God

Aristotle found it necessary to complete his metaphysics by the introduction of a Prime Mover—God. This, for two reasons, is an important fact in the history of metaphysics. In the first place if we are to accord to anyone the position of the greatest metaphysician, having regard to genius of insight, to general equipment in knowledge, and to the stimulus of his metaphysical ancestry, we must choose Aristotle. Secondly, in his consideration of this metaphysical question he was entirely dispassionate; and he is the last European metaphysician of first rate importance for whom this claim can be made. After Aristotle, ethical and religious interests began to influence metaphysical conclusions. The Jews dispersed, first willingly and then forcibly, and the Judaic-Alexandrian school arose. Then Christianity closely followed by Mahometanism, intervened. The Greek gods who surrounded Aristotle were subordinate metaphysical entities, well within nature. Accordingly on the subject of his Prime Mover, he would have no motive, except to follow his metaphysical train of thought whithersoever it led him. It did not lead him very far towards the production of a God available for religious purposes. It may be doubted whether any properly general metaphysics can ever, without the illicit introduction of other considerations, get much further than Aristotle. But his conclusion does represent a first step without which no evidence on a narrower experiential basis can be of much avail in shaping the conception. For nothing, within any limited type of experience, can give intelligence to shape our ideas of any entity at the base of all actual things, unless the general character of things requires that there be such an entity.

Aristotle found it necessary to complete his metaphysics by introducing a Prime Mover, God. This is important in the history of metaphysics for two reasons. First, if we must choose the greatest metaphysician, we must choose Aristotle. We must consider his genius for insight, his broad knowledge, and the stimulation he received from earlier metaphysicians. Second, he considered this metaphysical question with complete detachment. He was the last European metaphysician of the first rank for whom this claim can be made. After Aristotle, ethical and religious interests began to influence metaphysical conclusions. The Jews dispersed, first willingly and then by force, and the Judaic-Alexandrian school arose. Then Christianity intervened, followed closely by Islam. The Greek gods who surrounded Aristotle were subordinate metaphysical beings, entirely within nature. So, in considering his Prime Mover, Aristotle had no reason to do anything but follow his metaphysical reasoning wherever it led. His reasoning did not take him very far toward a God suited to religious purposes. It is doubtful whether any properly general metaphysics can ever get much further than Aristotle without improperly introducing other considerations. But his conclusion does represent a first step. Without that step, evidence drawn from a narrower range of experience can do little to shape the concept of God. No limited kind of experience can help us form an intelligent idea of a being underlying all actual things. That is, it cannot do so unless the general character of things requires that such a being exist.

The phrase, Prime Mover, warns us that Aristotle’s thought was enmeshed in the details of an erroneous physics and an erroneous cosmology. In Aristotle’s physics special causes were required to sustain the motions of material things. These could easily be fitted into his system, provided that the general cosmic motions could be sustained. For then in relation to the general working system, each thing could be provided with its true end. Hence the necessity for a Prime Mover who sustains the motions of the spheres on which depend the adjustment of things. To-day we repudiate the Aristotelian physics and the Aristotelian cosmology, so that the exact form of the above argument manifestly fails. But if our general metaphysics is in any way similar to that outlined in the previous chapter, an analogous metaphysical problem arises which can be solved only in an analogous fashion. In the place of Aristotle’s God as Prime Mover, we require God as the Principle of Concretion. This position can be substantiated only by the discussion of the general implication of the course of actual occasions,—that is to say, of the process of realisation.

The phrase Prime Mover reminds us that Aristotle’s thought was tied to an incorrect physics and an incorrect cosmology. In Aristotle’s physics, special causes were needed to keep material things moving. These causes could easily fit into his system, provided that the general motions of the cosmos could be sustained. Within the system as a whole, each thing could then be given its true end. This made a Prime Mover necessary to sustain the motions of the spheres, on which the order of things depends. Today we reject Aristotle’s physics and cosmology, so the argument in its exact form clearly fails. But if our general metaphysics is at all like that outlined in the previous chapter, a similar metaphysical problem arises. That problem can only be solved in a similar way. Instead of Aristotle’s God as Prime Mover, we need God as the Principle of Concretion. This view can be supported only by discussing the general implications of the course of actual occasions, that is, the process of realization.

