions by which the same things are always recurring at intervals of time. Now, whichever of these suppositions regarding the "ages of ages" be the true one, it avails nothing for the substantiating of those cycles; for whether the ages of ages be not a repetition of the same world, but different worlds succeeding one another in a regulated connection, the ransomed souls abiding in well-assured bliss without any recurrence of misery, or whether the ages of ages be the eternal causes which rule what shall be and is in time, it equally follows, that those cycles which bring round the same things have no existence; and nothing more thoroughly explodes them than the fact of the eternal life of the saints.

I do not presume to decide whether God does this. Perhaps the periods called “ages of ages” are joined in a continuous series. They may follow one another in an ordered variety. Perhaps only those freed from misery are exempt from their changes, living forever in blessed immortality. Or perhaps they are called “ages of ages” to show that the ages remain unchanged in God’s constant wisdom. In this sense, they are, so to speak, the active causes of the ages passing in time. Perhaps “ages” is used in place of “age.” Then “ages of ages” would mean no more than “age of age.” Likewise, “heavens of heavens” would mean no more than “heaven of heaven.” For God called the firmament above which the waters lie “Heaven.” Yet the psalm says, “Let the waters that are above the heavens praise the name of the Lord.”⁵⁵⁷ Which of these two meanings should we give “ages of ages”? Or is there another, better meaning? This is a very profound question. Nothing in our present subject prevents us from postponing the discussion. Further discussion may enable us to reach a conclusion. Or it may simply make us more cautious, so that we avoid rash claims about so obscure a matter. For now, we are disputing the view that events recur in periodic cycles. According to that view, the same things always return at intervals. Whichever account of the “ages of ages” is true, it gives no support to those cycles. Perhaps the ages of ages are not repetitions of the same world, but different worlds following one another in an ordered sequence. In that case, the redeemed souls remain in assured bliss, with no return to misery. Or perhaps the ages of ages are the eternal causes governing what is and what will be in time. Either way, it follows that cycles bringing back the same things do not exist. Nothing disproves them more thoroughly than the eternal life of the saints.

What pious ears could bear to hear that after a life spent in so many and severe distresses (if, indeed, that should be called a life at all which is rather a death, so utter that the love of this present death makes us fear that death which delivers us from it), that after evils so disastrous, and miseries of all kinds have at length been expiated and finished by the help of true religion and wisdom, and when we have thus attained to the vision of God, and have entered into bliss by the contemplation of spiritual light and participation in His unchangeable immortality, which we burn to attain,—that we must at some time lose all this, and that they who do lose it are cast down from that eternity, truth, and felicity to infernal mortality and shameful foolishness, and are involved in accursed woes, in which God is lost, truth held in detestation, and happiness sought in iniquitous impurities? and that this will happen endlessly again and again, recurring at fixed intervals, and in regularly returning periods? and that this everlasting and ceaseless revolution of definite cycles, which remove and restore true misery and deceitful bliss in turn, is contrived in order that God may be able to know His own works, since on the one hand He cannot rest from creating, and on the other, cannot know the infinite number of His creatures, if He always makes creatures? Who, I say, can listen to such things? Who can accept or suffer them to be spoken? Were they true, it were not only more prudent to keep silence regarding them, but even (to express myself as best I can) it were the part of wisdom not to know them. For if in the future world we shall not remember these things, and by this oblivion be blessed, why should we now increase our misery, already burdensome enough, by the knowledge of them? If, on the other hand, the knowledge of them will be forced upon us hereafter, now at least let us remain in ignorance, that in the present expectation we may enjoy a blessedness which the future reality is not to bestow; since in this life we are expecting to obtain life everlasting, but in the world to come are to discover it to be blessed, but not everlasting.

What devout person could bear to hear such things? We spend our lives in so many severe hardships. Indeed, can this even be called life? It is more like death, so complete that our love of this present death makes us fear the death that frees us from it. At last, with the help of true religion and wisdom, these terrible evils and all kinds of misery are atoned for and brought to an end. We come to see God and enter into bliss. We contemplate spiritual light and share in his unchanging immortality, which we burn to attain. Yet we are told that we must someday lose all this. Those who lose it are cast down from that eternity, truth, and happiness into hellish mortality and shameful foolishness. They become entangled in accursed sorrows. There God is lost, truth is hated, and happiness is sought in wicked impurities. And we are told that this will happen endlessly, again and again, at fixed intervals and in regularly recurring periods. We are told, moreover, that this everlasting, ceaseless cycle alternately takes away and restores true misery and deceptive bliss. And this is supposedly arranged so that God can know his own works. For, on this account, he cannot stop creating. Yet if he always creates, he cannot know the infinite number of his creatures. Who, I ask, can listen to such things? Who can accept them or bear to hear them spoken? Even if these things were true, it would be more prudent to remain silent about them. Indeed, as best I can put it, wisdom would require us not to know them. If we will not remember them in the world to come, and will be blessed through forgetting them, why learn them now? Why add this knowledge to misery that is already burdensome enough? If, on the other hand, this knowledge will be forced upon us hereafter, let us at least remain ignorant now. Then we can enjoy a blessedness in our present expectation that the future reality will not give us. In this life we expect to obtain everlasting life. But in the world to come, we would discover that it is blessed, but not everlasting.

