AUGUSTINE COMES NOW TO THE THIRD KIND OF THEOLOGY, THAT IS, THE NATURAL, AND TAKES UP THE QUESTION, WHETHER THE WORSHIP OF THE GODS OF THE NATURAL THEOLOGY IS OF ANY AVAIL TOWARDS SECURING BLESSEDNESS IN THE LIFE TO COME. THIS QUESTION HE PREFERS TO DISCUSS WITH THE PLATONISTS, BECAUSE THE PLATONIC SYSTEM IS "FACILE PRINCEPS" AMONG PHILOSOPHIES, AND MAKES THE NEAREST APPROXIMATION TO CHRISTIAN TRUTH. IN PURSUING THIS ARGUMENT, HE FIRST REFUTES APULEIUS, AND ALL WHO MAINTAIN THAT THE DEMONS SHOULD BE WORSHIPPED AS MESSENGERS AND MEDIATORS BETWEEN GODS AND MEN; DEMONSTRATING THAT BY NO POSSIBILITY CAN MEN BE RECONCILED TO GOOD GODS BY DEMONS, WHO ARE THE SLAVES OF VICE, AND WHO DELIGHT IN AND PATRONIZE WHAT GOOD AND WISE MEN ABHOR AND CONDEMN,—THE BLASPHEMOUS FICTIONS OF POETS, THEATRICAL EXHIBITIONS, AND MAGICAL ARTS.
Augustine now turns to the third kind of theology, known as natural theology. He asks whether worshiping its gods can help secure blessedness in the life to come. He prefers to discuss this question with the Platonists. This is because Platonism is clearly the foremost philosophy and comes closest to Christian truth. He begins by refuting Apuleius and all who claim that demons should be worshiped as messengers and mediators between gods and humans. He shows that demons cannot possibly reconcile humans to good gods. Demons are slaves to vice. They delight in and support what good and wise people hate and condemn: the blasphemous fictions of poets, theatrical performances, and magical arts.
1. That the question of natural theology is to be discussed with those philosophers who sought a more excellent wisdom.
1. The question of natural theology should be discussed with philosophers who sought a higher wisdom.
We shall require to apply our mind with far greater intensity to the present question than was requisite in the solution and unfolding of the questions handled in the preceding books; for it is not with ordinary men, but with philosophers that we must confer concerning the theology which they call natural. For it is not like the fabulous, that is, the theatrical; nor the civil, that is, the urban theology: the one of which displays the crimes of the gods, whilst the other manifests their criminal desires, which demonstrate them to be rather malign demons than gods. It is, we say, with philosophers we have to confer with respect to this theology,—men whose very name, if rendered into Latin, signifies those who profess the love of wisdom. Now, if wisdom is God, who made all things, as is attested by the divine authority and truth, then the philosopher is a lover of God. But since the thing itself, which is called by this name, exists not in all who glory in the name,—for it does not follow, of course, that all who are called philosophers are lovers of true wisdom,—we must needs select from the number of those with whose opinions we have been able to acquaint ourselves by reading, some with whom we may not unworthily engage in the treatment of this question. For I have not in this work undertaken to refute all the vain opinions of the philosophers, but only such as pertain to theology, which Greek word we understand to mean an account or explanation of the divine nature. Nor, again, have I undertaken to refute all the vain theological opinions of all the philosophers, but only of such of them as, agreeing in the belief that there is a divine nature, and that this divine nature is concerned about human affairs, do nevertheless deny that the worship of the one unchangeable God is sufficient for the obtaining of a blessed life after death, as well as at the present time; and hold that, in order to obtain that life, many gods, created, indeed, and appointed to their several spheres by that one God, are to be worshipped. These approach nearer to the truth than even Varro; for, whilst he saw no difficulty in extending natural theology in its entirety even to the world and the soul of the world, these acknowledge God as existing above all that is of the nature of soul, and as the Creator not only of this visible world, which is often called heaven and earth, but also of every soul whatsoever, and as Him who gives blessedness to the rational soul,—of which kind is the human soul,—by participation in His own unchangeable and incorporeal light. There is no one, who has even a slender knowledge of these things, who does not know of the Platonic philosophers, who derive their name from their master Plato. Concerning this Plato, then, I will briefly state such things as I deem necessary to the present question, mentioning beforehand those who preceded him in time in the same department of literature.
We must apply our minds much more carefully to this question than we did to those discussed in the preceding books. For we must now discuss what philosophers call natural theology, and we are dealing with philosophers, not ordinary people. Natural theology is unlike the fabulous, or theatrical, theology and the civil, or civic, theology. The first displays the crimes of the gods. The second reveals their criminal desires, which show them to be evil demons rather than gods. We must discuss natural theology with philosophers. Their very name, translated into Latin, means people who profess to love wisdom. If wisdom is God, who made all things, as divine authority and truth attest, then a philosopher loves God. But not everyone who takes pride in the name possesses what it signifies. It does not follow that everyone called a philosopher loves true wisdom. We must therefore choose, from those whose views we know through reading, some worthy partners for this discussion. In this work, I have not undertaken to refute all the philosophers’ empty opinions. I address only those concerning theology, a Greek word meaning an account or explanation of the divine nature. Even then, I have not undertaken to refute all the empty theological opinions of all philosophers. I address only certain philosophers who agree that a divine nature exists and is concerned with human affairs. Yet they deny that worship of the one unchangeable God is enough to obtain a blessed life, both now and after death. They hold that, to obtain that life, we must worship many gods. These gods, they believe, were created by the one God and assigned their respective spheres by him. These philosophers come closer to the truth than even Varro. He saw no difficulty in extending natural theology as a whole to the world and the soul of the world. They, however, acknowledge that God exists above everything that belongs to the nature of soul. They acknowledge him as the creator of this visible world, often called heaven and earth, and of every soul whatsoever. They also hold that he gives blessedness to the rational soul, such as the human soul, through its participation in his own unchangeable and incorporeal light. Everyone with even a slight knowledge of these matters knows of the Platonic philosophers. They take their name from their master, Plato. I will therefore briefly state what I consider necessary about Plato for the present question. First, I will mention those who preceded him in the same field of writing.
Wisdom vii. 24-27.
2. Concerning the two schools of philosophers, that is, the Italic and Ionic, and their founders.
2. About the two schools of philosophy, the Italic and Ionic, and their founders.
As far as concerns the literature of the Greeks, whose language holds a more illustrious place than any of the languages of the other nations, history mentions two schools of philosophers, the one called the Italic school, originating in that part of Italy which was formerly called Magna Græcia; the other called the Ionic school, having its origin in those regions which are still called by the name of Greece. The Italic school had for its founder Pythagoras of Samos, to whom also the term "philosophy" is said to owe its origin. For whereas formerly those who seemed to excel others by the laudable manner in which they regulated their lives were called sages, Pythagoras, on being asked what he professed, replied that he was a philosopher, that is, a student or lover of wisdom; for it seemed to him to be the height of arrogance to profess oneself a sage. The founder of the Ionic school, again, was Thales of Miletus, one of those seven who were styled the "seven sages," of whom six were distinguished by the kind of life they lived, and by certain maxims which they gave forth for the proper conduct of life. Thales was distinguished as an investigator into the nature of things; and, in order that he might have successors in his school, he committed his dissertations to writing. That, however, which especially rendered him eminent was his ability, by means of astronomical calculations, even to predict eclipses of the sun and moon. He thought, however, that water was the first principle of things, and that of it all the elements of the world, the world itself, and all things which are generated in it, ultimately consist. Over all this work, however, which, when we consider the world, appears so admirable, he set nothing of the nature of divine mind. To him succeeded Anaximander, his pupil, who held a different opinion concerning the nature of things; for he did not hold that all things spring from one principle, as Thales did, who held that principle to be water, but thought that each thing springs from its own proper principle. These principles of things he believed to be infinite in number, and thought that they generated innumerable worlds, and all the things which arise in them. He thought, also, that these worlds are subject to a perpetual process of alternate dissolution and regeneration, each one continuing for a longer or shorter period of time, according to the nature of the case; nor did he, any more than Thales, attribute anything to a divine mind in the production of all this activity of things. Anaximander left as his successor his disciple Anaximenes, who attributed all the causes of things to an infinite air. He neither denied nor ignored the existence of gods, but, so far from believing that the air was made by them, he held, on the contrary, that they sprang from the air. Anaxagoras, however, who was his pupil, perceived that a divine mind was the productive cause of all things which we see, and said that all the various kinds of things, according to their several modes and species, were produced out of an infinite matter consisting of homogeneous particles, but by the efficiency of a divine mind. Diogenes, also, another pupil of Anaximenes, said that a certain air was the original substance of things out of which all things were produced, but that it was possessed of a divine reason, without which nothing could be produced from it. Anaxagoras was succeeded by his disciple Archelaus, who also thought that all things consisted of homogeneous particles, of which each particular thing was made, but that those particles were pervaded by a divine mind, which perpetually energized all the eternal bodies, namely, those particles, so that they are alternately united and separated. Socrates, the master of Plato, is said to have been the disciple of Archelaus; and on Plato's account it is that I have given this brief historical sketch of the whole history of these schools.
Greek literature holds a more distinguished place than the literature of other nations. Its language, too, is more distinguished than theirs. Greek history records two schools of philosophy. One was called the Italic school. It began in the part of Italy once known as Magna Graecia. The other was called the Ionic school. It began in the regions still known as Greece. Pythagoras of Samos founded the Italic school. He is also said to have given rise to the term "philosophy." Before his time, people who seemed to excel others by living admirable lives were called sages. When Pythagoras was asked what he professed to be, he answered that he was a philosopher. That is, he was a student or lover of wisdom. He thought it supremely arrogant to call oneself a sage. Thales of Miletus founded the Ionic school. He was one of those known as the "seven sages." Six of them were distinguished by the lives they lived and by their sayings about proper conduct. Thales was distinguished by his investigations into the nature of things. He wrote down his teachings so that others could carry on his school. What made him especially famous was his ability to predict eclipses of the sun and moon through astronomical calculations. He thought that water was the first principle of all things. He believed that all the elements of the world, the world itself, and everything produced in it ultimately consist of water. Yet he assigned no role to any divine mind in this work, which seems so admirable when we consider the world. His pupil Anaximander succeeded him. Anaximander held a different view of the nature of things. Unlike Thales, he did not believe that everything comes from one principle, which Thales held to be water. Instead, he thought that each thing comes from its own proper principle. He believed these principles were infinite in number. He thought they produced countless worlds and everything that arises in them. He also thought that these worlds continually pass through cycles of dissolution and regeneration. Each world lasts for a longer or shorter time, according to its circumstances. Like Thales, he assigned no role to a divine mind in producing all this activity. Anaximander was succeeded by his pupil Anaximenes. He attributed all the causes of things to infinite air. He neither denied nor ignored the existence of gods. But he did not believe that they made the air. On the contrary, he believed that they came from it. Anaxagoras, a pupil of Anaximenes, saw that a divine mind was the productive cause of everything we see. He said that all the different kinds of things were produced from infinite matter made up of homogeneous particles. Each was produced according to its own form and kind, through the action of a divine mind. Diogenes, another pupil of Anaximenes, also said that a certain kind of air was the original substance from which everything was produced. But he believed that this air possessed divine reason, without which nothing could be produced from it. Anaxagoras was succeeded by his pupil Archelaus. He too thought that all things consisted of homogeneous particles, from which each particular thing was made. But he believed that a divine mind was present throughout those particles. This mind continually gave energy to all those eternal bodies, the particles, causing them to join and separate in turn. Socrates, Plato's teacher, is said to have been a pupil of Archelaus. It is because of Plato that I have given this brief account of the history of these schools.
“Sapiens” means a wise man, someone who has attained wisdom.
3. Of the Socratic philosophy.
3. On Socratic philosophy.
Socrates is said to have been the first who directed the entire effort of philosophy to the correction and regulation of manners, all who went before him having expended their greatest efforts in the investigation of physical, that is, natural phenomena. However, it seems to me that it cannot be certainly discovered whether Socrates did this because he was wearied of obscure and uncertain things, and so wished to direct his mind to the discovery of something manifest and certain, which was necessary in order to the obtaining of a blessed life,—that one great object toward which the labour, vigilance, and industry of all philosophers seem to have been directed,—or whether (as some yet more favourable to him suppose) he did it because he was unwilling that minds defiled with earthly desires should essay to raise themselves upward to divine things. For he saw that the causes of things were sought for by them,—which causes he believed to be ultimately reducible to nothing else than the will of the one true and supreme God,—and on this account he thought they could only be comprehended by a purified mind; and therefore that all diligence ought to be given to the purification of the life by good morals, in order that the mind, delivered from the depressing weight of lusts, might raise itself upward by its native vigour to eternal things, and might, with purified understanding, contemplate that nature which is incorporeal and unchangeable light, where live the causes of all created natures. It is evident, however, that he hunted out and pursued, with a wonderful pleasantness of style and argument, and with a most pointed and insinuating urbanity, the foolishness of ignorant men, who thought that they knew this or that,—sometimes confessing his own ignorance, and sometimes dissimulating his knowledge, even in those very moral questions to which he seems to have directed the whole force of his mind. And hence there arose hostility against him, which ended in his being calumniously impeached, and condemned to death. Afterwards, however, that very city of the Athenians, which had publicly condemned him, did publicly bewail him,—the popular indignation having turned with such vehemence on his accusers, that one of them perished by the violence of the multitude, whilst the other only escaped a like punishment by voluntary and perpetual exile.
Socrates is said to have been the first to devote all the effort of philosophy to correcting and guiding human conduct. All who came before him had devoted their greatest efforts to investigating physical, or natural, phenomena. Yet I do not think we can know for certain why Socrates made this change. Perhaps he had grown tired of obscure and uncertain matters. He may have wanted to discover something clear and certain, something needed to attain a blessed life. This is the one great goal toward which all philosophers seem to have directed their labor, vigilance, and effort. Or perhaps, as some who regard him even more favorably suppose, he had another reason. He may not have wanted minds defiled by earthly desires to attempt to rise toward divine things. He saw that people sought the causes of things. He believed that all these causes could ultimately be traced to the will of the one true and supreme God. For this reason, he thought that only a purified mind could understand them. He therefore believed that every effort should be made to purify one’s life through good morals. Then the mind, freed from the weight of its desires, could rise by its own natural strength toward eternal things. With purified understanding, it could contemplate that nature which is immaterial and unchanging light, where the causes of all created things reside. What is clear, however, is that he sought out and exposed the folly of ignorant people who thought they knew this or that. He did so with a wonderfully pleasant style and manner of argument, and with a pointed and subtly persuasive wit. Sometimes he admitted his own ignorance. At other times he concealed his knowledge, even on the moral questions to which he seems to have devoted his full attention. This stirred up hostility against him. In the end, he was falsely accused and condemned to death. Later, however, the very city of Athens that had publicly condemned him publicly mourned him. Public anger turned so fiercely against his accusers that a mob killed one of them. The other escaped the same punishment only by choosing permanent exile.
Illustrious, therefore, both in his life and in his death, Socrates left very many disciples of his philosophy, who vied with one another in desire for proficiency in handling those moral questions which concern the chief good (summum bonum), the possession of which can make a man blessed; and because, in the disputations of Socrates, where he raises all manner of questions, makes assertions, and then demolishes them, it did not evidently appear what he held to be the chief good, every one took from these disputations what pleased him best, and every one placed the final good in whatever it appeared to himself to consist. Now, that which is called the final good is that at which, when one has arrived, he is blessed. But so diverse were the opinions held by those followers of Socrates concerning this final good, that (a thing scarcely to be credited with respect to the followers of one master) some placed the chief good in pleasure, as Aristippus, others in virtue, as Antisthenes. Indeed, it were tedious to recount the various opinions of various disciples.
Socrates was therefore renowned in both life and death. He left many disciples of his philosophy. They competed with one another to become skilled in discussing moral questions about the highest good (summum bonum). Possessing this good can make a person blessed. In his discussions, Socrates raised all kinds of questions, made assertions, and then demolished them. But it was not clear what he believed the highest good to be. Each disciple therefore took what pleased him most from these discussions. Each placed the final good wherever he believed it lay. The final good is that which makes a person blessed once he attains it. Yet Socrates' followers held widely different views about this good. It is almost unbelievable that followers of one master could differ so much. Some, like Aristippus, placed the highest good in pleasure. Others, like Antisthenes, placed it in virtue. It would be tedious to recount the different opinions of the various disciples.
The ultimate goal of the good.
4. Concerning Plato, the chief among the disciples of Socrates, and his threefold division of philosophy.
4. About Plato, the foremost disciple of Socrates, and his division of philosophy into three parts.
But, among the disciples of Socrates, Plato was the one who shone with a glory which far excelled that of the others, and who not unjustly eclipsed them all. By birth an Athenian of honourable parentage, he far surpassed his fellow-disciples in natural endowments, of which he was possessed in a wonderful degree. Yet, deeming himself and the Socratic discipline far from sufficient for bringing philosophy to perfection, he travelled as extensively as he was able, going to every place famed for the cultivation of any science of which he could make himself master. Thus he learned from the Egyptians whatever they held and taught as important; and from Egypt, passing into those parts of Italy which were filled with the fame of the Pythagoreans, he mastered, with the greatest facility, and under the most eminent teachers, all the Italic philosophy which was then in vogue. And, as he had a peculiar love for his master Socrates, he made him the speaker in all his dialogues, putting into his mouth whatever he had learned, either from others, or from the efforts of his own powerful intellect, tempering even his moral disputations with the grace and politeness of the Socratic style. And, as the study of wisdom consists in action and contemplation, so that one part of it may be called active, and the other contemplative,—the active part having reference to the conduct of life, that is, to the regulation of morals, and the contemplative part to the investigation into the causes of nature and into pure truth,—Socrates is said to have excelled in the active part of that study, while Pythagoras gave more attention to its contemplative part, on which he brought to bear all the force of his great intellect. To Plato is given the praise of having perfected philosophy by combining both parts into one. He then divides it into three parts,—the first moral, which is chiefly occupied with action; the second natural, of which the object is contemplation; and the third rational, which discriminates between the true and the false. And though this last is necessary both to action and contemplation, it is contemplation, nevertheless, which lays peculiar claim to the office of investigating the nature of truth. Thus this tripartite division is not contrary to that which made the study of wisdom to consist in action and contemplation. Now, as to what Plato thought with respect to each of these parts,—that is, what he believed to be the end of all actions, the cause of all natures, and the light of all intelligences,—it would be a question too long to discuss, and about which we ought not to make any rash affirmation. For, as Plato liked and constantly affected the well-known method of his master Socrates, namely, that of dissimulating his knowledge or his opinions, it is not easy to discover clearly what he himself thought on various matters, any more than it is to discover what were the real opinions of Socrates. We must, nevertheless, insert into our work certain of those opinions which he expresses in his writings, whether he himself uttered them, or narrates them as expressed by others, and seems himself to approve of,—opinions sometimes favourable to the true religion, which our faith takes up and defends, and sometimes contrary to it, as, for example, in the questions concerning the existence of one God or of many, as it relates to the truly blessed life which is to be after death. For those who are praised as having most closely followed Plato, who is justly preferred to all the other philosophers of the Gentiles, and who are said to have manifested the greatest acuteness in understanding him, do perhaps entertain such an idea of God as to admit that in Him are to be found the cause of existence, the ultimate reason for the understanding, and the end in reference to which the whole life is to be regulated. Of which three things, the first is understood to pertain to the natural, the second to the rational, and the third to the moral part of philosophy. For if man has been so created as to attain, through that which is most excellent in him, to that which excels all things,—that is, to the one true and absolutely good God, without whom no nature exists, no doctrine instructs, no exercise profits,—let Him be sought in whom all things are secure to us, let Him be discovered in whom all truth becomes certain to us, let Him be loved in whom all becomes right to us.
