The One and the Many

We saw in the last lecture that the pragmatic method, in its dealings with certain concepts, instead of ending with admiring contemplation, plunges forward into the river of experience with them and prolongs the perspective by their means. Design, free-will, the absolute mind, spirit instead of matter, have for their sole meaning a better promise as to this world's outcome. Be they false or be they true, the meaning of them is this meliorism. I have sometimes thought of the phenomenon called 'total reflexion' in optics as a good symbol of the relation between abstract ideas and concrete realities, as pragmatism conceives it. Hold a tumbler of water a little above your eyes and look up through the water at its surface—or better still look similarly through the flat wall of an aquarium. You will then see an extraordinarily brilliant reflected image say of a candle-flame, or any other clear object, situated on the opposite side of the vessel. No candle-ray, under these circumstances gets beyond the water's surface: every ray is totally reflected back into the depths again. Now let the water represent the world of sensible facts, and let the air above it represent the world of abstract ideas. Both worlds are real, of course, and interact; but they interact only at their boundary, and the locus of everything that lives, and happens to us, so far as full experience goes, is the water. We are like fishes swimming in the sea of sense, bounded above by the superior element, but unable to breathe it pure or penetrate it. We get our oxygen from it, however, we touch it incessantly, now in this part, now in that, and every time we touch it we are reflected back into the water with our course re-determined and re-energized. The abstract ideas of which the air consists, indispensable for life, but irrespirable by themselves, as it were, and only active in their re-directing function. All similes are halting but this one rather takes my fancy. It shows how something, not sufficient for life in itself, may nevertheless be an effective determinant of life elsewhere.

In the last lecture, we saw how the pragmatic method deals with certain concepts. Instead of stopping to admire them, it plunges into the river of experience with them. It uses them to extend our view. Design, free will, the absolute mind, and spirit rather than matter have only one meaning. They promise a better outcome for this world. Whether they are false or true, their meaning is this belief that things can improve. I have sometimes thought that 'total reflection' in optics is a good symbol for how pragmatism sees abstract ideas and concrete realities. Hold a glass of water slightly above your eyes and look up through the water at its surface. Better still, look in the same way through the flat wall of an aquarium. You will see an extraordinarily bright reflected image of an object on the other side of the vessel. It could be a candle flame or any other distinct object. Under these conditions, no ray from the candle passes beyond the water’s surface. Every ray is totally reflected back into the depths. Now let the water represent the world of facts we perceive through our senses. Let the air above it represent the world of abstract ideas. Both worlds are real, of course, and they interact. But they interact only at their boundary. Everything that lives and everything that happens to us, as far as full experience goes, takes place in the water. We are like fish swimming in the sea of sense. The higher element lies above us, but we cannot breathe it pure or enter it. Yet we get our oxygen from it. We touch it constantly, now here, now there. Each time, we are reflected back into the water, with our course redirected and our energy renewed. The abstract ideas that make up the air are essential to life. But we cannot breathe them on their own, so to speak. They are active only in redirecting us. All comparisons fall short, but I rather like this one. It shows how something insufficient for life on its own may nevertheless effectively shape life elsewhere.

In this present hour I wish to illustrate the pragmatic method by one more application. I wish to turn its light upon the ancient problem of 'the one and the many.' I suspect that in but few of you has this problem occasioned sleepless nights, and I should not be astonished if some of you told me it had never vexed you. I myself have come, by long brooding over it, to consider it the most central of all philosophic problems, central because so pregnant. I mean by this that if you know whether a man is a decided monist or a decided pluralist, you perhaps know more about the rest of his opinions than if you give him any other name ending in IST. To believe in the one or in the many, that is the classification with the maximum number of consequences. So bear with me for an hour while I try to inspire you with my own interest in the problem.

Today I want to illustrate the pragmatic method with one more application. I want to shed its light on the ancient problem of 'the one and the many.' I suspect that this problem has kept few of you awake at night. I would not be surprised if some of you told me it had never troubled you. After thinking about it for a long time, I have come to consider it the most central of all philosophical problems. It is central because it has so many implications. By this I mean that knowing whether a person is a committed monist or a committed pluralist perhaps tells you more about their other opinions than any other label ending in IST. Belief in the one or the many is the distinction with the greatest number of consequences. So bear with me for an hour while I try to share my own interest in the problem.

Philosophy has often been defined as the quest or the vision of the world's unity. We never hear this definition challenged, and it is true as far as it goes, for philosophy has indeed manifested above all things its interest in unity. But how about the VARIETY in things? Is that such an irrelevant matter? If instead of using the term philosophy, we talk in general of our intellect and its needs we quickly see that unity is only one of these. Acquaintance with the details of fact is always reckoned, along with their reduction to system, as an indispensable mark of mental greatness. Your 'scholarly' mind, of encyclopedic, philological type, your man essentially of learning, has never lacked for praise along with your philosopher. What our intellect really aims at is neither variety nor unity taken singly but totality.⁵ In this, acquaintance with reality's diversities is as important as understanding their connexion. The human passion of curiosity runs on all fours with the systematizing passion.

Philosophy has often been defined as the search for, or vision of, the world's unity. We never hear this definition challenged, and it is true as far as it goes. Philosophy has indeed shown an interest in unity above all else. But what about the VARIETY in things? Is variety so irrelevant? Instead of speaking of philosophy, let us speak generally of our intellect and its needs. Then we quickly see that unity is only one of those needs. Knowledge of the details of fact is always considered an essential mark of a great mind, alongside the ability to organize those facts into a system. The 'scholarly' mind, encyclopedic and focused on language and texts, has always been praised alongside the philosopher. What our intellect really seeks is neither variety nor unity alone, but the whole.⁵ Knowing the diversity of reality is as important to this goal as understanding how its parts connect. The human passion for curiosity is just as strong as the passion for organizing things into systems.

In spite of this obvious fact the unity of things has always been considered more illustrious, as it were, than their variety. When a young man first conceives the notion that the whole world forms one great fact, with all its parts moving abreast, as it were, and interlocked, he feels as if he were enjoying a great insight, and looks superciliously on all who still fall short of this sublime conception. Taken thus abstractly as it first comes to one, the monistic insight is so vague as hardly to seem worth defending intellectually. Yet probably everyone in this audience in some way cherishes it. A certain abstract monism, a certain emotional response to the character of oneness, as if it were a feature of the world not coordinate with its manyness, but vastly more excellent and eminent, is so prevalent in educated circles that we might almost call it a part of philosophic common sense. Of COURSE the world is one, we say. How else could it be a world at all? Empiricists as a rule, are as stout monists of this abstract kind as rationalists are.

Despite this obvious fact, people have always considered the unity of things more distinguished, so to speak, than their variety. When a young man first grasps the idea that the whole world forms one great fact, he feels he has gained a profound insight. He sees all its parts moving together, as it were, and interlocking. He looks down on everyone who has yet to reach this sublime understanding. As this monistic insight first comes to us, in the abstract, it is so vague that it hardly seems worth defending intellectually. Yet probably everyone in this audience values it in some way. A certain abstract monism is so common among educated people that we might almost call it part of philosophical common sense. It is an emotional response to oneness, as if oneness were not simply one feature of the world alongside its manyness, but a vastly superior and more important one. Of COURSE the world is one, we say. How else could it be a world at all? As a rule, empiricists are just as firm in this abstract kind of monism as rationalists are.