We conceive actuality as in essential relation to an unfathomable possibility. Eternal objects inform actual occasions with hierarchic patterns, included and excluded in every variety of discrimination. Another view of the same truth is that every actual occasion is a limitation imposed on possibility, and that by virtue of this limitation the particular value of that shaped togetherness of things emerges. In this way we express how a single occasion is to be viewed in terms of possibility, and how possibility is to be viewed in terms of a single actual occasion. But there are no single occasions, in the sense of isolated occasions. Actuality is through and through togetherness—togetherness of otherwise isolated eternal objects, and togetherness of all actual occasions. It is my task in this chapter to describe the unity of actual occasions. The previous chapter centered its interest in the abstract: the present chapter deals with the concrete, i.e., that which has grown together.

We understand actuality as essentially related to an unfathomable possibility. Eternal objects give actual occasions patterns arranged in hierarchies. These patterns include and exclude eternal objects in every variety of distinction. Another way to see the same truth is that every actual occasion places a limit on possibility. Because of this limit, the particular value of that shaped togetherness of things emerges. In this way, we express how to view a single occasion in terms of possibility. We also express how to view possibility in terms of a single actual occasion. But there are no single occasions in the sense of isolated occasions. Actuality is togetherness through and through. It is the togetherness of eternal objects that would otherwise be isolated, and the togetherness of all actual occasions. My task in this chapter is to describe the unity of actual occasions. The previous chapter focused on the abstract. This chapter deals with the concrete, that is, what has grown together.

Consider an occasion α:—we have to enumerate how other actual occasions are in α, in the sense that their relationships with α are constitutive of the essence of α. What α is in itself, is that it is a unit of realised experience; accordingly we ask how other occasions are in the experience which is α. Also for the present I am excluding cognitive experience. The complete answer to this question is, that the relationships among actual occasions are as unfathomable in their variety of type as are those among eternal objects in the realm of abstraction. But there are fundamental types of such relationships in terms of which the whole complex variety can find its description.

Consider an occasion α. We must list the ways other actual occasions are in α. They are in α in the sense that their relationships with α help make α what it is. In itself, α is a unit of realized experience. So we ask how other occasions are present in the experience that is α. For now, I am excluding cognitive experience. The complete answer is that relationships among actual occasions vary as endlessly in type as relationships among eternal objects in the realm of abstraction. But there are fundamental types of relationships that can be used to describe this whole complex variety.

A preliminary for the understanding of these types of entry (of one occasion into the essence of another) is to note that they are involved in the modes of realisation of abstractive hierarchies, discussed in the previous chapter. The spatio-temporal relationships, involved in those hierarchies as realised in α, have all a definition in terms of α and of the occasions entrant in α. Thus the entrant occasions lend their aspects to the hierarchies, and thereby convert spatio-temporal modalities into categorical determinations; and the hierarchies lend their forms to the occasions and thereby limit the entrant occasions to being entrant only under those forms. Thus in the same way (as seen in the previous chapter) that every occasion is a synthesis of all eternal objects under the limitation of gradations of actuality, so every occasion is a synthesis of all occasions under the limitation of gradations of types of entry. Each occasion synthesises the totality of content under its own limitations of mode.

To understand these types of entry, in which one occasion enters the essence of another, we must first note their connection to abstractive hierarchies. These types of entry are involved in how those hierarchies are realized, as discussed in the previous chapter. When these hierarchies are realized in α, all their spatio-temporal relationships can be defined in terms of α and the occasions entering α. The entering occasions thus lend their aspects to the hierarchies, turning spatio-temporal modes into categorical determinations. The hierarchies, in turn, lend their forms to the occasions. In doing so, they limit the entering occasions to entering only under those forms. As we saw in the previous chapter, every occasion is a synthesis of all eternal objects, limited by gradations of actuality. In the same way, every occasion is a synthesis of all occasions, limited by gradations in their types of entry. Each occasion synthesizes the totality of content within its own limits of mode.

In respect to these types of internal relationship between α and other occasions, these other occasions (as constitutive of α) can be classified in many alternative ways. These are all concerned with different definitions of past, present, and future. It has been usual in philosophy to assume that these various definitions must necessarily be equivalent. The present state of opinion in physical science conclusively shows that this assumption is without metaphysical justification, even though any such discrimination may be found to be unnecessary for physical science. This question has already been dealt with in the chapter on Relativity. But the physical theory of relativity touches only the fringe of the various theories which are metaphysically tenable. It is important for my argument to insist upon the unbounded freedom within which the actual is a unique categorical determination.