And if they maintain that no one can attain to the blessedness of the world to come, unless in this life he has been indoctrinated in those cycles in which bliss and misery relieve one another, how do they avow that the more a man loves God, the more readily he attains to blessedness,—they who teach what paralyzes love itself? For who would not be more remiss and lukewarm in his love for a person whom he thinks he shall be forced to abandon, and whose truth and wisdom he shall come to hate; and this, too, after he has quite attained to the utmost and most blissful knowledge of Him that he is capable of? Can any one be faithful in his love, even to a human friend, if he knows that he is destined to become his enemy?⁵⁵⁸ God forbid that there be any truth in an opinion which threatens us with a real misery that is never to end, but is often and endlessly to be interrupted by intervals of fallacious happiness. For what happiness can be more fallacious and false than that in whose blaze of truth we yet remain ignorant that we shall be miserable, or in whose most secure citadel we yet fear that we shall be so? For if, on the one hand, we are to be ignorant of coming calamity, then our present misery is not so shortsighted, for it is assured of coming bliss. If, on the other hand, the disaster that threatens is not concealed from us in the world to come, then the time of misery which is to be at last exchanged for a state of blessedness, is spent by the soul more happily than its time of happiness, which is to end in a return to misery. And thus our expectation of unhappiness is happy, but of happiness unhappy. And therefore, as we here suffer present ills, and hereafter fear ills that are imminent, it were truer to say that we shall always be miserable, than that we can some time be happy.

They claim that no one can attain happiness in the world to come without learning about these cycles in this life. In those cycles, happiness and misery take turns. Yet they also say that the more a person loves God, the more readily he attains happiness. How can they say this when their teaching paralyzes love itself? Who would not love someone less eagerly and more halfheartedly if he thought he would be forced to abandon him? Who would not, if he thought he would come to hate that person's truth and wisdom? And this would happen even after he had gained the fullest and happiest knowledge of God possible for him. Can anyone remain faithful in love, even to a human friend, if he knows he is destined to become his enemy?⁵⁵⁸ God forbid that there should be any truth in such an opinion. It threatens us with real misery that will never end, though false happiness will interrupt it again and again forever. What happiness could be more deceptive and false than this? In the full light of truth, we would still be unaware that we were going to be miserable. Or, in its safest stronghold, we would still fear that misery was coming. If we are to be unaware of the coming disaster, then our present misery is less shortsighted. For it is certain that happiness will come. But if the disaster awaiting us is not hidden from us in the world to come, the opposite follows. The soul spends its time in misery more happily, because that misery will finally give way to happiness. Its time of happiness is less happy, because it will end in a return to misery. Thus, our expectation of unhappiness is happy, while our expectation of happiness is unhappy. Here we suffer present troubles, and hereafter we fear troubles that are near. So it would be truer to say that we shall always be miserable than that we can ever be happy.

