On Tyranny

Sect. 199. AS usurpation is the exercise of power, which another hath a right to; so tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right, which no body can have a right to. And this is making use of the power any one has in his hands, not for the good of those who are under it, but for his own private separate advantage. When the governor, however intitled, makes not the law, but his will, the rule; and his commands and actions are not directed to the preservation of the properties of his people, but the satisfaction of his own ambition, revenge, covetousness, or any other irregular passion.

199. As usurpation is the exercise of power that belongs to someone else, tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right. Nobody can have a right to such power. Tyranny is using power someone holds not for the good of those under it, but for the ruler's private advantage. When a governor, however entitled, makes his will the rule instead of the law, he is tyrannical. His commands and actions are not aimed at preserving his people's property. They aim to satisfy his own ambition, revenge, greed, or other irregular passions.

Sect. 200. If one can doubt this to be truth, or reason, because it comes from the obscure hand of a subject, I hope the authority of a king will make it pass with him. King James the first, in his speech to the parliament, 1603, tells them thus,

200. If anyone doubts that this is true or reasonable because it comes from the obscure hand of a subject, I hope the authority of a king will make him accept it. King James the First, in his speech to Parliament in 1603, tells them this:

And again, in his speech to the parliament, 1609, he hath these words:

Again, in his speech to Parliament in 1609, he said:

And a little after,

Shortly after,

Thus that learned king, who well understood the notion of things, makes the difference betwixt a king and a tyrant to consist only in this, that one makes the laws the bounds of his power, and the good of the public, the end of his government; the other makes all give way to his own will and appetite.

That learned king, who understood the nature of things well, says the difference between a king and a tyrant is this. A king sets the laws as the limits of his power. He makes the public good the purpose of his government. A tyrant makes everything give way to his own will and appetite.

Sect. 201. It is a mistake, to think this fault is proper only to monarchies; other forms of government are liable to it, as well as that: for wherever the power, that is put in any hands for the government of the people, and the preservation of their properties, is applied to other ends, and made use of to impoverish, harass, or subdue them to the arbitrary and irregular commands of those that have it; there it presently becomes tyranny, whether those that thus use it are one or many. Thus we read of the thirty tyrants at Athens, as well as one at Syracuse; and the intolerable dominion of the Decemviri at Rome was nothing better.

201. It is wrong to think this fault belongs only to monarchies. Other forms of government are liable to it too. Wherever power is placed in any hands to govern the people and protect their property, it should not be used for other ends. If it is used for other ends, it becomes tyranny. When that power is used to impoverish, harass, or force people to obey arbitrary and irregular commands, it is tyranny. This is true whether one person or many use the power. For example, we read of the Thirty Tyrants at Athens, as well as of a single tyrant at Syracuse. The intolerable rule of the Decemviri at Rome was no better.

Sect. 202. Where-ever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be transgressed to another’s harm; and whosoever in authority exceeds the power given him by the law, and makes use of the force he has under his command, to compass that upon the subject, which the law allows not, ceases in that to be a magistrate; and, acting without authority, may be opposed, as any other man, who by force invades the right of another. This is acknowledged in subordinate magistrates. He that hath authority to seize my person in the street, may be opposed as a thief and a robber, if he endeavours to break into my house to execute a writ, notwithstanding that I know he has such a warrant, and such a legal authority, as will impower him to arrest me abroad. And why this should not hold in the highest, as well as in the most inferior magistrate, I would gladly be informed. Is it reasonable, that the eldest brother, because he has the greatest part of his father’s estate, should thereby have a right to take away any of his younger brothers portions? or that a rich man, who possessed a whole country, should from thence have a right to seize, when he pleased, the cottage and garden of his poor neighbour? The being rightfully possessed of great power and riches, exceedingly beyond the greatest part of the sons of Adam, is so far from being an excuse, much less a reason, for rapine and oppression, which the endamaging another without authority is, that it is a great aggravation of it: for the exceeding the bounds of authority is no more a right in a great, than in a petty officer; no more justifiable in a king than a constable; but is so much the worse in him, in that he has more trust put in him, has already a much greater share than the rest of his brethren, and is supposed, from the advantages of his education, employment, and counsellors, to be more knowing in the measures of right and wrong.

