Chapter 5

It is also the business of the legislator and all those who would support a government of this sort not to make it too great a work, or too perfect; but to aim only to render it stable: for, let a state be constituted ever so badly, there is no difficulty in its continuing a few days: they should therefore endeavour to procure its safety by all those ways which we have described in assigning the causes of the preservation and destruction of governments; avoiding what is hurtful, and by framing such laws, written and unwritten, as contain those things which chiefly tend to the preservation of the state; nor to suppose that that is useful either for a democratic or [1320a] an oligarchic form of government which contributes to make them more purely so, but what will contribute to their duration: but our demagogues at present, to flatter the people, occasion frequent confiscations in the courts; for which reason those who have the welfare of the state really at heart should act directly opposite to what they do, and enact a law to prevent forfeitures from being divided amongst the people or paid into the treasury, but to have them set apart for sacred uses: for those who are of a bad disposition would not then be the less cautious, as their punishment would be the same; and the community would not be so ready to condemn those whom they sat in judgment on when they were to get nothing by it: they should also take care that the causes which are brought before the public should be as few as possible, and punish with the utmost severity those who rashly brought an action against any one; for it is not the commons but the nobles who are generally prosecuted: for in all things the citizens of the same state ought to be affectionate to each other, at least not to treat those who have the chief power in it as their enemies. Now, as the democracies which have been lately established are very numerous, and it is difficult to get the common people to attend the public assemblies without they are paid for it, this, when there is not a sufficient public revenue, is fatal to the nobles; for the deficiencies therein must be necessarily made up by taxes, confiscations, and fines imposed by corrupt courts of justice: which things have already destroyed many democracies. Whenever, then, the revenues of the state are small, there should be but few public assemblies and but few courts of justice: these, however, should have very extensive jurisdictions, but should continue sitting a few days only, for by this means the rich would not fear the expense, although they should receive nothing for their attendance, though the poor did; and judgment also would be given much better; for the rich will not choose to be long absent from their own affairs, but will willingly be so for a short time: and, when there are sufficient revenues, a different conduct ought to be pursued from what the demagogues at present follow; for now they divide the surplus of the public money amongst the poor; these receive it and again want the same supply, while the giving it is like pouring water into a sieve: but the true patriot in a democracy ought to take care that the majority of the community are not too poor, for this is the cause of rapacity in that government; he therefore should endeavour that they may enjoy perpetual plenty; and as this also is advantageous to the rich, what can be saved out of the public money should be put by, and then divided at once amongst the poor, if possible, in such a quantity as may enable every one of them to purchase a little field, and, if that cannot be done, at least to give each of them enough to procure the implements [1320b] of trade and husbandry; and if there is not enough for all to receive so much at once, then to divide it according to tribes or any other allotment. In the meantime let the rich pay them for necessary services, but not be obliged to find them in useless amusements. And something like this was the manner in which they managed at Carthage, and preserved the affections of the people; for by continually sending some of their community into colonies they procured plenty. It is also worthy of a sensible and generous nobility to divide the poor amongst them, and supplying them with what is necessary, induce them to work; or to imitate the conduct of the people at Tarentum: for they, permitting the poor to partake in common of everything which is needful for them, gain the affections of the commonalty. They have also two different ways of electing their magistrates; for some are chosen by vote, others by lot; by the last, that the people at large may have some share in the administration; by the former, that the state may be well governed: the same may be accomplished if of the same magistrates you choose some by vote, others by lot. And thus much for the manner in which democracies ought to be established.

Lawmakers and everyone who supports this kind of government should not try to make it too elaborate or too perfect. They should aim only to make it stable. For even a very badly organized state can easily survive a few days. They should therefore secure its safety through all the methods we have described when discussing what preserves and destroys governments. They should avoid harmful practices and establish written and unwritten laws that do most to preserve the state. They should not think that making a democracy or [1320a] an oligarchy more extreme benefits that form of government. What benefits either form is whatever helps it last. But today’s demagogues flatter the people by frequently bringing about confiscations through the courts. Those who truly care about the state’s welfare should therefore do the opposite. They should pass a law preventing confiscated property from being distributed among the people or paid into the treasury. Instead, the property should be reserved for sacred purposes. Wrongdoers would be just as cautious, since their punishment would remain the same. And the community would be less eager to convict defendants if it gained nothing from their conviction. Lawmakers should also ensure that as few cases as possible come before the public. They should punish with the greatest severity anyone who recklessly brings a case against another person. For those prosecuted are generally nobles, not ordinary people. In every matter, citizens of the same state should show goodwill toward one another. At least, they should not treat those who hold the chief power in the state as enemies. The recently established democracies have very large populations. It is difficult to get ordinary people to attend public assemblies unless they are paid. When public revenue is insufficient, paying for attendance is disastrous for the nobles. The shortfall must necessarily be covered by taxes, confiscations, and fines imposed by corrupt courts. These practices have already destroyed many democracies. So whenever state revenues are small, public assemblies and courts should meet infrequently. The courts, however, should have authority over a very wide range of cases, but sit for only a few days. This arrangement would keep the rich from fearing the expense. That would be true even if the rich received no payment for attending, while the poor were paid. Judgments would also be much better. For the rich are unwilling to spend long periods away from their own affairs, but willingly attend for short periods. When revenues are sufficient, governments should follow a different course from today’s demagogues. These demagogues distribute surplus public money among the poor. The poor receive the money, then need the same help again. Giving money this way is like pouring water into a sieve. But a true patriot in a democracy should ensure that most citizens are not too poor. For such poverty causes greed and plunder in that government. The patriot should therefore try to ensure that the people enjoy lasting prosperity. Since this also benefits the rich, any public money that can be saved should be set aside. The savings should then be distributed among the poor in a single payment. If possible, each person should receive enough to buy a small field. If that is impossible, each should at least receive enough to obtain tools [1320b] for a trade or farming. If there is not enough to give everyone that much at once, distribute it by tribes or some other grouping. Meanwhile, let the rich pay the poor for necessary services, without being required to provide useless entertainments. Carthage followed something like this policy and preserved the people’s goodwill. By continually sending some citizens to colonies, Carthage secured prosperity for them. Sensible and generous nobles would also do well to divide the poor among themselves. They should provide the poor with necessities and encourage them to work. Or they could follow the example of the people of Tarentum. There, the poor are allowed to share in the use of everything they need. Through this practice, the people of Tarentum win the goodwill of the common people. They also have two different ways of selecting magistrates. Some are elected by vote, while others are chosen by lot. Selection by lot gives the people at large some share in government. Election by vote ensures that the state is well governed. The same result can be achieved by filling some positions within the same magistracy by vote and others by lot. So much, then, for how democracies should be established.