Chapter 2

Chapter 2

3 min

Now the foundation of a democratical state is liberty, and people have been accustomed to say this as if here only liberty was to be found; for they affirm that this is the end proposed by every democracy. But one part of liberty is to govern and be governed alternately; for, according to democratical justice, equality is measured by numbers, and not by worth: and this being just, it is necessary that the supreme power should be vested in the people at large; and that what the majority determine should be final: so that in a democracy the poor ought to have more power than the rich, as being the greater number; for this is one mark of liberty which all framers of a democracy lay down as a criterion of that state; another is, to live as every one likes; for this, they say, is a right which liberty gives, since he is a slave who must live as he likes not. This, then, is another criterion of a democracy. Hence arises the claim to be under no command whatsoever to any one, upon any account, any otherwise than by rotation, and that just as far only as that person is, in his turn, under his also. This also is conducive to that equality which liberty demands. These things being premised, and such being the government, it follows that such rules as the following should be observed in it, that all the magistrates should be chosen out of all the people, and all to command each, and each in his turn all: that all the magistrates should be chosen by lot, except to those offices only which required some particular knowledge and skill: that no census, or a very small one, should be required to qualify a man for any office: that none should be in the same employment twice, or very few, and very seldom, except in the army: that all their appointments should be limited to a very short time, or at least as many as possible: that the whole community should be qualified to judge in all causes whatsoever, let the object be ever so extensive, ever so interesting, or of ever so high a nature; as at Athens, where the people at large judge the magistrates when they come out of office, and decide concerning public affairs as well as private contracts: that the supreme power should be in the public assembly; and that no magistrate should be allowed any discretionary power but in a few instances, and of no consequence to public business. Of all magistrates a senate is best suited to a democracy, where the whole community is not paid for giving their attendance; for in that case it loses its power; for then the people will bring all causes before them, by appeal, as we have already mentioned in a former book. In the next place, there should, if possible, be a fund to pay all the citizens—who have any share in the management of public affairs, either as members of the assembly, judges, and magistrates; but if this cannot be done, at least the magistrates, the judges the senators, and members of the supreme assembly, and also those officers who are obliged to eat at a common table ought to be paid. Moreover, as an oligarchy is said to be a government of men of family, fortune, and education; so, on the contrary, a democracy is a government in the hands of men of no birth, indigent circumstances, and mechanical employments. In this state also no office [1318a] should be for life; and, if any such should remain after the government has been long changed into a democracy, they should endeavour by degrees to diminish the power; and also elect by lot instead of vote. These things, then, appertain to all democracies; namely, to be established on that principle of justice which is homogeneous to those governments; that is, that all the members of the state, by number, should enjoy an equality, which seems chiefly to constitute a democracy, or government of the people: for it seems perfectly equal that the rich should have no more share in the government than the poor, nor be alone in power; but that all should be equal, according to number; for thus, they think, the equality and liberty of the state best preserved.

Liberty is the foundation of a democratic state. People commonly speak as if liberty could be found only in a democracy. They say that liberty is the goal of every democracy. One part of liberty is taking turns governing and being governed. For democratic justice measures equality by numbers, not by merit. If this is just, supreme power must belong to the people as a whole. Whatever the majority decides must be final. So in a democracy, the poor ought to have more power than the rich, because they are more numerous. Everyone who establishes a democracy treats this as one defining feature of liberty. Another part of liberty is living as one likes. Supporters of democracy say that liberty gives people this right. For someone forced to live against his wishes is a slave. So living as one likes is another defining feature of democracy. From this comes the claim that no one should be subject to anyone's command, on any grounds. If people must be governed, they should take turns. Each should be subject to another only to the extent that the other is, in turn, subject to him. This arrangement also promotes the equality that liberty demands. Given these principles and this form of government, the following rules should apply. All citizens should be eligible for all public offices. All should govern each, and each should govern all in turn. All officials should be chosen by lot, except for offices requiring special knowledge and skill. No property qualification, or only a very small one, should be required for any office. No one should hold the same office twice, or only in very few cases and very rarely, except in the army. All terms of office should be very short, or at least as many as possible should be. The whole community should be eligible to judge every kind of case, however broad, important, or serious its subject. At Athens, for example, the people as a whole judge officials when they leave office. They also decide cases involving public affairs and private contracts. Supreme power should belong to the public assembly. Officials should have no independent decision-making power, except in a few cases of no importance to public business. Of all governing bodies, a senate is best suited to a democracy where the whole community receives no payment for attending. For when everyone is paid to attend, the senate loses its power. The people will then have every case brought before them on appeal, as we mentioned in an earlier book. Next, if possible, there should be a fund to pay all citizens who take part in public affairs. This includes members of the assembly, judges, and officials. If paying everyone is impossible, at least officials, judges, senators, and members of the supreme assembly should be paid. The same applies to officers required to eat at a common table. Moreover, an oligarchy is described as government by men of distinguished family, wealth, and education. A democracy, by contrast, is government by men of humble birth, poverty, and manual occupations. In a democracy, too, no office [1318a] should be held for life. If any lifelong offices survive long after the government has become democratic, efforts should be made to reduce their power gradually. Those offices should also be filled by lot rather than by vote. These features, then, belong to all democracies. They rest on the principle of justice suited to democratic government: all citizens should have equality, counted as individuals. This seems to be the chief defining feature of democracy, or government by the people. For it seems perfectly equal that the rich should have no greater share in government than the poor. Nor should the rich alone hold power. Instead, all should be equal, with each person counting equally. For this, supporters of democracy believe, best preserves the state's equality and liberty.