202. Wherever law ends, tyranny begins. This happens when the law is broken in a way that harms someone. Anyone in authority who goes beyond the power the law gives them and uses the force under their command to do what the law does not allow stops being a magistrate in that act. Acting without authority, they may be resisted like any other person who uses force to invade another's rights. This is recognized for lower magistrates. A person who has the power to seize me in the street may be opposed as a thief and a robber. This applies if he tries to break into my house to execute a writ. This is true even if I know he has a warrant and legal authority to arrest me in public. I would like to know why this should not apply to the highest magistrate as well as to the lowest. Should an eldest brother, because he inherited most of the estate, be allowed to seize any of his younger brothers' shares? Or should a rich man who owns a whole country have that right? Could he seize his poor neighbor's cottage and garden at will? Being lawfully in possession of great power and wealth, far beyond most people, is no excuse. It is certainly not a reason for robbery or oppression. Harming another without authority is such wrongdoing, and great power only makes it worse. Exceeding the bounds of authority is no more a right for a great officer than for a petty one. It is no more justifiable in a king than in a constable. It is worse in a great man because more trust is placed in him. He already has a much larger share than his fellow citizens. He is expected, by his education, role, and advisers, to know better what is right and what is wrong.

Sect. 203. May the commands then of a prince be opposed? may he be resisted as often as any one shall find himself aggrieved, and but imagine he has not right done him? This will unhinge and overturn all polities, and, instead of government and order, leave nothing but anarchy and confusion.

203. Can a prince's orders be opposed? Can he be resisted whenever someone feels wronged and merely believes he has not been treated rightly? That would unhinge and overturn all political systems. Instead of government and order, it would leave only anarchy and confusion.

Sect. 204. To this I answer, that force is to be opposed to nothing, but to unjust and unlawful force; whoever makes any opposition in any other case, draws on himself a just condemnation both from God and man; and so no such danger or confusion will follow, as is often suggested: for,

204. I answer that force should be used only against unjust or unlawful force. Anyone who opposes force in any other case brings just condemnation from God and from people. So no such danger or confusion will follow, as is often suggested, for,

Sect. 205. First, As, in some countries, the person of the prince by the law is sacred; and so, whatever he commands or does, his person is still free from all question or violence, not liable to force, or any judicial censure or condemnation. But yet opposition may be made to the illegal acts of any inferior officer, or other commissioned by him; unless he will, by actually putting himself into a state of war with his people, dissolve the government, and leave them to that defence which belongs to every one in the state of nature: for of such things who can tell what the end will be? and a neighbour kingdom has shewed the world an odd example. In all other cases the sacredness of the person exempts him from all inconveniencies, whereby he is secure, whilst the government stands, from all violence and harm whatsoever; than which there cannot be a wiser constitution: for the harm he can do in his own person not being likely to happen often, nor to extend itself far; nor being able by his single strength to subvert the laws, nor oppress the body of the people, should any prince have so much weakness, and ill nature as to be willing to do it, the inconveniency of some particular mischiefs, that may happen sometimes, when a heady prince comes to the throne, are well recompensed by the peace of the public, and security of the government, in the person of the chief magistrate, thus set out of the reach of danger: it being safer for the body, that some few private men should be sometimes in danger to suffer, than that the head of the republic should be easily, and upon slight occasions, exposed.

205. First, in some countries the person of the prince is sacred by law. So whatever he commands or does, his person is still free from all question or violence, and not liable to force or any judicial censure or condemnation. Yet opposition may be made to the illegal acts of any inferior officer, or of anyone else commissioned by him. That is so unless the prince will dissolve the government by actually putting himself into a state of war with his people, and leave them to the defense that belongs to everyone in the state of nature. For of such things, who can tell what the end will be? And a neighboring kingdom has shown the world an odd example. In all other cases the sacredness of his person exempts him from all inconveniences. By this he is secure, while the government stands, from all violence and harm whatever. There cannot be a wiser constitution than this. For the harm he can do in his own person is not likely to happen often, nor to extend far. Nor can he, by his single strength, subvert the laws or oppress the body of the people, should any prince be weak and ill-natured enough to want to do it. Some particular mischiefs may sometimes happen when a headstrong prince comes to the throne. But that inconvenience is well repaid by the peace of the public and the security of the government, with the person of the chief magistrate thus set out of the reach of danger. For it is safer for the body that a few private men should sometimes be in danger of suffering, than that the head of the republic should be exposed easily and on slight occasions.

Sect. 206. Secondly, But this privilege, belonging only to the king’s person, hinders not, but they may be questioned, opposed, and resisted, who use unjust force, though they pretend a commission from him, which the law authorizes not; as is plain in the case of him that has the king’s writ to arrest a man, which is a full commission from the king; and yet he that has it cannot break open a man’s house to do it, nor execute this command of the king upon certain days, nor in certain places, though this commission have no such exception in it; but they are the limitations of the law, which if any one transgress, the king’s commission excuses him not: for the king’s authority being given him only by the law, he cannot impower any one to act against the law, or justify him, by his commission, in so doing; the commission, or command of any magistrate, where he has no authority, being as void and insignificant, as that of any private man; the difference between the one and the other, being that the magistrate has some authority so far, and to such ends, and the private man has none at all: for it is not the commission, but the authority, that gives the right of acting; and against the laws there can be no authority. But, notwithstanding such resistance, the king’s person and authority are still both secured, and so no danger to governor or government.

