[1287a] We will next consider the absolute monarch that we have just mentioned, who does everything according to his own will: for a king governing under the direction of laws which he is obliged to follow does not of himself create any particular species of government, as we have already said: for in every state whatsoever, either aristocracy or democracy, it is easy to appoint a general for life; and there are many who entrust the administration of affairs to one person only; such is the government at Dyrrachium, and nearly the same at Opus. As for an absolute monarchy as it is called, that is to say, when the whole state is wholly subject to the will of one person, namely the king, it seems to many that it is unnatural that one man should have the entire rule over his fellow-citizens when the state consists of equals: for nature requires that the same right and the same rank should necessarily take place amongst all those who are equal by nature: for as it would be hurtful to the body for those who are of different constitutions to observe the same regimen, either of diet or clothing, so is it with respect to the honours of the state as hurtful, that those who are equal in merit should be unequal in rank; for which reason it is as much a man's duty to submit to command as to assume it, and this also by rotation; for this is law, for order is law; and it is more proper that law should govern than any one of the citizens: upon the same principle, if it is advantageous to place the supreme power in some particular persons, they should be appointed to be only guardians, and the servants of the laws, for the supreme power must be placed somewhere; but they say, that it is unjust that where all are equal one person should continually enjoy it. But it seems unlikely that man should be able to adjust that which the law cannot determine; it may be replied, that the law having laid down the best rules possible, leaves the adjustment and application of particulars to the discretion of the magistrate; besides, it allows anything to be altered which experience proves may be better established. Moreover, he who would place the supreme power in mind, would place it in God and the laws; but he who entrusts man with it, gives it to a wild beast, for such his appetites sometimes make him; for passion influences those who are in power, even the very best of men: for which reason law is reason without desire.
[1287a] We will next consider the absolute monarch just mentioned, who does everything according to his own will. A king who governs under laws he must obey does not, by himself, create a distinct form of government. We have already made this point. In any state, whether an aristocracy or a democracy, it is easy to appoint a general for life. Many states also entrust the management of their affairs to just one person. Such is the government at Dyrrachium, and the government at Opus is nearly the same. In what is called absolute monarchy, the whole state is entirely subject to one person's will, namely the king's. Many consider it unnatural for one man to have complete authority over his fellow citizens when the state consists of equals. For nature requires people who are equal by nature to have the same rights and rank. People with different physical constitutions would be harmed by following the same rules for diet or clothing. Similarly, in matters of public honor, people equal in merit are harmed by being unequal in rank. For this reason, a man has as much duty to obey as to command, taking turns at each. For this arrangement is law, since order is law. And it is more fitting for law to govern than for any individual citizen to govern. By the same principle, if giving supreme power to particular people is beneficial, they should only guard and serve the laws. Supreme power must rest somewhere. But opponents of absolute monarchy say that, where everyone is equal, one person cannot justly hold that power permanently. Yet it seems unlikely that a person could settle what the law cannot decide. The reply may be that law lays down the best possible rules. It then leaves officials to use their judgment in deciding particular cases and applying those rules. Moreover, the law allows changes whenever experience shows that better arrangements are possible. Furthermore, whoever would give supreme power to reason would give it to God and the laws. But whoever entrusts that power to a man gives it to a wild beast. For a man's appetites sometimes make him a wild beast. Passion influences people in power, even the very best of men. For this reason, law is reason without desire.
