Ingratitude is so dangerous to itself, and so detestable to other people, that nature, one would think, had sufficiently provided against it, without need of any other law. For every ungrateful man is his own enemy, and it seems superfluous to compel a man to be kind to himself, and to follow in his own inclinations. This, of all wickedness imaginable, is certainly the vice which does the most divide and distract human nature. Without the exercise and the commerce of mutual offices, we can be neither happy nor safe for it is only society that secures us: take us one by one, and we are a prey even to brutes as well as to one another.
Ingratitude is so dangerous to the ungrateful person and so hateful to everyone else that you'd think nature would have provided enough protection against it. No other law should be needed. Every ungrateful person is their own worst enemy. It seems pointless to force someone to be kind to themselves and follow their own best interests. Of all the evils we can imagine, this is certainly the vice that most divides and destroys human nature. We cannot be happy or safe without helping each other and working together. Only society protects us. Take us one by one, and we become prey to wild animals and to each other.
Nature has brought us into the world naked and unarmed; we have not the teeth or the paws of lions or bears to make ourselves terrible; but by the two blessings of reason and union, we secure and defend ourselves against violence and fortune. This it is that makes man the master of all other creatures, who otherwise were scarce a match for the weakest of them. This it is that comforts us in sickness, in age, in misery, in pains, and in the worst of calamities. Take away this combination, and mankind is dissociated, and falls to pieces. It is true, that there is no law established against this abominable vice; but we cannot say yet that it escapes unpunished, for a public hatred is certainly the greatest of all penalties; over and above that we lose the most valuable blessings of life, in the not bestowing and receiving of benefits. If ingratitude were to be punished by a law, it would discredit the obligation; for a benefit to be given, not lent: and if we have no return at all, there is no just cause of complaint: for gratitude were no virtue, if there were any danger in being ungrateful. There are halters, I know, hooks and gibbets, provided for homicide poison, sacrilege, and rebellion; but ingratitude (here upon earth) is only punished in the schools; all farther pains and inflictions being wholly remitted to divine justice. And, if a man may judge of the conscience by the countenance the ungrateful man is never without a canker at his heart; his mind an aspect is sad and solicitous; whereas the other is always cheerful and serene.
Nature brought us into the world naked and unarmed. We do not have the teeth or the claws of lions or bears to make ourselves feared. But through two blessings, reason and union, we secure and defend ourselves against violence and fortune. This is what makes man the master of all other creatures, when otherwise he would scarcely be a match for the weakest of them. This is what comforts us in sickness, in old age, in misery, in pain, and in the worst of calamities. Take away this bond, and mankind comes apart and falls to pieces. It is true that no law has been made against this hateful vice. Yet we cannot say it goes unpunished, for public hatred is certainly the greatest of all penalties. On top of that, we lose the most valuable blessings of life when benefits are neither given nor received. If ingratitude were punished by law, it would discredit the obligation, for a benefit is to be given, not lent. If we get no return at all, we have no just cause to complain. Gratitude would be no virtue if there were any danger in being ungrateful. There are nooses, I know, and hooks and gallows, provided for murder, poisoning, sacrilege, and rebellion. But ingratitude, here on earth, is punished only in the schools of philosophy. All further pains and punishments are left entirely to divine justice. And if a man may judge the conscience by the face, the ungrateful man always has a canker eating at his heart. His bearing and his look are sad and anxious, while the other is always cheerful and calm.
As there are no laws extant against ingratitude, so is it utterly impossible to contrive any, that in all circumstances shall reach it. If it were actionable, there would not be courts enough in the whole world to try the causes in. There can be no setting a day for the requiting of benefits as for the payment of money, nor any estimate upon the benefits themselves; but the whole matter rests in the conscience of both parties: and then there are so many degrees of it, that the same rule will never serve all. Beside that, to proportion it as the benefit is greater or less, will be both impracticable and without reason. One good turn saves my life; another, my freedom, or peradventure my very soul. How shall any law now suit a punishment to an ingratitude under these differing degrees? It must not be said in benefits as in bonds, Pay what you owe. How shall a man pay life, health, credit, security, in kind? There can be no set rule to bound that infinite variety of cases, which are more properly the subject of humanity and religion than of law and public justice. There would be disputes also about the benefit itself, which must totally depend upon the courtesy of the judge; for no law imaginable can set it forth. One man gives me an estate; another only lends me a sword, and that sword preserves my life. Nay, the very same thing, several ways done, changes the quality of the obligation. A word, a tone, a look, makes a great alteration in the case. How shall we judge then, and determine a matter which does not depend upon the fact itself, but upon the force and intention of it? Some things are reputed benefits, not for their value, but because we desire them: and there are offices of as much greater value, that we do not reckon upon at all. If ingratitude were liable to a law, we must never give but before witnesses, which would overthrow the dignity of the benefit: and then the punishment must either be equal where the crimes are unequal, or else it must be unrighteous, so that blood must answer for blood. He that is ungrateful for my saving his life must forfeit his own. And what can be more inhuman than that benefits should conclude in sanguinary events? A man saves my life, and I am ungrateful for it. Shall I be punished in my purse? that is too little; if it be less than the benefit, it is unjust, and it must be capital to be made equal to it. There are, moreover, certain privileges granted to parents, that can never be reduced to a common rule. Their injuries may be cognizable, but not their benefits. The diversity of cases is too large and intricate to be brought within the prospect of a law: so that it is much more equitable to punish none than to punish all alike. What if a man follows a good office with an injury; whether or no shall this quit scores? or who shall compare them, and weigh the one against the other? There is another thing yet which perhaps we do not dream of: not one man upon the face of the earth would escape, and yet every man would expect to be his judge. Once again, we are all of us ungrateful; and the number does not only take away the shame, but gives authority and protection to the wickedness.