We can classify the other occasions that constitute α in many different ways. We can classify them according to their types of internal relationship with α. All these classifications concern different definitions of past, present, and future. Philosophers have usually assumed that these various definitions must be equivalent. The current state of opinion in physics conclusively shows that this assumption has no metaphysical justification. This is true even though physics may not need to make such distinctions. I have already discussed this question in the chapter on Relativity. But the physical theory of relativity touches only the edges of the various theories that are metaphysically tenable. For my argument, it is important to stress that within this unbounded freedom, the actual is a unique categorical determination.

Every actual occasion exhibits itself as a process: it is a becomingness. In so disclosing itself, it places itself as one among a multiplicity of other occasions, without which it could not be itself. It also defines itself as a particular individual achievement, focussing in its limited way an unbounded realm of eternal objects.

Every actual occasion reveals itself as a process, a becoming. In doing so, it shows itself to be one among many other occasions. Without those other occasions, it could not be itself. It also defines itself as a particular individual achievement. In its limited way, it brings into focus an unbounded realm of eternal objects.

Any one occasion α issues from other occasions which collectively form its past. It displays for itself other occasions which collectively form its present. It is in respect to its associated hierarchy, as displayed in this immediate present, that an occasion finds its own originality. It is that display which is its own contribution to the output of actuality. It may be conditioned, and even completely determined by the past from which it issues. But its display in the present under those conditions is what directly emerges from its prehensive activity. The occasion α also holds within itself an indetermination in the form of a future, which has partial determination by reason of its inclusion in α and also has determinate spatio-temporal relatedness to α and to actual occasions of the past from α and of the present for α.

Any occasion α arises from other occasions that together form its past. It displays to itself other occasions that together form its present. An occasion finds its own originality in its associated hierarchy, as displayed in this immediate present. That display is the occasion’s own contribution to what becomes actual. The occasion may be conditioned, or even completely determined, by the past from which it arises. But under those conditions, its display in the present emerges directly from its prehensive activity. Occasion α also contains an indeterminate element in the form of a future. This future is partly determined because it is included in α. It also has definite relations in space and time to α, to actual occasions in α’s past, and to actual occasions in its present.

This future is a synthesis in α of eternal objects as not-being and as requiring the passage from α to other individualisations (with determinate spatio-temporal relations to α) in which not-being becomes being.

This future is a synthesis in α of eternal objects as not-being. These objects require a passage from α to other individualisations, where not-being becomes being. These other individualisations have definite spatio-temporal relations to α.

There is also in α what, in the previous chapter, I have termed the ‘abrupt’ realisation of finite eternal objects. This abrupt realisation requires either a reference of the basic objects of the finite hierarchy to determinate occasions other than α (as their situations), in past, present, future; or requires a realisation of these eternal objects in determinate relationships, but under the aspect of exemption from inclusion in the spatio-temporal scheme of relatedness between actual occasions. This abrupt synthesis of eternal objects in each occasion is the inclusion in actuality of the analytical character of the realm of eternality. This inclusion has those limited gradations of actuality which characterise every occasion by reason of its essential limitation. It is this realised extension of eternal relatedness beyond the mutual relatedness of the actual occasions, which prehends into each occasion the full sweep of eternal relatedness. I term this abrupt realisation the ‘graded envisagement’ which each occasion prehends into its synthesis. This graded envisagement is how the actual includes what (in one sense) is not-being as a positive factor in its own achievement. It is the source of error, of truth, of art, of ethics, and of religion. By it, fact is confronted with alternatives.

There is also in α what I called the ‘abrupt’ realization of finite eternal objects in the previous chapter. This abrupt realization requires either that the basic objects of the finite hierarchy refer to determinate occasions other than α. These occasions are their situations and may be past, present, or future. Or it requires that these eternal objects be realized in determinate relationships. In this case, they are not included in the spatio-temporal scheme of relationships between actual occasions. This abrupt synthesis of eternal objects in each occasion brings the analytical character of the realm of eternality into actuality. This inclusion has limited degrees of actuality. These limited degrees characterize every occasion because every occasion is essentially limited. This realized extension of eternal relatedness goes beyond the mutual relatedness of actual occasions. It is through this extension that each occasion prehends the full sweep of eternal relatedness. I call this abrupt realization the ‘graded envisagement’ that each occasion prehends into its synthesis. Through this graded envisagement, the actual includes what is, in one sense, not-being as a positive factor in its own achievement. This graded envisagement is the source of error, truth, art, ethics, and religion. Through it, fact is confronted with alternatives.

