It is evident then that in the due government of a family, greater attention should be paid to the several members of it and their virtues than to the possessions or riches of it; and greater to the freemen than the slaves: but here some one may doubt whether there is any other virtue in a slave than his organic services, and of higher estimation than these, as temperance, fortitude, justice, and such-like habits, or whether they possess only bodily qualities: each side of the question has its difficulties; for if they possess these virtues, wherein do they differ from freemen? and that they do not, since they are men, and partakers of reason, is absurd. Nearly the same inquiry may be made concerning a woman and a child, whether these also have their proper virtues; whether a woman ought to be temperate, brave, and just, and whether a child is temperate or no; and indeed this inquiry ought to be general, whether the virtues of those who, by nature, either govern or are governed, are the same or different; for if it is necessary that both of them should partake of the fair and good, why is it also necessary that, without exception, the one should govern, the other always be governed? for this cannot arise from their possessing these qualities in different degrees; for to govern, and to be governed, are things different in species, but more or less are not. And yet it is wonderful that one party ought to have them, and the other not; for if he who is to govern should not be temperate and just, how can he govern well? or if he is to be governed, how can he be governed well? for he who is intemperate [1260a] and a coward will never do what he ought: it is evident then that both parties ought to be virtuous; but there is a difference between them, as there is between those who by nature command and who by nature obey, and this originates in the soul; for in this nature has planted the governing and submitting principle, the virtues of which we say are different, as are those of a rational and an irrational being. It is plain then that the same principle may be extended farther, and that there are in nature a variety of things which govern and are governed; for a freeman is governed in a different manner from a slave, a male from a female, and a man from a child: and all these have parts of mind within them, but in a different manner. Thus a slave can have no power of determination, a woman but a weak one, a child an imperfect one. Thus also must it necessarily be with respect to moral virtues; all must be supposed to possess them, but not in the same manner, but as is best suited to every one's employment; on which account he who is to govern ought to be perfect in moral virtue, for his business is entirely that of an architect, and reason is the architect; while others want only that portion of it which may be sufficient for their station; from whence it is evident, that although moral virtue is common to all those we have spoken of, yet the temperance of a man and a woman are not the same, nor their courage, nor their justice, though Socrates thought otherwise; for the courage of the man consists in commanding, the woman's in obeying; and the same is true in other particulars: and this will be evident to those who will examine different virtues separately; for those who use general terms deceive themselves when they say, that virtue consists in a good disposition of mind, or doing what is right, or something of this sort. They do much better who enumerate the different virtues as Georgias did, than those who thus define them; and as Sophocles speaks of a woman, we think of all persons, that their 'virtues should be applicable to their characters, for says he,
Clearly, then, managing a household properly requires more attention to its members and their virtues than to its property or wealth. Free members also deserve more attention than slaves. But someone may ask whether a slave has any virtue beyond serving as a tool. Can slaves possess more valuable qualities, such as self-control, courage, justice, and similar traits? Or do they possess only bodily qualities? Both answers present difficulties. If slaves possess these virtues, how do they differ from free people? Yet denying them these virtues is absurd, since they are human beings and share in reason. Nearly the same question arises about a woman and a child. Do they also have virtues proper to them? Should a woman be self-controlled, brave, and just? Is a child self-controlled or not? Indeed, we should ask the question more generally. Are the virtues of those who naturally rule the same as those of people naturally ruled, or are they different? If both must share in what is noble and good, why must one always rule and the other always obey? This division cannot arise from possessing these qualities in different degrees. Ruling and being ruled differ in kind, while having more or less of a quality does not. Yet it would be strange for one group to need these virtues and the other not to need them. If a ruler lacks self-control and justice, how can he rule well? If someone being ruled lacks these virtues, how can he be ruled well? For someone who lacks self-control [1260a] and is a coward will never do what he ought. Clearly, then, both groups must be virtuous. But their virtues differ, just as those who naturally command differ from those who naturally obey. This difference begins in the soul. Nature has placed both a ruling element and an obedient element in the soul. We say their virtues differ, as do the virtues of a rational being and an irrational one. Clearly, the same principle applies more broadly. Nature contains many kinds of rulers and subjects. A free man is ruled differently from a slave, a male differently from a female, and a man differently from a child. All possess these parts of the mind, but in different ways. A slave has no capacity to deliberate, a woman has only a weak capacity, and a child has an incomplete one. The same must necessarily hold for moral virtues. We must suppose that all possess them, but not in the same way. Each must possess them in the way best