But these things are declared to be false by the loud testimony of religion and truth; for religion truthfully promises a true blessedness, of which we shall be eternally assured, and which cannot be interrupted by any disaster. Let us therefore keep to the straight path, which is Christ, and, with Him as our Guide and Saviour, let us turn away in heart and mind from the unreal and futile cycles of the godless. Porphyry, Platonist though he was, abjured the opinion of his school, that in these cycles souls are ceaselessly passing away and returning, either being struck with the extravagance of the idea, or sobered by his knowledge of Christianity. As I mentioned in the tenth book,⁵⁵⁹ he preferred saying that the soul, as it had been sent into the world that it might know evil, and be purged and delivered from it, was never again exposed to such an experience after it had once returned to the Father. And if he abjured the tenets of his school, how much more ought we Christians to abominate and avoid an opinion so unfounded and hostile to our faith? But having disposed of these cycles and escaped out of them, no necessity compels us to suppose that the human race had no beginning in time, on the ground that there is nothing new in nature which, by I know not what cycles, has not at some previous period existed, and is not hereafter to exist again. For if the soul, once delivered, as it never was before, is never to return to misery, then there happens in its experience something which never happened before; and this, indeed, something of the greatest consequence, to wit, the secure entrance into eternal felicity. And if in an immortal nature there can occur a novelty, which never has been, nor ever shall be, reproduced by any cycle, why is it disputed that the same may occur in mortal natures? If they maintain that blessedness is no new experience to the soul, but only a return to that state in which it has been eternally, then at least its deliverance from misery is something new, since, by their own showing, the misery from which it is delivered is itself, too, a new experience. And if this new experience fell out by accident, and was not embraced in the order of things appointed by Divine Providence, then where are those determinate and measured cycles in which no new thing happens, but all things are reproduced as they were before? If, however, this new experience was embraced in that providential order of nature (whether the soul was exposed to the evil of this world for the sake of discipline, or fell into it by sin), then it is possible for new things to happen which never happened before, and which yet are not extraneous to the order of nature. And if the soul is able by its own imprudence to create for itself a new misery, which was not unforeseen by the Divine Providence, but was provided for in the order of nature along with the deliverance from it, how can we, even with all the rashness of human vanity, presume to deny that God can create new things—new to the world, but not to Him—which He never before created, but yet foresaw from all eternity? If they say that it is indeed true that ransomed souls return no more to misery, but that even so no new thing happens, since there always have been, now are, and ever shall be a succession of ransomed souls, they must at least grant that in this case there are new souls to whom the misery and the deliverance from it are new. For if they maintain that those souls out of which new men are daily being made (from whose bodies, if they have lived wisely, they are so delivered that they never return to misery) are not new, but have existed from eternity, they must logically admit that they are infinite. For however great a finite number of souls there were, that would not have sufficed to make perpetually new men from eternity,—men whose souls were to be eternally freed from this mortal state, and never afterwards to return to it. And our philosophers will find it hard to explain how there is an infinite number of souls in an order of nature which they require shall be finite, that it may be known by God.

But religion and truth clearly testify that these things are false. Religion truly promises a real blessedness, one we will enjoy forever and that no disaster can interrupt. So let us stay on the straight path, which is Christ. With him as our guide and savior, let us turn our hearts and minds away from the unreal and pointless cycles of the godless. Though Porphyry was a Platonist, he rejected his school’s belief that souls endlessly depart and return in these cycles. Perhaps he was struck by how absurd the idea was, or perhaps his knowledge of Christianity brought him to his senses. As I mentioned in the tenth book,⁵⁵⁹ he preferred another account. The soul was sent into the world to learn about evil, be cleansed, and be freed from it. Once it had returned to the Father, it would never be exposed to such an experience again. If Porphyry rejected the teachings of his school, how much more should we Christians detest and avoid this baseless belief, so hostile to our faith? Now that we have put aside these cycles and escaped from them, nothing forces us to suppose that the human race had no beginning in time. Nor must we accept the claim that nothing in nature is new, because everything has existed before and will exist again through cycles of some kind. A soul may be freed from misery for the first time and never return to it. If so, something happens in its experience that has never happened before. Indeed, it is something of the greatest importance: a secure entrance into eternal happiness. Something new can therefore happen to an immortal being, something that has never happened before and will never be repeated in any cycle. Why, then, should anyone dispute that the same can happen to mortal beings? Suppose they claim that blessedness is not a new experience for the soul, but only a return to a state it has enjoyed eternally. Even so, its freedom from misery is at least something new. For by their own account, the misery from which it is freed is also a new experience. If this new experience happened by chance, outside the order appointed by divine providence, where are those fixed and measured cycles? In those cycles, nothing new happens, and everything is repeated as it was before. But suppose this new experience was included in the order of nature established by providence. That may be so whether the soul faced the evil of this world for its training or fell into it through sin. In either case, new things can happen that have never happened before and yet are not outside the order of nature. The soul, through its own foolishness, may bring a new misery upon itself. God’s providence foresaw this misery and provided for it in the order of nature, along with the soul’s release from it. If the soul can do this, how can we, even in the most reckless human vanity, presume to deny that God can create new things? They would be new to the world, but not to him. Though he had never created them before, he foresaw them from all eternity. They may say that freed souls do indeed never return to misery, but that nothing new happens even so. They may argue that there have always been, are now, and always will be souls freed in succession. Even then, they must at least admit that there are new souls for whom misery and release from it are new experiences. For suppose they claim that the souls from which new people are made every day are not new, but have existed from eternity. If those people have lived wisely, their souls are freed from their bodies, never to return to misery. If these souls have existed from eternity, then they must logically admit that the souls are infinite in number. However great a finite number of souls might be, it would not have been enough to make new people continually from eternity. For the souls of these people would be freed forever from this mortal state, never to return to it. Our philosophers will find it hard to explain how there can be an infinite number of souls in the order of nature. They insist that this order must be finite so that God can know it.

