The State of Nature

Sect. 4. TO understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.

4. To understand political power correctly and trace it to its origin, we must ask what state people are naturally in. That state is one of perfect freedom. People can direct their actions and use their property and bodies as they think best. This freedom is limited only by the law of nature. They do not need to ask permission or depend on the will of any other person.

A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.

A state of equality, where all power and jurisdiction are reciprocal. No one has more than another. It is clear that creatures of the same species and rank are born with the same natural advantages and use the same faculties. They should be equal to one another without subordination or subjection. This equality is broken only if the lord and master of them all clearly declares otherwise. If he does, and appoints someone plainly, that person gains an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.

Sect. 5. This equality of men by nature, the judicious Hooker looks upon as so evident in itself, and beyond all question, that he makes it the foundation of that obligation to mutual love amongst men, on which he builds the duties they owe one another, and from whence he derives the great maxims of justice and charity. His words are,

5. The judicious Hooker regards this natural equality of men as so clear and beyond question. He makes it the foundation for the obligation of mutual love among people. From that he builds the duties they owe one another and derives the great maxims of justice and charity. His words are,

Sect. 6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence: though man in that state have an uncontroulable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about his business; they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another’s pleasure: and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us, that may authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another’s uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for our’s. Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.

6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of license. A person in that state has an uncontrolled liberty to dispose of his body or possessions. He does not have liberty to destroy himself. He may not destroy any creature in his possession unless a higher use than mere preservation requires it. The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, and that law binds everyone. Reason is that law. It teaches everyone who consults it that we are all equal and independent. No one should harm another in life, health, liberty, or possessions. Men are all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker. They are all servants of one sovereign Master, sent into the world by his order and about his business. They belong to their Maker, who made them to last during his pleasure, not one another’s. Because we have similar faculties and share a common nature, there can be no subordination among us that authorizes destroying one another as if we were made for each other’s use. The lower ranks of creatures are for our use. Every one is bound to preserve himself and not to abandon his station willfully. By the same reason, when his own preservation does not conflict, he ought, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind. He may not, unless it is to bring an offender to justice, take away or harm another person’s life. He may not damage anything that helps preserve that life. This includes liberty, health, limbs, and possessions.

Sect. 7. And that all men may be restrained from invading others rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be observed, which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law of nature is, in that state, put into every man’s hands, whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree, as may hinder its violation: for the law of nature would, as all other laws that concern men in this world be in vain, if there were no body that in the state of nature had a power to execute that law, and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders. And if any one in the state of nature may punish another for any evil he has done, every one may do so: for in that state of perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another, what any may do in prosecution of that law, every one must needs have a right to do.

7. To keep people from violating others' rights and from harming one another, the law of nature must be enforced. That law requires the peace and preservation of all humanity. In the state of nature, the power to enforce the law of nature is placed in each person's hands. Everyone therefore has the right to punish those who break that law, to the extent needed to stop the violation. The law of nature is like any law that concerns people. It would be useless if no one in the state of nature had the power to enforce it. Without enforcement, the innocent could not be protected and offenders could not be restrained. If any person in the state of nature may punish another for a wrong they have committed, then everyone may do the same. In that state of perfect equality there is naturally no superiority or authority of one person over another. Therefore, whatever one person may do to enforce that law, everyone must have the same right to do so.

Sect. 8. And thus, in the state of nature, one man comes by a power over another; but yet no absolute or arbitrary power, to use a criminal, when he has got him in his hands, according to the passionate heats, or boundless extravagancy of his own will; but only to retribute to him, so far as calm reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint: for these two are the only reasons, why one man may lawfully do harm to another, which is that we call punishment. In transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common equity, which is that measure God has set to the actions of men, for their mutual security; and so he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tye, which is to secure them from injury and violence, being slighted and broken by him. Which being a trespass against the whole species, and the peace and safety of it, provided for by the law of nature, every man upon this score, by the right he hath to preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is necessary, destroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on any one, who hath transgressed that law, as may make him repent the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and by his example others, from doing the like mischief. And in the case, and upon this ground, EVERY MAN HATH A RIGHT TO PUNISH THE OFFENDER, AND BE EXECUTIONER OF THE LAW OF NATURE.

