Preface

The present book embodies a study of some aspects of Western culture during the past three centuries, in so far as it has been influenced by the development of science. This study has been guided by the conviction that the mentality of an epoch springs from the view of the world which is, in fact, dominant in the educated sections of the communities in question. There may be more than one such scheme, corresponding to cultural divisions. The various human interests which suggest cosmologies, and also are influenced by them, are science, aesthetics, ethics, religion. In every age each of these topics suggests a view of the world. In so far as the same set of people are swayed by all, or more than one, of these interests, their effective outlook will be the joint production from these sources. But each age has it dominant preoccupation; and, during the three centuries in question, the cosmology derived from science has been asserting itself at the expense of older points of view with their origins elsewhere. Men can be provincial in time, as well as in place. We may ask ourselves whether the scientific mentality of the modern world in the immediate past is not a successful example of such provincial limitation.

This book studies some aspects of Western culture over the past three centuries, as influenced by the development of science. The study rests on a conviction about the mentality of an era. It arises from the view of the world that actually dominates among educated people in the communities concerned. There may be more than one such worldview, reflecting cultural divisions. Science, aesthetics, ethics, and religion are human interests that suggest cosmologies and are also influenced by them. In every age, each of these interests suggests a view of the world. When the same people are influenced by all or more than one, their outlook will be shaped by these interests together. But each age has its dominant concern. During the three centuries in question, the cosmology derived from science has been gaining ground. It has done so at the expense of older views that originated elsewhere. People can be limited by their own time as well as by their own place. We may ask whether the scientific mentality of the recent modern world is not a successful example of such narrowness.

Philosophy, in one of its functions, is the critic of cosmologies. It is its function to harmonise, refashion, and justify divergent intuitions as to the nature of things. It has to insist on the scrutiny of the ultimate ideas, and on the retention of the whole of the evidence in shaping our cosmological scheme. Its business is to render explicit, and—so far as may be—efficient, a process which otherwise is unconsciously performed without rational tests.

One role of philosophy is to examine cosmologies critically. Philosophy seeks to reconcile, reshape, and justify different intuitions about the nature of things. It must insist that we examine our most fundamental ideas and consider all the evidence when shaping our view of the universe. Its task is to make this process explicit and, as far as possible, effective. Otherwise, the process takes place unconsciously, without being tested by reason.

Bearing this in mind, I have avoided the introduction of a variety of abstruse detail respecting scientific advance. What is wanted, and what I have striven after, is a sympathetic study of main ideas as seen from the inside. If my view of the function of philosophy is correct, it is the most effective of all the intellectual pursuits. It builds cathedrals before the workmen have moved a stone, and it destroys them before the elements have worn down their arches. It is the architect of the buildings of the spirit, and it is also their solvent:—and the spiritual precedes the material. Philosophy works slowly. Thoughts lie dormant for ages; and then, almost suddenly as it were, mankind finds that they have embodied themselves in institutions.

Keeping this in mind, I have avoided going into a variety of difficult details about scientific progress. What is needed, and what I have tried to provide, is a sympathetic study of the main ideas from within. If my view of the role of philosophy is correct, it is the most effective of all intellectual pursuits. Philosophy builds cathedrals before the workers have moved a stone. It destroys them before the elements have worn down their arches. Philosophy is the architect of the buildings of the spirit, and it also dissolves them. And the spiritual comes before the material. Philosophy works slowly. Thoughts lie dormant for ages. Then, almost suddenly, humanity finds that those thoughts have taken shape in institutions.

This book in the main consists of a set of eight Lowell Lectures delivered in the February of 1925. These lectures with some slight expansion, and the subdivision of one lecture into Chapters VII and VIII, are here printed as delivered. But some additional matter has been added, so as to complete the thought of the book on a scale which could not be included within that lecture course. Of this new matter, the second chapter—‘Mathematics as an Element in the History of Thought’—was delivered as a lecture before the Mathematical Society of Brown University, Providence, R. I.; and the twelfth chapter—‘Religion and Science’—formed an address delivered in the Phillips Brooks House at Harvard, and is to be published in the August number of the Atlantic Monthly of this year (1925). The tenth and eleventh chapters—‘Abstraction’ and ‘God’—are additions which now appear for the first time. But the book represents one train of thought, and the antecedent utilisation of some of its contents is a subsidiary point.

This book consists mainly of eight Lowell Lectures delivered in February 1925. The lectures are printed here as delivered, with some slight expansion. One lecture has also been divided into Chapters VII and VIII. But I have added material to develop the book’s ideas more fully than the lecture course allowed. The second chapter, ‘Mathematics as an Element in the History of Thought’, was delivered as a lecture before the Mathematical Society of Brown University, Providence, R. I. The twelfth chapter, ‘Religion and Science’, was an address delivered at the Phillips Brooks House at Harvard. It will be published in the August issue of the Atlantic Monthly this year (1925). The tenth and eleventh chapters, ‘Abstraction’ and ‘God’, are additions appearing here for the first time. But the book presents a single train of thought. The earlier use of some of its contents is a secondary matter.

There has been no occasion in the text to make detailed reference to Lloyd Morgan’s Emergent Evolution or to Alexander’s Space, Time and Deity. It will be obvious to readers that I have found them very suggestive. I am especially indebted to Alexander’s great work. The wide scope of the present book makes it impossible to acknowledge in detail the various sources of information or of ideas. The book is the product of thought and reading in past years, which were not undertaken with any anticipation of utilisation for the present purpose. Accordingly it would now be impossible for me to give reference to my sources for details, even if it were desirable so to do. But there is no need: the facts which are relied upon are simple and well known. On the philosophical side, any consideration of epistemology has been entirely excluded. It would have been impossible to discuss that topic without upsetting the whole balance of the work. The key to the book is the sense of the overwhelming importance of a prevalent philosophy.

I have had no occasion in the text to discuss Lloyd Morgan’s Emergent Evolution or Alexander’s Space, Time and Deity in detail. Readers will see that I have found both works very suggestive. I am especially indebted to Alexander’s great work. The wide scope of this book makes it impossible to acknowledge every source of information or ideas in detail. The book is the product of years of thought and reading. I did not undertake that work expecting to use it for this purpose. So even if it were desirable to cite my sources for details, I could no longer do so. But there is no need: the facts I rely on are simple and well known. On the philosophical side, I have left out any discussion of epistemology. I could not have discussed that subject without upsetting the balance of the whole work. The key to the book is a sense of the overwhelming importance of a prevalent philosophy.

My most grateful thanks are due to my colleague Mr. Raphael Demos for reading the proofs and for the suggestion of many improvements in expression.

I am deeply grateful to my colleague Mr. Raphael Demos for reading the proofs and suggesting many improvements to the wording.