Preface

The lectures that follow were delivered at the Lowell Institute in Boston in November and December, 1906, and in January, 1907, at Columbia University, in New York. They are printed as delivered, without developments or notes. The pragmatic movement, so-called—I do not like the name, but apparently it is too late to change it—seems to have rather suddenly precipitated itself out of the air. A number of tendencies that have always existed in philosophy have all at once become conscious of themselves collectively, and of their combined mission; and this has occurred in so many countries, and from so many different points of view, that much unconcerted statement has resulted. I have sought to unify the picture as it presents itself to my own eyes, dealing in broad strokes, and avoiding minute controversy. Much futile controversy might have been avoided, I believe, if our critics had been willing to wait until we got our message fairly out.

The following lectures were delivered at the Lowell Institute in Boston in November and December 1906, and at Columbia University in New York in January 1907. They are printed as delivered, without additions or notes. The so-called pragmatic movement seems to have appeared rather suddenly out of thin air. I do not like the name, but apparently it is too late to change it. A number of tendencies that have always existed in philosophy have all at once become collectively aware of themselves and their shared mission. This has happened in so many countries and from so many different points of view that many uncoordinated statements have resulted. I have tried to bring the picture together as I see it, using broad strokes and avoiding detailed controversy. I believe much pointless controversy could have been avoided if our critics had been willing to wait until we had fully presented our message.

If my lectures interest any reader in the general subject, he will doubtless wish to read farther. I therefore give him a few references.

If my lectures interest any reader in the general subject, they will no doubt want to read more. So I offer a few references.

In America, John Dewey's 'Studies in Logical Theory' are the foundation. Read also by Dewey the articles in the Philosophical Review, vol. xv, pp. 113 and 465, in Mind, vol. xv, p. 293, and in the Journal of Philosophy, vol. iv, p. 197.

In America, John Dewey's 'Studies in Logical Theory' is the foundation. Also read Dewey's articles in the Philosophical Review, vol. xv, pp. 113 and 465. Read his articles in Mind, vol. xv, p. 293, and in the Journal of Philosophy, vol. iv, p. 197.

Probably the best statements to begin with however, are F. C. S. Schiller's in his 'Studies in Humanism,' especially the essays numbered i, v, vi, vii, xviii and xix. His previous essays and in general the polemic literature of the subject are fully referred to in his footnotes.

However, the best place to start is probably F. C. S. Schiller's 'Studies in Humanism,' especially essays i, v, vi, vii, xviii, and xix. His footnotes provide full references to his earlier essays and, more generally, to the literature debating the subject.

Furthermore, see G. Milhaud: le Rationnel, 1898, and the fine articles by Le Roy in the Revue de Metaphysique, vols. 7, 8 and 9. Also articles by Blondel and de Sailly in the Annales de Philosophie Chretienne, 4me Serie, vols. 2 and 3. Papini announces a book on Pragmatism, in the French language, to be published very soon.

Also see G. Milhaud, le Rationnel, 1898, and Le Roy's excellent articles in the Revue de Metaphysique, volumes 7, 8, and 9. See also articles by Blondel and de Sailly in the Annales de Philosophie Chretienne, 4th Series, volumes 2 and 3. Papini announces that a book on Pragmatism, written in French, will be published very soon.

To avoid one misunderstanding at least, let me say that there is no logical connexion between pragmatism, as I understand it, and a doctrine which I have recently set forth as 'radical empiricism.' The latter stands on its own feet. One may entirely reject it and still be a pragmatist.

To avoid at least one misunderstanding, let me be clear. Pragmatism, as I understand it, has no logical connection to a doctrine I recently presented as 'radical empiricism.' Radical empiricism stands on its own. One may reject it entirely and still be a pragmatist.

Harvard University, April, 1907.

Harvard University, April 1907.