8. In the state of nature, one person gains power over another. This power is not absolute or arbitrary. It does not allow a person to treat a criminal according to his passions or whims. Instead, it allows only what calm reason and conscience require. The response must be proportionate to the offender's transgression. It should be enough to make reparation and to restrain further harm. Reparation and restraint are the only reasons one person may lawfully harm another. We call this punishment. When someone breaks the law of nature, he shows he lives by a different rule than reason and common fairness. That rule is the measure God has set for human actions to secure people from injury. The offender therefore becomes dangerous to mankind, because he has slighted and broken the bond that keeps people safe from injury and violence. Such a trespass is against the whole human species and its peace and safety. So every person may, to preserve mankind, restrain or, when necessary, destroy what is harmful. They may bring on the wrongdoer such harm as will make him repent, and thereby deter him and, by his example, others from the same mischief. EVERY PERSON HAS A RIGHT TO PUNISH THE OFFENDER, AND TO BE THE EXECUTIONER OF THE LAW OF NATURE.

Sect. 9. I doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine to some men: but before they condemn it, I desire them to resolve me, by what right any prince or state can put to death, or punish an alien, for any crime he commits in their country. It is certain their laws, by virtue of any sanction they receive from the promulgated will of the legislative, reach not a stranger: they speak not to him, nor, if they did, is he bound to hearken to them. The legislative authority, by which they are in force over the subjects of that commonwealth, hath no power over him. Those who have the supreme power of making laws in England, France or Holland, are to an Indian, but like the rest of the world, men without authority: and therefore, if by the law of nature every man hath not a power to punish offences against it, as he soberly judges the case to require, I see not how the magistrates of any community can punish an alien of another country; since, in reference to him, they can have no more power than what every man naturally may have over another.

9. I do not doubt this will seem a strange doctrine to some men. But before they condemn it, I ask them to tell me by what right any prince or state can put to death, or punish, an alien for a crime he commits in their country. It is certain that their laws, even when backed by the declared will of the legislature, do not reach a stranger. The laws do not speak to him. Even if they did, he is not bound to obey them. The legislative authority that makes laws for the subjects of a commonwealth has no power over him. To an Indian, those who have the supreme power of making laws in England, France, or Holland are, like the rest of the world, people without authority. Therefore, if the law of nature does not give every man the power to punish offences against it, as he soberly judges the case to require, I cannot see how the magistrates of any community can punish an alien from another country. In relation to that alien, they have no more power than any individual naturally has over another.

Sect. 10. Besides the crime which consists in violating the law, and varying from the right rule of reason, whereby a man so far becomes degenerate, and declares himself to quit the principles of human nature, and to be a noxious creature, there is commonly injury done to some person or other, and some other man receives damage by his transgression: in which case he who hath received any damage, has, besides the right of punishment common to him with other men, a particular right to seek reparation from him that has done it: and any other person, who finds it just, may also join with him that is injured, and assist him in recovering from the offender so much as may make satisfaction for the harm he has suffered.

10. There is the crime of breaking the law and departing from right reason. Such behavior makes a person degenerate and shows he has abandoned the principles of human nature. He becomes a harmful creature. That crime usually harms some other person. When someone is harmed, he has a special right to seek compensation from the wrongdoer. This is in addition to the common right of punishment that all people share. Any other person who thinks it right may join the injured person. He may help him recover from the offender whatever will make satisfaction for the harm he suffered.

Sect. 11. From these two distinct rights, the one of punishing the crime for restraint, and preventing the like offence, which right of punishing is in every body; the other of taking reparation, which belongs only to the injured party, comes it to pass that the magistrate, who by being magistrate hath the common right of punishing put into his hands, can often, where the public good demands not the execution of the law, remit the punishment of criminal offences by his own authority, but yet cannot remit the satisfaction due to any private man for the damage he has received. That, he who has suffered the damage has a right to demand in his own name, and he alone can remit: the damnified person has this power of appropriating to himself the goods or service of the offender, by right of self-preservation, as every man has a power to punish the crime, to prevent its being committed again, by the right he has of preserving all mankind, and doing all reasonable things he can in order to that end: and thus it is, that every man, in the state of nature, has a power to kill a murderer, both to deter others from doing the like injury, which no reparation can compensate, by the example of the punishment that attends it from every body, and also to secure men from the attempts of a criminal, who having renounced reason, the common rule and measure God hath given to mankind, hath, by the unjust violence and slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war against all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tyger, one of those wild savage beasts, with whom men can have no society nor security: and upon this is grounded that great law of nature, Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed. And Cain was so fully convinced, that every one had a right to destroy such a criminal, that after the murder of his brother, he cries out, Every one that findeth me, shall slay me; so plain was it writ in the hearts of all mankind.