The difference is that the empiricists are less dazzled. Unity doesn't blind them to everything else, doesn't quench their curiosity for special facts, whereas there is a kind of rationalist who is sure to interpret abstract unity mystically and to forget everything else, to treat it as a principle; to admire and worship it; and thereupon to come to a full stop intellectually.

The difference is that empiricists are less dazzled. Unity does not blind them to everything else or dampen their curiosity about particular facts. But one kind of rationalist is sure to interpret abstract unity mystically and forget everything else. Such a rationalist treats unity as a principle, admires and worships it, and then stops thinking altogether.

'The world is One!'—the formula may become a sort of number-worship. 'Three' and 'seven' have, it is true, been reckoned sacred numbers; but, abstractly taken, why is 'one' more excellent than 'forty-three,' or than 'two million and ten'? In this first vague conviction of the world's unity, there is so little to take hold of that we hardly know what we mean by it.

'The world is One!' This formula may become a kind of number worship. It is true that 'three' and 'seven' have been considered sacred numbers. But in the abstract, why is 'one' better than 'forty-three' or 'two million and ten'? This first vague belief that the world is one gives us so little to grasp that we hardly know what we mean by it.

The only way to get forward with our notion is to treat it pragmatically. Granting the oneness to exist, what facts will be different in consequence? What will the unity be known-as? The world is one—yes, but HOW one? What is the practical value of the oneness for US?

The only way to make progress with this idea is to approach it pragmatically. If we grant that the world is one, what facts will be different as a result? How will we recognize its unity? The world is one, yes, but HOW is it one? What practical value does this oneness have for US?

Asking such questions, we pass from the vague to the definite, from the abstract to the concrete. Many distinct ways in which oneness predicated of the universe might make a difference, come to view. I will note successively the more obvious of these ways.

By asking such questions, we move from the vague to the definite, from the abstract to the concrete. We can see many distinct ways in which the universe's oneness might make a difference. I will discuss the more obvious ways in turn.

1. First, the world is at least ONE SUBJECT OF DISCOURSE. If its manyness were so irremediable as to permit NO union whatever of it parts, not even our minds could 'mean' the whole of it at once: the would be like eyes trying to look in opposite directions. But in point of fact we mean to cover the whole of it by our abstract term 'world' or 'universe,' which expressly intends that no part shall be left out. Such unity of discourse carries obviously no farther monistic specifications. A 'chaos,' once so named, has as much unity of discourse as a cosmos. It is an odd fact that many monists consider a great victory scored for their side when pluralists say 'the universe is many.' "'The universe'!" they chuckle—"his speech bewrayeth him. He stands confessed of monism out of his own mouth." Well, let things be one in that sense! You can then fling such a word as universe at the whole collection of them, but what matters it? It still remains to be ascertained whether they are one in any other sense that is more valuable.

1. First, the world is at least ONE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION. Suppose its many parts were so completely separate that they could not be united in any way. Then even our minds could not think of the whole world at once. They would be like eyes trying to look in opposite directions. But in fact, we mean to include the whole world when we use the abstract term 'world' or 'universe.' The term expressly means to leave no part out. Obviously, this unity as a subject of discussion tells us nothing more about whether the world is one. Once named, a 'chaos' has as much unity as a subject of discussion as a cosmos. It is odd that many monists think they have won a great victory when pluralists say 'the universe is many.' "'The universe'!" they chuckle. "His own words give him away. He admits he is a monist out of his own mouth." Well, let things be one in that sense! You can then fling a word like universe at the whole collection of things, but what does that matter? We still have to find out whether the things are one in any other, more valuable sense.

2. Are they, for example, CONTINUOUS? Can you pass from one to another, keeping always in your one universe without any danger of falling out? In other words, do the parts of our universe HANG together, instead of being like detached grains of sand?

2. Are they, for example, CONTINUOUS? Can you move from one to another while staying in the same universe, without any danger of falling out? In other words, do the parts of our universe HANG together, rather than being like separate grains of sand?

Even grains of sand hang together through the space in which they are embedded, and if you can in any way move through such space, you can pass continuously from number one of them to number two. Space and time are thus vehicles of continuity, by which the world's parts hang together. The practical difference to us, resultant from these forms of union, is immense. Our whole motor life is based upon them.

Even grains of sand are connected by the space around them. If you can move through that space in any way, you can pass continuously from one grain to another. Space and time thus provide continuity, connecting the parts of the world. These connections make an immense practical difference to us. Our whole life of movement depends on them.

3. There are innumerable other paths of practical continuity among things. Lines of INFLUENCE can be traced by which they together. Following any such line you pass from one thing to another till you may have covered a good part of the universe's extent. Gravity and heat-conduction are such all-uniting influences, so far as the physical world goes. Electric, luminous and chemical influences follow similar lines of influence. But opaque and inert bodies interrupt the continuity here, so that you have to step round them, or change your mode of progress if you wish to get farther on that day. Practically, you have then lost your universe's unity, SO FAR AS IT WAS CONSTITUTED BY THOSE FIRST LINES OF INFLUENCE. There are innumerable kinds of connexion that special things have with other special things; and the ENSEMBLE of any one of these connexions forms one sort of system by which things are conjoined. Thus men are conjoined in a vast network of ACQUAINTANCESHIP. Brown knows Jones, Jones knows Robinson, etc.; and BY CHOOSING YOUR FARTHER INTERMEDIARIES RIGHTLY you may carry a message from Jones to the Empress of China, or the Chief of the African Pigmies, or to anyone else in the inhabited world. But you are stopped short, as by a non-conductor, when you choose one man wrong in this experiment. What may be called love-systems are grafted on the acquaintance-system. A loves (or hates) B; B loves (or hates) C, etc. But these systems are smaller than the great acquaintance-system that they presuppose.

3. There are countless other ways things are practically connected. We can trace lines of INFLUENCE along which things connect. Following any such line, you pass from one thing to another. You may cover a good part of the universe’s extent this way. Gravity and heat conduction are influences that unite everything in the physical world. Electrical, light, and chemical influences follow similar lines. But opaque and inert bodies interrupt those connections. If you want to go farther that day, you must go around them or change how you proceed. In practice, you have then lost the unity those first lines of influence gave the universe. Countless kinds of connection link particular things to other particular things. The whole network of any one kind of connection forms a system that joins things together. For example, people are joined in a vast network of ACQUAINTANCESHIP. Brown knows Jones, Jones knows Robinson, and so on. If you choose the people to pass it on carefully, you may carry a message from Jones to the Empress of China, the Chief of the African Pigmies, or anyone else in the inhabited world. But if you choose one person wrongly in this experiment, you are stopped short, as by a nonconductor. What we may call love-systems are grafted onto the acquaintance-system. A loves (or hates) B, B loves (or hates) C, and so on. But these systems are smaller than the great acquaintance-system they depend on.