Among Socrates’ disciples, Plato shone with a glory far greater than the others. He eclipsed them all, and deservedly so. Born in Athens to an honorable family, he possessed extraordinary natural gifts that far surpassed those of his fellow disciples. Yet he thought that neither he nor Socrates’ teaching was enough to bring philosophy to perfection. So he traveled as widely as he could. He went wherever people were known for cultivating a field of knowledge he could master. From the Egyptians he learned whatever they considered important and taught. From Egypt he went to those parts of Italy renowned for the Pythagoreans. There, under the most distinguished teachers, he mastered with great ease all the Italian philosophy then in vogue. He had a special love for his teacher Socrates and made him the speaker in all his dialogues. He put into Socrates’ mouth whatever he had learned from others or through his own powerful intellect. Even his discussions of moral questions took on the grace and courtesy of the Socratic style. The study of wisdom consists of action and contemplation. One part may therefore be called active and the other contemplative. The active part concerns how we live, that is, how we govern our conduct. The contemplative part investigates the causes of nature and pure truth. Socrates is said to have excelled in the active part of this study. Pythagoras gave more attention to the contemplative part, bringing the full force of his great intellect to it. Plato is praised for perfecting philosophy by combining both parts into one. He then divides philosophy into three parts. The first is moral philosophy, which is chiefly concerned with action. The second is natural philosophy, whose object is contemplation. The third is rational philosophy, which distinguishes truth from falsehood. This last part is necessary for both action and contemplation. Nevertheless, the investigation of the nature of truth belongs especially to contemplation. Thus, this threefold division does not conflict with the division of wisdom into action and contemplation. It would take too long to discuss what Plato thought about each of these parts. That is, what he believed to be the goal of all actions, the cause of all things in nature, and the light of all minds. Nor should we make any hasty claims about it. Plato favored and constantly used the well-known method of his teacher Socrates, concealing his knowledge or opinions. So it is no easier to discover clearly what Plato himself thought on various matters than what Socrates really believed. Nevertheless, we must include in our work certain opinions expressed in Plato’s writings. These are opinions he either states himself or presents as spoken by others and seems to approve. Some support the true religion that our faith upholds and defends, while others oppose it. This is so, for example, in questions about whether there is one God or many. These questions concern the truly blessed life to come after death. Plato is justly preferred to all the other philosophers among the Gentiles. Some are praised as his closest followers and said to have shown the greatest insight in understanding him. They perhaps hold that God is the cause of existence, the ultimate reason for understanding, and the goal by which all of life should be governed. Of these three things, the first belongs to natural philosophy, the second to rational philosophy, and the third to moral philosophy. For consider that human beings may have been created to reach, through what is best in them, the one who surpasses all things. He is the one true and absolutely good God. Without him no nature exists, no teaching instructs, and no effort bears fruit. Let us seek him in whom all things are secure for us. Let us discover him in whom all truth becomes certain to us. Let us love him in whom all becomes right for us.
5. That it is especially with the Platonists that we must carry on our disputations on matters of theology, their opinions being preferable to those of all other philosophers.
5. We must discuss theology especially with the Platonists. Their views are preferable to those of all other philosophers.
If, then, Plato defined the wise man as one who imitates, knows, loves this God, and who is rendered blessed through fellowship with Him in His own blessedness, why discuss with the other philosophers? It is evident that none come nearer to us than the Platonists. To them, therefore, let that fabulous theology give place which delights the minds of men with the crimes of the gods; and that civil theology also, in which impure demons, under the name of gods, have seduced the peoples of the earth given up to earthly pleasures, desiring to be honoured by the errors of men, and, by filling the minds of their worshippers with impure desires, exciting them to make the representation of their crimes one of the rites of their worship, whilst they themselves found in the spectators of these exhibitions a most pleasing spectacle,—a theology in which, whatever was honourable in the temple, was defiled by its mixture with the obscenity of the theatre, and whatever was base in the theatre was vindicated by the abominations of the temples. To these philosophers also the interpretations of Varro must give place, in which he explains the sacred rites as having reference to heaven and earth, and to the seeds and operations of perishable things; for, in the first place, those rites have not the signification which he would have men believe is attached to them, and therefore truth does not follow him in his attempt so to interpret them; and even if they had this signification, still those things ought not to be worshipped by the rational soul as its god which are placed below it in the scale of nature, nor ought the soul to prefer to itself as gods things to which the true God has given it the preference. The same must be said of those writings pertaining to the sacred rites, which Numa Pompilius took care to conceal by causing them to be buried along with himself, and which, when they were afterwards turned up by the plough, were burned by order of the senate. And, to treat Numa with all honour, let us mention as belonging to the same rank as these writings that which Alexander of Macedon wrote to his mother as communicated to him by Leo, an Egyptian high priest. In this letter not only Picus and Faunus, and Æneas and Romulus, or even Hercules and Æsculapius and Liber, born of Semele, and the twin sons of Tyndareus, or any other mortals who have been deified, but even the principal gods themselves, to whom Cicero, in his Tusculan questions, alludes without mentioning their names, Jupiter, Juno, Saturn, Vulcan, Vesta, and many others whom Varro attempts to identify with the parts or the elements of the world, are shown to have been men. There is, as we have said, a similarity between this case and that of Numa; for, the priest being afraid because he had revealed a mystery, earnestly begged of Alexander to command his mother to burn the letter which conveyed these communications to her. Let these two theologies, then, the fabulous and the civil, give place to the Platonic philosophers, who have recognised the true God as the author of all things, the source of the light of truth, and the bountiful bestower of all blessedness. And not these only, but to these great acknowledgers of so great a God, those philosophers must yield who, having their mind enslaved to their body, supposed the principles of all things to be material; as Thales, who held that the first principle of all things was water; Anaximenes, that it was air; the Stoics, that it was fire; Epicurus, who affirmed that it consisted of atoms, that is to say, of minute corpuscules; and many others whom it is needless to enumerate, but who believed that bodies, simple or compound, animate or inanimate, but nevertheless bodies, were the cause and principle of all things. For some of them—as, for instance, the Epicureans—believed that living things could originate from things without life; others held that all things living or without life spring from a living principle, but that, nevertheless, all things, being material, spring from a material principle. For the Stoics thought that fire, that is, one of the four material elements of which this visible world is composed, was both living and intelligent, the maker of the world and of all things contained in it,—that it was in fact God. These and others like them have only been able to suppose that which their hearts enslaved to sense have vainly suggested to them. And yet they have within themselves something which they could not see: they represented to themselves inwardly things which they had seen without, even when they were not seeing them, but only thinking of them. But this representation in thought is no longer a body, but only the similitude of a body; and that faculty of the mind by which this similitude of a body is seen is neither a body nor the similitude of a body; and the faculty which judges whether the representation is beautiful or ugly is without doubt superior to the object judged of. This principle is the understanding of man, the rational soul; and it is certainly not a body, since that similitude of a body which it beholds and judges of is itself not a body. The soul is neither earth, nor water, nor air, nor fire, of which four bodies, called the four elements, we see that this world is composed. And if the soul is not a body, how should God, its Creator, be a body? Let all those philosophers, then, give place, as we have said, to the Platonists, and those also who have been ashamed to say that God is a body, but yet have thought that our souls are of the same nature as God. They have not been staggered by the great changeableness of the soul,—an attribute which it would be impious to ascribe to the divine nature,—but they say it is the body which changes the soul, for in itself it is unchangeable. As well might they say, "Flesh is wounded by some body, for in itself it is invulnerable." In a word, that which is unchangeable can be changed by nothing, so that that which can be changed by the body cannot properly be said to be immutable.
If Plato defined the wise person as one who imitates, knows, and loves this God, why debate with the other philosophers? According to Plato, such a person becomes blessed by sharing in God’s own blessedness. Clearly, no philosophers come closer to us than the Platonists. So let mythical theology give way to them. That theology delights people’s minds with stories of the gods’ crimes. Let civil theology give way as well. In it, impure demons have taken the name of gods and seduced the peoples of the earth, who are given over to earthly pleasures. These demons want to be honored through human error. They fill their worshippers’ minds with impure desires and stir them to act out their crimes as a religious rite. Meanwhile, the demons find the spectators of these performances a most pleasing spectacle. In this theology, whatever was honorable in the temple was defiled by its association with the obscenity of the theater. And whatever was base in the theater was justified by the abominations practiced in the temples. Varro’s interpretations must also give way to these philosophers. He explains the sacred rites as referring to heaven and earth, and to the seeds and workings of perishable things. First, the rites do not have the meaning he would have people believe they have. So his interpretation is not supported by the truth. But even if the rites did have this meaning, the rational soul should not worship such things as its god. They stand below the soul in the order of nature. Nor should the soul place above itself as gods things that the true God has placed below it. The same must be said of the writings about sacred rites that Numa Pompilius arranged to have buried with him. He took care to keep them hidden. Later, when a plow turned them up, the senate ordered them burned. And, with all due respect to Numa, let us place in the same category a letter Alexander of Macedon wrote to his mother. It reported what Leo, an Egyptian high priest, had told him. The letter shows that the chief gods themselves were once human. Cicero alludes to these gods without naming them in his Tusculan Questions. They include Jupiter, Juno, Saturn, Vulcan, Vesta, and many others whom Varro tries to identify with parts or elements of the world. The letter says the same of Picus, Faunus, Aeneas, Romulus, Hercules, Aesculapius, Liber the son of Semele, the twin sons of Tyndareus, and all other mortals who have been made gods. As we have said, this case resembles Numa’s. The priest was afraid because he had revealed a mystery. So he urged Alexander to tell his mother to burn the letter containing these disclosures. Let these two theologies, the mythical and the civil, give way to the Platonic philosophers. They have recognized the true God as the creator of all things, the source of the light of truth, and the generous giver of all blessedness. But these theologies are not alone in having to yield to those who acknowledge so great a God. The same is true of philosophers whose minds were enslaved to their bodies and who thought that the first principles of all things were material. Thales held that the first principle was water. Anaximenes said it was air. The Stoics said it was fire. Epicurus said it consisted of atoms, that is, tiny particles. Many others, whom there is no need to name, also held that bodies were the cause and first principle of all things. These bodies might be simple or compound, living or lifeless, but they were bodies nonetheless. Some of them, such as the Epicureans, believed that living things could arise from lifeless things. Others held that all things, living or lifeless, spring from a living principle. Yet they also held that all things are material and spring from a material principle. The Stoics thought that fire was living and intelligent. Fire is one of the four material elements that make up this visible world. They thought it was the maker of the world and everything in it. In fact, they thought it was God. These philosophers and others like them could imagine only what their hearts, enslaved to the senses, suggested to them in vain. Yet they have within themselves something they could not see. They formed images in their minds of things they had seen outside themselves, even when they were no longer looking at them but only thinking about them. Such an image is not a body. It is only a likeness of a body. And the faculty of the mind that sees this likeness is neither a body nor the likeness of a body. The faculty that judges whether the image is beautiful or ugly is surely superior to what it judges. This faculty is human understanding, the rational soul. It is certainly not a body, since the likeness of a body that it sees and judges is not itself a body. The soul is neither earth, water, air, nor fire. We see that the world is made up of these four bodies, which are called the four elements. And if the soul is not a body, how can God, its creator, be a body? Let all these philosophers, then, give way to the Platonists, as we have said. So should those who were ashamed to say that God is a body, yet thought that our souls have the same nature as God. They have not been troubled by how greatly the soul can change, though it would be impious to attribute such changeability to the divine nature. They say that the body changes the soul, but that the soul is unchangeable in itself. They might just as well say, "Flesh is wounded by some body, for in itself it cannot be wounded." In short, nothing can change what is unchangeable. So what can be changed by the body cannot properly be called unchangeable.
The gods of the highest rank.
Book 1, chapter 13.
6. Concerning the meaning of the Platonists in that part of philosophy called physical.
6. What the Platonists meant in the branch of philosophy called natural philosophy.
These philosophers, then, whom we see not undeservedly exalted above the rest in fame and glory, have seen that no material body is God, and therefore they have transcended all bodies in seeking for God. They have seen that whatever is changeable is not the most high God, and therefore they have transcended every soul and all changeable spirits in seeking the supreme. They have seen also that, in every changeable thing, the form which makes it that which it is, whatever be its mode or nature, can only be through Him who truly is, because He is unchangeable. And therefore, whether we consider the whole body of the world, its figure, qualities, and orderly movement, and also all the bodies which are in it; or whether we consider all life, either that which nourishes and maintains, as the life of trees, or that which, besides this, has also sensation, as the life of beasts; or that which adds to all these intelligence, as the life of man; or that which does not need the support of nutriment, but only maintains, feels, understands, as the life of angels,—all can only be through Him who absolutely is. For to Him it is not one thing to be, and another to live, as though He could be, not living; nor is it to Him one thing to live, and another thing to understand, as though He could live, not understanding; nor is it to Him one thing to understand, another thing to be blessed, as though He could understand and not be blessed. But to Him to live, to understand, to be blessed, are to be. They have understood, from this unchangeableness and this simplicity, that all things must have been made by Him, and that He could Himself have been made by none. For they have considered that whatever is is either body or life, and that life is something better than body, and that the nature of body is sensible, and that of life intelligible. Therefore they have preferred the intelligible nature to the sensible. We mean by sensible things such things as can be perceived by the sight and touch of the body; by intelligible things, such as can be understood by the sight of the mind. For there is no corporeal beauty, whether in the condition of a body, as figure, or in its movement, as in music, of which it is not the mind that judges. But this could never have been, had there not existed in the mind itself a superior form of these things, without bulk, without noise of voice, without space and time. But even in respect of these things, had the mind not been mutable, it would not have been possible for one to judge better than another with regard to sensible forms. He who is clever judges better than he who is slow, he who is skilled than he who is unskilful, he who is practised than he who is unpractised; and the same person judges better after he has gained experience than he did before. But that which is capable of more and less is mutable; whence able men, who have thought deeply on these things, have gathered that the first form is not to be found in those things whose form is changeable. Since, therefore, they saw that body and mind might be more or less beautiful in form, and that, if they wanted form, they could have no existence, they saw that there is some existence in which is the first form, unchangeable, and therefore not admitting of degrees of comparison, and in that they most rightly believed was the first principle of things, which was not made, and by which all things were made. Therefore that which is known of God He manifested to them when His invisible things were seen by them, being understood by those things which have been made; also His eternal power and Godhead by whom all visible and temporal things have been created. We have said enough upon that part of theology which they call physical, that is, natural.
These philosophers are rightly honored above the rest for their wisdom. They saw that no material body is God. So, in seeking God, they looked beyond all bodies. They saw that nothing changeable is the most high God. So, in seeking the supreme God, they looked beyond every soul and all changeable spirits. They also saw that every changeable thing has a form that makes it what it is, whatever its kind or nature. That form can only be through him who truly is, because he is unchangeable. Consider the whole physical world, its shape, qualities, and orderly movement, as well as all the bodies within it. Or consider every kind of life. There is life that nourishes and sustains, such as the life of trees. There is life that also senses, such as the life of animals. There is life that has intelligence as well, such as human life. And there is life that needs no nourishment, but only sustains, senses, and understands, such as the life of angels. All these can only be through him who absolutely is. For God, to be is not one thing and to live another, as though he could be without living. Nor is living one thing and understanding another, as though he could live without understanding. Nor is understanding one thing and being blessed another, as though he could understand without being blessed. For him, to live, to understand, and to be blessed are to be. From his unchangeableness and simplicity, the philosophers understood that he must have made all things. They also understood that nothing could have made him. They considered that everything that exists is either body or life, and that life is better than body. The nature of body can be perceived by the senses, while the nature of life can be understood by the mind. They therefore preferred what can be understood by the mind to what can be perceived by the senses. By things perceived by the senses, we mean things seen and touched by the body. By things understood by the mind, we mean things grasped by its sight. The mind judges every kind of bodily beauty. This includes beauty in a body's condition, such as its shape, or in its movement, as in music. But the mind could not judge these things unless it contained a higher form of them. This form has no bulk, no sound of voice, and no place in space or time. Yet the mind itself is changeable, even in its grasp of these forms. Otherwise, one person could not judge things perceived by the senses better than another. A clever person judges better than a slow one, a skilled person better than an unskilled one, and a practiced person better than an unpracticed one. The same person also judges better after gaining experience than before. But anything capable of more or less is changeable. So thoughtful and able people concluded that the first form cannot be found in things whose form changes. They saw that body and mind can be more or less beautiful in form. They also saw that, without form, neither could exist. They therefore saw that there is a being in whom the first form exists. This form is unchangeable and therefore cannot be greater or lesser. They rightly believed that this being is the first principle of all things. He was not made, and he made all things. So God made known to them what can be known about him. They understood his invisible qualities through the things he made. They also understood his eternal power and divinity, through which all visible and temporal things were created. We have said enough about the part of theology they call physical, or natural.
Rom. i. 19, 20.
7. How much the Platonists are to be held as excelling other philosophers in logic, i.e. rational philosophy.
7. How far the Platonists surpass other philosophers in logic, that is, rational philosophy.
Then, again, as far as regards the doctrine which treats of that which they call logic, that is, rational philosophy, far be it from us to compare them with those who attributed to the bodily senses the faculty of discriminating truth, and thought that all we learn is to be measured by their untrustworthy and fallacious rules. Such were the Epicureans, and all of the same school. Such also were the Stoics, who ascribed to the bodily senses that expertness in disputation which they so ardently love, called by them dialectic, asserting that from the senses the mind conceives the notions (ἔννοιαι) of those things which they explicate by definition. And hence is developed the whole plan and connection of their learning and teaching. I often wonder, with respect to this, how they can say that none are beautiful but the wise; for by what bodily sense have they perceived that beauty, by what eyes of the flesh have they seen wisdom's comeliness of form? Those, however, whom we justly rank before all others, have distinguished those things which are conceived by the mind from those which are perceived by the senses, neither taking away from the senses anything to which they are competent, nor attributing to them anything beyond their competency. And the light of our understandings, by which all things are learned by us, they have affirmed to be that selfsame God by whom all things were made.
