CHAPTER 6

But it is not difficult to perceive that those who maintain the contrary opinion have some reason on their side; for a man may become a slave two different ways; for he may be so by law also, and this law is a certain compact, by which whatsoever is taken in battle is adjudged to be the property of the conquerors: but many persons who are conversant in law call in question this pretended right, and say that it would be hard that a man should be compelled by violence to be the slave and subject of another who had the power to compel him, and was his superior in strength; and upon this subject, even of those who are wise, some think one way and some another; but the cause of this doubt and variety of opinions arises from hence, that great abilities, when accompanied with proper means, are generally able to succeed by force: for victory is always owing to a superiority in some advantageous circumstances; so that it seems that force never prevails but in consequence of great abilities. But still the dispute concerning the justice of it remains; for some persons think, that justice consists in benevolence, others think it just that the powerful should govern: in the midst of these contrary opinions, there are no reasons sufficient to convince us, that the right of being master and governor ought not to be placed with those who have the greatest abilities. Some persons, entirely resting upon the right which the law gives (for that which is legal is in some respects just), insist upon it that slavery occasioned by war is just, not that they say it is wholly so, for it may happen that the principle upon which the wars were commenced is unjust; moreover no one will say that a man who is unworthily in slavery is therefore a slave; for if so, men of the noblest families might happen to be slaves, and the descendants of slaves, if they should chance to be taken prisoners in war and sold: to avoid this difficulty they say that such persons should not be called slaves, but barbarians only should; but when they say this, they do nothing more than inquire who is a slave by nature, which was what we at first said; for we must acknowledge that there are some persons who, wherever they are, must necessarily be slaves, but others in no situation; thus also it is with those of noble descent: it is not only in their own country that they are Esteemed as such, but everywhere, but the barbarians are respected on this account at home only; as if nobility and freedom were of two sorts, the one universal, the other not so. Thus says the Helen of Theodectes:

But it is easy to see that those who hold the opposite view have some reason on their side. For a man may become a slave in two different ways, including by law. This law is an agreement that whatever is captured in battle belongs to the conquerors. But many people familiar with the law challenge this supposed right. They say it would be unjust to force a man into slavery and submission merely because another can overpower him. Even wise people disagree on this subject. The uncertainty and disagreement arise because great ability, when supported by suitable resources, can generally prevail through force. For victory always depends on superiority in some favorable circumstances. So force seems never to prevail without great ability. But the question of justice remains disputed. Some think justice consists in goodwill toward others. Others think it is just for the powerful to rule. Amid these opposing views, no argument sufficiently shows that those with the greatest abilities should not be masters and rulers. Some rely entirely on the right granted by law, since what is legal is just in some respects. They insist that enslavement through war is just, though they do not claim it is entirely just. For a war may have been started on unjust grounds. Moreover, no one would say that a man wrongly enslaved is therefore truly a slave. Otherwise, even men from the noblest families might become slaves, and their descendants might also be slaves. This could happen if those men were captured in war and sold. To avoid this difficulty, those defending enslavement say such men should not be called slaves. Only barbarians should be called slaves. But in saying this, they are merely asking who is a slave by nature, as we said at first. For we must acknowledge that some people must necessarily be slaves wherever they are, while others are slaves nowhere. The same applies to people of noble descent. They are regarded as noble not only in their own country, but everywhere. Barbarians, however, are respected for noble descent only at home. This treats nobility and freedom as if each had two forms, one universal and the other not. Thus Helen in Theodectes says:

Those who express sentiments like these, shew only that they distinguish the slave and the freeman, the noble and the ignoble from each other by their virtues and their [1255b] vices; for they think it reasonable, that as a man begets a man, and a beast a beast, so from a good man, a good man should be descended; and this is what nature desires to do, but frequently cannot accomplish it. It is evident then that this doubt has some reason in it, and that these persons are not slaves, and those freemen, by the appointment of nature; and also that in some instances it is sufficiently clear, that it is advantageous to both parties for this man to be a slave, and that to be a master, and that it is right and just, that some should be governed, and others govern, in the manner that nature intended; of which sort of government is that which a master exercises over a slave. But to govern ill is disadvantageous to both; for the same thing is useful to the part and to the whole, to the body and to the soul; but the slave is as it were a part of the master, as if he were an animated part of his body, though separate. For which reason a mutual utility and friendship may subsist between the master and the slave, I mean when they are placed by nature in that relation to each other, for the contrary takes place amongst those who are reduced to slavery by the law, or by conquest.

People who express these views distinguish slaves from free people, and the noble from the lowborn, only by their virtues and [1255b] vices. For they think it reasonable that a good man should have a good son, just as humans produce humans and animals produce animals. Nature aims at this result but often cannot achieve it. Clearly, then, there is some reason for this doubt. Nature does not determine that these people are slaves and those people are free. Yet in some cases, it is clear enough that both parties benefit when one is a slave and the other a master. It is also right and just that some should be ruled and others should rule as nature intended. A master's rule over a slave is one such form of government. But ruling badly harms both parties. For the same thing benefits both the part and the whole, both the body and the soul. The slave is, in a sense, part of the master, like a living part of his body, though separate. For this reason, mutual benefit and friendship may exist between master and slave when nature places them in that relationship. But the opposite holds for those enslaved by law or conquest.