Human efforts are daily unifying the world more and more in definite systematic ways. We found colonial, postal, consular, commercial systems, all the parts of which obey definite influences that propagate themselves within the system but not to facts outside of it. The result is innumerable little hangings-together of the world's parts within the larger hangings-together, little worlds, not only of discourse but of operation, within the wider universe. Each system exemplifies one type or grade of union, its parts being strung on that peculiar kind of relation, and the same part may figure in many different systems, as a man may hold several offices and belong to various clubs. From this 'systematic' point of view, therefore, the pragmatic value of the world's unity is that all these definite networks actually and practically exist. Some are more enveloping and extensive, some less so; they are superposed upon each other; and between them all they let no individual elementary part of the universe escape. Enormous as is the amount of disconnexion among things (for these systematic influences and conjunctions follow rigidly exclusive paths), everything that exists is influenced in SOME way by something else, if you can only pick the way out rightly Loosely speaking, and in general, it may be said that all things cohere and adhere to each other SOMEHOW, and that the universe exists practically in reticulated or concatenated forms which make of it a continuous or 'integrated' affair. Any kind of influence whatever helps to make the world one, so far as you can follow it from next to next. You may then say that 'the world IS One'—meaning in these respects, namely, and just so far as they obtain. But just as definitely is it NOT one, so far as they do not obtain; and there is no species of connexion which will not fail, if, instead of choosing conductors for it, you choose non-conductors. You are then arrested at your very first step and have to write the world down as a pure MANY from that particular point of view. If our intellect had been as much interested in disjunctive as it is in conjunctive relations, philosophy would have equally successfully celebrated the world's DISUNION.

Every day, human efforts unite the world more and more in specific, systematic ways. We establish colonial, postal, consular, and commercial systems. All the parts of each system are subject to specific influences that spread within it, but not to things outside it. The result is countless small connections among the world's parts within larger connections. These are little worlds within the wider universe, worlds not only of discussion but also of action. Each system shows one kind or degree of unity. Its parts are linked by the particular kind of relationship that defines it. The same part may belong to many different systems, just as a person may hold several offices and belong to various clubs. From this 'systematic' point of view, then, the practical value of the world's unity is that all these specific networks actually exist and operate. Some are broader and more extensive than others. They overlap, and together they include every individual, elementary part of the universe. The amount of disconnection among things is enormous, because these systematic influences and connections follow strictly limited paths. Yet everything that exists is influenced in SOME way by something else, if you can only identify the way correctly. Loosely speaking, and in general, we may say that all things hold together and connect with one another SOMEHOW. We may also say that, in practice, the universe exists as a network or chain of connections. These make it a continuous or 'integrated' whole. Any kind of influence helps make the world one, as far as you can follow it from one thing to the next. You may then say that 'the world IS One', meaning in these respects and only as far as they apply. But the world is just as definitely NOT one where these connections do not apply. Every kind of connection will fail if you choose things that do not conduct it instead of things that do. You are then stopped at your very first step. From that particular point of view, you must describe the world as a pure MANY. If our minds had been as interested in separating relationships as in connecting ones, philosophy would have celebrated the world's DISUNION just as successfully.

The great point is to notice that the oneness and the manyness are absolutely co-ordinate here. Neither is primordial or more essential or excellent than the other. Just as with space, whose separating of things seems exactly on a par with its uniting of them, but sometimes one function and sometimes the other is what come home to us most, so, in our general dealings with the world of influences, we now need conductors and now need non-conductors, and wisdom lies in knowing which is which at the appropriate moment.

The key point is that oneness and manyness are absolutely equal here. Neither is more fundamental, essential, or better than the other. In the same way, space seems to separate things just as much as it unites them. But sometimes we feel one function more strongly, and sometimes the other. So, in dealing with the world of influences, we sometimes need conductors and sometimes non-conductors. Wisdom lies in knowing which is which at the right moment.

4. All these systems of influence or non-influence may be listed under the general problem of the world's CAUSAL UNITY. If the minor causal influences among things should converge towards one common causal origin of them in the past, one great first cause for all that is, one might then speak of the absolute causal unity of the world. God's fiat on creation's day has figured in traditional philosophy as such an absolute cause and origin. Transcendental Idealism, translating 'creation' into 'thinking' (or 'willing to' think') calls the divine act 'eternal' rather than 'first'; but the union of the many here is absolute, just the same—the many would not BE, save for the One. Against this notion of the unity of origin of all there has always stood the pluralistic notion of an eternal self-existing many in the shape of atoms or even of spiritual units of some sort. The alternative has doubtless a pragmatic meaning, but perhaps, as far as these lectures go, we had better leave the question of unity of origin unsettled.

4. All these ways in which things may or may not influence one another fall under the general problem of the world's CAUSAL UNITY. The smaller causal influences among things might converge on one common causal origin in the past. If so, there would be one great first cause for all that exists. We could then speak of the absolute causal unity of the world. In traditional philosophy, God's command on the day of creation has served as such an absolute cause and origin. Transcendental Idealism translates 'creation' into 'thinking' (or 'willing to think'). It calls the divine act 'eternal' rather than 'first'. But here, too, the unity of the many is absolute. The many would not BE without the One. Against the idea that all things share one origin, there has always been a pluralistic view. This view holds that many things, whether atoms or spiritual units of some kind, exist eternally and independently. The choice between these views undoubtedly has a pragmatic meaning. But perhaps, for the purposes of these lectures, we had better leave the question of a single origin unsettled.

5. The most important sort of union that obtains among things, pragmatically speaking, is their GENERIC UNITY. Things exist in kinds, there are many specimens in each kind, and what the 'kind' implies for one specimen, it implies also for every other specimen of that kind. We can easily conceive that every fact in the world might be singular, that is, unlike any other fact and sole of its kind. In such a world of singulars our logic would be useless, for logic works by predicating of the single instance what is true of all its kind. With no two things alike in the world, we should be unable to reason from our past experiences to our future ones. The existence of so much generic unity in things is thus perhaps the most momentous pragmatic specification of what it may mean to say 'the world is One.' ABSOLUTE generic unity would obtain if there were one summum genus under which all things without exception could be eventually subsumed. 'Beings,' 'thinkables,' 'experiences,' would be candidates for this position. Whether the alternatives expressed by such words have any pragmatic significance or not, is another question which I prefer to leave unsettled just now.

5. The most important kind of connection among things, in practical terms, is their GENERIC UNITY. Things belong to kinds, and each kind has many members. Whatever belonging to a kind implies for one member, it also implies for every other member. We can easily imagine that every fact in the world might be unique, unlike any other fact and the only one of its kind. In such a world of unique facts, our logic would be useless. Logic works by applying to a single instance what is true of every instance of its kind. If no two things in the world were alike, we could not reason from our past experiences to our future ones. The existence of so much generic unity among things is therefore perhaps the most consequential practical meaning of the claim that 'the world is One.' ABSOLUTE generic unity would exist if there were one highest category under which all things, without exception, could ultimately be included. 'Beings,' 'thinkables,' and 'experiences' would be candidates for this category. Whether the alternatives expressed by such words have any practical significance is another question, which I prefer to leave unsettled for now.