And now that we have exploded these cycles which were supposed to bring back the soul at fixed periods to the same miseries, what can seem more in accordance with godly reason than to believe that it is possible for God both to create new things never before created, and in doing so, to preserve His will unaltered? But whether the number of eternally redeemed souls can be continually increased or not, let the philosophers themselves decide, who are so subtle in determining where infinity cannot be admitted. For our own part, our reasoning holds in either case. For if the number of souls can be indefinitely increased, what reason is there to deny that what had never before been created, could be created? since the number of ransomed souls never existed before, and has yet not only been once made, but will never cease to be anew coming into being. If, on the other hand, it be more suitable that the number of eternally ransomed souls be definite, and that this number will never be increased, yet this number, whatever it be, did assuredly never exist before, and it cannot increase, and reach the amount it signifies, without having some beginning; and this beginning never before existed. That this beginning, therefore, might be, the first man was created.

Now we have disproved these cycles, which supposedly return the soul to the same miseries at fixed intervals. What could be more consistent with godly reason than this? God can create things never created before while keeping his will unchanged. But can the number of eternally redeemed souls continue to increase, or not? Let the philosophers decide. They are so skilled at determining where infinity cannot be admitted. For our part, our reasoning holds either way. Suppose the number of souls can increase without limit. Why, then, deny that something never created before could be created? The number of redeemed souls never existed before. Yet it has not only come into being once, it will never cease to arise anew. On the other hand, suppose it is more fitting that the number of eternally redeemed souls be fixed and never increase. Whatever that number may be, it certainly never existed before. It cannot increase and reach its full amount without a beginning. And that beginning never existed before. So that this beginning might occur, the first man was created.

21. That there was created at first but one individual, and that the human race was created in him.

21. That only one person was created at first, and that the human race was created in him.

Now that we have solved, as well as we could, this very difficult question about the eternal God creating new things, without any novelty of will, it is easy to see how much better it is that God was pleased to produce the human race from the one individual whom He created, than if He had originated it in several men. For as to the other animals, He created some solitary, and naturally seeking lonely places,—as the eagles, kites, lions, wolves, and such like; others gregarious, which herd together, and prefer to live in company,—as pigeons, starlings, stags, and little fallow deer, and the like: but neither class did He cause to be propagated from individuals, but called into being several at once. Man, on the other hand, whose nature was to be a mean between the angelic and bestial, He created in such sort, that if he remained in subjection to His Creator as his rightful Lord, and piously kept His commandments, he should pass into the company of the angels, and obtain, without the intervention of death,⁵⁶⁰ a blessed and endless immortality; but if he offended the Lord his God by a proud and disobedient use of his free will, he should become subject to death, and live as the beasts do,—the slave of appetite, and doomed to eternal punishment after death. And therefore God created only one single man, not, certainly, that he might be a solitary bereft of all society, but that by this means the unity of society and the bond of concord might be more effectually commended to him, men being bound together not only by similarity of nature, but by family affection. And indeed He did not even create the woman that was to be given him as his wife, as he created the man, but created her out of the man, that the whole human race might derive from one man.

We have now addressed, as well as we could, the difficult question of how the eternal God creates new things without changing his will. So it is easy to see why God chose a better way to bring about the human race. He created it from one individual rather than from several men. He created some other animals to live alone and naturally seek lonely places. These include eagles, kites, lions, wolves, and similar creatures. He created others to gather in herds and prefer company. These include pigeons, starlings, stags, little fallow deer, and similar creatures. But he did not cause either kind to descend from single individuals. Instead, he brought several of each into being at once. Human nature, on the other hand, was to stand between the angelic and the animal. God created man so that he could join the company of angels. To do so, man had to remain subject to his Creator as his rightful Lord and faithfully obey his commandments. Then he would gain a blessed and endless immortality without undergoing death.⁵⁶⁰ But if man offended the Lord his God by using his free will proudly and disobediently, he would become subject to death. He would live as the beasts do, enslaved by appetite and doomed to eternal punishment after death. God therefore created only one man. He certainly did not intend him to live alone, without companionship. Rather, God intended this to teach him more effectively the value of social unity and harmony. People would be bound together not only by their common nature but also by family affection. God did not even create the woman who would become his wife as he had created the man. Instead, he created her from the man, so that the whole human race might descend from one man.