11. From these two distinct rights comes the following. One right is to punish a crime to restrain the offender and prevent the same offense. That right to punish belongs to everyone. The other right is to seek reparation, and that belongs only to the injured person. Because of this, the magistrate, who by his office holds the common right to punish, can often, when the public good does not require enforcing the law, remit the punishment for criminal offences by his own authority. He cannot, however, remit the satisfaction due to a private person for the damage he has suffered. The person who has suffered the damage has the right to demand compensation in his own name, and he alone can forgive it. The injured person may appropriate the offender’s goods or services to himself as a means of self-preservation. Every person has a power to punish a crime to prevent it from happening again. This power comes from the right to preserve all mankind and to do all reasonable things toward that end. Thus every man in the state of nature has the power to kill a murderer. This power serves to deter others from committing the same injury, which no reparation can make up for. It also serves to protect people from further attempts by a criminal. A criminal who has renounced reason, the common rule and measure God has given to mankind, and who by unjust violence and slaughter has attacked one person, has declared war against all mankind. Such a person may be destroyed like a lion or a tiger, one of those wild, savage beasts with whom men can have no society or security. On this is grounded that great law of nature, Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed. Cain was so fully convinced that everyone had a right to destroy such a criminal that, after murdering his brother, he cried out, Everyone that finds me shall kill me. So plainly was it written in the hearts of all mankind.

Sect. 12. By the same reason may a man in the state of nature punish the lesser breaches of that law. It will perhaps be demanded, with death? I answer, each transgression may be punished to that degree, and with so much severity, as will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender, give him cause to repent, and terrify others from doing the like. Every offence, that can be committed in the state of nature, may in the state of nature be also punished equally, and as far forth as it may, in a commonwealth: for though it would be besides my present purpose, to enter here into the particulars of the law of nature, or its measures of punishment; yet, it is certain there is such a law, and that too, as intelligible and plain to a rational creature, and a studier of that law, as the positive laws of commonwealths; nay, possibly plainer; as much as reason is easier to be understood, than the fancies and intricate contrivances of men, following contrary and hidden interests put into words; for so truly are a great part of the municipal laws of countries, which are only so far right, as they are founded on the law of nature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted.

12. By the same reasoning, a person in the state of nature may punish lesser breaches of that law. One might ask, "With death?" I answer. Each transgression may be punished to whatever degree and with whatever severity will make it a bad bargain for the offender. It should give him reason to repent. It should also deter others from doing the same. Any offense committed in the state of nature can be punished there as it would be in a commonwealth. I will not go into the details of the law of nature or its measures of punishment here. But it is certain that such a law exists. It is as plain and intelligible to a rational person who studies it as the positive laws of commonwealths are. It may even be clearer. Reason is easier to understand than the fancies and complex schemes of people who pursue hidden and conflicting interests. This is true of many municipal laws. Those laws are only correct insofar as they are founded on the law of nature, and they must be regulated and interpreted by it.