6. Another specification of what the phrase 'the world is One' may mean is UNITY OF PURPOSE. An enormous number of things in the world subserve a common purpose. All the man-made systems, administrative, industrial, military, or what not, exist each for its controlling purpose. Every living being pursues its own peculiar purposes. They co-operate, according to the degree of their development, in collective or tribal purposes, larger ends thus enveloping lesser ones, until an absolutely single, final and climacteric purpose subserved by all things without exception might conceivably be reached. It is needless to say that the appearances conflict with such a view. Any resultant, as I said in my third lecture, MAY have been purposed in advance, but none of the results we actually know in is world have in point of fact been purposed in advance in all their details. Men and nations start with a vague notion of being rich, or great, or good. Each step they make brings unforeseen chances into sight, and shuts out older vistas, and the specifications of the general purpose have to be daily changed. What is reached in the end may be better or worse than what was proposed, but it is always more complex and different.

6. Another possible meaning of 'the world is One' is UNITY OF PURPOSE. An enormous number of things in the world serve a common purpose. All human systems, whether administrative, industrial, military, or otherwise, exist to serve their own governing purposes. Every living being pursues its own particular purposes. Living beings cooperate in collective or tribal purposes, to a degree that depends on their development. Larger purposes thus embrace smaller ones. Conceivably, this could lead to a single, ultimate purpose served by all things without exception. Needless to say, appearances conflict with this view. As I said in my third lecture, any outcome MAY have been intended in advance. But none of the outcomes we actually know in this world were intended in advance in every detail. People and nations begin with a vague idea of being rich, great, or good. Each step reveals unforeseen opportunities and closes off earlier possibilities. So the details of the general purpose have to change daily. The final outcome may be better or worse than what was intended, but it is always more complex and different.

Our different purposes also are at war with each other. Where one can't crush the other out, they compromise; and the result is again different from what anyone distinctly proposed beforehand. Vaguely and generally, much of what was purposed may be gained; but everything makes strongly for the view that our world is incompletely unified teleologically and is still trying to get its unification better organized.

Our different purposes also conflict with one another. Where one purpose cannot defeat another, they compromise. The result is again different from what anyone clearly intended beforehand. Much of what was intended may be achieved in a vague and general way. But everything strongly suggests that our world is not yet fully unified in its purposes. It is still trying to organize those purposes into a better unity.

Whoever claims ABSOLUTE teleological unity, saying that there is one purpose that every detail of the universe subserves, dogmatizes at his own risk. Theologians who dogmalize thus find it more and more impossible, as our acquaintance with the warring interests of the world's parts grows more concrete, to imagine what the one climacteric purpose may possibly be like. We see indeed that certain evils minister to ulterior goods, that the bitter makes the cocktail better, and that a bit of danger or hardship puts us agreeably to our trumps. We can vaguely generalize this into the doctrine that all the evil in the universe is but instrumental to its greater perfection. But the scale of the evil actually in sight defies all human tolerance; and transcendental idealism, in the pages of a Bradley or a Royce, brings us no farther than the book of Job did—God's ways are not our ways, so let us put our hands upon our mouth. A God who can relish such superfluities of horror is no God for human beings to appeal to. His animal spirits are too high. In other words the 'Absolute' with his one purpose, is not the man-like God of common people.

Anyone who claims ABSOLUTE unity of purpose does so at their own risk. Such a person claims that every detail of the universe serves one purpose. Theologians who make this claim find it increasingly hard to imagine what that one ultimate purpose could be. This becomes harder as we learn more about the conflicting interests of the world's parts. We do see that certain evils serve later goods. Bitterness makes a cocktail better, and a little danger or hardship pleasantly brings out our best. We can generalize vaguely from this to the doctrine that all evil in the universe serves its greater perfection. But the scale of the evil we actually see is more than any human being can tolerate. And transcendental idealism, in the writings of Bradley or Royce, takes us no further than the book of Job did. God's ways are not our ways, so let us put our hands over our mouths. A God who can enjoy such excessive horrors is no God for human beings to appeal to. His spirits are too high. In other words, the 'Absolute', with his one purpose, is not the humanlike God of ordinary people.

7. AESTHETIC UNION among things also obtains, and is very analogous to ideological union. Things tell a story. Their parts hang together so as to work out a climax. They play into each other's hands expressively. Retrospectively, we can see that altho no definite purpose presided over a chain of events, yet the events fell into a dramatic form, with a start, a middle, and a finish. In point of fact all stories end; and here again the point of view of a many is that more natural one to take. The world is full of partial stories that run parallel to one another, beginning and ending at odd times. They mutually interlace and interfere at points, but we cannot unify them completely in our minds. In following your life-history, I must temporarily turn my attention from my own. Even a biographer of twins would have to press them alternately upon his reader's attention.

7. AESTHETIC UNION also exists among things, and it is much like ideological union. Things tell a story. Their parts fit together to build toward a climax. They reinforce one another in expressive ways. Looking back, we can see that a chain of events took a dramatic form, with a beginning, a middle, and an end. This can happen even though no definite purpose guided the events. In fact, all stories end. Here again, it is more natural to see the world as many things. The world is full of partial stories that run alongside one another, beginning and ending at different times. The stories intertwine and interfere with one another at points, but we cannot bring them completely together in our minds. To follow your life story, I must temporarily turn my attention away from my own. Even a biographer writing about twins would have to focus the reader's attention on each twin in turn.

It follows that whoever says that the whole world tells one story utters another of those monistic dogmas that a man believes at his risk. It is easy to see the world's history pluralistically, as a rope of which each fibre tells a separate tale; but to conceive of each cross-section of the rope as an absolutely single fact, and to sum the whole longitudinal series into one being living an undivided life, is harder. We have indeed the analogy of embryology to help us. The microscopist makes a hundred flat cross-sections of a given embryo, and mentally unites them into one solid whole. But the great world's ingredients, so far as they are beings, seem, like the rope's fibres, to be discontinuous cross-wise, and to cohere only in the longitudinal direction. Followed in that direction they are many. Even the embryologist, when he follows the DEVELOPMENT of his object, has to treat the history of each single organ in turn. ABSOLUTE aesthetic union is thus another barely abstract ideal. The world appears as something more epic than dramatic.

It follows that anyone who says the whole world tells one story is stating another monistic dogma. Anyone who believes it does so at their own risk. It is easy to see the world’s history in pluralistic terms, as a rope whose fibers each tell a separate story. But it is harder to see each cross-section of the rope as an absolutely single fact. It is harder still to bring the whole series of cross-sections together as one being living an undivided life. The analogy of embryology does help us here. A scientist looking through a microscope makes a hundred thin cross-sections of an embryo. The scientist then mentally joins them into one solid whole. But the ingredients of the great world, insofar as they are beings, seem like the fibers of a rope. They seem disconnected across the rope and joined only along its length. Followed along the rope, they are many. Even the embryologist, when following the DEVELOPMENT of an embryo, has to consider the history of each organ in turn. ABSOLUTE aesthetic unity is therefore another purely abstract ideal. The world seems more like an epic than a drama.