This general concept, of an event as a process whose outcome is a unit of experience, points to the analysis of an event into (i) substantial activity, (ii) conditioned potentialities which are there for synthesis, and (iii) the achieved outcome of the synthesis. The unity of all actual occasions forbids the analysis of substantial activities into independent entities. Each individual activity is nothing but the mode in which the general activity is individualised by the imposed conditions. The envisagement which enters into the synthesis is also a character which conditions the synthesising activity. The general activity is not an entity in the sense in which occasions or eternal objects are entities. It is a general metaphysical character which underlies all occasions, in a particular mode for each occasion. There is nothing with which to compare it: it is Spinoza’s one infinite substance. Its attributes are its character of individualisation into a multiplicity of modes, and the realm of eternal objects which are variously synthesised in these modes. Thus eternal possibility and modal differentiation into individual multiplicity are the attributes of the one substance. In fact each general element of the metaphysical situation is an attribute of the substantial activity.

An event is a process whose outcome is a unit of experience. This general concept points to three elements of an event: (i) substantial activity, (ii) conditioned potentialities available for synthesis, and (iii) the achieved outcome of the synthesis. Because all actual occasions are united, substantial activities cannot be broken down into independent entities. Each individual activity is simply the way the general activity takes an individual form under the conditions imposed on it. The envisagement that enters into the synthesis also helps condition the synthesizing activity. The general activity is not an entity in the sense that occasions or eternal objects are entities. It is a general metaphysical character that underlies all occasions, taking a particular form in each occasion. There is nothing to compare it with: it is Spinoza’s one infinite substance. Its attributes are its capacity to take individual form in many modes, and the realm of eternal objects. These eternal objects are synthesized in different ways in those modes. Thus eternal possibility and differentiation into many individual modes are the attributes of the one substance. In fact, each general element of the metaphysical situation is an attribute of the substantial activity.

Yet another element in the metaphysical situation is disclosed by the consideration that the general attribute of modality is limited. This element must rank as an attribute of the substantial activity. In its nature each mode is limited, so as not to be other modes. But, beyond these limitations of particulars, the general modal individualisation is limited in two ways: In the first place it is an actual course of events, which might be otherwise so far as concerns eternal possibility, but is that course. This limitation takes three forms, (i) the special logical relations which all events must conform to, (ii) the selection of relationships to which the events do conform, and (iii) the particularity which infects the course even within those general relationships of logic and causation. Thus this first limitation is a limitation of antecedent selection. So far as the general metaphysical situation is concerned, there might have been an indiscriminate modal pluralism apart from logical or other limitation. But there could not then have been these modes, for each mode represents a synthesis of actualities which are limited to conform to a standard. We here come to the second way of limitation. Restriction is the price of value. There cannot be value without antecedent standards of value, to discriminate the acceptance or rejection of what is before the envisaging mode of activity. Thus there is an antecedent limitation among values, introducing contraries, grades, and oppositions.

Another element of the metaphysical situation emerges when we consider that modality itself is limited. This element must count as an attribute of substantial activity. By its nature, each mode is limited, so that it is not any other mode. But beyond these limits on individual modes, modal individualisation in general is limited in two ways. First, modal individualisation takes the form of an actual course of events. As far as eternal possibility is concerned, that course might have been otherwise, but it is that course. This limitation takes three forms: (i) the specific logical relations to which all events must conform, (ii) the selection of relationships to which events do conform, and (iii) the particularity that affects the course of events even within those general relationships of logic and causation. Thus, this first limitation is a limit imposed by prior selection. As far as the general metaphysical situation is concerned, there might have been an indiscriminate plurality of modes, without logical or other limits. But in that case, these modes could not have existed. Each mode is a synthesis of actualities that are limited so as to conform to a standard. This brings us to the second kind of limitation. Restriction is the price of value. There can be no value without prior standards of value. These standards distinguish what the envisaging mode of activity accepts from what it rejects. Thus, there is a prior limitation among values, introducing contraries, grades, and oppositions.

According to this argument the fact that there is a process of actual occasions, and the fact that the occasions are the emergence of values which require such limitation, both require that the course of events should have developed amid an antecedent limitation composed of conditions, particularisation, and standards of value.

