It is, perhaps, one of the most pernicious errors of a rash and inconsiderate life, the common ignorance of the world in the matter of exchanging benefits. And this arises from a mistake, partly in the person that we would oblige, and partly in the thing itself. To begin with the latter: “A benefit is a good office, done with intention and judgment;” that is to say, with a due regard to all the circumstances of what, how, why, when, where, to whom, how much, and the like; or otherwise: “It is a voluntary and benevolent action that delights the giver in the comfort it brings to the receiver.” It will be hard to draw this subject, either into method or compass: the one, because of the infinite variety and complication of cases; the other, by reason of the large extent of it: for the whole business (almost) of mankind in society falls under this head; the duties of kings and subjects, husbands and wives, parents and children, masters and servants, natives and strangers, high and low, rich and poor, strong and weak, friends and enemies. The very meditation of it breeds good blood and generous thoughts; and instructs us in honor, humanity, friendship, piety, gratitude, prudence, and justice. In short, the art and skill of conferring benefits is, of all human duties, the most absolutely necessary to the well-being, both of reasonable nature, and of every individual; as the very cement of all communities, and the blessing of particulars. He that does good to another man does good also to himself; not only in the consequence, but in the very act of doing it; for the conscience of well-doing is an ample reward.
It is perhaps one of the most harmful errors of a rash and thoughtless life: the common ignorance of the world about exchanging benefits. This comes from a mistake, partly about the person we would oblige, and partly about the thing itself. To begin with the latter: “A benefit is a kind service, done with intention and judgment.” That is, it is done with due regard to all the circumstances: what, how, why, when, where, to whom, how much, and the like. Or, put another way: “It is a voluntary and kindly action that delights the giver in the comfort it brings to the receiver.” It will be hard to bring this subject into either order or bounds. Order is hard because of the endless variety and complexity of cases. Bounds are hard because of its great extent. For (almost) the whole business of mankind in society falls under this head. It covers the duties of kings and subjects, husbands and wives, parents and children, masters and servants, natives and strangers, high and low, rich and poor, strong and weak, friends and enemies. The very thought of it breeds good feeling and generous thoughts. It instructs us in honor, humanity, friendship, piety, gratitude, prudence, and justice. In short, of all human duties, the art and skill of conferring benefits is the most absolutely necessary to the well-being of both rational nature and every individual. It is the very cement of all communities and the blessing of each person. He who does good to another man does good to himself too. This is so not only in the consequences, but in the very act of doing it. For the consciousness of doing well is an ample reward.
Of benefits in general, there are several sorts; as necessary, profitable, and delightful. Some things there are, without which we cannot live; others without which we ought not to live; and some, again, without which we will not live. In the first rank are those which deliver us from capital dangers, or apprehensions of death: and the favor is rated according to the hazard; for the greater the extremity, the greater seems the obligation. The next is a case wherein we may indeed live, but we had better die; as in the question of liberty, modesty, and a good conscience. In the third place, follow those things which custom, use, affinity, and acquaintance, have made dear to us; as husbands, wives, children, friends, etc., which an honest man will preserve at his utmost peril. Of things profitable there is a large field, as money, honor, etc., to which might be added, matters of superfluity and pleasure. But we shall open a way to the circumstances of a benefit by some previous and more general deliberations upon the thing itself.
There are several sorts of benefits in general: necessary, profitable, and delightful. There are some things without which we cannot live. There are others without which we ought not to live. And there are some, again, without which we will not live. In the first rank are those that deliver us from mortal dangers or the fear of death. The favor is rated according to the danger: the greater the extremity, the greater the obligation seems. The next is a case in which we may indeed live, but had better die. Such are questions of liberty, chastity, and a good conscience. In the third place come those things that custom, use, relation by marriage, and acquaintance have made dear to us. Such are husbands, wives, children, friends, and so on, which an honest man will preserve at his utmost peril. Of profitable things there is a large field, such as money, honor, and so on. To these might be added things of luxury and pleasure. But we shall open the way to the circumstances of a benefit by first considering the thing itself in a more general way.