So far, then, we see how the world is unified by its many systems, kinds, purposes, and dramas. That there is more union in all these ways than openly appears is certainly true. That there MAY be one sovereign purpose, system, kind, and story, is a legitimate hypothesis. All I say here is that it is rash to affirm this dogmatically without better evidence than we possess at present.

So far, then, we have seen how the world is unified by its many systems, kinds, purposes, and dramas. There is certainly more unity in all these ways than is immediately apparent. There may be one overarching purpose, system, kind, and story. That is a reasonable hypothesis. All I am saying is that it is rash to assert it with certainty without better evidence than we have now.

8. The GREAT monistic DENKMITTEL for a hundred years past has been the notion of THE ONE KNOWER. The many exist only as objects for his thought—exist in his dream, as it were; and AS HE KNOWS them, they have one purpose, form one system, tell one tale for him. This notion of an ALL-ENVELOPING NOETIC UNITY in things is the sublimest achievement of intellectualist philosophy. Those who believe in the Absolute, as the all-knower is termed, usually say that they do so for coercive reasons, which clear thinkers cannot evade. The Absolute has far-reaching practical consequences, some of which I drew attention in my second lecture. Many kinds of difference important to us would surely follow from its being true. I cannot here enter into all the logical proofs of such a Being's existence, farther than to say that none of them seem to me sound. I must therefore treat the notion of an All-Knower simply as an hypothesis, exactly on a par logically with the pluralist notion that there is no point of view, no focus of information extant, from which the entire content of the universe is visible at once. "God's consciousness," says Professor Royce,⁶ "forms in its wholeness one luminously transparent conscious moment"—this is the type of noetic unity on which rationalism insists. Empiricism on the other hand is satisfied with the type of noetic unity that is humanly familiar. Everything gets known by SOME knower along with something else; but the knowers may in the end be irreducibly many, and the greatest knower of them all may yet not know the whole of everything, or even know what he does know at one single stroke:—he may be liable to forget. Whichever type obtained, the world would still be a universe noetically. Its parts would be conjoined by knowledge, but in the one case the knowledge would be absolutely unified, in the other it would be strung along and overlapped.

8. For the past hundred years, the great monistic DENKMITTEL, or tool of thought, has been the idea of THE ONE KNOWER. The many things exist only as objects of his thought, as if they existed in his dream. As he knows them, they have one purpose, form one system, and tell one story for him. This idea of an all-encompassing unity of knowledge in things is the highest achievement of intellectualist philosophy. Those who believe in the Absolute, as the all-knower is called, usually say they have compelling reasons for doing so. They say no clear thinker can escape those reasons. The Absolute has far-reaching practical consequences. I drew attention to some of them in my second lecture. If the Absolute were real, many kinds of differences important to us would surely follow. I cannot examine all the logical proofs for such a Being’s existence here. I can only say that none of them seem sound to me. I must therefore treat the idea of an All-Knower simply as a hypothesis. Logically, it stands on exactly the same footing as the pluralist idea. According to that idea, there is no point of view, no existing focus of information, from which the entire universe can be seen at once. "God's consciousness," says Professor Royce,⁶ "forms in its wholeness one luminously transparent conscious moment". This is the kind of unity of knowledge on which rationalism insists. Empiricism, on the other hand, is satisfied with the kind of unity of knowledge familiar to us as humans. Everything is known by some knower along with something else. But there may ultimately be many knowers who cannot be reduced to one. Even the greatest knower may not know everything. He may not even know everything he does know all at once. He may be liable to forget. Whichever kind of unity exists, the world would still be a universe in terms of knowledge. Its parts would be connected by knowledge. But in one case, knowledge would be absolutely unified. In the other, knowledge would be spread out and overlapping.

The notion of one instantaneous or eternal Knower—either adjective here means the same thing—is, as I said, the great intellectualist achievement of our time. It has practically driven out that conception of 'Substance' which earlier philosophers set such store by, and by which so much unifying work used to be done—universal substance which alone has being in and from itself, and of which all the particulars of experience are but forms to which it gives support. Substance has succumbed to the pragmatic criticisms of the English school. It appears now only as another name for the fact that phenomena as they come are actually grouped and given in coherent forms, the very forms in which we finite knowers experience or think them together. These forms of conjunction are as much parts of the tissue of experience as are the terms which they connect; and it is a great pragmatic achievement for recent idealism to have made the world hang together in these directly representable ways instead of drawing its unity from the 'inherence' of its parts—whatever that may mean—in an unimaginable principle behind the scenes.

The idea of one instantaneous or eternal Knower is, as I said, the great intellectualist achievement of our time. Here, both adjectives mean the same thing. This idea has practically replaced the concept of 'Substance', which earlier philosophers valued highly and used to unify so much. Universal substance alone exists in and of itself. All the particulars of experience are merely forms supported by it. Substance has given way to the pragmatic criticisms of the English school. Substance now appears only as another name for a fact: phenomena, as they come, are actually grouped and given in coherent forms. These are the very forms in which we finite knowers experience or think of them together. These ways of joining things are as much part of the fabric of experience as the things they connect. It is a great pragmatic achievement of recent idealism to have made the world hold together in these directly representable ways. It no longer draws the world’s unity from the 'inherence' of its parts in an unimaginable principle behind the scenes, whatever that may mean.

'The world is one,' therefore, just so far as we experience it to be concatenated, one by as many definite conjunctions as appear. But then also NOT one by just as many definite DISjunctions as we find. The oneness and the manyness of it thus obtain in respects which can be separately named. It is neither a universe pure and simple nor a multiverse pure and simple. And its various manners of being one suggest, for their accurate ascertainment, so many distinct programs of scientific work. Thus the pragmatic question 'What is the oneness known-as? What practical difference will it make?' saves us from all feverish excitement over it as a principle of sublimity and carries us forward into the stream of experience with a cool head. The stream may indeed reveal far more connexion and union than we now suspect, but we are not entitled on pragmatic principles to claim absolute oneness in any respect in advance.

'The world is one,' then, only as far as we experience it as connected. It is one in as many ways as we find definite connections. But it is also NOT one in as many ways as we find definite DISconnections. The world's oneness and its manyness exist in ways we can name separately. It is neither simply a universe nor simply a multiverse. And each of its different kinds of oneness calls for a separate program of scientific work to determine it accurately. So the pragmatic question 'What do we know this oneness as? What practical difference will it make?' keeps us from becoming feverishly excited about oneness as a principle of sublimity. It carries us forward into the stream of experience with a cool head. The stream may indeed reveal far more connection and union than we now suspect. But pragmatic principles do not entitle us to claim absolute oneness in any respect in advance.