And God was not ignorant that man would sin, and that, being himself made subject now to death, he would propagate men doomed to die, and that these mortals would run to such enormities in sin, that even the beasts devoid of rational will, and who were created in numbers from the waters and the earth, would live more securely and peaceably with their own kind than men, who had been propagated from one individual for the very purpose of commending concord. For not even lions or dragons have ever waged with their kind such wars as men have waged with one another.⁵⁶¹ But God foresaw also that by His grace a people would be called to adoption, and that they, being justified by the remission of their sins, would be united by the Holy Ghost to the holy angels in eternal peace, the last enemy, death, being destroyed; and He knew that this people would derive profit from the consideration that God had caused all men to be derived from one, for the sake of showing how highly He prizes unity in a multitude.

God knew that man would sin and become subject to death. He knew that man would have descendants who were also doomed to die. These mortals would commit such terrible sins that even beasts would live more safely and peacefully with their own kind. These beasts have no rational will and were created in great numbers from the waters and the earth. Yet all humans descended from one man, for the very purpose of encouraging harmony. Not even lions or dragons have ever fought wars against their own kind as humans have against one another.⁵⁶¹ But God also foresaw that, by his grace, a people would be called to become his adopted children. They would be justified through the forgiveness of their sins. The Holy Spirit would unite them with the holy angels in eternal peace, after death, the last enemy, was destroyed. God knew that this people would benefit from remembering that he had made all humans descendants of one man. By this he showed how highly he values unity among the many.

23. Of the nature of the human soul created in the image of God.

23. On the nature of the human soul, created in God's image.

God, then, made man in His own image. For He created for him a soul endowed with reason and intelligence, so that he might excel all the creatures of earth, air, and sea, which were not so gifted. And when He had formed the man out of the dust of the earth, and had willed that his soul should be such as I have said,—whether He had already made it, and now by breathing imparted it to man, or rather made it by breathing, so that that breath which God made by breathing (for what else is "to breathe" than to make breath?) is the soul,⁵⁶²—He made also a wife for him, to aid him in the work of generating his kind, and her He formed of a bone taken out of the man's side, working in a divine manner. For we are not to conceive of this work in a carnal fashion, as if God wrought as we commonly see artisans, who use their hands, and material furnished to them, that by their artistic skill they may fashion some material object. God's hand is God's power; and He, working invisibly, effects visible results. But this seems fabulous rather than true to men, who measure by customary and everyday works the power and wisdom of God, whereby He understands and produces without seeds even seeds themselves; and because they cannot understand the things which at the beginning were created, they are sceptical regarding them—as if the very things which they do know about human propagation, conceptions and births, would seem less incredible if told to those who had no experience of them; though these very things, too, are attributed by many rather to physical and natural causes than to the work of the divine mind.

God made man in his own image. He gave him a soul with reason and intelligence. This allowed him to excel all creatures of earth, air, and sea, which did not have these gifts. God formed the man from the dust of the earth. He willed that his soul should be as I have described it. Perhaps God had already made the soul and then breathed it into the man. Or perhaps he made it by breathing. In that case, the breath God made by breathing is the soul. For what else does it mean to breathe than to make breath?⁵⁶² God also made a wife for the man, to help him produce offspring of his own kind. He formed her from a bone taken from the man’s side, working in a divine way. We should not imagine this work in physical terms. God did not work like the craftspeople we commonly see. They use their hands, supplied materials, and artistic skill to shape a physical object. God’s hand is his power. He works invisibly and produces visible results. But this seems more like a fable than the truth to some people. They judge God’s power and wisdom by the ordinary, everyday works they know. Yet by this power and wisdom, he understands and produces even seeds themselves without seeds. They cannot understand the things created in the beginning, so they doubt them. Yet the things they do know about human reproduction, conception, and birth would seem no less incredible to people without experience of them. Many people, however, attribute even these things to physical and natural causes rather than to the work of the divine mind.

24. Whether the angels can be said to be the creators of any, even the least creature.

24. Whether angels can be called the creators of any creature, even the smallest.

But in this book we have nothing to do with those who do not believe that the divine mind made or cares for this world. As for those who believe their own Plato, that all mortal animals—among whom man holds the pre-eminent place, and is near to the gods themselves—were created not by that most high God who made the world, but by other lesser gods created by the Supreme, and exercising a delegated power under His control,—if only those persons be delivered from the superstition which prompts them to seek a plausible reason for paying divine honours and sacrificing to these gods as their creators, they will easily be disentangled also from this their error. For it is blasphemy to believe or to say (even before it can be understood) that any other than God is creator of any nature, be it never so small and mortal. And as for the angels, whom those Platonists prefer to call gods, although they do, so far as they are permitted and commissioned, aid in the production of the things around us, yet not on that account are we to call them creators, any more than we call gardeners the creators of fruits and trees.