Now consider the branch of their teaching called logic, or rational philosophy. We must not compare them with those who believed the bodily senses could distinguish truth. Those others thought that everything we learn must be judged by the unreliable and misleading rules of the senses. The Epicureans and all of their school held this view. So did the Stoics. They attributed to the bodily senses the skill in argument they loved so dearly and called dialectic. They claimed that the mind forms its concepts (ἔννοιαι) of things from the senses. These are the things they explain through definitions. From this comes the whole structure and connection of their learning and teaching. I often wonder how they can say that only the wise are beautiful. What bodily sense has perceived that beauty? What physical eyes have seen the beauty of wisdom’s form? Those whom we rightly rank above all others, however, distinguished what the mind conceives from what the senses perceive. They did not deny the senses any power they actually possess. Nor did they give them powers beyond their ability. They also affirmed that the light of our understanding, by which we learn all things, is the very same God who made all things.
8. That the Platonists hold the first rank in moral philosophy also.
8. That the Platonists also rank first in moral philosophy.
The remaining part of philosophy is morals, or what is called by the Greeks ἠθική, in which is discussed the question concerning the chief good,—that which will leave us nothing further to seek in order to be blessed, if only we make all our actions refer to it, and seek it not for the sake of something else, but for its own sake. Therefore it is called the end, because we wish other things on account of it, but itself only for its own sake. This beatific good, therefore, according to some, comes to a man from the body, according to others, from the mind, and, according to others, from both together. For they saw that man himself consists of soul and body; and therefore they believed that from either of these two, or from both together, their well-being must proceed, consisting in a certain final good, which could render them blessed, and to which they might refer all their actions, not requiring anything ulterior to which to refer that good itself. This is why those who have added a third kind of good things, which they call extrinsic,—as honour, glory, wealth, and the like,—have not regarded them as part of the final good, that is, to be sought after for their own sake, but as things which are to be sought for the sake of something else, affirming that this kind of good is good to the good, and evil to the evil. Wherefore, whether they have sought the good of man from the mind or from the body, or from both together, it is still only from man they have supposed that it must be sought. But they who have sought it from the body have sought it from the inferior part of man; they who have sought it from the mind, from the superior part; and they who have sought it from both, from the whole man. Whether, therefore, they have sought it from any part, or from the whole man, still they have only sought it from man; nor have these differences, being three, given rise only to three dissentient sects of philosophers, but to many. For diverse philosophers have held diverse opinions, both concerning the good of the body, and the good of the mind, and the good of both together. Let, therefore, all these give place to those philosophers who have not affirmed that a man is blessed by the enjoyment of the body, or by the enjoyment of the mind, but by the enjoyment of God,—enjoying Him, however, not as the mind does the body or itself, or as one friend enjoys another, but as the eye enjoys light, if, indeed, we may draw any comparison between these things. But what the nature of this comparison is, will, if God help me, be shown in another place, to the best of my ability. At present, it is sufficient to mention that Plato determined the final good to be to live according to virtue, and affirmed that he only can attain to virtue who knows and imitates God,—which knowledge and imitation are the only cause of blessedness. Therefore he did not doubt that to philosophize is to love God, whose nature is incorporeal. Whence it certainly follows that the student of wisdom, that is, the philosopher, will then become blessed when he shall have begun to enjoy God. For though he is not necessarily blessed who enjoys that which he loves (for many are miserable by loving that which ought not to be loved, and still more miserable when they enjoy it), nevertheless no one is blessed who does not enjoy that which he loves. For even they who love things which ought not to be loved do not count themselves blessed by loving merely, but by enjoying them. Who, then, but the most miserable will deny that he is blessed, who enjoys that which he loves, and loves the true and highest good? But the true and highest good, according to Plato, is God, and therefore he would call him a philosopher who loves God; for philosophy is directed to the obtaining of the blessed life, and he who loves God is blessed in the enjoyment of God.
The remaining branch of philosophy is ethics, which the Greeks call ἠθική. It considers the question of the highest good. This is the good that leaves us nothing more to seek in order to be blessed. To attain it, we must direct all our actions toward it. We must seek it for its own sake, not for the sake of something else. That is why it is called the final good. We desire other things for its sake, but desire it only for its own sake. Some say that this good, which makes us blessed, comes from the body. Others say it comes from the mind, and still others say it comes from both together. They saw that human beings consist of soul and body. So they believed that human well-being must come from one or both of these. They understood well-being as a final good that could make them blessed. They could direct all their actions toward it, without needing to direct that good itself toward anything beyond it. Some added a third kind of good, which they called external. These include honor, glory, wealth, and similar things. But they did not regard them as part of the final good, to be sought for their own sake. Instead, they thought these things should be sought for the sake of something else. They said that such goods are good for good people and evil for evil people. Whether these thinkers sought the human good from the mind, the body, or both, they sought it from humanity alone. Those who sought it from the body sought it from the lower part of the human being. Those who sought it from the mind sought it from the higher part. Those who sought it from both sought it from the whole person. Whether they sought it from one part or from the whole person, they sought it only from humanity. These three positions did not produce just three opposing schools of philosophy, but many. Different philosophers held different views about the good of the body, the mind, and both together. Let all of them yield to those philosophers who say that people are blessed by enjoying God. They do not say that people are blessed by enjoying the body or the mind. We enjoy God, however, not as the mind enjoys the body or itself, or as one friend enjoys another. Rather, we enjoy him as the eye enjoys light, if these things can indeed be compared. With God’s help, I will explain the nature of this comparison elsewhere, as best I can. For now, it is enough to say that Plato held that the final good is to live virtuously. He said that only those who know and imitate God can attain virtue. This knowledge and imitation are the only cause of blessedness. So he had no doubt that to pursue philosophy is to love God, whose nature is not physical. It certainly follows that the seeker of wisdom, the philosopher, becomes blessed upon beginning to enjoy God. A person who enjoys what they love is not necessarily blessed. Many are miserable because they love what they should not love. They are even more miserable when they enjoy it. Nevertheless, no one is blessed who does not enjoy what they love. Even those who love things they should not love do not count themselves blessed merely by loving them. They count themselves blessed by enjoying them. Who but the most miserable person would deny that someone is blessed who enjoys what they love and loves the true and highest good? According to Plato, God is the true and highest good. So he would call someone who loves God a philosopher. For philosophy aims at attaining the blessed life, and those who love God are blessed in enjoying him.
9. Concerning that philosophy which has come nearest to the Christian faith.
9. On the philosophy that has come closest to the Christian faith.
Whatever philosophers, therefore, thought concerning the supreme God, that He is both the maker of all created things, the light by which things are known, and the good in reference to which things are to be done; that we have in Him the first principle of nature, the truth of doctrine, and the happiness of life,—whether these philosophers may be more suitably called Platonists, or whether they may give some other name to their sect; whether, we say, that only the chief men of the Ionic school, such as Plato himself, and they who have well understood him, have thought thus; or whether we also include the Italic school, on account of Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans, and all who may have held like opinions; and, lastly, whether also we include all who have been held wise men and philosophers among all nations who are discovered to have seen and taught this, be they Atlantics, Libyans, Egyptians, Indians, Persians, Chaldeans, Scythians, Gauls, Spaniards, or of other nations,—we prefer these to all other philosophers, and confess that they approach nearest to us.
Some philosophers held these beliefs about the supreme God. He is the maker of all created things, the light by which things are known, and the good that guides our actions. In him we find the first principle of nature, the truth of doctrine, and the happiness of life. These philosophers may most suitably be called Platonists, or they may give their school another name. Perhaps only the leading thinkers of the Ionic school held these beliefs, such as Plato himself and those who understood him well. Or perhaps we should also include the Italic school, because of Pythagoras, the Pythagoreans, and all who held similar views. Finally, we may also include all those regarded as wise men and philosophers among all nations who are found to have understood and taught these beliefs. They may be Atlantics, Libyans, Egyptians, Indians, Persians, Chaldeans, Scythians, Gauls, Spaniards, or people of other nations. We prefer these thinkers to all other philosophers, and we acknowledge that they come closest to us.
10. That the excellency of the Christian religion is above all the science of philosophers.
10. That the excellence of the Christian religion surpasses all the knowledge of philosophers.
For although a Christian man instructed only in ecclesiastical literature may perhaps be ignorant of the very name of Platonists, and may not even know that there have existed two schools of philosophers speaking the Greek tongue, to wit, the Ionic and Italic, he is nevertheless not so deaf with respect to human affairs, as not to know that philosophers profess the study, and even the possession, of wisdom. He is on his guard, however, with respect to those who philosophize according to the elements of this world, not according to God, by whom the world itself was made; for he is warned by the precept of the apostle, and faithfully hears what has been said, "Beware that no one deceive you through philosophy and vain deceit, according to the elements of the world." Then, that he may not suppose that all philosophers are such as do this, he hears the same apostle say concerning certain of them, "Because that which is known of God is manifest among them, for God has manifested it to them. For His invisible things from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things which are made, also His eternal power and Godhead." And, when speaking to the Athenians, after having spoken a mighty thing concerning God, which few are able to understand, "In Him we live, and move, and have our being," he goes on to say, "As certain also of your own have said." He knows well, too, to be on his guard against even these philosophers in their errors. For where it has been said by him, "that God has manifested to them by those things which are made His invisible things, that they might be seen by the understanding," there it has also been said that they did not rightly worship God Himself, because they paid divine honours, which are due to Him alone, to other things also to which they ought not to have paid them,—"because, knowing God, they glorified Him not as God; neither were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of corruptible man, and of birds, and fourfooted beasts, and creeping things;"—where the apostle would have us understand him as meaning the Romans, and Greeks, and Egyptians, who gloried in the name of wisdom; but concerning this we will dispute with them afterwards. With respect, however, to that wherein they agree with us we prefer them to all others, namely, concerning the one God, the author of this universe, who is not only above every body, being incorporeal, but also above all souls, being incorruptible—our principle, our light, our good. And though the Christian man, being ignorant of their writings, does not use in disputation words which he has not learned,—not calling that part of philosophy natural (which is the Latin term), or physical (which is the Greek one), which treats of the investigation of nature; or that part rational, or logical, which deals with the question how truth may be discovered; or that part moral, or ethical, which concerns morals, and shows how good is to be sought, and evil to be shunned,—he is not, therefore, ignorant that it is from the one true and supremely good God that we have that nature in which we are made in the image of God, and that doctrine by which we know Him and ourselves, and that grace through which, by cleaving to Him, we are blessed. This, therefore, is the cause why we prefer these to all the others, because, whilst other philosophers have worn out their minds and powers in seeking the causes of things, and endeavouring to discover the right mode of learning and of living, these, by knowing God, have found where resides the cause by which the universe has been constituted, and the light by which truth is to be discovered, and the fountain at which felicity is to be drunk. All philosophers, then, who have had these thoughts concerning God, whether Platonists or others, agree with us. But we have thought it better to plead our cause with the Platonists, because their writings are better known. For the Greeks, whose tongue holds the highest place among the languages of the Gentiles, are loud in their praises of these writings; and the Latins, taken with their excellence, or their renown, have studied them more heartily than other writings, and, by translating them into our tongue, have given them greater celebrity and notoriety.
A Christian trained only in church literature may never have heard the name “Platonists.” He may not even know that there were two schools of Greek-speaking philosophers, the Ionian and the Italian. Yet he is not so unaware of human affairs that he does not know that philosophers claim to seek wisdom, and even to possess it. He is wary, however, of those who philosophize according to the elements of this world, rather than according to God, who made the world itself. He has been warned by the apostle’s command, and faithfully listens to what was said: “Beware that no one deceives you through philosophy and empty deception, according to the elements of the world.” But he must not suppose that all philosophers do this. He hears the same apostle say of some of them, “What can be known about God is clear to them, because God has made it clear to them. For since the creation of the world his invisible qualities, including his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly seen and understood through what has been made.” And when the apostle spoke to the Athenians, he said something profound about God that few can understand: “In him we live and move and have our being.” He then added, “As some of your own people have said.” The Christian also knows to guard against the errors of even these philosophers. The apostle said that God had made his invisible qualities clear to them through what he had made, so that they could be understood. But he also said that they did not rightly worship God himself. They gave divine honors, due to him alone, to other things that did not deserve them. “Although they knew God, they did not glorify him as God or give thanks. Instead, their thoughts became empty, and their foolish hearts were darkened. Claiming to be wise, they became fools. They exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images resembling mortal human beings, birds, four-footed animals, and creeping creatures.” Here the apostle wants us to understand that he means the Romans, Greeks, and Egyptians, who took pride in the name of wisdom. We will debate this with them later. But we prefer these philosophers to all others because of what they share with us. They believe in the one God, the author of the universe. He is above every body because he has no body, and above all souls because he cannot be corrupted. He is our source, our light, and our good. A Christian who does not know their writings will not use unfamiliar terms in debate. He will not call the branch of philosophy that investigates nature “natural,” the Latin term, or “physical,” the Greek term. Nor will he call the branch concerned with discovering truth “rational” or “logical.” Nor will he call the branch concerned with conduct “moral” or “ethical.” This branch shows how good should be sought and evil avoided. Yet he still knows that everything comes from the one true and supremely good God. From God we have the nature in which we are made in his image. From him we have the teaching by which we know him and ourselves. And from him we have the grace through which we are blessed by holding fast to him. This is why we prefer these philosophers to all the others. Other philosophers have exhausted their minds and powers seeking the causes of things and trying to discover the right way to learn and live. But these philosophers, by knowing God, have found the cause by which the universe was formed. They have found the light by which truth is discovered and the fountain from which happiness is to be drunk. All philosophers who have held these thoughts about God, whether Platonists or others, agree with us. Yet we have thought it better to make our case to the Platonists because their writings are better known. The Greeks, whose language holds the highest place among the languages of the Gentiles, praise these writings highly. The Latins, attracted by their excellence or their fame, have studied them more eagerly than other writings. By translating them into our language, they have made them even more widely known.
Col. ii. 8.
Rom. 1:19–20.
Acts xvii. 28.
Rom. i. 21-23.
11. How Plato has been able to approach so nearly to Christian knowledge.
11. How Plato came so close to Christian knowledge.
Certain partakers with us in the grace of Christ, wonder when they hear and read that Plato had conceptions concerning God, in which they recognise considerable agreement with the truth of our religion. Some have concluded from this, that when he went to Egypt he had heard the prophet Jeremiah, or, whilst travelling in the same country, had read the prophetic scriptures, which opinion I myself have expressed in certain of my writings. But a careful calculation of dates, contained in chronological history, shows that Plato was born about a hundred years after the time in which Jeremiah prophesied, and, as he lived eighty-one years, there are found to have been about seventy years from his death to that time when Ptolemy, king of Egypt, requested the prophetic scriptures of the Hebrew people to be sent to him from Judea, and committed them to seventy Hebrews, who also knew the Greek tongue, to be translated and kept. Therefore, on that voyage of his, Plato could neither have seen Jeremiah, who was dead so long before, nor have read those same scriptures which had not yet been translated into the Greek language, of which he was a master, unless, indeed, we say that, as he was most earnest in the pursuit of knowledge, he also studied those writings through an interpreter, as he did those of the Egyptians,—not, indeed, writing a translation of them (the facilities for doing which were only gained even by Ptolemy in return for munificent acts of kindness, though fear of his kingly authority might have seemed a sufficient motive), but learning as much as he possibly could concerning their contents by means of conversation. What warrants this supposition is the opening verses of Genesis: "In the beginning God made the heaven and earth. And the earth was invisible, and without order; and darkness was over the abyss: and the Spirit of God moved over the waters." For in the Timæus, when writing on the formation of the world, he says that God first united earth and fire; from which it is evident that he assigns to fire a place in heaven. This opinion bears a certain resemblance to the statement, "In the beginning God made heaven and earth." Plato next speaks of those two intermediary elements, water and air, by which the other two extremes, namely, earth and fire, were mutually united; from which circumstance he is thought to have so understood the words, "The Spirit of God moved over the waters." For, not paying sufficient attention to the designations given by those scriptures to the Spirit of God, he may have thought that the four elements are spoken of in that place, because the air also is called spirit. Then, as to Plato's saying that the philosopher is a lover of God, nothing shines forth more conspicuously in those sacred writings. But the most striking thing in this connection, and that which most of all inclines me almost to assent to the opinion that Plato was not ignorant of those writings, is the answer which was given to the question elicited from the holy Moses when the words of God were conveyed to him by the angel; for, when he asked what was the name of that God who was commanding him to go and deliver the Hebrew people out of Egypt, this answer was given: "I am who am; and thou shalt say to the children of Israel, He who is sent me unto you;" as though compared with Him that truly is, because He is unchangeable, those things which have been created mutable are not,—a truth which Plato vehemently held, and most diligently commended. And I know not whether this sentiment is anywhere to be found in the books of those who were before Plato, unless in that book where it is said, "I am who am; and thou shalt say to the children of Israel, Who is sent me unto you."
Some who share with us in the grace of Christ are surprised to hear or read about Plato’s ideas concerning God. They recognize considerable agreement between his ideas and the truth of our religion. Some have concluded that Plato heard the prophet Jeremiah when he went to Egypt. Others suppose that he read the prophetic scriptures while traveling there. I myself expressed this opinion in some of my writings. But a careful calculation of dates, based on chronological history, shows that Plato was born about a hundred years after Jeremiah prophesied. Plato lived eighty-one years. About seventy years after his death, Ptolemy, king of Egypt, asked for the Hebrew people’s prophetic scriptures to be sent to him from Judea. He entrusted them to seventy Hebrews who also knew Greek, so they could translate them and he could keep them. Therefore, during his journey, Plato could not have met Jeremiah, who had died long before. Nor could he have read those scriptures, which had not yet been translated into Greek, a language he had mastered. Still, Plato was eager for knowledge. Perhaps he studied those writings through an interpreter, as he did the writings of the Egyptians. He would not have written a translation of them. Even Ptolemy gained the means to do that only in return for generous acts of kindness, though fear of his royal authority might have seemed sufficient. Rather, Plato would have learned as much as he could about their contents through conversation. The opening verses of Genesis support this possibility: "In the beginning God made the heaven and earth. And the earth was invisible, and without order; and darkness was over the abyss: and the Spirit of God moved over the waters." In the Timæus, Plato writes about the formation of the world. He says that God first united earth and fire. This clearly shows that he places fire in heaven. His view somewhat resembles the statement, "In the beginning God made heaven and earth." Plato next speaks of two intermediate elements, water and air. Through them, the two extremes, earth and fire, were joined together. For this reason, some think he understood the words, "The Spirit of God moved over the waters," in this way. He may not have paid enough attention to the names those scriptures give to the Spirit of God. He may therefore have thought that the passage speaks of the four elements, since air is also called spirit. Plato also says that the philosopher is a lover of God. Nothing is more clearly expressed in those sacred writings. But another point is more striking. It above all makes me almost agree that Plato knew those writings. It is the answer given to the holy Moses when an angel conveyed God’s words to him. Moses asked the name of the God who was commanding him to deliver the Hebrew people from Egypt. He received this answer: "I am who am; and thou shalt say to the children of Israel, He who is sent me unto you;" This suggests that, compared with him who truly is because he is unchangeable, created things that can change are not. Plato strongly held this truth and praised it most diligently. I do not know whether this idea appears anywhere in the books of those who came before Plato, except in the book that says, "I am who am; and thou shalt say to the children of Israel, Who is sent me unto you."