206. Secondly, this privilege belongs only to the king’s person. It does not prevent people from questioning, opposing, or resisting those who use unjust force. That applies even when those people claim they have a commission from the king. The law does not authorize such a commission. For example, someone may have the king’s writ to arrest a person. That writ is a commission from the king. Still, the holder may not break open a man’s house to make the arrest. He may not execute the king’s order on certain days or in certain places. This is so even if the commission mentions no such limits. These are legal limits. If anyone breaks them, the king’s commission does not excuse him. The king’s authority comes only from the law. He cannot empower someone to act against the law or justify such acts by his commission. A commission or order from a magistrate who has no authority is void. It is as meaningless as an order from a private person. The difference is that a magistrate has authority in some cases. A private person has none. It is the authority, not the commission, that gives the right to act. No authority exists against the laws. Even when people resist such unlawful force, the king’s person and authority remain protected. This resistance does not endanger the governor or the government.

Sect. 207. Thirdly, Supposing a government wherein the person of the chief magistrate is not thus sacred; yet this doctrine of the lawfulness of resisting all unlawful exercises of his power, will not upon every slight occasion indanger him, or imbroil the government: for where the injured party may be relieved, and his damages repaired by appeal to the law, there can be no pretence for force, which is only to be used where a man is intercepted from appealing to the law: for nothing is to be accounted hostile force, but where it leaves not the remedy of such an appeal; and it is such force alone, that puts him that uses it into a state of war, and makes it lawful to resist him. A man with a sword in his hand demands my purse in the high-way, when perhaps I have not twelve pence in my pocket: this man I may lawfully kill. To another I deliver 100 pounds to hold only whilst I alight, which he refuses to restore me, when I am got up again, but draws his sword to defend the possession of it by force, if I endeavour to retake it. The mischief this man does me is a hundred, or possibly a thousand times more than the other perhaps intended me (whom I killed before he really did me any); and yet I might lawfully kill the one, and cannot so much as hurt the other lawfully. The reason whereof is plain; because the one using force, which threatened my life, I could not have time to appeal to the law to secure it: and when it was gone, it was too late to appeal. The law could not restore life to my dead carcass: the loss was irreparable; which to prevent, the law of nature gave me a right to destroy him, who had put himself into a state of war with me, and threatened my destruction. But in the other case, my life not being in danger, I may have the benefit of appealing to the law, and have reparation for my 100 pounds that way.

207. Thirdly, suppose a government in which the person of the chief magistrate is not sacred in this way. Even so, this doctrine that it is lawful to resist all unlawful exercises of his power will not endanger him, or embroil the government, on every slight occasion. For where the injured party may be relieved, and his damages repaired, by appeal to the law, there can be no pretext for force. Force is only to be used where a man is prevented from appealing to the law. For nothing is to be counted hostile force unless it leaves no remedy by such an appeal. And it is such force alone that puts the one who uses it into a state of war, and makes it lawful to resist him. A man with a sword in his hand demands my purse on the highway, when perhaps I have not twelve pence in my pocket. This man I may lawfully kill. To another man I hand 100 pounds to hold only while I dismount. When I have got up again, he refuses to give it back, and draws his sword to defend his possession of it by force if I try to retake it. The mischief this man does me is a hundred, or possibly a thousand, times more than the other perhaps intended me. And I killed that other before he really did me any. Yet I might lawfully kill the one, and cannot lawfully so much as hurt the other. The reason for this is plain. The one used force that threatened my life, so I could not have time to appeal to the law to secure it. And once my life was gone, it was too late to appeal. The law could not restore life to my dead body. The loss was irreparable. To prevent it, the law of nature gave me a right to destroy him who had put himself into a state of war with me and threatened my destruction. But in the other case my life is not in danger. So I may have the benefit of appealing to the law, and get reparation for my 100 pounds that way.