It is so difficult to see definitely what absolute oneness can mean, that probably the majority of you are satisfied with the sober attitude which we have reached. Nevertheless there are possibly some radically monistic souls among you who are not content to leave the one and the many on a par. Union of various grades, union of diverse types, union that stops at non-conductors, union that merely goes from next to next, and means in many cases outer nextness only, and not a more internal bond, union of concatenation, in short; all that sort of thing seems to you a halfway stage of thought. The oneness of things, superior to their manyness, you think must also be more deeply true, must be the more real aspect of the world. The pragmatic view, you are sure, gives us a universe imperfectly rational. The real universe must form an unconditional unit of being, something consolidated, with its parts co-implicated through and through. Only then could we consider our estate completely rational. There is no doubt whatever that this ultra-monistic way of thinking means a great deal to many minds. "One Life, One Truth, one Love, one Principle, One Good, One God"—I quote from a Christian Science leaflet which the day's mail brings into my hands—beyond doubt such a confession of faith has pragmatically an emotional value, and beyond doubt the word 'one' contributes to the value quite as much as the other words. But if we try to realize INTELLECTUALLY what we can possibly MEAN by such a glut of oneness we are thrown right back upon our pragmatistic determinations again. It means either the mere name One, the universe of discourse; or it means the sum total of all the ascertainable particular conjunctions and concatenations; or, finally, it means some one vehicle of conjunction treated as all-inclusive, like one origin, one purpose, or one knower. In point of fact it always means one KNOWER to those who take it intellectually to-day. The one knower involves, they think, the other forms of conjunction. His world must have all its parts co-implicated in the one logical-aesthetical-teleological unit-picture which is his eternal dream.

It is very difficult to see clearly what absolute oneness can mean. So probably most of you are satisfied with the sober position we have reached. Still, some of you may be radical monists who are not content to put the one and the many on equal terms. There are unions of various degrees and kinds. Some stop at barriers that do not conduct. Some merely go from one thing to the next. In many cases, they mean only that things are next to one another, not that they have a deeper connection. In short, there is union through chains of connections. All these kinds of union seem to you only a halfway point in thought. You think the oneness of things is superior to their manyness. You think oneness must also be more deeply true, the more real aspect of the world. You are sure that the pragmatic view gives us a universe that is not fully rational. The real universe must be an unconditional unity of being, something consolidated, with its parts thoroughly interconnected. Only then could we consider our situation completely rational. There is no doubt that this ultra-monistic way of thinking means a great deal to many people. "One Life, One Truth, one Love, one Principle, One Good, One God." I quote from a Christian Science leaflet that arrived in today's mail. Such a statement of faith undoubtedly has emotional value in practical terms. And the word 'one' undoubtedly contributes to that value just as much as the other words. But if we try to understand INTELLECTUALLY what we can possibly MEAN by so much oneness, we are thrown right back on our pragmatic conclusions. Oneness means either the mere name One, the universe of discourse, or the sum of all the particular connections and chains of connections we can discover. Finally, oneness may mean some one means of connection treated as all-inclusive, such as one origin, one purpose, or one knower. In fact, for those who understand oneness intellectually today, it always means one KNOWER. They think the one knower implies the other forms of connection. In his world, all the parts must be interconnected in the one unified picture that is his eternal dream. That picture is a logical, aesthetic, and purposive whole.

The character of the absolute knower's picture is however so impossible for us to represent clearly, that we may fairly suppose that the authority which absolute monism undoubtedly possesses, and probably always will possess over some persons, draws its strength far less from intellectual than from mystical grounds. To interpret absolute monism worthily, be a mystic. Mystical states of mind in every degree are shown by history, usually tho not always, to make for the monistic view. This is no proper occasion to enter upon the general subject of mysticism, but I will quote one mystical pronouncement to show just what I mean. The paragon of all monistic systems is the Vedanta philosophy of Hindostan, and the paragon of Vedantist missionaries was the late Swami Vivekananda who visited our shores some years ago. The method of Vedantism is the mystical method. You do not reason, but after going through a certain discipline YOU SEE, and having seen, you can report the truth. Vivekananda thus reports the truth in one of his lectures here:

Yet we cannot clearly imagine what the absolute knower’s picture is like. So we may reasonably suppose that absolute monism draws its authority far less from intellectual than from mystical grounds. It undoubtedly has authority over some people, and probably always will. To do justice to absolute monism, be a mystic. History shows that mystical states of mind, in every degree, usually, though not always, lead toward the monistic view. This is not the place to discuss mysticism in general, but I will quote one mystical statement to show just what I mean. The finest example of all monistic systems is the Vedanta philosophy of Hindostan. The finest Vedantist missionary was the late Swami Vivekananda, who visited our shores some years ago. Vedantism uses the mystical method. You do not reason. Instead, after following a certain discipline, YOU SEE. Having seen, you can report the truth. Vivekananda reports the truth in one of his lectures here:

"Where is any more misery for him who sees this Oneness in the Universe...this Oneness of life, Oneness of everything? ...This separation between man and man, man and woman, man and child, nation from nation, earth from moon, moon from sun, this separation between atom and atom is the cause really of all the misery, and the Vedanta says this separation does not exist, it is not real. It is merely apparent, on the surface. In the heart of things there is Unity still. If you go inside you find that Unity between man and man, women and children, races and races, high and low, rich and poor, the gods and men: all are One, and animals too, if you go deep enough, and he who has attained to that has no more delusion. ... Where is any more delusion for him? What can delude him? He knows the reality of everything, the secret of everything. Where is there any more misery for him? What does he desire? He has traced the reality of everything unto the Lord, that centre, that Unity of everything, and that is Eternal Bliss, Eternal Knowledge, Eternal Existence. Neither death nor disease, nor sorrow nor misery, nor discontent is there ... in the centre, the reality, there is no one to be mourned for, no one to be sorry for. He has penetrated everything, the Pure One, the Formless, the Bodiless, the Stainless, He the Knower, He the Great Poet, the Self-Existent, He who is giving to everyone what he deserves."

"Where can misery remain for someone who sees this Oneness in the Universe... this Oneness of life, this Oneness of everything? ...Separation is really the cause of all misery. There is separation between people, between men and women, between adults and children, between nations. There is separation between the earth and the moon, the moon and the sun, and between atoms. Vedanta says this separation does not exist. It is not real. It only appears to exist on the surface. At the heart of things, Unity remains. If you look inside, you find Unity between people, women and children, races, high and low, rich and poor, gods and humans. All are One, and animals too, if you go deep enough. Anyone who has reached that Unity has no more delusion. ...Where can delusion remain for such a person? What can deceive him? He knows the reality of everything, the secret of everything. Where can misery remain for him? What does he desire? He has traced the reality of everything back to the Lord, that center, that Unity of everything. That Unity is Eternal Bliss, Eternal Knowledge, Eternal Existence. There is no death or disease, no sorrow or misery, no discontent there ... at the center, in reality, there is no one to mourn, no one to feel sorry for. He has entered into everything, he who is Pure, Formless, Bodiless, and Stainless. He is the Knower, the Great Poet, the Self-Existent One, who gives everyone what they deserve."