De Doctrina Christiana, ii. 43. Compare Retract. ii. 4, 2.
Freeing Jewish slaves and sending gifts to the temple. See Josephus, Ant. xii. 2.
Gen. i. 1, 2.
Spiritus, Latin for “spirit.”
Ex. iii. 14.
12. That even the Platonists, though they say these things concerning the one true God, nevertheless thought that sacred rites were to be performed in honour of many gods.
12. Even the Platonists, though they say these things about the one true God, believed that sacred rites should be performed in honor of many gods.
But we need not determine from what source he learned these things,—whether it was from the books of the ancients who preceded him, or, as is more likely, from the words of the apostle: "Because that which is known of God has been manifested among them, for God hath manifested it to them. For His invisible things from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by those things which have been made, also His eternal power and Godhead." From whatever source he may have derived this knowledge, then, I think I have made it sufficiently plain that I have not chosen the Platonic philosophers undeservedly as the parties with whom to discuss; because the question we have just taken up concerns the natural theology,—the question, namely, whether sacred rites are to be performed to one God, or to many, for the sake of the happiness which is to be after death. I have specially chosen them because their juster thoughts concerning the one God who made heaven and earth, have made them illustrious among philosophers. This has given them such superiority to all others in the judgment of posterity, that, though Aristotle, the disciple of Plato, a man of eminent abilities, inferior in eloquence to Plato, yet far superior to many in that respect, had founded the Peripatetic sect,—so called because they were in the habit of walking about during their disputations,—and though he had, through the greatness of his fame, gathered very many disciples into his school, even during the life of his master; and though Plato at his death was succeeded in his school, which was called the Academy, by Speusippus, his sister's son, and Xenocrates, his beloved disciple, who, together with their successors, were called from this name of the school, Academics; nevertheless the most illustrious recent philosophers, who have chosen to follow Plato, have been unwilling to be called Peripatetics, or Academics, but have preferred the name of Platonists. Among these were the renowned Plotinus, Iamblichus, and Porphyry, who were Greeks, and the African Apuleius, who was learned both in the Greek and Latin tongues. All these, however, and the rest who were of the same school, and also Plato himself, thought that sacred rites ought to be performed in honour of many gods.
But we need not decide where he learned these things. He may have learned them from the books of earlier writers. More likely, he learned them from the apostle’s words: "What can be known about God has been made clear among them, because God has made it clear to them. For since the creation of the world, his invisible qualities have been clearly seen and understood through what he has made, including his eternal power and divine nature." Whatever his source, I think I have shown clearly enough why I chose to debate the Platonic philosophers. The question we have just taken up concerns natural theology. It asks whether sacred rites should be performed for one God or for many gods, to obtain happiness after death. I chose the Platonists especially because their more accurate thoughts about the one God who made heaven and earth made them renowned among philosophers. Later generations judged them superior to all others. Aristotle, Plato’s disciple, was a man of great ability. Though less eloquent than Plato, he was far more eloquent than many others. He founded the Peripatetic school, named for its members’ habit of walking about during their discussions. His great fame drew many disciples to his school, even while Plato was still alive. When Plato died, he was succeeded in his school, called the Academy, by his nephew Speusippus and his beloved disciple Xenocrates. They and their successors were called Academics, after the school. Nevertheless, the most distinguished philosophers of more recent times who followed Plato refused to be called Peripatetics or Academics. They preferred the name Platonists. Among them were the renowned Greeks Plotinus, Iamblichus, and Porphyry, and the African Apuleius, who was learned in both Greek and Latin. All these philosophers, the others of the same school, and Plato himself, thought that sacred rites should be performed in honor of many gods.
Rom. i. 20.
13. Concerning the opinion of Plato, according to which he defined the gods as beings entirely good and the friends of virtue.
13. Plato's view that the gods are entirely good beings and friends of virtue.
Therefore, although in many other important respects they differ from us, nevertheless with respect to this particular point of difference, which I have just stated, as it is one of great moment, and the question on hand concerns it, I will first ask them to what gods they think that sacred rites are to be performed,—to the good or to the bad, or to both the good and the bad? But we have the opinion of Plato affirming that all the gods are good, and that there is not one of the gods bad. It follows, therefore, that these are to be performed to the good, for then they are performed to gods; for if they are not good, neither are they gods. Now, if this be the case (for what else ought we to believe concerning the gods?), certainly it explodes the opinion that the bad gods are to be propitiated by sacred rites in order that they may not harm us, but the good gods are to be invoked in order that they may assist us. For there are no bad gods, and it is to the good that, as they say, the due honour of such rites is to be paid. Of what character, then, are those gods who love scenic displays, even demanding that a place be given them among divine things, and that they be exhibited in their honour? The power of these gods proves that they exist, but their liking such things proves that they are bad. For it is well known what Plato's opinion was concerning scenic plays. He thinks that the poets themselves, because they have composed songs so unworthy of the majesty and goodness of the gods, ought to be banished from the state. Of what character, therefore, are those gods who contend with Plato himself about those scenic plays? He does not suffer the gods to be defamed by false crimes; the gods command those same crimes to be celebrated in their own honour.
Although they differ from us in many other important ways, I will begin with the difference I have just described. It is a matter of great importance and directly concerns the question at hand. I ask them which gods should receive sacred rites: the good, the bad, or both? Plato says that all the gods are good and that not one of them is bad. It follows that these rites should be performed for the good, since only then are they performed for gods. If they are not good, they are not gods. If this is so, and what else should we believe about the gods, it destroys a certain opinion. That opinion holds that sacred rites must appease the bad gods so they will not harm us. It also holds that the good gods must be called upon to help us. But there are no bad gods. As they say, these rites are the honor due to the good gods. What kind of gods, then, love stage performances? They even demand that these performances be included in sacred worship and presented in their honor. The power of these gods proves that they exist, but their love of such things proves that they are bad. Plato’s opinion of plays is well known. He thinks the poets themselves should be banished from the state. They have written songs so unworthy of the majesty and goodness of the gods. What kind of gods, then, disagree with Plato himself about these plays? He refuses to let the gods be slandered with false accusations of wrongdoing. The gods command that those same deeds be celebrated in their honor.
In fine, when they ordered these plays to be inaugurated, they not only demanded base things, but also did cruel things, taking from Titus Latinius his son, and sending a disease upon him because he had refused to obey them, which they removed when he had fulfilled their commands. Plato, however, bad though they were, did not think they were to be feared; but, holding to his opinion with the utmost firmness and constancy, does not hesitate to remove from a well-ordered state all the sacrilegious follies of the poets, with which these gods are delighted because they themselves are impure. But Labeo places this same Plato (as I have mentioned already in the second book) among the demi-gods. Now Labeo thinks that the bad deities are to be propitiated with bloody victims, and by fasts accompanied with the same, but the good deities with plays, and all other things which are associated with joyfulness. How comes it, then, that the demi-god Plato so persistently dares to take away those pleasures, because he deems them base, not from the demi-gods but from the gods, and these the good gods? And, moreover, those very gods themselves do certainly refute the opinion of Labeo, for they showed themselves in the case of Latinius to be not only wanton and sportive, but also cruel and terrible. Let the Platonists, therefore, explain these things to us, since, following the opinion of their master, they think that all the gods are good and honourable, and friendly to the virtues of the wise, holding it unlawful to think otherwise concerning any of the gods. We will explain it, say they. Let us then attentively listen to them.
In short, when the gods ordered these plays to be established, they demanded shameful things and acted cruelly. They took Titus Latinius’s son from him and sent a disease upon him because he refused to obey them. When he carried out their commands, they cured him. Plato, however, did not think these gods should be feared, despite their wickedness. He held firmly and steadfastly to his opinion. He did not hesitate to remove from a well-ordered state all the sacrilegious follies of the poets. The gods delight in these follies because they themselves are impure. Yet Labeo places this same Plato among the demigods, as I mentioned in the second book. Labeo thinks that evil deities should be appeased with bloody sacrifices and fasts accompanied by such sacrifices. Good deities, he thinks, should be honored with plays and everything else associated with joy. How, then, can the demigod Plato so persistently dare to take these pleasures away from the gods? He does not take them from demigods, but from gods, and good gods at that. He does so because he considers the pleasures shameful. Moreover, those very gods themselves surely refute Labeo’s opinion. In the case of Latinius, they showed themselves to be not only wanton and playful, but also cruel and terrible. Let the Platonists explain these things to us. Following their master’s opinion, they believe that all gods are good and honorable and friendly to the virtues of the wise. They hold it unlawful to think otherwise about any of the gods. “We will explain it,” they say. Let us then listen to them attentively.
Chapter 14.
14. Of the opinion of those who have said that rational souls are of three kinds, to wit, those of the celestial gods, those of the aerial demons, and those of terrestrial men.
14. On the view that there are three kinds of rational souls: those of the heavenly gods, those of demons in the air, and those of humans on earth.
There is, say they, a threefold division of all animals endowed with a rational soul, namely, into gods, men, and demons. The gods occupy the loftiest region, men the lowest, the demons the middle region. For the abode of the gods is heaven, that of men the earth, that of the demons the air. As the dignity of their regions is diverse, so also is that of their natures; therefore the gods are better than men and demons. Men have been placed below the gods and demons, both in respect of the order of the regions they inhabit, and the difference of their merits. The demons, therefore, who hold the middle place, as they are inferior to the gods, than whom they inhabit a lower region, so they are superior to men, than whom they inhabit a loftier one. For they have immortality of body in common with the gods, but passions of the mind in common with men. On which account, say they, it is not wonderful that they are delighted with the obscenities of the theatre, and the fictions of the poets, since they are also subject to human passions, from which the gods are far removed, and to which they are altogether strangers. Whence we conclude that it was not the gods, who are all good and highly exalted, that Plato deprived of the pleasure of theatric plays, by reprobating and prohibiting the fictions of the poets, but the demons.
They say that all animals with rational souls fall into three groups: gods, humans, and demons. The gods occupy the highest region, humans the lowest, and demons the middle. The gods live in heaven, humans on earth, and demons in the air. Just as their regions differ in rank, so do their natures. Therefore, the gods are better than both humans and demons. Humans rank below both gods and demons, in where they live and in their merits. Demons, who occupy the middle place, are inferior to the gods because they live in a lower region. Likewise, they are superior to humans because they live in a higher region. Demons share the immortality of their bodies with the gods. But they share the passions of the mind with humans. For this reason, they say, it is no wonder that demons delight in the obscenities of the theater and the poets’ fictions. Demons are subject to human passions, while the gods are far removed from and entirely unfamiliar with them. We conclude, then, that Plato did not deprive the gods of the pleasure of theatrical plays. For the gods are all good and highly exalted. Rather, by condemning and forbidding the poets’ fictions, Plato deprived the demons of that pleasure.
Of these things many have written: among others Apuleius, the Platonist of Madaura, who composed a whole work on the subject, entitled, Concerning the God of Socrates. He there discusses and explains of what kind that deity was who attended on Socrates, a sort of familiar, by whom it is said he was admonished to desist from any action which would not turn out to his advantage. He asserts most distinctly, and proves at great length, that it was not a god but a demon; and he discusses with great diligence the opinion of Plato concerning the lofty estate of the gods, the lowly estate of men, and the middle estate of demons. These things being so, how did Plato dare to take away, if not from the gods, whom he removed from all human contagion, certainly from the demons, all the pleasures of the theatre, by expelling the poets from the state? Evidently in this way he wished to admonish the human soul, although still confined in these moribund members, to despise the shameful commands of the demons, and to detest their impurity, and to choose rather the splendour of virtue. But if Plato showed himself virtuous in answering and prohibiting these things, then certainly it was shameful of the demons to command them. Therefore either Apuleius is wrong, and Socrates' familiar did not belong to this class of deities, or Plato held contradictory opinions, now honouring the demons, now removing from the well-regulated state the things in which they delighted, or Socrates is not to be congratulated on the friendship of the demon, of which Apuleius was so ashamed that he entitled his book On the God of Socrates, whilst according to the tenor of his discussion, wherein he so diligently and at such length distinguishes gods from demons, he ought not to have entitled it, Concerning the God, but Concerning the Demon of Socrates. But he preferred to put this into the discussion itself rather than into the title of his book. For, through the sound doctrine which has illuminated human society, all, or almost all men have such a horror at the name of demons, that every one who, before reading the dissertation of Apuleius, which sets forth the dignity of demons, should have read the title of the book, On the Demon of Socrates, would certainly have thought that the author was not a sane man. But what did even Apuleius find to praise in the demons, except subtlety and strength of body and a higher place of habitation? For when he spoke generally concerning their manners, he said nothing that was good, but very much that was bad. Finally, no one, when he has read that book, wonders that they desired to have even the obscenity of the stage among divine things, or that, wishing to be thought gods, they should be delighted with the crimes of the gods, or that all those sacred solemnities, whose obscenity occasions laughter, and whose shameful cruelty causes horror, should be in agreement with their passions.
Many have written about these matters. Among them was Apuleius, the Platonist from Madaura. He wrote an entire work on the subject, titled Concerning the God of Socrates. In it, he discusses and explains the nature of the deity who accompanied Socrates. This being was a kind of familiar spirit. It is said to have warned him against actions that would not benefit him. Apuleius states clearly and argues at length that it was not a god but a demon. He also carefully discusses Plato’s view of the lofty position of the gods, the lowly position of humans, and the intermediate position of demons. Given this, how did Plato dare to deprive the demons of all the pleasures of the theater by expelling the poets from the state? He did not deprive the gods, whom he kept far from all human contamination. But he certainly deprived the demons. Evidently, Plato wanted to urge the human soul to despise the demons’ shameful commands and detest their impurity. Though still confined in a dying body, the soul should choose the splendor of virtue instead. But if Plato acted virtuously in opposing and forbidding these things, then the demons acted shamefully in commanding them. Therefore, either Apuleius is wrong, and Socrates’ familiar did not belong to this class of deities, or Plato held contradictory views. For he honored the demons at one time, yet removed what delighted them from a well-ordered state. Otherwise, Socrates should not be congratulated on his friendship with the demon. Apuleius was so ashamed of this friendship that he titled his book On the God of Socrates. Yet his argument carefully and at length distinguishes gods from demons. So he should have called it not Concerning the God, but Concerning the Demon of Socrates. He preferred to put this distinction in the discussion rather than in the title. Sound doctrine has enlightened human society, and all, or almost all, people now shrink from the name of demons. If anyone had seen the title On the Demon of Socrates before reading Apuleius’ treatise on their dignity, that person would certainly have thought the author insane. But what did even Apuleius find to praise in the demons? Only the subtlety and strength of their bodies and their higher dwelling place. When he spoke generally about their character, he said nothing good and a great deal that was bad. After reading his book, no one wonders that they wanted even the obscenity of the stage included among divine things. Nor does anyone wonder that, wishing to be thought gods, they delighted in the crimes of the gods. Nor does anyone wonder that all those sacred ceremonies suited their passions, ceremonies whose obscenity provokes laughter and whose shameful cruelty causes horror.
15. That the demons are not better than men because of their aerial bodies, or on account of their superior place of abode.
15. Demons are not better than humans because their bodies are made of air or because they live in a higher place.
Wherefore let not the mind truly religious, and submitted to the true God, suppose that demons are better than men, because they have better bodies. Otherwise it must put many beasts before itself which are superior to us both in acuteness of the senses, in ease and quickness of movement, in strength and in long-continued vigour of body. What man can equal the eagle or the vulture in strength of vision? Who can equal the dog in acuteness of smell? Who can equal the hare, the stag, and all the birds in swiftness? Who can equal in strength the lion or the elephant? Who can equal in length of life the serpents, which are affirmed to put off old age along with their skin, and to return to youth again? But as we are better than all these by the possession of reason and understanding, so we ought also to be better than the demons by living good and virtuous lives. For divine providence gave to them bodies of a better quality than ours, that that in which we excel them might in this way be commended to us as deserving to be far more cared for than the body, and that we should learn to despise the bodily excellence of the demons compared with goodness of life, in respect of which we are better than they, knowing that we too shall have immortality of body,—not an immortality tortured by eternal punishment, but that which is consequent on purity of soul.
A truly religious mind, submitted to the true God, should not suppose that demons are better than people because their bodies are better. Otherwise, it would have to place many animals above us. They surpass us in sharpness of senses, ease and speed of movement, strength, and lasting physical vigor. Who can match an eagle or a vulture in eyesight? Who can match a dog in sense of smell? Who can match the hare, the stag, and all birds in speed? Who can match the strength of a lion or an elephant? Who can match the long life of serpents? They are said to shed old age along with their skin and become young again. We are better than all these animals because we possess reason and understanding. In the same way, we should be better than demons by living good and virtuous lives. Divine providence gave demons bodies of a better quality than ours. In this way, what makes us better than they are is shown to deserve far more care than the body. We should learn to regard the demons’ bodily superiority as nothing compared with goodness of life. In goodness of life, we are better than they are. We know that we too will have immortal bodies. This will not be an immortality tormented by eternal punishment, but one that follows from purity of soul.