The instance taken from the arts seems fallacious: wherein it is said to be wrong for a sick person to apply for a remedy to books, but that it would be far more eligible to employ those who are skilful in physic; for these do nothing contrary to reason from motives of friendship but earn their money by curing the sick, whereas those who have the management of public affairs do many things through hatred or favour. And, as a proof of what we have advanced, it may be observed, that whenever a sick person suspects that his physician has been persuaded by his enemies to be guilty of any foul practice to him in his profession, he then rather chooses to apply to books for his cure: and not only this [1287b] but even physicians themselves when they are ill call in other physicians: and those who teach others the gymnastic exercises, exercise with those of the same profession, as being incapable from self-partiality to form a proper judgment of what concerns themselves. From whence it is evident, that those who seek for what is just, seek for a mean; now law is a mean. Moreover; the moral law is far superior and conversant with far superior objects than the written law; for the supreme magistrate is safer to be trusted to than the one, though he is inferior to the other. But as it is impossible that one person should have an eye to everything himself, it will be necessary that the supreme magistrate should employ several subordinate ones under him; why then should not this be done at first, instead of appointing one person in this manner? Besides, if, according to what has been already said, the man of worth is on that account fit to govern, two men of worth are certainly better than one: as, for instance, in Homer, "Let two together go:" and also Agamemnon's wish; "Were ten such faithful counsel mine!" Not but that there are even now some particular magistrates invested with supreme power to decide, as judges, those things which the law cannot, as being one of those cases which comes not properly under its jurisdiction; for of those which can there is no doubt: since then laws comprehend some things, but not all, it is necessary to enquire and consider which of the two is preferable, that the best man or the best law should govern; for to reduce every subject which can come under the deliberation of man into a law is impossible.
The example drawn from the arts seems misleading. The argument says that sick people should not seek remedies in books, but should instead turn to skilled physicians. Physicians do not act against reason out of friendship, but earn their money by curing the sick. Those who manage public affairs, however, often act out of hatred or favoritism. We can support our point with the following observation. Suppose a sick person suspects that enemies have persuaded his physician to harm him through medical treatment. He then prefers to seek a cure in books. Nor is that all. [1287b] Even physicians call in other physicians when they are ill. Likewise, those who teach physical exercises train with others in the same profession. Their bias toward themselves prevents them from judging their own needs properly. So clearly, those who seek justice seek an impartial middle ground, and law provides that middle ground. Moreover, moral law is far superior to written law and deals with far more important matters. The supreme magistrate can be trusted more safely than written law, though he is inferior to moral law. But one person cannot oversee everything himself. The supreme magistrate will therefore need several subordinate magistrates. Why not appoint several magistrates from the start, instead of appointing one person in this way? Besides, suppose, as we have already said, that a worthy man is fit to govern because of his worth. Then two worthy men are certainly better than one. As Homer says, "Let two together go:" and Agamemnon wishes, "Were ten such faithful counsel mine!" Even now, however, some individual magistrates have supreme authority to judge matters that the law cannot decide. Such cases fall outside the law’s proper scope. For matters within its scope, there is no doubt that law should rule. Since laws cover some matters but not all, we must examine which is preferable: rule by the best man or by the best law. For it is impossible to make a law covering every subject people might need to deliberate about.
No one then denies, that it is necessary that there should be some person to decide those cases which cannot come under the cognisance of a written law: but we say, that it is better to have many than one; for though every one who decides according to the principles of the law decides justly; yet surely it seems absurd to suppose, that one person can see better with two eyes, and hear better with two ears, or do better with two hands and two feet, than many can do with many: for we see that absolute monarchs now furnish themselves with many eyes and ears and hands and feet; for they entrust those who are friends to them and their government with part of their power; for if they are not friends to the monarch, they will not do what he chooses; but if they are friends to him, they are friends also to his government: but a friend is an equal and like his friend: if then he thinks that such should govern, he thinks that his equal also should govern. These are nearly the objections which are usually made to a kingly power.
No one denies that someone must decide cases not covered by written law. But we say that many people are better than one. Although everyone who decides according to the principles of law decides justly, the following idea surely seems absurd. Can one person see better with two eyes or hear better with two ears than many people with many? Can one person do more with two hands and two feet than many people with many? For we see that absolute monarchs today equip themselves with many eyes, ears, hands, and feet. They do so by entrusting some of their power to friends of themselves and their government. For people who are not the monarch’s friends will not do what he wants. But if they are his friends, they are also friends of his government. Yet a friend is equal to and like his friend. So if the monarch thinks such friends should govern, he thinks his equals should also govern. These are, broadly speaking, the usual objections to kingly power.