In this book, we are not concerned with those who deny that the divine mind made or cares for this world. Others follow Plato in believing that all mortal animals were created by lesser gods. Among these animals, human beings hold the highest place and are close to the gods themselves. These people believe that the supreme God made the world and created the lesser gods. They believe that these lesser gods created mortal animals with power delegated to them, under his control. If such people can be freed from the superstition that leads them to seek a plausible reason to worship and sacrifice to these gods as their creators, they will easily be freed from this error as well. For it is blasphemy to believe or say that anyone other than God creates any nature, however small and mortal. It is blasphemy even before one understands it. The Platonists prefer to call angels gods. These angels do help produce the things around us, as far as they are permitted and commissioned to do so. But that is no reason to call them creators, any more than we call gardeners the creators of fruits and trees.

25. That God alone is the Creator of every kind of creature, whatever its nature or form.

25. God alone created every kind of creature, whatever its nature or form.

For whereas there is one form which is given from without to every bodily substance,—such as the form which is constructed by potters and smiths, and that class of artists who paint and fashion forms like the body of animals,—but another and internal form which is not itself constructed, but, as the efficient cause, produces not only the natural bodily forms, but even the life itself of the living creatures, and which proceeds from the secret and hidden choice of an intelligent and living nature,—let that first-mentioned form be attributed to every artificer, but this latter to one only, God, the Creator and Originator who made the world itself and the angels, without the help of world or angels. For the same divine and, so to speak, creative energy, which cannot be made, but makes, and which gave to the earth and sky their roundness,—this same divine, effective, and creative energy gave their roundness to the eye and to the apple; and the other natural objects which we anywhere see, received also their form, not from without, but from the secret and profound might of the Creator, who said, "Do not I fill heaven and earth?"⁵⁶³ and whose wisdom it is that "reacheth from one end to another mightily; and sweetly doth she order all things."⁵⁶⁴ Wherefore I know not what kind of aid the angels, themselves created first, afforded to the Creator in making other things. I cannot ascribe to them what perhaps they cannot do, neither ought I to deny them such faculty as they have. But, by their leave, I attribute the creating and originating work which gave being to all natures to God, to whom they themselves thankfully ascribe their existence. We do not call gardeners the creators of their fruits, for we read, "Neither is he that planteth anything, neither he that watereth, but God that giveth the increase."⁵⁶⁵ Nay, not even the earth itself do we call a creator, though she seems to be the prolific mother of all things which she aids in germinating and bursting forth from the seed, and which she keeps rooted in her own breast; for we likewise read, "God giveth it a body, as it hath pleased Him, and to every seed his own body."⁵⁶⁶ We ought not even to call a woman the creatress of her own offspring; for He rather is its creator who said to His servant, "Before I formed thee in the womb, I knew thee."⁵⁶⁷ And although the various mental emotions of a pregnant woman do produce in the fruit of her womb similar qualities,—as Jacob with his peeled wands caused piebald sheep to be produced,—yet the mother as little creates her offspring, as she created herself. Whatever bodily or seminal causes, then, may be used for the production of things, either by the co-operation of angels, men, or the lower animals, or by sexual generation; and whatever power the desires and mental emotions of the mother have to produce in the tender and plastic fœtus, corresponding lineaments and colours; yet the natures themselves, which are thus variously affected, are the production of none but the most high God. It is His occult power which pervades all things, and is present in all without being contaminated, which gives being to all that is, and modifies and limits its existence; so that without Him it would not be thus or thus, nor would have any being at all.⁵⁶⁸ If, then, in regard to that outward form which the workman's hand imposes on his work, we do not say that Rome and Alexandria were built by masons and architects, but by the kings by whose will, plan, and resources they were built, so that the one has Romulus, the other Alexander, for its founder; with how much greater reason ought we to say that God alone is the Author of all natures, since He neither uses for His work any material which was not made by Him, nor any workmen who were not also made by Him, and since, if He were, so to speak, to withdraw from created things His creative power, they would straightway relapse into the nothingness in which they were before they were created? "Before," I mean, in respect of eternity, not of time. For what other creator could there be of time, than He who created those things whose movements make time?⁵⁶⁹