But now, as regards loftiness of place, it is altogether ridiculous to be so influenced by the fact that the demons inhabit the air, and we the earth, as to think that on that account they are to be put before us; for in this way we put all the birds before ourselves. But the birds, when they are weary with flying, or require to repair their bodies with food, come back to the earth to rest or to feed, which the demons, they say, do not. Are they, therefore, inclined to say that the birds are superior to us, and the demons superior to the birds? But if it be madness to think so, there is no reason why we should think that, on account of their inhabiting a loftier element, the demons have a claim to our religious submission. But as it is really the case that the birds of the air are not only not put before us who dwell on the earth, but are even subjected to us on account of the dignity of the rational soul which is in us, so also it is the case that the demons, though they are aerial, are not better than we who are terrestrial because the air is higher than the earth, but, on the contrary, men are to be put before demons because their despair is not to be compared to the hope of pious men. Even that law of Plato's, according to which he mutually orders and arranges the four elements, inserting between the two extreme elements—namely, fire, which is in the highest degree mobile, and the immoveable earth—the two middle ones, air and water, that by how much the air is higher up than the water, and the fire than the air, by so much also are the waters higher than the earth,—this law, I say, sufficiently admonishes us not to estimate the merits of animated creatures according to the grades of the elements. And Apuleius himself says that man is a terrestrial animal in common with the rest, who is nevertheless to be put far before aquatic animals, though Plato puts the waters themselves before the land. By this he would have us understand that the same order is not to be observed when the question concerns the merits of animals, though it seems to be the true one in the gradation of bodies; for it appears to be possible that a soul of a higher order may inhabit a body of a lower, and a soul of a lower order a body of a higher.
Now consider height of place. It is utterly ridiculous to think demons should rank above us simply because they live in the air and we live on earth. By that reasoning, we would also rank all birds above ourselves. But birds return to earth when they are tired of flying or need food to restore their bodies. They come back to rest or feed, while demons, we are told, do not. Would these people therefore say that birds are superior to us, and demons superior to birds? If that is madness, there is no reason to think demons deserve our religious submission because they inhabit a higher element. In fact, birds of the air are not ranked above us who live on earth. Instead, they are subject to us because of the dignity of the rational soul within us. Likewise, demons are not better than we are merely because they live in the air, which is higher than the earth. On the contrary, human beings should rank above demons, because the demons’ despair cannot compare with the hope of devout people. Even Plato’s ordering of the four elements warns us not to judge living creatures by the rank of their elements. He places air and water between the two extremes: fire, which is supremely mobile, and the motionless earth. Air stands above water, and fire above air, just as water stands above earth. Apuleius himself says that humans are land animals, like other land animals. Yet he says they should rank far above water animals, although Plato ranks water above land. He would have us understand that the order of bodies does not hold when judging the worth of animals. For it seems possible that a higher soul may inhabit a lower body, and a lower soul a higher one.
16. What Apuleius the Platonist thought concerning the manners and actions of demons.
16. What Apuleius the Platonist thought about the behavior and actions of demons.
The same Apuleius, when speaking concerning the manners of demons, said that they are agitated with the same perturbations of mind as men; that they are provoked by injuries, propitiated by services and by gifts, rejoice in honours, are delighted with a variety of sacred rites, and are annoyed if any of them be neglected. Among other things, he also says that on them depend the divinations of augurs, soothsayers, and prophets, and the revelations of dreams; and that from them also are the miracles of the magicians. But, when giving a brief definition of them, he says, "Demons are of an animal nature, passive in soul, rational in mind, aerial in body, eternal in time." "Of which five things, the three first are common to them and us, the fourth peculiar to themselves, and the fifth common to them with the gods." But I see that they have in common with the gods two of the first things, which they have in common with us. For he says that the gods also are animals; and when he is assigning to every order of beings its own element, he places us among the other terrestrial animals which live and feel upon the earth. Wherefore, if the demons are animals as to genus, this is common to them, not only with men, but also with the gods and with beasts; if they are rational as to their mind, this is common to them with the gods and with men; if they are eternal in time, this is common to them with the gods only; if they are passive as to their soul, this is common to them with men only; if they are aerial in body, in this they are alone. Therefore it is no great thing for them to be of an animal nature, for so also are the beasts; in being rational as to mind, they are not above ourselves, for so are we also; and as to their being eternal as to time, what is the advantage of that if they are not blessed? for better is temporal happiness than eternal misery. Again, as to their being passive in soul, how are they in this respect above us, since we also are so, but would not have been so had we not been miserable? Also, as to their being aerial in body, how much value is to be set on that, since a soul of any kind whatsoever is to be set above every body? and therefore religious worship, which ought to be rendered from the soul, is by no means due to that thing which is inferior to the soul. Moreover, if he had, among those things which he says belong to demons, enumerated virtue, wisdom, happiness, and affirmed that they have those things in common with the gods, and, like them, eternally, he would assuredly have attributed to them something greatly to be desired, and much to be prized. And even in that case it would not have been our duty to worship them like God on account of these things, but rather to worship Him from whom we know they had received them. But how much less are they really worthy of divine honour,—those aerial animals who are only rational that they may be capable of misery, passive that they may be actually miserable, and eternal that it may be impossible for them to end their misery!
The same Apuleius says that demons are troubled by the same emotions as humans. Injuries anger them, while services and gifts appease them. They rejoice in honors and delight in various sacred rites. They are annoyed if any of these rites are neglected. He also says that augurs, soothsayers, and prophets depend on them for divination, as do revelations in dreams. The miracles performed by magicians also come from them. He briefly defines demons as follows: "Demons are animals by nature, subject to passions in soul, rational in mind, made of air in body, and eternal in time." He adds, "Of these five qualities, they share the first three with us, the fourth belongs to them alone, and the fifth they share with the gods." But I see that they share two of the first three qualities with the gods as well as with us. Apuleius says that the gods are animals too. And when he assigns each kind of being to its own element, he places us among the other land animals that live and feel on earth. So, if demons are animals by kind, they share this quality with humans, gods, and beasts. If they are rational in mind, they share this with gods and humans. If they are eternal in time, they share this only with the gods. If their souls are subject to passions, they share this only with humans. If their bodies are made of air, this belongs to them alone. It is therefore no great thing for them to be animals, since beasts are animals too. Their rational minds do not make them superior to us, since we too are rational. And what good is their eternal existence if they are not blessed? Temporary happiness is better than eternal misery. Nor do their souls make them superior to us because they are subject to passions. Our souls are subject to passions too, but they would not be if we were not miserable. And how much value should we place on their bodies being made of air? Any soul, whatever its kind, is more valuable than any body. Religious worship must come from the soul. It is certainly not owed to anything inferior to the soul. Suppose Apuleius had included virtue, wisdom, and happiness among the qualities of demons. Suppose he had said that they shared these qualities with the gods and possessed them eternally, as the gods do. He would then have credited them with something greatly desirable and worthy of high regard. Even so, we should not worship them as God because of these qualities. We should instead worship him from whom we know they received them. How much less, then, do these creatures of air deserve divine honor? They are rational only so that they can suffer misery. Their souls are subject to passions, so that they actually suffer it. And they are eternal, so that their misery can never end.
De Deo Socratis.
17. Whether it is proper that men should worship those spirits from whose vices it is necessary that they be freed.
17. Whether people should worship spirits whose vices they must be freed from.
Wherefore, to omit other things, and confine our attention to that which he says is common to the demons with us, let us ask this question: If all the four elements are full of their own animals, the fire and the air of immortal, and the water and the earth of mortal ones, why are the souls of demons agitated by the whirlwinds and tempests of passions?—for the Greek word πάθος means perturbation, whence he chose to call the demons "passive in soul," because the word passion, which is derived from πάθος, signified a commotion of the mind contrary to reason. Why, then, are these things in the minds of demons which are not in beasts? For if anything of this kind appears in beasts, it is not perturbation, because it is not contrary to reason, of which they are devoid. Now it is foolishness or misery which is the cause of these perturbations in the case of men, for we are not yet blessed in the possession of that perfection of wisdom which is promised to us at last, when we shall be set free from our present mortality. But the gods, they say, are free from these perturbations, because they are not only eternal, but also blessed; for they also have the same kind of rational souls, but most pure from all spot and plague. Wherefore, if the gods are free from perturbation because they are blessed, not miserable animals, and the beasts are free from them because they are animals which are capable neither of blessedness nor misery, it remains that the demons, like men, are subject to perturbations because they are not blessed but miserable animals. What folly, therefore, or rather what madness, to submit ourselves through any sentiment of religion to demons, when it belongs to the true religion to deliver us from that depravity which makes us like to them! For Apuleius himself, although he is very sparing toward them, and thinks they are worthy of divine honours, is nevertheless compelled to confess that they are subject to anger; and the true religion commands us not to be moved with anger, but rather to resist it. The demons are won over by gifts; and the true religion commands us to favour no one on account of gifts received. The demons are flattered by honours; but the true religion commands us by no means to be moved by such things. The demons are haters of some men and lovers of others, not in consequence of a prudent and calm judgment, but because of what he calls their "passive soul;" whereas the true religion commands us to love even our enemies. Lastly, the true religion commands us to put away all disquietude of heart, and agitation of mind, and also all commotions and tempests of the soul, which Apuleius asserts to be continually swelling and surging in the souls of demons. Why, therefore, except through foolishness and miserable error, shouldst thou humble thyself to worship a being to whom thou desirest to be unlike in thy life? And why shouldst thou pay religious homage to him whom thou art unwilling to imitate, when it is the highest duty of religion to imitate Him whom thou worshippest?
Let us set other matters aside and focus on what he says demons share with us. He says that all four elements are full of their own living creatures. Fire and air are filled with immortal creatures, while water and earth are filled with mortal ones. If so, why are the souls of demons stirred by whirlwinds and storms of passion? The Greek word πάθος means a disturbance. That is why he chose to call demons "passive in soul." The word passion, derived from πάθος, meant a disturbance of the mind that goes against reason. Why, then, do these disturbances occur in the minds of demons but not in animals? If something like this appears in animals, it is not a disturbance of this kind. It cannot go against reason, because animals have no reason. In humans, foolishness or misery causes these disturbances. We do not yet enjoy the blessedness of that perfect wisdom promised to us at last. We will receive it when we are freed from our present mortality. But, they say, the gods are free from these disturbances because they are not only eternal but also blessed. They too have rational souls, but souls entirely pure and free from every stain and affliction. So the gods are free from disturbances because they are blessed creatures, not miserable ones. Animals are free from them because they are capable of neither blessedness nor misery. It follows that demons, like humans, are subject to disturbances because they are not blessed but miserable creatures. How foolish, or rather how mad, to submit ourselves to demons out of any religious feeling! True religion ought to free us from the corruption that makes us like them. Apuleius himself treats demons very leniently and thinks they deserve divine honors. Yet even he is forced to admit that they are subject to anger. True religion commands us not to give in to anger, but to resist it. Demons are won over by gifts. True religion commands us not to favor anyone because of gifts received. Demons are flattered by honors. True religion commands us not to be influenced by such things at all. Demons hate some people and love others. They do this not from wise and calm judgment, but because of what he calls their "passive soul." True religion, by contrast, commands us to love even our enemies. Finally, true religion commands us to put away all unrest of heart and agitation of mind. It also tells us to put away all the turmoil and storms of the soul. Apuleius says these are continually swelling and surging in the souls of demons. Why, then, except through foolishness and miserable error, would you humble yourself to worship a being you do not want to resemble? Why pay religious homage to one you refuse to imitate? For the highest duty of religion is to imitate him whom you worship.
18. What kind of religion that is which teaches that men ought to employ the advocacy of demons in order to be recommended to the favour of the good gods.
18. What kind of religion teaches that people should ask demons to speak for them to win the favor of the good gods?
In vain, therefore, have Apuleius, and they who think with him, conferred on the demons the honour of placing them in the air, between the ethereal heavens and the earth, that they may carry to the gods the prayers of men, to men the answers of the gods; for Plato held, they say, that no god has intercourse with man. They who believe these things have thought it unbecoming that men should have intercourse with the gods, and the gods with men, but a befitting thing that the demons should have intercourse with both gods and men, presenting to the gods the petitions of men, and conveying to men what the gods have granted; so that a chaste man, and one who is a stranger to the crimes of the magic arts, must use as patrons, through whom the gods may be induced to hear him, demons who love these crimes, although the very fact of his not loving them ought to have recommended him to them as one who deserved to be listened to with greater readiness and willingness on their part. They love the abominations of the stage, which chastity does not love. They love, in the sorceries of the magicians, "a thousand arts of inflicting harm," which innocence does not love. Yet both chastity and innocence, if they wish to obtain anything from the gods, will not be able to do so by their own merits, except their enemies act as mediators on their behalf. Apuleius need not attempt to justify the fictions of the poets, and the mockeries of the stage. If human modesty can act so faithlessly towards itself as not only to love shameful things, but even to think that they are pleasing to the divinity, we can cite on the other side their own highest authority and teacher, Plato.
Apuleius and those who agree with him have honored demons in vain by placing them in the air, between the heavenly realm and the earth. They say the demons carry human prayers to the gods and the gods’ answers to humans. They claim that Plato held that no god has direct contact with humans. Those who believe this think it improper for humans and gods to have direct contact with one another. Yet they think it fitting for demons to have contact with both. The demons present human requests to the gods and bring humans what the gods have granted. Thus a chaste person, innocent of the crimes of magic, must rely on demons who love those crimes as patrons to persuade the gods to hear him. Yet his very dislike of those crimes should have recommended him to the gods, making them more ready and willing to listen. Demons love the abominations of the theater, which chastity does not love. They love the magicians’ sorceries, with their "a thousand arts of inflicting harm," which innocence does not love. Yet if chastity and innocence wish to obtain anything from the gods, their own merits will not be enough. Their enemies must act as mediators on their behalf. Apuleius need not try to defend the poets’ fictions and the mockery of the theater. Human modesty may betray itself by loving shameful things and even thinking they please the divine. If so, we can cite against them their own highest authority and teacher, Plato.
Virgil, Æn. 7. 338.
19. Of the impiety of the magic art, which is dependent on the assistance of malign spirits.
19. On the ungodliness of magic, which depends on the help of evil spirits.
Moreover, against those magic arts, concerning which some men, exceedingly wretched and exceedingly impious, delight to boast, may not public opinion itself be brought forward as a witness? For why are those arts so severely punished by the laws, if they are the works of deities who ought to be worshipped? Shall it be said that the Christians have ordained those laws by which magic arts are punished? With what other meaning, except that these sorceries are without doubt pernicious to the human race, did the most illustrious poet say,
Moreover, can we not appeal to public opinion itself as a witness against those magic arts? Some people, utterly miserable and utterly impious, delight in boasting about them. Why does the law punish these arts so severely if they are the works of deities who should be worshipped? Will anyone claim that Christians made the laws that punish magic arts? What else could the most illustrious poet have meant but that these sorceries are undoubtedly harmful to the human race, when he said,
"By heaven, I swear, and your dear life, Unwillingly these arms I wield, And take, to meet the coming strife, Enchantment's sword and shield."
"By heaven and your dear life, I swear, I take up these weapons unwillingly. To face the coming battle, I take the enchanted sword and shield."
Virgil, Æn. 4. 492, 493.
And that also which he says in another place concerning magic arts,
And also what he says elsewhere about magical arts,
"I've seen him to another place transport the standing corn,"
"I've seen him move the growing grain to another place,"
Virgil, Ec. 8. 99.
has reference to the fact that the fruits of one field are said to be transferred to another by these arts which this pestiferous and accursed doctrine teaches. Does not Cicero inform us that, among the laws of the Twelve Tables, that is, the most ancient laws of the Romans, there was a law written which appointed a punishment to be inflicted on him who should do this? Lastly, was it before Christian judges that Apuleius himself was accused of magic arts? Had he known these arts to be divine and pious, and congruous with the works of divine power, he ought not only to have confessed, but also to have professed them, rather blaming the laws by which these things were prohibited and pronounced worthy of condemnation, while they ought to have been held worthy of admiration and respect. For by so doing, either he would have persuaded the judges to adopt his own opinion, or, if they had shown their partiality for unjust laws, and condemned him to death notwithstanding his praising and commending such things, the demons would have bestowed on his soul such rewards as he deserved, who, in order to proclaim and set forth their divine works, had not feared the loss of his human life. As our martyrs, when that religion was charged on them as a crime, by which they knew they were made safe and most glorious throughout eternity, did not choose, by denying it, to escape temporal punishments, but rather by confessing, professing, and proclaiming it, by enduring all things for it with fidelity and fortitude, and by dying for it with pious calmness, put to shame the law by which that religion was prohibited, and caused its revocation. But there is extant a most copious and eloquent oration of this Platonic philosopher, in which he defends himself against the charge of practising these arts, affirming that he is wholly a stranger to them, and only wishing to show his innocence by denying such things as cannot be innocently committed. But all the miracles of the magicians, who he thinks are justly deserving of condemnation, are performed according to the teaching and by the power of demons. Why, then, does he think that they ought to be honoured? For he asserts that they are necessary, in order to present our prayers to the gods, and yet their works are such as we must shun if we wish our prayers to reach the true God. Again, I ask, what kind of prayers of men does he suppose are presented to the good gods by the demons? If magical prayers, they will have none such; if lawful prayers, they will not receive them through such beings. But if a sinner who is penitent pour out prayers, especially if he has committed any crime of sorcery, does he receive pardon through the intercession of those demons by whose instigation and help he has fallen into the sin he mourns? or do the demons themselves, in order that they may merit pardon for the penitent, first become penitents because they have deceived them? This no one ever said concerning the demons; for had this been the case, they would never have dared to seek for themselves divine honours. For how should they do so who desired by penitence to obtain the grace of pardon, seeing that such detestable pride could not exist along with a humility worthy of pardon?
This refers to the claim that these arts can transfer the crops of one field to another. They are taught by this harmful and cursed doctrine. Does Cicero not tell us that the Twelve Tables, the oldest Roman laws, prescribed punishment for anyone who did this? And was Apuleius himself accused of practicing magic before Christian judges? If he had known these arts to be divine and holy, and consistent with the works of divine power, he should have admitted practicing them. He should also have openly defended them. He should have criticized the laws that forbade and condemned them, when they deserved admiration and respect instead. By doing so, he might have persuaded the judges to accept his view. Or they might have favored unjust laws and condemned him to death despite his praise of these arts. Then the demons would have given his soul its due reward. For he would not have feared losing his human life in order to proclaim their divine works. Our martyrs acted differently when their religion was treated as a crime. They knew that it made them safe and most glorious for eternity. They did not deny it to escape temporary punishments. Instead, they confessed, professed, and proclaimed it. They faithfully and courageously endured everything for it and died for it with holy calm. In this way, they shamed the law that forbade their religion and brought about its repeal. But we still have a long and eloquent speech by this Platonic philosopher. In it, he defends himself against the charge of practicing these arts. He declares that he has nothing to do with them. He only wants to prove his innocence by denying acts that cannot be done innocently. Yet all the miracles of the magicians, whom he considers justly condemned, are performed through the demons’ teaching and power. Why, then, does he think demons should be honored? He claims they are needed to present our prayers to the gods. Yet we must avoid their works if we want our prayers to reach the true God. Again, I ask what kind of human prayers he thinks demons present to the good gods. If they are magical prayers, the gods will have nothing to do with them. If they are lawful prayers, the gods will not receive them through such beings. But suppose a repentant sinner prays, especially one who has committed a crime of sorcery. Does he receive pardon through the intercession of those demons who prompted and helped him commit the sin he now mourns? Or do the demons themselves first repent of deceiving sinners, so that they may deserve pardon for them? No one has ever said this about demons. If it were true, they would never have dared to seek divine honors for themselves. How could those seeking pardon through repentance do so? Such detestable pride cannot exist alongside the humility that deserves pardon.