Observe how radical the character of the monism here is. Separation is not simply overcome by the One, it is denied to exist. There is no many. We are not parts of the One; It has no parts; and since in a sense we undeniably ARE, it must be that each of us is the One, indivisibly and totally. AN ABSOLUTE ONE, AND I THAT ONE—surely we have here a religion which, emotionally considered, has a high pragmatic value; it imparts a perfect sumptuosity of security. As our Swami says in another place:

Notice how radical this monism is. It does not simply say that the One overcomes separation. It denies that separation exists at all. There is no many. We are not parts of the One, because the One has no parts. And since we undeniably do exist in some sense, each of us must be the One, indivisible and complete. AN ABSOLUTE ONE, AND I AM THAT ONE. Surely, as an emotional experience, this religion has great pragmatic value. It gives us a perfectly luxurious sense of security. As our Swami says elsewhere:

"When man has seen himself as one with the infinite Being of the universe, when all separateness has ceased, when all men, all women, all angels, all gods, all animals, all plants, the whole universe has been melted into that oneness, then all fear disappears. Whom to fear? Can I hurt myself? Can I kill myself? Can I injure myself? Do you fear yourself? Then will all sorrow disappear. What can cause me sorrow? I am the One Existence of the universe. Then all jealousies will disappear; of whom to be jealous? Of myself? Then all bad feelings disappear. Against whom will I have this bad feeling? Against myself? There is none in the universe but me. ... Kill out this differentiation; kill out this superstition that there are many. 'He who, in this world of many, sees that One; he who in this mass of insentiency sees that One Sentient Being; he who in this world of shadow catches that Reality, unto him belongs eternal peace, unto none else, unto none else.'"

"When a person sees themselves as one with the infinite Being of the universe, all separateness ends. All men, all women, all angels, all gods, all animals, all plants, and the whole universe melt into that oneness. Then all fear disappears. Whom is there to fear? Can I hurt myself? Can I kill myself? Can I injure myself? Do you fear yourself? Then all sorrow will disappear. What can cause me sorrow? I am the One Existence of the universe. Then all jealousy will disappear. Whom could I be jealous of? Myself? Then all bad feelings disappear. Who could I have bad feelings toward? Myself? There is no one in the universe but me. ... Get rid of this sense of separation. Get rid of the superstition that there are many. 'Whoever sees the One in this world of many has eternal peace. Whoever sees the One Sentient Being in this mass of things without consciousness has eternal peace. Whoever sees that Reality in this world of shadows has eternal peace. No one else does, no one else does.'"

We all have some ear for this monistic music: it elevates and reassures. We all have at least the germ of mysticism in us. And when our idealists recite their arguments for the Absolute, saying that the slightest union admitted anywhere carries logically absolute Oneness with it, and that the slightest separation admitted anywhere logically carries disunion remediless and complete, I cannot help suspecting that the palpable weak places in the intellectual reasonings they use are protected from their own criticism by a mystical feeling that, logic or no logic, absolute Oneness must somehow at any cost be true. Oneness overcomes MORAL separateness at any rate. In the passion of love we have the mystic germ of what might mean a total union of all sentient life. This mystical germ wakes up in us on hearing the monistic utterances, acknowledges their authority, and assigns to intellectual considerations a secondary place.

We all have some ear for this monistic music. It lifts our spirits and reassures us. We all have at least the seed of mysticism in us. Our idealists argue for the Absolute. They say that admitting even the slightest union anywhere logically means admitting absolute Oneness. They also say that admitting even the slightest separation anywhere logically means admitting complete, irreparable disunion. When I hear these arguments, I cannot help suspecting that a mystical feeling shields their obvious weak points from the idealists’ own criticism. That feeling tells them that, logic or no logic, absolute Oneness must somehow be true, whatever the cost. At any rate, Oneness overcomes MORAL separateness. In the passion of love, we have the mystical seed of what might mean a total union of all sentient life. This mystical seed awakens in us when we hear statements of monism. It acknowledges their authority and gives intellectual considerations a secondary place.

I will dwell no longer on these religious and moral aspects of the question in this lecture. When I come to my final lecture there will be something more to say.

I will say no more about the religious and moral aspects of the question in this lecture. I will have more to say about them in my final lecture.

Leave then out of consideration for the moment the authority which mystical insights may be conjectured eventually to possess; treat the problem of the One and the Many in a purely intellectual way; and we see clearly enough where pragmatism stands. With her criterion of the practical differences that theories make, we see that she must equally abjure absolute monism and absolute pluralism. The world is one just so far as its parts hang together by any definite connexion. It is many just so far as any definite connexion fails to obtain. And finally it is growing more and more unified by those systems of connexion at least which human energy keeps framing as time goes on.

For the moment, let us set aside the authority that mystical insights may eventually be thought to have. Let us consider the problem of the One and the Many in purely intellectual terms. Then we can see clearly where pragmatism stands. Pragmatism judges theories by the practical differences they make. By that standard, it must reject both absolute monism and absolute pluralism. The world is one insofar as its parts are joined by any definite connection. It is many insofar as any definite connection is missing. Finally, the world is growing more unified, at least through the systems of connection that human effort keeps creating over time.

It is possible to imagine alternative universes to the one we know, in which the most various grades and types of union should be embodied. Thus the lowest grade of universe would be a world of mere WITHNESS, of which the parts were only strung together by the conjunction 'and.' Such a universe is even now the collection of our several inner lives. The spaces and times of your imagination, the objects and events of your day-dreams are not only more or less incoherent inter se, but are wholly out of definite relation with the similar contents of anyone else's mind. Our various reveries now as we sit here compenetrate each other idly without influencing or interfering. They coexist, but in no order and in no receptacle, being the nearest approach to an absolute 'many' that we can conceive. We cannot even imagine any reason why they SHOULD be known all together, and we can imagine even less, if they were known together, how they could be known as one systematic whole.

We can imagine universes different from the one we know, with many different degrees and kinds of unity. The lowest kind of universe would be a world of mere WITHNESS. Its parts would be strung together only by the word 'and.' The collection of our separate inner lives is even now such a universe. The spaces and times you imagine, and the objects and events in your daydreams, are more or less disconnected from one another. They also have no definite relationship to the similar contents of anyone else's mind. As we sit here, our various daydreams mingle without influencing or interfering with one another. They coexist, but in no order and in no shared space. They are the closest we can imagine to an absolute 'many.' We cannot even imagine why they SHOULD be known all together. And if they were known together, it is even harder to imagine how they could be known as one organized whole.

But add our sensations and bodily actions, and the union mounts to a much higher grade. Our audita et visa and our acts fall into those receptacles of time and space in which each event finds its date and place. They form 'things' and are of 'kinds' too, and can be classed. Yet we can imagine a world of things and of kinds in which the causal interactions with which we are so familiar should not exist. Everything there might be inert towards everything else, and refuse to propagate its influence. Or gross mechanical influences might pass, but no chemical action. Such worlds would be far less unified than ours. Again there might be complete physico-chemical interaction, but no minds; or minds, but altogether private ones, with no social life; or social life limited to acquaintance, but no love; or love, but no customs or institutions that should systematize it. No one of these grades of universe would be absolutely irrational or disintegrated, inferior tho it might appear when looked at from the higher grades. For instance, if our minds should ever become 'telepathically' connected, so that we knew immediately, or could under certain conditions know immediately, each what the other was thinking, the world we now live in would appear to the thinkers in that world to have been of an inferior grade.