suited to their work. For this reason, a ruler must possess complete moral virtue. His task is entirely that of a master planner, and reason is the master planner. Others need only as much virtue as their position requires. Clearly, then, moral virtue is common to all the people we have discussed. Yet a man's self-control differs from a woman's, as do his courage and justice, though Socrates thought otherwise. A man's courage consists in commanding, and a woman's in obeying. The same holds for the other virtues. Anyone who examines the virtues separately will see this. People deceive themselves by speaking in general terms. They say virtue consists in a good state of mind, in doing what is right, or in something similar. Those who list the different virtues, as Georgias did, do much better than those who define virtue this way. We apply to everyone what Sophocles says about a woman, that their 'virtues should suit their characters, for he says,
"Silence is a woman's ornament,"
"Silence is a virtue in a woman,"
but it is not a man's; and as a child is incomplete, it is evident that his virtue is not to be referred to himself in his present situation, but to that in which he will be complete, and his preceptor. In like manner the virtue of a slave is to be referred to his master; for we laid it down as a maxim, that the use of a slave was to employ him in what you wanted; so that it is clear enough that few virtues are wanted in his station, only that he may not neglect his work through idleness or fear: some person may question if what I have said is true, whether virtue is not necessary for artificers in their calling, for they often through idleness neglect their work, but the difference between them is very great; for a slave is connected with you for life, but the artificer not so nearly: as near therefore as the artificer approaches to the situation of a slave, just so much ought he to have of the virtues of one; for a mean artificer is to a certain point a slave; but then a slave is one of those things which are by nature what they are, but this is not true [1260b] of a shoemaker, or any other artist. It is evident then that a slave ought to be trained to those virtues which are proper for his situation by his master; and not by him who has the power of a master, to teach him any particular art. Those therefore are in the wrong who would deprive slaves of reason, and say that they have only to follow their orders; for slaves want more instruction than children, and thus we determine this matter. It is necessary, I am sensible, for every one who treats upon government, to enter particularly into the relations of husband and wife, and of parent and child, and to show what are the virtues of each and their respective connections with each other; what is right and what is wrong; and how the one ought to be followed, and the other avoided. Since then every family is part of a city, and each of those individuals is part of a family, and the virtue of the parts ought to correspond to the virtue of the whole; it is necessary, that both the wives and children of the community should be instructed correspondent to the nature thereof, if it is of consequence to the virtue of the state, that the wives and children therein should be virtuous, and of consequence it certainly is, for the wives are one half of the free persons; and of the children the succeeding citizens are to be formed. As then we have determined these points, we will leave the rest to be spoken to in another place, as if the subject was now finished; and beginning again anew, first consider the sentiments of those who have treated of the most perfect forms of government.
but it is not a man's. And since a child is incomplete, his virtue clearly must not be judged by his present condition. Instead, it must be judged in relation to his future maturity and his teacher. Likewise, a slave's virtue must be judged in relation to his master. For we established that a slave's purpose is to perform the tasks his master needs done. So clearly, his position requires few virtues, only enough to prevent him from neglecting his work through laziness or fear. Someone may question whether, if my argument is true, craftsmen also need virtue in their work. For craftsmen, too, often neglect their work through laziness. But there is a great difference between craftsmen and slaves. A slave is bound to you for life, but a craftsman is not so closely connected. Therefore, the closer a craftsman's position comes to a slave's, the more he needs a slave's virtues. For a lowly craftsman is, to some extent, a slave. But a slave is among those beings whose condition is determined by nature. The same is not true [1260b] of a shoemaker or any other craftsman. Clearly, then, a master should train his slave in the virtues suited to the slave's position. Such training is not the task of someone whose authority as master extends only to teaching a particular craft. So those who deny slaves the use of reason and say slaves need only obey orders are wrong. For slaves need more instruction than children. This settles the matter. I recognize that anyone discussing government must examine the relationships between husband and wife, and between parent and child. Such a discussion must explain the virtues of each person and how these people relate to one another. It must also explain what is right and wrong, and how to follow the right and avoid the wrong. Now every family is part of a city, and each of these individuals is part of a family. The virtue of the parts should correspond to the virtue of the whole. Therefore, wives and children must be educated in a way that fits the community's form of government. This is necessary if their virtue matters to the virtue of the state. And it certainly does matter, since wives make up half the free population, and children will become the next citizens. Now that we have settled these points, we will leave the remaining questions for another occasion, treating the subject as finished. Let us begin afresh by examining the views of those who have discussed the best forms of government.