Pliny (Hist. Nat. xxviii. 2) and others quote the law as follows: "Qui fruges incantasit, qui malum carmen incantasit.... neu alienam segetem pelexeris."
Before Claudius, the prefect of Africa, who was a pagan.
20. Whether we are to believe that the good gods are more willing to have intercourse with demons than with men.
20. Whether we should believe that the good gods prefer to associate with demons rather than with people.
But does any urgent and most pressing cause compel the demons to mediate between the gods and men, that they may offer the prayers of men, and bring back the answers from the gods? and if so, what, pray, is that cause, what is that so great necessity? Because, say they, no god has intercourse with man. Most admirable holiness of God, which has no intercourse with a supplicating man, and yet has intercourse with an arrogant demon! which has no intercourse with a penitent man, and yet has intercourse with a deceiving demon! which has no intercourse with a man fleeing for refuge to the divine nature, and yet has intercourse with a demon feigning divinity! which has no intercourse with a man seeking pardon, and yet has intercourse with a demon persuading to wickedness! which has no intercourse with a man expelling the poets by means of philosophical writings from a well-regulated state, and yet has intercourse with a demon requesting from the princes and priests of a state the theatrical performance of the mockeries of the poets! which has no intercourse with the man who prohibits the ascribing of crime to the gods, and yet has intercourse with a demon who takes delight in the fictitious representation of their crimes! which has no intercourse with a man punishing the crimes of the magicians by just laws, and yet has intercourse with a demon teaching and practising magical arts! which has no intercourse with a man shunning the imitation of a demon, and yet has intercourse with a demon lying in wait for the deception of a man!
But is there some urgent and pressing reason why demons must act as intermediaries between gods and humans? Must they carry human prayers to the gods and bring back their answers? If so, what is this great necessity? They say it is because no god has contact with a human being. How admirable is the holiness of God! It refuses contact with a person who prays, yet accepts contact with an arrogant demon. It refuses contact with a person who repents, yet accepts contact with a deceitful demon. It refuses contact with a person who seeks refuge in the divine nature, yet accepts contact with a demon pretending to be divine. It refuses contact with a person seeking pardon, yet accepts contact with a demon urging people to do evil. It refuses contact with a person who uses philosophical writings to drive poets from a well-ordered state. Yet it accepts contact with a demon who asks the rulers and priests of a state to stage the poets’ mockeries. It refuses contact with a person who forbids people to attribute crimes to the gods. Yet it accepts contact with a demon who delights in fictional portrayals of their crimes. It refuses contact with a person who punishes the crimes of magicians through just laws. Yet it accepts contact with a demon who teaches and practices magic. It refuses contact with a person who avoids imitating a demon. Yet it accepts contact with a demon lying in wait to deceive a person.
21. Whether the gods use the demons as messengers and interpreters, and whether they are deceived by them willingly, or without their own knowledge.
21. Whether the gods use demons as messengers and interpreters, and whether they knowingly or unknowingly allow the demons to deceive them.
But herein, no doubt, lies the great necessity for this absurdity, so unworthy of the gods, that the ethereal gods, who are concerned about human affairs, would not know what terrestrial men were doing unless the aerial demons should bring them intelligence, because the ether is suspended far away from the earth and far above it, but the air is contiguous both to the ether and to the earth. O admirable wisdom! what else do these men think concerning the gods who, they say, are all in the highest degree good, but that they are concerned about human affairs, lest they should seem unworthy of worship, whilst, on the other hand, from the distance between the elements, they are ignorant of terrestrial things? It is on this account that they have supposed the demons to be necessary as agents, through whom the gods may inform themselves with respect to human affairs, and through whom, when necessary, they may succour men; and it is on account of this office that the demons themselves have been held as deserving of worship. If this be the case, then a demon is better known by these good gods through nearness of body, than a man is by goodness of mind. O mournful necessity! or shall I not rather say detestable and vain error, that I may not impute vanity to the divine nature! For if the gods can, with their minds free from the hindrance of bodies, see our mind, they do not need the demons as messengers from our mind to them; but if the ethereal gods, by means of their bodies, perceive the corporeal indices of minds, as the countenance, speech, motion, and thence understand what the demons tell them, then it is also possible that they may be deceived by the falsehoods of demons. Moreover, if the divinity of the gods cannot be deceived by the demons, neither can it be ignorant of our actions. But I would they would tell me whether the demons have informed the gods that the fictions of the poets concerning the crimes of the gods displease Plato, concealing the pleasure which they themselves take in them; or whether they have concealed both, and have preferred that the gods should be ignorant with respect to this whole matter, or have told both, as well the pious prudence of Plato with respect to the gods as their own lust, which is injurious to the gods; or whether they have concealed Plato's opinion, according to which he was unwilling that the gods should be defamed with falsely alleged crimes through the impious licence of the poets, whilst they have not been ashamed nor afraid to make known their own wickedness, which make them love theatrical plays, in which the infamous deeds of the gods are celebrated. Let them choose which they will of these four alternatives, and let them consider how much evil any one of them would require them to think of the gods. For if they choose the first, they must then confess that it was not possible for the good gods to dwell with the good Plato, though he sought to prohibit things injurious to them, whilst they dwelt with evil demons, who exulted in their injuries; and this because they suppose that the good gods can only know a good man, placed at so great a distance from them, through the mediation of evil demons, whom they could know on account of their nearness to themselves. If they shall choose the second, and shall say that both these things are concealed by the demons, so that the gods are wholly ignorant both of Plato's most religious law and the sacrilegious pleasure of the demons, what, in that case, can the gods know to any profit with respect to human affairs through these mediating demons, when they do not know those things which are decreed, through the piety of good men, for the honour of the good gods against the lust of evil demons? But if they shall choose the third, and reply that these intermediary demons have communicated, not only the opinion of Plato, which prohibited wrongs to be done to the gods, but also their own delight in these wrongs, I would ask if such a communication is not rather an insult? Now the gods, hearing both and knowing both, not only permit the approach of those malign demons, who desire and do things contrary to the dignity of the gods and the religion of Plato, but also, through these wicked demons, who are near to them, send good things to the good Plato, who is far away from them; for they inhabit such a place in the concatenated series of the elements, that they can come into contact with those by whom they are accused, but not with him by whom they are defended,—knowing the truth on both sides, but not being able to change the weight of the air and the earth. There remains the fourth supposition; but it is worse than the rest. For who will suffer it to be said that the demons have made known the calumnious fictions of the poets concerning the immortal gods, and also the disgraceful mockeries of the theatres, and their own most ardent lust after, and most sweet pleasure in these things, whilst they have concealed from them that Plato, with the gravity of a philosopher, gave it as his opinion that all these things ought to be removed from a well-regulated republic; so that the good gods are now compelled, through such messengers, to know the evil doings of the most wicked beings, that is to say, of the messengers themselves, and are not allowed to know the good deeds of the philosophers, though the former are for the injury, but these latter for the honour of the gods themselves?
Here, no doubt, is the supposed reason for this absurdity, which is so unworthy of the gods. The gods of the ether care about human affairs. Yet they would not know what people on earth were doing unless the demons of the air brought them news. This is because the ether hangs far away and high above the earth. The air, however, touches both the ether and the earth. What admirable wisdom! These men say that all the gods are good in the highest degree. Yet what do they think about them? They say the gods care about human affairs, so that they will not seem unworthy of worship. At the same time, they say the gods do not know what happens on earth because the elements are so far apart. For this reason, they have imagined that demons are needed as agents. Through them the gods learn about human affairs and, when necessary, come to human aid. Because of this role, the demons themselves have been held worthy of worship. If this is so, then these good gods know a demon better because its body is near them. They know a person less well, even if his mind is good. What a sad necessity! Or should I not rather call it a hateful and empty error, so that I do not attribute emptiness to the divine nature? If the gods can see our minds with their own minds, free from the hindrance of bodies, they need no demons to carry messages from our minds to them. But perhaps the gods of the ether use their bodies to perceive bodily signs of thought, such as expressions, speech, and movement. If they understand what the demons tell them in this way, then they can also be deceived by the demons’ lies. Moreover, if the gods’ divine nature cannot be deceived by demons, it cannot be ignorant of our actions either. But I wish these men would tell me what the demons have reported to the gods. Did they say that Plato disapproves of the poets’ stories about the gods’ crimes, while hiding their own pleasure in them? Or did they hide both facts, preferring to keep the gods ignorant of the whole matter? Or did they tell both, reporting Plato’s devout care for the gods and their own desires, which harm the gods? Or did they conceal Plato’s opinion? He did not want the poets, in their impious license, to defame the gods by falsely accusing them of crimes. Yet perhaps the demons were neither ashamed nor afraid to reveal their own wickedness. For this wickedness makes them love plays that celebrate the gods’ disgraceful deeds. Let these men choose whichever of the four alternatives they wish. Then let them consider how badly each one would require them to think of the gods. If they choose the first, they must admit that the good gods could not dwell with the good Plato. He sought to forbid things that harmed their honor. Yet they dwelt with evil demons who delighted in those injuries. This is because they suppose that the good gods can know a good man, so far away, only through evil demons. They suppose the gods can know the demons because they are near them. If they choose the second, they say that the demons hide both facts. The gods are then wholly ignorant of both Plato’s deeply religious law and the demons’ sacrilegious pleasure. In that case, what useful knowledge of human affairs can the gods gain through these mediating demons? They do not know even what good men, out of devotion, have decreed. Those decrees honor the good gods and oppose the desires of evil demons. But perhaps they choose the third answer. They may say that these intermediary demons reported both Plato’s opinion, which forbade wrongs against the gods, and their own delight in those wrongs. I ask whether such a report is not itself an insult. The gods hear and know both things. Yet they not only allow those malignant demons to approach them, though the demons desire and do things contrary to the gods’ dignity and Plato’s devotion. They also send good things to the good Plato, who is far away, through these wicked demons, who are near them. For the gods occupy such a place in the connected order of the elements that they can come into contact with those who accuse them, but not with the man who defends them. They know the truth about both sides, yet they cannot change the weight of air and earth. The fourth possibility remains, but it is worse than the rest. Who could bear to say that the demons reported the poets’ slanderous stories about the immortal gods and the disgraceful mockeries of the theaters? Who could bear to say that they also reported their own burning desire for these things and the great pleasure they take in them? Yet, on this account, they hid Plato’s judgment. With the seriousness of a philosopher, he declared that all these things should be removed from a well-governed republic. The good gods are thus forced, through such messengers, to know the evil deeds of the most wicked beings, the messengers themselves. Yet they are not allowed to know the good deeds of the philosophers. The former deeds harm the gods, while the latter honor them.
Another reading: "whom they could not know, though near to themselves."
22. That we must, notwithstanding the opinion of Apuleius, reject the worship of demons.
22. Why we must reject the worship of demons despite Apuleius's opinion.
None of these four alternatives, then, is to be chosen; for we dare not suppose such unbecoming things concerning the gods as the adoption of any one of them would lead us to think. It remains, therefore, that no credence whatever is to be given to the opinion of Apuleius and the other philosophers of the same school, namely, that the demons act as messengers and interpreters between the gods and men to carry our petitions from us to the gods, and to bring back to us the help of the gods. On the contrary, we must believe them to be spirits most eager to inflict harm, utterly alien from righteousness, swollen with pride, pale with envy, subtle in deceit; who dwell indeed in this air as in a prison, in keeping with their own character, because, cast down from the height of the higher heaven, they have been condemned to dwell in this element as the just reward of irretrievable transgression. But, though the air is situated above the earth and the waters, they are not on that account superior in merit to men, who, though they do not surpass them as far as their earthly bodies are concerned, do nevertheless far excel them through piety of mind,—they having made choice of the true God as their helper. Over many, however, who are manifestly unworthy of participation in the true religion, they tyrannize as over captives whom they have subdued,—the greatest part of whom they have persuaded of their divinity by wonderful and lying signs, consisting either of deeds or of predictions. Some, nevertheless, who have more attentively and diligently considered their vices, they have not been able to persuade that they are gods, and so have feigned themselves to be messengers between the gods and men. Some, indeed, have thought that not even this latter honour ought to be acknowledged as belonging to them, not believing that they were gods, because they saw that they were wicked, whereas the gods, according to their view, are all good. Nevertheless they dared not say that they were wholly unworthy of all divine honour, for fear of offending the multitude, by whom, through inveterate superstition, the demons were served by the performance of many rites, and the erection of many temples.
We must reject all four alternatives. We dare not believe the unworthy things about the gods that any of them would imply. Therefore, we must give no credit at all to the opinion of Apuleius and other philosophers of his school. They claim that demons act as messengers and interpreters between gods and humans. They supposedly carry our petitions to the gods and bring back their help. Instead, we must believe that demons are spirits eager to cause harm. They are utterly opposed to righteousness, swollen with pride, pale with envy, and cunning in deceit. They dwell in the air as if in a prison, as befits their character. They were cast down from the heights of heaven and condemned to live in the air. This was the just punishment for a transgression that could not be undone. The air is above the earth and the waters. Yet this does not make demons superior in merit to humans. Humans do not surpass them in their earthly bodies, but far surpass them through piety of mind. They have chosen the true God as their helper. Demons do, however, rule tyrannically over many people who are clearly unworthy of sharing in the true religion. They treat them as captives they have conquered. They have persuaded most of these people that they are gods, using wondrous and deceptive signs, either deeds or predictions. Some people, however, have examined the demons’ vices more carefully and diligently. The demons have not been able to persuade these people that they are gods. So they have pretended to be messengers between gods and humans. Some people have thought that demons should not be granted even this lesser honor. They did not believe demons were gods, because they saw that demons were wicked. In their view, all gods are good. Yet they dared not say that demons were entirely unworthy of divine honor. They feared offending the multitude, who, because of deeply rooted superstition, served demons with many rituals and built many temples for them.
23. What Hermes Trismegistus thought concerning idolatry, and from what source he knew that the superstitions of Egypt were to be abolished.
23. What Hermes Trismegistus thought about idolatry, and how he knew that Egypt's superstitions would be abolished.
The Egyptian Hermes, whom they call Trismegistus, had a different opinion concerning those demons. Apuleius, indeed, denies that they are gods; but when he says that they hold a middle place between the gods and men, so that they seem to be necessary for men as mediators between them and the gods, he does not distinguish between the worship due to them and the religious homage due to the supernal gods. This Egyptian, however, says that there are some gods made by the supreme God, and some made by men. Any one who hears this, as I have stated it, no doubt supposes that it has reference to images, because they are the works of the hands of men; but he asserts that visible and tangible images are, as it were, only the bodies of the gods, and that there dwell in them certain spirits, which have been invited to come into them, and which have power to inflict harm, or to fulfil the desires of those by whom divine honours and services are rendered to them. To unite, therefore, by a certain art, those invisible spirits to visible and material things, so as to make, as it were, animated bodies, dedicated and given up to those spirits who inhabit them,—this, he says, is to make gods, adding that men have received this great and wonderful power. I will give the words of this Egyptian as they have been translated into our tongue: "And, since we have undertaken to discourse concerning the relationship and fellowship between men and the gods, know, O Æsculapius, the power and strength of man. As the Lord and Father, or that which is highest, even God, is the maker of the celestial gods, so man is the maker of the gods who are in the temples, content to dwell near to men." And a little after he says, "Thus humanity, always mindful of its nature and origin, perseveres in the imitation of divinity; and as the Lord and Father made eternal gods, that they should be like Himself, so humanity fashioned its own gods according to the likeness of its own countenance." When this Æsculapius, to whom especially he was speaking, had answered him, and had said, "Dost thou mean the statues, O Trismegistus?"—"Yes, the statues," replied he, "however unbelieving thou art, O Æsculapius,—the statues, animated, and full of sensation and spirit, and who do such great and wonderful things,—the statues, prescient of future things, and foretelling them by lot, by prophet, by dreams, and many other things, who bring diseases on men and cure them again, giving them joy or sorrow according to their merits. Dost thou not know, Æsculapius, that Egypt is an image of heaven, or, more truly, a translation and descent of all things which are ordered and transacted there,—that it is, in truth, if we may say so, to be the temple of the whole world? And yet, as it becomes the prudent man to know all things beforehand, ye ought not to be ignorant of this, that there is a time coming when it shall appear that the Egyptians have all in vain, with pious mind, and with most scrupulous diligence, waited on the divinity, and when all their holy worship shall come to nought, and be found to be in vain."
The Egyptian Hermes, whom they call Trismegistus, had a different view of these demons. Apuleius denies that they are gods. But he says they occupy a middle place between gods and humans. He makes them seem necessary as mediators between humans and the gods. Yet he does not distinguish between the worship due to them and the religious homage due to the heavenly gods. Hermes, however, says that the supreme God made some gods, while humans made others. Anyone hearing this, as I have stated it, would no doubt think he means images made by human hands. But he claims that visible, tangible images are only the bodies of the gods, so to speak. Certain spirits have been invited to enter and dwell in them. These spirits have power to cause harm or grant the desires of those who honor and serve them as gods. He says that making gods means using a certain art to unite these invisible spirits with visible, material things. In this way, people make what are, so to speak, living bodies, dedicated and given over to the spirits inhabiting them. He adds that humans have received this great and wonderful power. I will give the Egyptian's words as they have been translated into our language: "Since we have undertaken to discuss the relationship and fellowship between humans and the gods, know, O Aesculapius, the power and strength of humanity. The Lord and Father, or the highest being, God himself, is the maker of the heavenly gods. In the same way, humans make the gods in temples, who are content to live near them." A little later he says, "So humanity, always mindful of its nature and origin, continues to imitate divinity. As the Lord and Father made eternal gods to be like himself, humanity fashioned its own gods in its own image." Aesculapius, to whom he was chiefly speaking, answered, "Do you mean the statues, O Trismegistus?" He replied, "Yes, the statues, O Aesculapius, however unbelieving you are. These statues are alive and full of feeling and spirit. They do great and wonderful things. They know the future and foretell it by lots, prophets, dreams, and many other means. They bring diseases on people and cure them again, giving them joy or sorrow according to their deserts. Do you not know, Aesculapius, that Egypt is an image of heaven? More truly, everything ordered and done in heaven has been transferred and brought down to Egypt. In truth, if we may say so, Egypt is the temple of the whole world. Yet a prudent person should know all things beforehand. You therefore ought to know that a time is coming when the Egyptians' devotion to divinity will appear to have been in vain. They served with pious minds and the utmost care, but all their holy worship will come to nothing and be found to have been in vain."