There is one kind of form given to every bodily substance from outside. Potters and smiths make such forms. So do artists who paint or shape forms resembling the bodies of animals. But there is another, internal form, which is not itself made. As an active cause, it produces natural bodily forms and even the life of living creatures. It proceeds from the secret, hidden choice of an intelligent and living nature. We may attribute the first kind of form to every craftsman. But the second belongs to God alone, the Creator and Originator. He made the world itself and the angels, without help from either. The same divine and, so to speak, creative power cannot be made, but makes. It gave the earth and sky their roundness. This same divine, effective, creative power gave the eye and the apple their roundness. All the other natural things we see received their form in the same way. They received it not from outside, but from the Creator’s secret and profound power. He said, "Do not I fill heaven and earth?"⁵⁶³ And his wisdom "reacheth from one end to another mightily; and sweetly doth she order all things."⁵⁶⁴ I do not know what kind of help the angels, who were themselves created first, gave the Creator in making other things. I cannot credit them with what perhaps they cannot do. Nor should I deny them whatever ability they have. But, with their permission, I attribute to God the work of creating and bringing all natures into being. They themselves thankfully credit him with their own existence. We do not call gardeners the creators of their fruits. For we read, "Neither is he that planteth anything, neither he that watereth, but God that giveth the increase."⁵⁶⁵ We do not even call the earth itself a creator. Yet it seems to be the fruitful mother of all things it helps sprout and emerge from seed. It also keeps them rooted in its own breast. For we likewise read, "God giveth it a body, as it hath pleased him, and to every seed his own body."⁵⁶⁶ We should not even call a woman the creator of her own child. Rather, its creator is the one who said to his servant, "Before I formed thee in the womb, I knew thee."⁵⁶⁷ A pregnant woman’s various emotions do produce similar qualities in the child in her womb. In the same way, Jacob used peeled branches to cause sheep with patches of color to be born. Yet a mother no more creates her child than she created herself. Bodily or seed-based causes may be used to produce things. Angels, humans, or lower animals may cooperate in this, or it may occur through sexual reproduction. A mother’s desires and emotions may also have the power to produce corresponding features and colors in the tender, easily shaped fetus. Yet the natures themselves, which are affected in these various ways, are produced by none but the most high God. His hidden power extends through all things and is present in all without being contaminated. It gives being to all that exists, and shapes and limits its existence. Without him, nothing would exist in this way or that, or have any being at all.⁵⁶⁸ A worker’s hand gives an outward form to the work. Yet we do not say that masons and architects built Rome and Alexandria. We say that the kings whose will, plans, and resources built them did so. Thus Rome has Romulus as its founder, and Alexandria has Alexander. How much more reason, then, do we have to say that God alone is the author of all natures? He uses no material for his work that he did not make. Nor does he use any workers that he did not also make. If he were, so to speak, to withdraw his creative power from created things, they would at once return to nothingness. That was their state before they were created. By "before" I mean in relation to eternity, not time. For who else could have created time but the one who created the things whose movements make time?⁵⁶⁹

26. Of that opinion of the Platonists, that the angels were themselves indeed created by God, but that afterwards they created man's body.

26. The Platonists' view that God created the angels, and that the angels later created the human body.

It is obvious, that in attributing the creation of the other animals to those inferior gods who were made by the Supreme, he meant it to be understood that the immortal part was taken from God Himself, and that these minor creators added the mortal part; that is to say, he meant them to be considered the creators of our bodies, but not of our souls. But since Porphyry maintains that if the soul is to be purified, all entanglement with a body must be escaped from; and at the same time agrees with Plato and the Platonists in thinking that those who have not spent a temperate and honourable life return to mortal bodies as their punishment (to bodies of brutes in Plato's opinion, to human bodies in Porphyry's); it follows that those whom they would have us worship as our parents and authors, that they may plausibly call them gods, are, after all, but the forgers of our fetters and chains,—not our creators, but our jailers and turnkeys, who lock us up in the most bitter and melancholy house of correction. Let the Platonists, then, either cease menacing us with our bodies as the punishment of our souls, or preaching that we are to worship as gods those whose work upon us they exhort us by all means in our power to avoid and escape from. But, indeed, both opinions are quite false. It is false that souls return again to this life to be punished; and it is false that there is any other creator of anything in heaven or earth, than He who made the heaven and the earth. For if we live in a body only to expiate our sins, how says Plato in another place, that the world could not have been the most beautiful and good, had it not been filled with all kinds of creatures, mortal and immortal?⁵⁷⁰ But if our creation even as mortals be a divine benefit, how is it a punishment to be restored to a body, that is, to a divine benefit? And if God, as Plato continually maintains, embraced in His eternal intelligence the ideas both of the universe and of all the animals, how, then, should He not with His own hand make them all? Could He be unwilling to be the constructor of works, the idea and plan of which called for His ineffable and ineffably to be praised intelligence?