But when we add our sensations and bodily actions, the unity rises to a much higher level. What we hear and see, and what we do, all have their place in time and space. Each event has a date and a location. These experiences and actions form 'things' and belong to 'kinds' too, so they can be classified. Yet we can imagine a world of things and kinds without the familiar causal interactions of our own. Everything there might be inert toward everything else and have no influence beyond itself. Or mechanical influences might pass between things, but without any chemical action. Such worlds would be far less unified than ours. There might also be a world with complete physical and chemical interaction, but no minds. Or there might be minds, but entirely private ones, with no social life. Or social life might be limited to acquaintance, with no love. Or there might be love, but no customs or institutions to give it a systematic form. None of these kinds of universe would be completely irrational or disintegrated. Each might seem inferior, though, when viewed from the perspective of a more unified world. For example, our minds might someday become 'telepathically' connected. We would then know immediately what each other was thinking, or could know immediately under certain conditions. To the thinkers in that world, the world we now live in would seem inferior.

With the whole of past eternity open for our conjectures to range in, it may be lawful to wonder whether the various kinds of union now realized in the universe that we inhabit may not possibly have been successively evolved after the fashion in which we now see human systems evolving in consequence of human needs. If such an hypothesis were legitimate, total oneness would appear at the end of things rather than at their origin. In other words the notion of the 'Absolute' would have to be replaced by that of the 'Ultimate.' The two notions would have the same content—the maximally unified content of fact, namely—but their time-relations would be positively reversed.⁷

With all of past eternity open to speculation, we may wonder how the different kinds of unity in our universe arose. Could they have evolved one after another, as we now see human systems evolve in response to human needs? If this hypothesis were valid, complete unity would appear at the end of things rather than at their origin. In other words, the idea of the 'Absolute' would have to be replaced by the idea of the 'Ultimate.' Both ideas would have the same content, namely, the most unified possible body of facts. But their relation to time would be exactly reversed.⁷

After discussing the unity of the universe in this pragmatic way, you ought to see why I said in my second lecture, borrowing the word from my friend G. Papini, that pragmatism tends to UNSTIFFEN all our theories. The world's oneness has generally been affirmed abstractly only, and as if anyone who questioned it must be an idiot. The temper of monists has been so vehement, as almost at times to be convulsive; and this way of holding a doctrine does not easily go with reasonable discussion and the drawing of distinctions. The theory of the Absolute, in particular, has had to be an article of faith, affirmed dogmatically and exclusively. The One and All, first in the order of being and of knowing, logically necessary itself, and uniting all lesser things in the bonds of mutual necessity, how could it allow of any mitigation of its inner rigidity? The slightest suspicion of pluralism, the minutest wiggle of independence of any one of its parts from the control of the totality, would ruin it. Absolute unity brooks no degrees—as well might you claim absolute purity for a glass of water because it contains but a single little cholera-germ. The independence, however infinitesimal, of a part, however small, would be to the Absolute as fatal as a cholera-germ.

After discussing the unity of the universe in this pragmatic way, you should see why I said pragmatism tends to UNSTIFFEN all our theories. I said this in my second lecture, borrowing the word from my friend G. Papini. People have generally affirmed the world's oneness only in abstract terms. They have spoken as if anyone who questioned it must be an idiot. Monists have been so forceful that they have sometimes seemed almost convulsive. And holding a doctrine in this way does not lend itself to reasonable discussion or to making distinctions. The theory of the Absolute, in particular, has had to be an article of faith, asserted dogmatically and exclusively. The One and All comes first in the order of being and of knowing. It is itself logically necessary, and it binds all lesser things together in mutual necessity. How could it allow any lessening of its inner rigidity? The slightest hint of pluralism would ruin it. So would the tiniest degree of independence of any one part from the control of the whole. Absolute unity admits no degrees. You might as well claim that a glass of water is absolutely pure because it contains only one tiny cholera germ. The independence of a part, however small, would be just as fatal to the Absolute, however tiny that independence might be.

Pluralism on the other hand has no need of this dogmatic rigoristic temper. Provided you grant SOME separation among things, some tremor of independence, some free play of parts on one another, some real novelty or chance, however minute, she is amply satisfied, and will allow you any amount, however great, of real union. How much of union there may be is a question that she thinks can only be decided empirically. The amount may be enormous, colossal; but absolute monism is shattered if, along with all the union, there has to be granted the slightest modicum, the most incipient nascency, or the most residual trace, of a separation that is not 'overcome.'

Pluralism, on the other hand, has no need for such a rigid, dogmatic attitude. It is fully satisfied as long as you grant SOME separation among things. That means some degree of independence, some freedom for parts to interact, or some real novelty or chance, however slight. Pluralism will allow any amount of real union, however great. It holds that only experience can determine how much union there is. The amount may be enormous, colossal. But absolute monism is shattered if, alongside all that union, there is even the slightest bit of separation that is not 'overcome', whether just beginning or barely remaining.

Pragmatism, pending the final empirical ascertainment of just what the balance of union and disunion among things may be, must obviously range herself upon the pluralistic side. Some day, she admits, even total union, with one knower, one origin, and a universe consolidated in every conceivable way, may turn out to be the most acceptable of all hypotheses. Meanwhile the opposite hypothesis, of a world imperfectly unified still, and perhaps always to remain so, must be sincerely entertained. This latter hypothesis is pluralism's doctrine. Since absolute monism forbids its being even considered seriously, branding it as irrational from the start, it is clear that pragmatism must turn its back on absolute monism, and follow pluralism's more empirical path.

Until experience finally establishes how much things are united or divided, pragmatism must clearly take the pluralist side. Pragmatism admits that complete unity may someday prove to be the most acceptable of all hypotheses. This would mean one knower, one origin, and a universe united in every conceivable way. Meanwhile, pragmatism must seriously consider the opposite hypothesis. The world is still imperfectly unified and perhaps will always remain so. This hypothesis is the doctrine of pluralism. Absolute monism forbids even considering pluralism seriously, declaring it irrational from the start. Clearly, then, pragmatism must turn away from absolute monism and follow the more empirical path of pluralism.

This leaves us with the common-sense world, in which we find things partly joined and partly disjoined. 'Things,' then, and their 'conjunctions'—what do such words mean, pragmatically handled? In my next lecture, I will apply the pragmatic method to the stage of philosophizing known as Common Sense.

This leaves us with the common-sense world, where we find things partly connected and partly separate. So what do 'things' and their 'connections' mean when we approach them pragmatically? In my next lecture, I will apply the pragmatic method to the stage of philosophizing known as Common Sense.