According to this argument, actual occasions occur in a process. These occasions are also the emergence of values that require limitation. Both facts require that events developed within preexisting limits made up of conditions, particular forms, and standards of value.

Thus as a further element in the metaphysical situation, there is required a principle of limitation. Some particular how is necessary, and some particularisation in the what of matter of fact is necessary. The only alternative to this admission, is to deny the reality of actual occasions. Their apparent irrational limitation must be taken as a proof of illusion and we must look for reality behind the scene. If we reject this alternative behind the scene, we must provide a ground for limitation which stands among the attributes of the substantial activity. This attribute provides the limitation for which no reason can be given: for all reason flows from it. God is the ultimate limitation, and His existence is the ultimate irrationality. For no reason can be given for just that limitation which it stands in His nature to impose. God is not concrete, but He is the ground for concrete actuality. No reason can be given for the nature of God, because that nature is the ground of rationality.

So the metaphysical situation also requires a principle of limitation. Some particular how is necessary, and some particular what in the matter of fact is necessary. The only alternative to admitting this is to deny the reality of actual occasions. We must then take their apparently irrational limitation as proof that they are an illusion. And we must look for reality behind the scenes. If we reject this alternative of looking behind the scenes, we must find a ground for limitation among the attributes of substantial activity. This attribute provides the limitation for which no reason can be given, because all reason flows from it. God is the ultimate limitation, and his existence is the ultimate irrationality. For no reason can be given for the particular limitation that it is his nature to impose. God is not concrete, but he is the ground for concrete actuality. No reason can be given for the nature of God, because that nature is the ground of rationality.

In this argument the point to notice is, that what is metaphysically indeterminate has nevertheless to be categorically determinate. We have come to the limit of rationality. For there is a categorical limitation which does not spring from any metaphysical reason. There is a metaphysical need for a principle of determination, but there can be no metaphysical reason for what is determined. If there were such a reason, there would be no need for any further principle: for metaphysics would already have provided the determination. The general principle of empiricism depends upon the doctrine that there is a principle of concretion which is not discoverable by abstract reason. What further can be known about God must be sought in the region of particular experiences, and therefore rests on an empirical basis. In respect to the interpretation of these experiences, mankind have differed profoundly. He has been named respectively, Jehovah, Allah, Brahma, Father in Heaven, Order of Heaven, First Cause, Supreme Being, Chance. Each name corresponds to a system of thought derived from the experiences of those who have used it.

The point to notice in this argument is that what is metaphysically indeterminate must nevertheless be categorically determinate. Here we reach the limit of rationality. There is a categorical limitation that has no metaphysical reason. Metaphysics requires a principle of determination, but there can be no metaphysical reason for what is determined. If there were such a reason, no further principle would be needed. Metaphysics would already have provided the determination. The general principle of empiricism depends on the doctrine that a principle of concretion exists beyond the reach of abstract reason. Whatever else can be known about God must be sought in particular experiences. It therefore rests on an empirical basis. People have differed profoundly in how they interpret these experiences. God has been called Jehovah, Allah, Brahma, Father in Heaven, Order of Heaven, First Cause, Supreme Being, and Chance. Each name corresponds to a system of thought derived from the experiences of those who have used it.

Among medieval and modern philosophers, anxious to establish the religious significance of God, an unfortunate habit has prevailed of paying to Him metaphysical compliments. He has been conceived as the foundation of the metaphysical situation with its ultimate activity. If this conception be adhered to, there can be no alternative except to discern in Him the origin of all evil as well as of all good. He is then the supreme author of the play, and to Him must therefore be ascribed its shortcomings as well as its success. If He be conceived as the supreme ground for limitation, it stands in His very nature to divide the Good from the Evil, and to establish Reason ‘within her dominions supreme.’

Medieval and modern philosophers have been eager to establish God’s religious significance. In doing so, they have often fallen into the unfortunate habit of paying him metaphysical compliments. They have conceived of him as the foundation of the metaphysical order and its ultimate activity. If we hold to this conception, we have no choice but to see him as the source of all evil as well as all good. He is then the supreme author of the play. Therefore, its shortcomings as well as its success must be attributed to him. If God is conceived as the supreme source of limitation, it is in his very nature to separate Good from Evil and to establish Reason ‘within her dominions supreme.’