Clearly, by attributing the creation of the other animals to the lesser gods made by the Supreme God, he meant that the immortal part came from God himself. These lesser creators added the mortal part. In other words, he meant them to be regarded as the creators of our bodies, but not our souls. But Porphyry maintains that, for the soul to be purified, it must escape every attachment to a body. He also agrees with Plato and the Platonists that those who have not lived temperate and honorable lives return to mortal bodies as punishment. Plato thinks they return to the bodies of animals, while Porphyry thinks they return to human bodies. It follows that those whom they call gods and would have us worship as our parents and makers are merely the forgers of our fetters and chains. They are not our creators, but our jailers and guards, who lock us in a bitter and miserable prison. The Platonists should therefore stop threatening us with bodies as punishment for our souls. Or they should stop preaching that we must worship as gods those whose work they urge us to avoid and escape by every means in our power. But in fact, both beliefs are completely false. It is false that souls return to this life to be punished. It is also false that anything in heaven or earth has any creator other than he who made heaven and earth. For if we live in a body only to make amends for our sins, why does Plato say otherwise elsewhere? He says that the world could not have been the most beautiful and good world unless it were filled with all kinds of creatures, mortal and immortal.⁵⁷⁰ But if our creation, even as mortals, is a divine gift, how can it be a punishment to return to a body? That would mean returning to a divine gift. Plato also repeatedly maintains that God held the ideas of the universe and all living creatures in his eternal intelligence. If so, why would he not make them all with his own hand? Could he be unwilling to create works whose conception and design called for his intelligence, which is beyond words and beyond all praise?

With good cause, therefore, does the true religion recognise and proclaim that the same God who created the universal cosmos, created also all the animals, souls as well as bodies. Among the terrestrial animals man was made by Him in His own image, and, for the reason I have given, was made one individual, though he was not left solitary. For there is nothing so social by nature, so unsocial by its corruption, as this race. And human nature has nothing more appropriate, either for the prevention of discord, or for the healing of it, where it exists, than the remembrance of that first parent of us all, whom God was pleased to create alone, that all men might be derived from one, and that they might thus be admonished to preserve unity among their whole multitude. But from the fact that the woman was made for him from his side, it was plainly meant that we should learn how dear the bond between man and wife should be. These works of God do certainly seem extraordinary, because they are the first works. They who do not believe them, ought not to believe any prodigies; for these would not be called prodigies did they not happen out of the ordinary course of nature. But, is it possible that anything should happen in vain, however hidden be its cause, in so grand a government of divine providence? One of the sacred Psalmists says, "Come, behold the works of the Lord, what prodigies He hath wrought in the earth."⁵⁷¹ Why God made woman out of man's side, and what this first prodigy prefigured, I shall, with God's help, tell in another place. But at present, since this book must be concluded, let us merely say that in this first man, who was created in the beginning, there was laid the foundation, not indeed evidently, but in God's foreknowledge, of these two cities or societies, so far as regards the human race. For from that man all men were to be derived—some of them to be associated with the good angels in their reward, others with the wicked in punishment; all being ordered by the secret yet just judgment of God. For since it is written, "All the paths of the Lord are mercy and truth,"⁵⁷² neither can His grace be unjust, nor His justice cruel.

For good reason, then, the true religion recognizes and proclaims that the same God created the whole universe and all animals, both their souls and their bodies. Among land animals, he made human beings in his own image. For the reason I have given, he created one individual, though he did not leave him alone. For no race is so social by nature, yet so unsocial through its corruption. Nothing in human nature is better suited to prevent discord, or to heal it where it exists, than remembering the first parent of us all. God chose to create him alone so that all people would come from one person. In this way, they would be reminded to preserve unity among their whole multitude. God made the woman for him from his side. This clearly teaches us how dear the bond between husband and wife should be. These works of God certainly seem extraordinary because they were the first works. Those who do not believe them should not believe any prodigies. For such wonders would not be called prodigies if they happened in the ordinary course of nature. But under the vast rule of divine providence, can anything happen in vain, however hidden its cause may be? One of the sacred Psalmists says, "Come, behold the works of the Lord, what prodigies he hath wrought in the earth."⁵⁷¹ With God's help, I shall explain elsewhere why he made woman from man's side and what this first prodigy foreshadowed. But this book must now come to an end. So let us simply say that the foundation of these two cities or societies, insofar as they concern the human race, was laid in the first man, who was created in the beginning. This was not yet visible, but it was known beforehand to God. For all people were to descend from that man. Some would join the good angels in their reward, and others would join the wicked angels in punishment. All this is ordered by God's secret but just judgment. For Scripture says, "All the paths of the Lord are mercy and truth."⁵⁷² Therefore, his grace cannot be unjust, nor can his justice be cruel.