Sect. 13. To this strange doctrine, viz. That in the state of nature every one has the executive power of the law of nature, I doubt not but it will be objected, that it is unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases, that self-love will make men partial to themselves and their friends: and on the other side, that ill nature, passion and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others; and hence nothing but confusion and disorder will follow, and that therefore God hath certainly appointed government to restrain the partiality and violence of men. I easily grant, that civil government is the proper remedy for the inconveniencies of the state of nature, which must certainly be great, where men may be judges in their own case, since it is easy to be imagined, that he who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury, will scarce be so just as to condemn himself for it: but I shall desire those who make this objection, to remember, that absolute monarchs are but men; and if government is to be the remedy of those evils, which necessarily follow from men’s being judges in their own cases, and the state of nature is therefore not to be endured, I desire to know what kind of government that is, and how much better it is than the state of nature, where one man, commanding a multitude, has the liberty to be judge in his own case, and may do to all his subjects whatever he pleases, without the least liberty to any one to question or controul those who execute his pleasure? and in whatsoever he doth, whether led by reason, mistake or passion, must be submitted to? much better it is in the state of nature, wherein men are not bound to submit to the unjust will of another: and if he that judges, judges amiss in his own, or any other case, he is answerable for it to the rest of mankind.

13. To this strange doctrine, that in the state of nature everyone has the executive power of the law of nature, I expect an obvious objection. People will say it is unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases. Self-love will make them partial to themselves and their friends. On the other hand, they will say, ill will, passion, and revenge will carry men too far in punishing others. From that, they argue, nothing but confusion and disorder will follow. Therefore God must have appointed government to restrain men’s partiality and violence. I readily grant that civil government is the proper remedy for the inconveniences of the state of nature. Those inconveniences must be great where men may be judges in their own cases. It is easy to imagine that someone unjust enough to injure his neighbor will hardly be just enough to condemn himself for it. But I ask those who raise this objection to remember that absolute monarchs are but men. If government is to cure the evils that necessarily follow from men judging their own cases, and if the state of nature is therefore intolerable, I want to know what kind of government that is, in which one man, commanding a multitude, has the liberty to be judge in his own case. How much better is it than the state of nature? In such a government he may do to all his subjects whatever he pleases. No one then has any liberty to question or check those who carry out his will. Whatever he does, whether guided by reason, mistake, or passion, must be submitted to. The state of nature is much better, because men are not bound to submit to another’s unjust will. And if a person who judges is wrong in his own case, or in any other, he is answerable for it to the rest of mankind.

Sect. 14. It is often asked as a mighty objection, where are, or ever were there any men in such a state of nature? To which it may suffice as an answer at present, that since all princes and rulers of independent governments all through the world, are in a state of nature, it is plain the world never was, nor ever will be, without numbers of men in that state. I have named all governors of independent communities, whether they are, or are not, in league with others: for it is not every compact that puts an end to the state of nature between men, but only this one of agreeing together mutually to enter into one community, and make one body politic; other promises, and compacts, men may make one with another, and yet still be in the state of nature. The promises and bargains for truck, &c. between the two men in the desert island, mentioned by Garcilasso de la Vega, in his history of Peru; or between a Swiss and an Indian, in the woods of America, are binding to them, though they are perfectly in a state of nature, in reference to one another: for truth and keeping of faith belongs to men, as men, and not as members of society.

14. It is often asked, as a mighty objection, where are there, or where ever were there, any men in such a state of nature? For now it may be enough to answer this. All princes and rulers of independent governments throughout the world are in a state of nature. So it is plain the world never was, and never will be, without numbers of men in that state. I have named all governors of independent communities, whether or not they are in league with others. For not every compact puts an end to the state of nature between men. Only one does: agreeing together mutually to enter into one community and make one body politic. Men may make other promises and compacts with one another and still be in the state of nature. Consider the promises and bargains for barter, and so on, between the two men on the desert island, mentioned by Garcilasso de la Vega in his history of Peru. Or consider those between a Swiss and an Indian in the woods of America. These are binding on them, though they are perfectly in a state of nature with respect to one another. For truth and keeping faith belong to men as men, and not as members of society.

Sect. 15. To those that say, there were never any men in the state of nature, I will not only oppose the authority of the judicious Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sect. 10, where he says,

15. To those who say there were never any men in the state of nature, I will not only reply by appealing to the authority of the learned Hooker. See Ecclesiastical Polity, book I, section 10, where he says,

But I moreover affirm, that all men are naturally in that state, and remain so, till by their own consents they make themselves members of some politic society; and I doubt not in the sequel of this discourse, to make it very clear.

But I also assert that all people are naturally in that state. They remain in it until they, by their own consent, become members of some political society. I have no doubt I will make this very clear later in this discussion.