These quotations come from a dialogue between Hermes and Æsculapius. Apuleius is said to have translated it into Latin.
Hermes then follows out at great length the statements of this passage, in which he seems to predict the present time, in which the Christian religion is overthrowing all lying figments with a vehemence and liberty proportioned to its superior truth and holiness, in order that the grace of the true Saviour may deliver men from those gods which man has made, and subject them to that God by whom man was made. But when Hermes predicts these things, he speaks as one who is a friend to these same mockeries of demons, and does not clearly express the name of Christ. On the contrary, he deplores, as if it had already taken place, the future abolition of those things by the observance of which there was maintained in Egypt a resemblance of heaven,—he bears witness to Christianity by a kind of mournful prophecy. Now it was with reference to such that the apostle said, that "knowing God, they glorified Him not as God, neither were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened; professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of corruptible man," and so on, for the whole passage is too long to quote. For Hermes makes many such statements agreeable to the truth concerning the one true God who fashioned this world. And I know not how he has become so bewildered by that "darkening of the heart" as to stumble into the expression of a desire that men should always continue in subjection to those gods which he confesses to be made by men, and to bewail their future removal; as if there could be anything more wretched than mankind tyrannized over by the work of his own hands, since man, by worshipping the works of his own hands, may more easily cease to be man, than the works of his hands can, through his worship of them, become gods. For it can sooner happen that man, who has received an honourable position, may, through lack of understanding, become comparable to the beasts, than that the works of man may become preferable to the work of God, made in His own image, that is, to man himself. Wherefore deservedly is man left to fall away from Him who made him, when he prefers to himself that which he himself has made.
Hermes goes on at great length about the statements in this passage. He seems to predict the present time, when the Christian religion is overthrowing all false inventions. It does so with a force and freedom suited to its greater truth and holiness. In this way, the grace of the true Savior delivers people from gods made by humans. It brings them under the authority of the God who made them. But when Hermes predicts these things, he speaks as a friend of these demonic mockeries. He does not clearly name Christ. Instead, he mourns the coming abolition of these practices as though it had already happened. Observing them had maintained in Egypt a likeness of heaven. In this way, he bears witness to Christianity through a kind of mournful prophecy. The apostle was speaking of people like these when he said, “Although they knew God, they did not glorify him as God or give thanks to him. Instead, their thinking became futile, and their foolish hearts were darkened. Claiming to be wise, they became fools. They exchanged the glory of the immortal God for an image resembling mortal man,” and so on. The whole passage is too long to quote. Hermes makes many such statements that agree with the truth about the one true God who made this world. Yet somehow this “darkening of the heart” has so confused him that he expresses a wish that people should always remain subject to gods he admits were made by humans. He also mourns their future removal. But what could be more wretched than humanity ruled by the work of its own hands? By worshipping what they have made, people can more easily cease to be human than make their creations gods. People have been given a place of honor. Yet, through lack of understanding, they can become like beasts. That can happen more readily than the works of human hands can become greater than God’s work, humanity itself, made in his image. So people deserve to be left to fall away from their maker when they value their own creations above themselves.
Rom. i. 21.
For these vain, deceitful, pernicious, sacrilegious things did the Egyptian Hermes sorrow, because he knew that the time was coming when they should be removed. But his sorrow was as impudently expressed as his knowledge was imprudently obtained; for it was not the Holy Spirit who revealed these things to him, as He had done to the holy prophets, who, foreseeing these things, said with exultation, "If a man shall make gods, lo, they are no gods;" and in another place, "And it shall come to pass in that day, saith the Lord, that I will cut off the names of the idols out of the land, and they shall no more be remembered." But the holy Isaiah prophesies expressly concerning Egypt in reference to this matter, saying, "And the idols of Egypt shall be moved at His presence, and their heart shall be overcome in them," and other things to the same effect. And with the prophet are to be classed those who rejoiced that that which they knew was to come had actually come,—as Simeon, or Anna, who immediately recognised Jesus when He was born, or Elisabeth, who in the Spirit recognised Him when He was conceived, or Peter, who said by the revelation of the Father, "Thou art Christ, the Son of the living God." But to this Egyptian those spirits indicated the time of their own destruction, who also, when the Lord was present in the flesh, said with trembling, "Art Thou come hither to destroy us before the time?" meaning by destruction before the time, either that very destruction which they expected to come, but which they did not think would come so suddenly as it appeared to have done, or only that destruction which consisted in their being brought into contempt by being made known. And, indeed, this was a destruction before the time, that is, before the time of judgment, when they are to be punished with eternal damnation, together with all men who are implicated in their wickedness, as the true religion declares, which neither errs nor leads into error; for it is not like him who, blown hither and thither by every wind of doctrine, and mixing true things with things which are false, bewails as about to perish a religion which he afterwards confesses to be error.
The Egyptian Hermes mourned these vain, deceitful, harmful, and sacrilegious things. He knew that the time was coming when they would be removed. But he expressed his sorrow shamelessly, just as he had obtained his knowledge recklessly. The Holy Spirit had not revealed these things to him, as he had to the holy prophets. They foresaw these things and said with joy, "If a man makes gods, look, they are not gods." And elsewhere, they said, "On that day, says the Lord, I will remove the names of the idols from the land. They will no longer be remembered." The holy Isaiah speaks specifically about Egypt in this matter. He says, "The idols of Egypt will tremble at his presence, and their hearts will fail within them," along with other things to the same effect. The prophets should be grouped with those who rejoiced when what they knew was coming had actually come. These included Simeon and Anna, who recognized Jesus immediately when he was born. They also included Elisabeth, who recognized him through the Spirit when he was conceived. And they included Peter, who said through the Father's revelation, "You are Christ, the Son of the living God." But it was those spirits who told the Egyptian when their own destruction would come. When the Lord was present in the flesh, they also said trembling, "Have you come here to destroy us before the time?" By destruction before the time, they meant one of two things. They meant either the very destruction they expected, but did not think would come as suddenly as it appeared to have done. Or they meant only the destruction that came when they were exposed and brought into contempt. Indeed, this was destruction before the time. It came before the time of judgment, when they will be punished with eternal damnation. So will all people who are implicated in their wickedness. This is what the true religion declares, and it neither errs nor leads others into error. It is not like Hermes, who is blown about by every wind of doctrine and mixes truth with falsehood. He mourns a religion as though it is about to perish, though he later admits that it is an error.
Jer. xvi. 20.
Zech. xiii. 2.
Isa. xix. 1.
Matt. xvi. 16.
Matt. viii. 29.
24. How Hermes openly confessed the error of his forefathers, the coming destruction of which he nevertheless bewailed.
24. How Hermes openly admitted his ancestors’ error, yet mourned its coming destruction.
After a long interval, Hermes again comes back to the subject of the gods which men have made, saying as follows: "But enough on this subject. Let us return to man and to reason, that divine gift on account of which man has been called a rational animal. For the things which have been said concerning man, wonderful though they are, are less wonderful than those which have been said concerning reason. For man to discover the divine nature, and to make it, surpasses the wonder of all other wonderful things. Because, therefore, our forefathers erred very far with respect to the knowledge of the gods, through incredulity and through want of attention to their worship and service, they invented this art of making gods; and this art once invented, they associated with it a suitable virtue borrowed from universal nature, and, being incapable of making souls, they evoked those of demons or of angels, and united them with these holy images and divine mysteries, in order that through these souls the images might have power to do good or harm to men." I know not whether the demons themselves could have been made, even by adjuration, to confess as he has confessed in these words: "Because our forefathers erred very far with respect to the knowledge of the gods, through incredulity and through want of attention to their worship and service, they invented the art of making gods." Does he say that it was a moderate degree of error which resulted in their discovery of the art of making gods, or was he content to say "they erred?" No; he must needs add "very far," and say, "They erred very far." It was this great error and incredulity, then, of their forefathers who did not attend to the worship and service of the gods, which was the origin of the art of making gods. And yet this wise man grieves over the ruin of this art at some future time, as if it were a divine religion. Is he not verily compelled by divine influence, on the one hand, to reveal the past error of his forefathers, and by a diabolical influence, on the other hand, to bewail the future punishment of demons? For if their forefathers, by erring very far with respect to the knowledge of the gods, through incredulity and aversion of mind from their worship and service, invented the art of making gods, what wonder is it that all that is done by this detestable art, which is opposed to the divine religion, should be taken away by that religion, when truth corrects error, faith refutes incredulity, and conversion rectifies aversion?
After a long interval, Hermes returns to the subject of the gods people have made. He says: "But enough on this subject. Let us return to man and to reason, the divine gift for which man has been called a rational animal. What has been said about man is wonderful, but what has been said about reason is even more wonderful. For man to discover the divine nature and make it surpasses every other wonder. Our forefathers strayed very far from knowledge of the gods. They did so through unbelief and neglect of their worship and service. So they invented the art of making gods. Once they had invented it, they joined to it a suitable power borrowed from universal nature. Since they could not make souls, they summoned the souls of demons or angels. They united them with these holy images and divine mysteries. In this way, the souls gave the images power to do good or harm to people." I do not know whether even the demons could have been forced by adjuration to confess what he has confessed. He says: "Our forefathers strayed very far from knowledge of the gods. They did so through unbelief and neglect of their worship and service. So they invented the art of making gods." Does he say that a small error led them to discover this art? Was he content to say, "they strayed"? No. He had to add "very far" and say, "They strayed very far." This great error and unbelief, then, gave rise to the art of making gods. It came from forefathers who neglected the worship and service of the gods. Yet this wise man grieves over the future destruction of this art, as if it were a divine religion. Is he not compelled by divine influence to reveal his forefathers' past error? And is he not compelled by diabolical influence to lament the future punishment of demons? Their forefathers strayed very far from knowledge of the gods. Through unbelief and an aversion to their worship and service, they invented the art of making gods. What wonder, then, that divine religion should sweep away all that this detestable art produces? For this art is opposed to divine religion. Truth corrects error, faith refutes unbelief, and conversion sets aversion right.
For if he had only said, without mentioning the cause, that his forefathers had discovered the art of making gods, it would have been our duty, if we paid any regard to what is right and pious, to consider and to see that they could never have attained to this art if they had not erred from the truth, if they had believed those things which are worthy of God, if they had attended to divine worship and service. However, if we alone should say that the causes of this art were to be found in the great error and incredulity of men, and aversion of the mind erring from and unfaithful to divine religion, the impudence of those who resist the truth were in some way to be borne with; but when he who admires in man, above all other things, this power which it has been granted him to practise, and sorrows because a time is coming when all those figments of gods invented by men shall even be commanded by the laws to be taken away,—when even this man confesses nevertheless, and explains the causes which led to the discovery of this art, saying that their ancestors, through great error and incredulity, and through not attending to the worship and service of the gods, invented this art of making gods,—what ought we to say, or rather to do, but to give to the Lord our God all the thanks we are able, because He has taken away those things by causes the contrary of those which led to their institution? For that which the prevalence of error instituted, the way of truth took away; that which incredulity instituted, faith took away; that which aversion from divine worship and service instituted, conversion to the one true and holy God took away. Nor was this the case only in Egypt, for which country alone the spirit of the demons lamented in Hermes, but in all the earth, which sings to the Lord a new song, as the truly holy and truly prophetic Scriptures have predicted, in which it is written, "Sing unto the Lord a new song; sing unto the Lord, all the earth." For the title of this psalm is, "When the house was built after the captivity." For a house is being built to the Lord in all the earth, even the city of God, which is the holy Church, after that captivity in which demons held captive those men who, through faith in God, became living stones in the house. For although man made gods, it did not follow that he who made them was not held captive by them, when, by worshipping them, he was drawn into fellowship with them,—into the fellowship not of stolid idols, but of cunning demons; for what are idols but what they are represented to be in the same Scriptures, "They have eyes, but they do not see," and, though artistically fashioned, are still without life and sensation? But unclean spirits, associated through that wicked art with these same idols, have miserably taken captive the souls of their worshippers, by bringing them down into fellowship with themselves. Whence the apostle says, "We know that an idol is nothing, but those things which the Gentiles sacrifice they sacrifice to demons, and not to God; and I would not ye should have fellowship with demons." After this captivity, therefore, in which men were held by malign demons, the house of God is being built in all the earth; whence the title of that psalm in which it is said, "Sing unto the Lord a new song; sing unto the Lord, all the earth. Sing unto the Lord, bless His name; declare well His salvation from day to day. Declare His glory among the nations, among all people His wonderful things. For great is the Lord, and much to be praised: He is terrible above all gods. For all the gods of the nations are demons: but the Lord made the heavens."
Suppose he had only said that his ancestors discovered the art of making gods, without explaining why. If we cared at all about what is right and devout, we would have had to consider the matter carefully. We would have seen that they could never have discovered this art if they had not strayed from the truth. They would not have discovered it if they had believed what is worthy of God and had attended to divine worship and service. Suppose we alone claimed that this art arose from people’s great error and unbelief. Suppose we alone traced it to minds that had turned away from true religion, straying from it and lacking faith. Then we might somehow have to put up with the shamelessness of those who resist the truth. But he himself admits these causes and explains how they led to the discovery of this art. He admires this power granted to human beings more than anything else in them. He grieves that a time is coming when the law will command the removal of all these gods invented by people. Yet even he says that his ancestors invented the art of making gods through great error and unbelief. He says they did so because they neglected the worship and service of the gods. What then should we say, or rather do? We should give the Lord our God all the thanks we can. For he has removed these things through causes opposite to those that brought them into being. The way of truth removed what widespread error had established. Faith removed what unbelief had established. Turning to the one true and holy God removed what turning away from divine worship and service had established. This happened not only in Egypt, the only country for which the spirit of the demons lamented in Hermes. It happened throughout the earth, which sings a new song to the Lord, as the truly holy and truly prophetic Scriptures foretold. They say, "Sing to the Lord a new song. Sing to the Lord, all the earth." The title of this psalm is, "When the house was built after the captivity." For a house is being built for the Lord throughout the earth. It is the city of God, the holy Church. It is being built after the captivity in which demons held people prisoner. Through faith in God, those people became living stones in the house. Although people made gods, they were still held captive by them. By worshipping them, they were drawn into fellowship with them. This was not fellowship with lifeless idols, but with cunning demons. For what are idols except what the same Scriptures say they are? "They have eyes, but they do not see." Though skillfully made, they still have no life or sensation. But unclean spirits were joined to these idols through that wicked art. They have brought the souls of their worshippers down into fellowship with themselves, and so have held them in miserable captivity. As the apostle says, "We know that an idol is nothing. But what the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to demons, not to God. And I do not want you to have fellowship with demons." After this captivity, in which evil demons held people prisoner, the house of God is being built throughout the earth. This is why the psalm bears that title. In it we read, "Sing to the Lord a new song. Sing to the Lord, all the earth. Sing to the Lord, bless his name. Proclaim his salvation day after day. Declare his glory among the nations, and his wonderful deeds among all peoples. For the Lord is great and greatly to be praised. He is to be feared above all gods. For all the gods of the nations are demons, but the Lord made the heavens."
Ps. xcvi. 1.
Ps. cxv. 5, etc.
1 Cor. x. 19, 20.
Ps. xcvi. 1-5.
Wherefore he who sorrowed because a time was coming when the worship of idols should be abolished, and the domination of the demons over those who worshipped them, wished, under the influence of a demon, that that captivity should always continue, at the cessation of which that psalm celebrates the building of the house of the Lord in all the earth. Hermes foretold these things with grief, the prophet with joyfulness; and because the Spirit is victorious who sang these things through the ancient prophets, even Hermes himself was compelled in a wonderful manner to confess, that those very things which he wished not to be removed, and at the prospect of whose removal he was sorrowful, had been instituted, not by prudent, faithful, and religious, but by erring and unbelieving men, averse to the worship and service of the gods. And although he calls them gods, nevertheless, when he says that they were made by such men as we certainly ought not to be, he shows, whether he will or not, that they are not to be worshipped by those who do not resemble these image-makers, that is, by prudent, faithful, and religious men, at the same time also making it manifest that the very men who made them involved themselves in the worship of those as gods who were not gods. For true is the saying of the prophet, "If a man make gods, lo, they are no gods." Such gods, therefore, acknowledged by such worshippers and made by such men, did Hermes call "gods made by men," that is to say, demons, through some art of I know not what description, bound by the chains of their own lusts to images. But, nevertheless, he did not agree with that opinion of the Platonic Apuleius, of which we have already shown the incongruity and absurdity, namely, that they were interpreters and intercessors between the gods whom God made, and men whom the same God made, bringing to God the prayers of men, and from God the gifts given in answer to these prayers. For it is exceedingly stupid to believe that gods whom men have made have more influence with gods whom God has made than men themselves have, whom the very same God has made. And consider, too, that it is a demon which, bound by a man to an image by means of an impious art, has been made a god, but a god to such a man only, not to every man. What kind of god, therefore, is that which no man would make but one erring, incredulous, and averse to the true God? Moreover, if the demons which are worshipped in the temples, being introduced by some kind of strange art into images, that is, into visible representations of themselves, by those men who by this art made gods when they were straying away from, and were averse to the worship and service of the gods,—if, I say, those demons are neither mediators nor interpreters between men and the gods, both on account of their own most wicked and base manners, and because men, though erring, incredulous, and averse from the worship and service of the gods, are nevertheless beyond doubt better than the demons whom they themselves have evoked, then it remains to be affirmed that what power they possess they possess as demons, doing harm by bestowing pretended benefits,—harm all the greater for the deception,—or else openly and undisguisedly doing evil to men. They cannot, however, do anything of this kind unless where they are permitted by the deep and secret providence of God, and then only so far as they are permitted. When, however, they are permitted, it is not because they, being midway between men and the gods, have through the friendship of the gods great power over men; for these demons cannot possibly be friends to the good gods who dwell in the holy and heavenly habitation, by whom we mean holy angels and rational creatures, whether thrones, or dominations, or principalities, or powers, from whom they are as far separated in disposition and character as vice is distant from virtue, wickedness from goodness.