Sect. 208. Fourthly, But if the unlawful acts done by the magistrate be maintained (by the power he has got), and the remedy which is due by law, be by the same power obstructed; yet the right of resisting, even in such manifest acts of tyranny, will not suddenly, or on slight occasions, disturb the government: for if it reach no farther than some private men’s cases, though they have a right to defend themselves, and to recover by force what by unlawful force is taken from them; yet the right to do so will not easily engage them in a contest, wherein they are sure to perish; it being as impossible for one, or a few oppressed men to disturb the government, where the body of the people do not think themselves concerned in it, as for a raving mad-man, or heady malcontent to overturn a well settled state; the people being as little apt to follow the one, as the other.

208. Fourthly. Suppose the magistrate's unlawful acts are upheld by the power he has gained. Suppose legal remedies are blocked by that power. Even then, the right to resist still exists. Even in clear acts of tyranny, that right will not quickly or lightly disturb the government. If the abuse affects only a few private people, they do have the right to defend themselves. They may use force to recover what was taken unlawfully. But this right will not easily push them into a contest that will surely destroy them. It is as impossible for one or a few oppressed men to disturb the government when most people do not feel affected. It is as impossible for a raving madman or a hot-headed malcontent to overthrow a well-settled state. People are as unlikely to follow the one as the other.

Sect. 209. But if either these illegal acts have extended to the majority of the people; or if the mischief and oppression has lighted only on some few, but in such cases, as the precedent, and consequences seem to threaten all; and they are persuaded in their consciences, that their laws, and with them their estates, liberties, and lives are in danger, and perhaps their religion too; how they will be hindered from resisting illegal force, used against them, I cannot tell. This is an inconvenience, I confess, that attends all governments whatsoever, when the governors have brought it to this pass, to be generally suspected of their people; the most dangerous state which they can possibly put themselves in, wherein they are the less to be pitied, because it is so easy to be avoided; it being as impossible for a governor, if he really means the good of his people, and the preservation of them, and their laws together, not to make them see and feel it, as it is for the father of a family, not to let his children see he loves, and takes care of them.

209. But if these illegal acts have spread to most of the people, the situation changes. If the harm and oppression have fallen on only a few, but the precedent and consequences threaten everyone. The same rule applies. If people believe in conscience that their laws are in danger, they will think their property is at risk. They will also fear for their liberties and lives, and perhaps for their religion. In such cases, I cannot see what would stop them from resisting illegal force used against them. This is a problem, I admit, that affects every government when rulers have driven things so far. It happens when the people generally distrust their governors. It is the most dangerous situation rulers can create for themselves. They are less to be pitied because it is so easy to avoid. If a governor truly intends his people's good and the preservation of their laws, he cannot avoid showing it. It is as impossible as a father denying his children proof that he loves and cares for them.

Sect. 210. But if all the world shall observe pretences of one kind, and actions of another; arts used to elude the law, and the trust of prerogative (which is an arbitrary power in some things left in the prince’s hand to do good, not harm to the people) employed contrary to the end for which it was given: if the people shall find the ministers and subordinate magistrates chosen suitable to such ends, and favoured, or laid by, proportionably as they promote or oppose them: if they see several experiments made of arbitrary power, and that religion underhand favoured, (tho’ publicly proclaimed against) which is readiest to introduce it; and the operators in it supported, as much as may be; and when that cannot be done, yet approved still, and liked the better: if a long train of actions shew the councils all tending that way; how can a man any more hinder himself from being persuaded in his own mind, which way things are going; or from casting about how to save himself, than he could from believing the captain of the ship he was in, was carrying him, and the rest of the company, to Algiers, when he found him always steering that course, though cross winds, leaks in his ship, and want of men and provisions did often force him to turn his course another way for some time, which he steadily returned to again, as soon as the wind, weather, and other circumstances would let him?

210. But suppose all the world observes pretenses of one kind and actions of another. Suppose they see tricks used to evade the law, and the trust of prerogative used contrary to the end for which it was given. (Prerogative is an arbitrary power in some things, left in the prince's hand to do good, not harm, to the people.) Suppose the people find the ministers and subordinate magistrates chosen to suit such ends, and favored or set aside according to how they promote or oppose them. Suppose they see several experiments made with arbitrary power. Suppose they see that religion which is readiest to bring arbitrary power in secretly favored, though publicly proclaimed against, and those who work at it supported as much as possible. And when that cannot be done, suppose they see those workers still approved, and liked all the better. Suppose a long train of actions shows the councils all tending that way. Then how can a man any longer keep himself from being persuaded in his own mind which way things are going? How can he keep from looking about for a way to save himself? He could no more do so than he could keep from believing that the captain of the ship he was in was carrying him and the rest of the company to Algiers. He would find the captain always steering that course. Cross winds, leaks in his ship, and lack of men and provisions often forced the captain to turn another way for a while. But he steadily returned to that course as soon as the wind, weather, and other circumstances would let him.