There are no laws against ingratitude, and it would be impossible to create any that could cover all situations. If ingratitude were a crime, there wouldn't be enough courts in the world to handle all the cases. You can't set a deadline for repaying kindness like you can for paying back money. There's no way to put a price on the favors themselves. The whole matter depends on the conscience of both people involved. There are so many different degrees of ingratitude that no single rule could work for everyone. Besides, trying to match the punishment to how big or small the favor was would be both impossible and unreasonable. One good deed saves my life. Another saves my freedom, or maybe even my soul. How could any law create a punishment that fits ingratitude under such different circumstances? You can't say about favors what you say about debts: "Pay what you owe." How can someone repay life, health, reputation, or safety in the same form they received it? There's no fixed rule that could cover the endless variety of cases. These matters belong more to humanity and religion than to law and public justice. There would also be arguments about the favor itself, which would depend entirely on the judge's opinion. No law could possibly define it. One person gives me an estate. Another only lends me a sword, and that sword saves my life. The very same thing, done in different ways, changes what we owe in return. A word, a tone, a look makes a huge difference in the situation. How can we judge and decide a matter that doesn't depend on the action itself, but on its force and intention? Some things are considered favors not because of their value, but because we want them. There are other acts of much greater value that we don't count at all. If ingratitude were against the law, we could never give anything without witnesses. This would destroy the dignity of giving. Then the punishment would either be the same where the crimes are different, or it would be unfair. Blood would have to answer for blood. Someone who is ungrateful for having their life saved would have to forfeit their own life. What could be more inhuman than having acts of kindness end in bloodshed? A person saves my life, and I'm ungrateful for it. Should I be punished with a fine? That's too little. If it's less than the benefit, it's unjust. It would have to be a death sentence to equal the favor. There are also certain privileges given to parents that can never be reduced to a common rule. Their injuries might be recognized by law, but not their benefits. The variety of cases is too vast and complicated to be covered by any law. So it's much fairer to punish no one than to punish everyone the same way. What if someone follows a good deed with an injury? Does this make them even? Who would compare them and weigh one against the other? There's another thing we might not think of: not one person on earth would escape punishment, yet everyone would expect to be the judge. Once again, we are all ungrateful. The sheer number of us doesn't just remove the shame, but gives authority and protection to this wickedness.
It is thought reasonable by some, that there should be a law against ingratitude; for, say they, it is common for one city to upbraid another, and to claim that of posterity which was bestowed upon their ancestors; but this is only clamor without reason. It is objected by others, as a discouragement to good offices, if men shall not be made answerable for them; but I say, on the other side, that no man would accept of a benefit upon those terms. He that gives is prompted to it by a goodness of mind, and the generosity of the action is lessened by the caution: for it is his desire that the receiver should please himself, and owe no more than he thinks fit. But what if this might occasion fewer benefits, so long as they would be franker? nor is there any hurt in putting a check upon rashness and profusion. In answer to this; men will be careful enough when they oblige without a law: nor is it possible for a judge ever to set us right in it; or indeed, anything else, but the faith of the receiver. The honor of a benefit is this way preserved, which is otherwise profaned, when it comes to the mercenary, and made matter of contention. We are even forward enough of ourselves to wrangle, without necessary provocations. It would be well, I think, if moneys might pass upon the same conditions with other benefits, and the payment remitted to the conscience, without formalizing upon bills and securities: but human wisdom has rather advised with convenience than virtue; and chosen rather to force honesty than expect it. For every paltry sum of money there must be bonds, witnesses, counterparts, powers, etc., which is no other than a shameful confession of fraud and wickedness, when more credit is given to our seals than to our minds; and caution taken lest he that has received the money should deny it. Were it not better now to be deceived by some than to suspect all? what is the difference, at this rate, betwixt the benefactor and the usurer, save only that in the benefactor’s case there is nobody stands bound?
Some people think there should be a law against ingratitude. They argue that cities often criticize each other and demand recognition from future generations for what was given to their ancestors. But this is just empty complaining without reason. Others object that without such laws, people will be discouraged from doing good deeds since no one can be held accountable for them. I disagree. No one would accept a favor under those conditions. When someone gives, they're motivated by goodness of heart. Making it a legal obligation lessens the generosity of the act. The giver wants the receiver to be pleased and to owe only what they think is fair. What if this led to fewer benefits, as long as they were more genuine? There's no harm in checking reckless and wasteful giving. People will be careful enough when they help others without needing a law. No judge could ever sort this out properly. Only the receiver's good faith can do that. This preserves the honor of giving, which gets corrupted when it becomes mercenary and turns into a legal battle. We're already eager enough to argue without adding unnecessary reasons. I think it would be good if money could be handled the same way as other favors. Payment should be left to conscience without formal bills and contracts. But human wisdom has chosen convenience over virtue. We'd rather force honesty than expect it. For every small sum of money, there must be bonds, witnesses, copies, legal documents, and so on. This is nothing but a shameful admission of fraud and wickedness. We trust our seals more than our minds. We take precautions in case the person who received the money denies it. Wouldn't it be better to be deceived by some people than to suspect everyone? At this rate, what's the difference between someone doing a favor and a moneylender, except that with favors no one is legally bound?