Therefore, the man who grieved at the coming end of idol worship also grieved at the end of demonic rule over worshippers. Under a demon’s influence, he wished that captivity to continue forever. Yet the psalm celebrates its end as the building of the Lord’s house throughout the earth. Hermes foretold these things with grief, while the prophet foretold them with joy. The Spirit who spoke through the ancient prophets is victorious. So even Hermes was compelled, in a remarkable way, to admit the truth about these practices. He did not want them removed, and he grieved at the prospect of their removal. Yet he admitted that they were established by people who were mistaken, unbelieving, and opposed to worshipping and serving the gods. They were not prudent, faithful, and religious people. Although Hermes calls them gods, he says they were made by people we certainly should not imitate. Whether he intends to or not, he shows that they should not be worshipped by people unlike their makers. That is, they should not be worshipped by prudent, faithful, and religious people. He also makes clear that their makers involved themselves in worshipping as gods beings that were not gods. For the prophet’s words are true: "If a man make gods, lo, they are no gods." Hermes called such gods "gods made by men." Such were their makers, and such were those who acknowledged and worshipped them. They were demons, bound to images by the chains of their own desires through some art whose nature I do not know. Yet Hermes did not agree with the Platonist Apuleius. We have already shown how inconsistent and absurd Apuleius’s opinion was. He held that these demons were interpreters and intercessors between the gods whom God made and the people whom God made. According to him, they carried human prayers to God and brought back his gifts in answer. It is exceedingly foolish to believe that gods made by people have more influence with gods made by God than people themselves do. For God made those people too. Consider also that a demon is made a god when someone binds it to an image by an impious art. But it is a god only to that person, not to everyone. What kind of god is this? No one would make it unless he were mistaken, unbelieving, and opposed to the true God. Demons are worshipped in temples after being brought into images, visible representations of themselves, by some strange art. Those who made gods by this art had wandered from, and opposed, the worship and service of the gods. These demons are neither mediators nor interpreters between people and the gods. Their own conduct is utterly wicked and base. And the people who summon them are undoubtedly better than the demons themselves, though they are mistaken, unbelieving, and opposed to worshipping and serving the gods. It follows that whatever power these beings have, they possess as demons. They do harm by granting supposed benefits, and the deception makes the harm greater. Or they do evil to people openly and without disguise. Yet they can do none of these things unless God’s deep and secret providence permits them. Even then, they can act only as far as they are permitted. When they are permitted to act, it is not because they stand between people and the gods. Nor is it because friendship with the gods gives them great power over people. These demons cannot possibly be friends of the good gods who live in the holy, heavenly dwelling. By these gods we mean holy angels and rational creatures, whether thrones, dominations, principalities, or powers. The demons are as far removed from them in character and disposition as vice is from virtue, and wickedness from goodness.
Jer. xvi. 20.
25. Concerning those things which may be common to the holy angels and to men.
25. About the things that holy angels and humans may share.
Wherefore we must by no means seek, through the supposed mediation of demons, to avail ourselves of the benevolence or beneficence of the gods, or rather of the good angels, but through resembling them in the possession of a good will, through which we are with them, and live with them, and worship with them the same God, although we cannot see them with the eyes of our flesh. But it is not in locality we are distant from them, but in merit of life, caused by our miserable unlikeness to them in will, and by the weakness of our character; for the mere fact of our dwelling on earth under the conditions of life in the flesh does not prevent our fellowship with them. It is only prevented when we, in the impurity of our hearts, mind earthly things. But in this present time, while we are being healed that we may eventually be as they are, we are brought near to them by faith, if by their assistance we believe that He who is their blessedness is also ours.
Therefore, we must never seek the kindness or help of the gods, or rather the good angels, through the supposed mediation of demons. Instead, we must become like them by having a good will. Through this good will, we are with them, live with them, and worship the same God with them. This is true even though we cannot see them with our physical eyes. We are not distant from them in place, but in the goodness of our lives. This distance comes from the unhappy difference between our wills and theirs, and from the weakness of our character. Simply living on earth in the flesh does not prevent us from sharing life with them. Our fellowship is prevented only when our impure hearts are set on earthly things. For now, we are being healed so that we may eventually become like them. We are brought close to them through faith, if, with their help, we believe that he who is the source of their happiness is also the source of ours.
26. That all the religion of the pagans has reference to dead men.
26. That all pagan religion refers to dead people.
It is certainly a remarkable thing how this Egyptian, when expressing his grief that a time was coming when those things would be taken away from Egypt, which he confesses to have been invented by men erring, incredulous, and averse to the service of divine religion, says, among other things, "Then shall that land, the most holy place of shrines and temples, be full of sepulchres and dead men," as if, in sooth, if these things were not taken away, men would not die! as if dead bodies could be buried elsewhere than in the ground! as if, as time advanced, the number of sepulchres must not necessarily increase in proportion to the increase of the number of the dead! But they who are of a perverse mind, and opposed to us, suppose that what he grieves for is that the memorials of our martyrs were to succeed to their temples and shrines, in order, forsooth, that they may have grounds for thinking that gods were worshipped by the pagans in temples, but that dead men are worshipped by us in sepulchres. For with such blindness do impious men, as it were, stumble over mountains, and will not see the things which strike their own eyes, that they do not attend to the fact that in all the literature of the pagans there are not found any, or scarcely any gods, who have not been men, to whom, when dead, divine honours have been paid. I will not enlarge on the fact that Varro says that all dead men are thought by them to be gods Manes, and proves it by those sacred rites which are performed in honour of almost all the dead, among which he mentions funeral games, considering this the very highest proof of divinity, because games are only wont to be celebrated in honour of divinities. Hermes himself, of whom we are now treating, in that same book in which, as if foretelling future things, he says with sorrow, "Then shall that land, the most holy place of shrines and temples, be full of sepulchres and dead men," testifies that the gods of Egypt were dead men. For, having said that their forefathers, erring very far with respect to the knowledge of the gods, incredulous and inattentive to the divine worship and service, invented the art of making gods, with which art, when invented, they associated the appropriate virtue which is inherent in universal nature, and by mixing up that virtue with this art, they called forth the souls of demons or of angels (for they could not make souls), and caused them to take possession of, or associate themselves with holy images and divine mysteries, in order that through these souls the images might have power to do good or harm to men;—having said this, he goes on, as it were, to prove it by illustrations, saying, "Thy grandsire, O Æsculapius, the first discoverer of medicine, to whom a temple was consecrated in a mountain of Libya, near to the shore of the crocodiles, in which temple lies his earthly man, that is, his body,—for the better part of him, or rather the whole of him, if the whole man is in the intelligent life, went back to heaven,—affords even now by his divinity all those helps to infirm men, which formerly he was wont to afford to them by the art of medicine." He says, therefore, that a dead man was worshipped as a god in that place where he had his sepulchre. He deceives men by a falsehood, for the man "went back to heaven." Then he adds, "Does not Hermes, who was my grandsire, and whose name I bear, abiding in the country which is called by his name, help and preserve all mortals who come to him from every quarter?" For this elder Hermes, that is, Mercury, who, he says, was his grandsire, is said to be buried in Hermopolis, that is, in the city called by his name; so here are two gods whom he affirms to have been men, Æsculapius and Mercury. Now concerning Æsculapius, both the Greeks and the Latins think the same thing; but as to Mercury, there are many who do not think that he was formerly a mortal, though Hermes testifies that he was his grandsire. But are these two different individuals who were called by the same name? I will not dispute much whether they are different individuals or not. It is sufficient to know that this Mercury of whom Hermes speaks is, as well as Æsculapius, a god who once was a man, according to the testimony of this same Trismegistus, esteemed so great by his countrymen, and also the grandson of Mercury himself.
It is remarkable how this Egyptian expresses his grief over a time to come. He says that certain things will be taken away from Egypt, though he admits that they were invented by people who were mistaken, unbelieving, and opposed to the service of divine religion. Among other things, he says, "Then that land, the holiest place of shrines and temples, will be full of tombs and dead people." As if people would not die if these things remained! As if dead bodies could be buried somewhere other than in the ground! As if the number of tombs would not necessarily increase over time as the number of dead increased! But those with perverse minds who oppose us suppose that he is grieving because memorials to our martyrs would replace their temples and shrines. They want grounds to claim that pagans worshipped gods in temples, while we worship dead people in tombs. Such is the blindness of these impious people that they stumble, as it were, over mountains. They refuse to see what is right before their eyes. They overlook the fact that in all pagan literature, there are no gods, or hardly any, who were not once human and were given divine honors after death. I will not dwell on what Varro says. He says that pagans regard all dead people as gods called Manes. He proves this by the sacred rites performed in honor of almost all the dead. Among these he mentions funeral games. He considers these the strongest proof of divinity, because games are usually celebrated only in honor of divine beings. Hermes himself, whom we are discussing, testifies that the gods of Egypt were dead people. He does this in the same book where he speaks sorrowfully, as if predicting the future: "Then that land, the holiest place of shrines and temples, will be full of tombs and dead people." He says that their ancestors were deeply mistaken about the knowledge of the gods. They were unbelieving and neglected divine worship and service. They invented the art of making gods and combined it with the appropriate power inherent in universal nature. By mixing this power with their art, they called forth the souls of demons or angels, since they could not make souls themselves. They caused these souls to inhabit or associate themselves with sacred images and divine mysteries. Through these souls, the images could then have power to do people good or harm. Having said this, he goes on to offer examples, as if to prove his claim: "Your grandfather, O Aesculapius, was the first to discover medicine. A temple was dedicated to him on a mountain in Libya, near the shore of the crocodiles. In that temple lies his earthly man, that is, his body. For the better part of him, or rather the whole of him, if the whole person consists in intelligent life, returned to heaven. Even now, through his divinity, he gives sick people all the help he once gave them through the art of medicine." He says, then, that a dead man was worshipped as a god in the place where he was buried. He deceives people with the false claim that the man "returned to heaven." Then he adds, "Does not Hermes, who was my grandfather and whose name I bear, live in the country named after him? Does he not help and protect all mortals who come to him from every direction?" For this older Hermes, that is, Mercury, whom he calls his grandfather, is said to be buried in Hermopolis, the city named after him. So here are two gods, Aesculapius and Mercury, whom he says were once human. Both Greeks and Latins agree about Aesculapius. But many do not believe that Mercury was once mortal, although Hermes says that he was his grandfather. Could these have been two different people with the same name? I will not argue at length about whether they were different people. It is enough to know that this Mercury, like Aesculapius, was a god who had once been human. We have the testimony of Trismegistus himself, who was so highly regarded by his countrymen and was also Mercury's grandson.
Hermes goes on to say, "But do we know how many good things Isis, the wife of Osiris, bestows when she is propitious, and what great opposition she can offer when enraged?" Then, in order to show that there were gods made by men through this art, he goes on to say, "For it is easy for earthly and mundane gods to be angry, being made and composed by men out of either nature;" thus giving us to understand that he believed that demons were formerly the souls of dead men, which, as he says, by means of a certain art invented by men very far in error, incredulous, and irreligious, were caused to take possession of images, because they who made such gods were not able to make souls. When, therefore, he says "either nature," he means soul and body,—the demon being the soul, and the image the body. What, then, becomes of that mournful complaint, that the land of Egypt, the most holy place of shrines and temples, was to be full of sepulchres and dead men? Verily, the fallacious spirit, by whose inspiration Hermes spoke these things, was compelled to confess through him that even already that land was full of sepulchres and of dead men, whom they were worshipping as gods. But it was the grief of the demons which was expressing itself through his mouth, who were sorrowing on account of the punishments which were about to fall upon them at the tombs of the martyrs. For in many such places they are tortured and compelled to confess, and are cast out of the bodies of men, of which they had taken possession.
Hermes goes on to say, "But do we know how many good things Isis, the wife of Osiris, gives when she is favorable? And do we know how fiercely she can oppose us when she is angry?" He then shows that this art produced gods made by humans. He says, "For earthly and worldly gods become angry easily, since humans made and composed them from both natures." By this, he suggests that he believed demons were once the souls of dead people. He says that an art invented by deeply mistaken, unbelieving, and irreligious people made these souls take possession of images. Those who made such gods could not make souls. So when he says "both natures," he means soul and body. The demon is the soul, and the image is the body. What, then, becomes of his sorrowful complaint? He said that Egypt, the most holy land of shrines and temples, would be filled with tombs and dead people. In truth, the deceitful spirit that inspired Hermes was forced to confess through him that Egypt was already full of tombs and dead people. The Egyptians were worshipping those dead people as gods. But it was the grief of the demons that spoke through his mouth. They were grieving over the punishments that would soon befall them at the tombs of the martyrs. In many such places, they are tortured and forced to confess. They are also driven out of the bodies they had possessed.
27. Concerning the nature of the honour which the Christians pay to their martyrs.
27. The kind of honor Christians give to their martyrs.
But, nevertheless, we do not build temples, and ordain priests, rites, and sacrifices for these same martyrs; for they are not our gods, but their God is our God. Certainly we honour their reliquaries, as the memorials of holy men of God who strove for the truth even to the death of their bodies, that the true religion might be made known, and false and fictitious religions exposed. For if there were some before them who thought that these religions were really false and fictitious, they were afraid to give expression to their convictions. But who ever heard a priest of the faithful, standing at an altar built for the honour and worship of God over the holy body of some martyr, say in the prayers, I offer to thee a sacrifice, O Peter, or O Paul, or O Cyprian? for it is to God that sacrifices are offered at their tombs,—the God who made them both men and martyrs, and associated them with holy angels in celestial honour; and the reason why we pay such honours to their memory is, that by so doing we may both give thanks to the true God for their victories, and, by recalling them afresh to remembrance, may stir ourselves up to imitate them by seeking to obtain like crowns and palms, calling to our help that same God on whom they called. Therefore, whatever honours the religious may pay in the places of the martyrs, they are but honours rendered to their memory, not sacred rites or sacrifices offered to dead men as to gods. And even such as bring thither food,—which, indeed, is not done by the better Christians, and in most places of the world is not done at all,—do so in order that it may be sanctified to them through the merits of the martyrs, in the name of the Lord of the martyrs, first presenting the food and offering prayer, and thereafter taking it away to be eaten, or to be in part bestowed upon the needy. But he who knows the one sacrifice of Christians, which is the sacrifice offered in those places, also knows that these are not sacrifices offered to the martyrs. It is, then, neither with divine honours nor with human crimes, by which they worship their gods, that we honour our martyrs; neither do we offer sacrifices to them, or convert the crimes of the gods into their sacred rites. For let those who will and can read the letter of Alexander to his mother Olympias, in which he tells the things which were revealed to him by the priest Leon, and let those who have read it recall to memory what it contains, that they may see what great abominations have been handed down to memory, not by poets, but by the mystic writings of the Egyptians, concerning the goddess Isis, the wife of Osiris, and the parents of both, all of whom, according to these writings, were royal personages. Isis, when sacrificing to her parents, is said to have discovered a crop of barley, of which she brought some ears to the king her husband, and his councillor Mercurius, and hence they identify her with Ceres. Those who read the letter may there see what was the character of those people to whom when dead sacred rites were instituted as to gods, and what those deeds of theirs were which furnished the occasion for these rites. Let them not once dare to compare in any respect those people, though they hold them to be gods, to our holy martyrs, though we do not hold them to be gods. For we do not ordain priests and offer sacrifices to our martyrs, as they do to their dead men, for that would be incongruous, undue, and unlawful, such being due only to God; and thus we do not delight them with their own crimes, or with such shameful plays as those in which the crimes of the gods are celebrated, which are either real crimes committed by them at a time when they were men, or else, if they never were men, fictitious crimes invented for the pleasure of noxious demons. The god of Socrates, if he had a god, cannot have belonged to this class of demons. But perhaps they who wished to excel in this art of making gods, imposed a god of this sort on a man who was a stranger to, and innocent of any connection with that art. What need we say more? No one who is even moderately wise imagines that demons are to be worshipped on account of the blessed life which is to be after death. But perhaps they will say that all the gods are good, but that of the demons some are bad and some good, and that it is the good who are to be worshipped, in order that through them we may attain to the eternally blessed life. To the examination of this opinion we will devote the following book.
Nevertheless, we do not build temples or appoint priests for these martyrs. Nor do we establish rites or offer sacrifices to them. They are not our gods. Their God is our God. We do honor their reliquaries as memorials of holy men of God. They fought for the truth even to the death of their bodies. They did this so that the true religion might be made known and false, invented religions exposed. Some before them may have believed that these religions were false and invented. But they were afraid to express their convictions. Has anyone ever heard a priest of the faithful say in prayer, “I offer you a sacrifice, Peter, Paul, or Cyprian”? Has anyone heard this while the priest stood at an altar built over a martyr’s holy body? Such altars are built to honor and worship God. Sacrifices are offered at the martyrs’ tombs to God. He made them both men and martyrs, and joined them with the holy angels in heavenly honor. We honor their memory so that we may thank the true God for their victories. By remembering them again, we also stir ourselves to imitate them and seek similar crowns and palms. We call for help on the same God they called on. Whatever honors religious people pay at the martyrs’ resting places honor their memory. They are not sacred rites or sacrifices offered to dead men as if they were gods. Some people do bring food to these places. Better Christians do not do this, and in most parts of the world it is not done at all. They bring it so that it may be made holy for them through the merits of the martyrs. They do this in the name of the martyrs’ Lord. First they present the food and offer a prayer. Then they take it away to eat or to give some of it to the needy. But anyone who knows the one Christian sacrifice offered in those places also knows something else. These offerings of food are not sacrifices to the martyrs. We do not honor our martyrs as others worship their gods, with divine honors or human crimes. We do not offer sacrifices to the martyrs. Nor do we turn the crimes of gods into sacred rites for them. Let those who are willing and able read Alexander’s letter to his mother, Olympias. In it he tells what the priest Leon revealed to him. Those who have read it should recall what it contains. They will see what great abominations have been handed down, not by poets, but by Egyptian mystical writings. These writings concern the goddess Isis, her husband Osiris, and the parents of both. According to the writings, all of them were royal figures. Isis is said to have discovered a crop of barley while sacrificing to her parents. She brought some ears of it to her husband, the king, and to his adviser Mercurius. This is why she is identified with Ceres. Readers of the letter can see what kind of people they were. After their deaths, sacred rites were established for them as if they were gods. Readers can also see what deeds of theirs gave rise to these rites. Let no one ever dare compare those people in any respect with our holy martyrs. They hold those people to be gods, but we do not hold our martyrs to be gods. We do not appoint priests or offer sacrifices to our martyrs, as they do for their dead. That would be unfitting, improper, and unlawful. Such things are due only to God. Nor do we delight the martyrs with their own crimes or with shameful plays celebrating the crimes of gods. These are either real crimes the gods committed when they were human, or, if they were never human, invented crimes. In that case, the crimes were invented for the pleasure of harmful demons. The god of Socrates, if he had a god, cannot have belonged to this class of demons. But perhaps those who wanted to excel in the art of making gods assigned such a god to him. He was a stranger to that art and had no guilty connection with it. What more need we say? No one with even moderate wisdom imagines that demons should be worshipped to gain the blessed life after death. But perhaps they will say that all gods are good, while some demons are bad and others good. They may say that the good demons should be worshipped so that through them we may attain eternal blessed life. We will devote the following book to examining this opinion.
Decorations of memorials.
Compare The Confessions, vi. 2.