Chapter 11

Monarchies, in a word, are preserved by means contrary to what I have already mentioned as the cause of their destruction; but to speak to each separately: the stability of a kingdom will depend upon the power of the king's being kept within moderate bounds; for by how much the less extensive his power is, by so much the longer will his government continue; for he will be less despotic and more upon an equality of condition with those he governs; who, on that account, will envy him the less.

In short, monarchies survive through measures opposite to those I have already described as causing their destruction. But let us consider each kind separately. A kingdom's stability depends on keeping the king's power within moderate limits. The less power he has, the longer his rule will last. For he will be less despotic and closer to equal standing with those he governs. As a result, his subjects will envy him less.

It was on this account that the kingdom of the Molossi continued so long; and the Lacedaemonians from their government's being from the beginning divided into two parts, and also by the moderation introduced into the other parts of it by Theopompus, and his establishment of the ephori; for by taking something from the power he increased the duration of the kingdom, so that in some measure he made it not less, but bigger; as they say he replied to his wife, who asked him if he was not ashamed to deliver down his kingdom to his children reduced from what he received it from his ancestors? No, says he, I give it him more lasting. Tyrannies are preserved two ways most opposite to each other, one of which is when the power is delegated from one to the other, and in this manner many tyrants govern in their states. Report says that Periander founded many of these. There are also many of them to be met with amongst the Persians. What has been already mentioned is as conducive as anything can be to preserve a tyranny; namely, to keep down those who are of an aspiring disposition, to take off those who will not submit, to allow no public meals, no clubs, no education, nothing at all, but to guard against everything that gives rise to high spirits or mutual confidence; nor to suffer the learned meetings of those who are at leisure to hold conversation with each other; and to endeavour by every means possible to keep all the people strangers to each other; for knowledge increases mutual confidence; and to oblige all strangers to appear in public, and to live near the city-gate, that all their actions may be sufficiently seen; for those who are kept like slaves seldom entertain any noble thoughts: in short, to imitate everything which the Persians and barbarians do, for they all contribute to support slavery; and to endeavour to know what every one who is under their power does and says; and for this purpose to employ spies: such were those women whom the Syracusians called potagogides Hiero also used to send out listeners wherever there was any meeting or conversation; for the people dare not speak with freedom for fear of such persons; and if any one does, there is the less chance of its being concealed; and to endeavour that the whole community should mutually accuse and come to blows with each other, friend with friend, the commons with the nobles, and the rich with each other. It is also advantageous for a tyranny that all those who are under it should be oppressed with poverty, that they may not be able to compose a guard; and that, being employed in procuring their daily bread, they may have no leisure to conspire against their tyrants. The Pyramids of Egypt are a proof of this, and the votive edifices of the Cyposelidse, and the temple of Jupiter Olympus, built by the Pisistratidae, and the works of Polycrates at Samos; for all these produced one end, the keeping the people poor. It is necessary also to multiply taxes, as at Syracuse; where Dionysius in the space of five years collected all the private property of his subjects into his own coffers. A tyrant also should endeavour to engage his subjects in a war, that they may have employment and continually depend upon their general. A king is preserved by his friends, but a tyrant is of all persons the man who can place no confidence in friends, as every one has it in his desire and these chiefly in their power to destroy him. All these things also which are done in an extreme democracy should be done in a tyranny, as permitting great licentiousness to the women in the house, that they may reveal their husbands' secrets; and showing great indulgence to slaves also for the same reason; for slaves and women conspire not against tyrants: but when they are treated with kindness, both of them are abettors of tyrants, and extreme democracies also; and the people too in such a state desire to be despotic. For which reason flatterers are in repute in both these: the demagogue in the democracy, for he is the proper flatterer of the people; among tyrants, he who will servilely adapt himself to their humours; for this is the business of [1314a] flatterers. And for this reason tyrants always love the worst of wretches, for they rejoice in being flattered, which no man of a liberal spirit will submit to; for they love the virtuous, but flatter none. Bad men too are fit for bad purposes; "like to like," as the proverb says. A tyrant also should show no favour to a man of worth or a freeman; for he should think, that no one deserved to be thought these but himself; for he who supports his dignity, and is a friend to freedom, encroaches upon the superiority and the despotism of the tyrant: such men, therefore, they naturally hate, as destructive to their government. A tyrant also should rather admit strangers to his table and familiarity than citizens, as these are his enemies, but the others have no design against him. These and such-like are the supports of a tyranny, for it comprehends whatsoever is wicked. But all these things may be comprehended in three divisions, for there are three objects which a tyranny has in view; one of which is, that the citizens should be of poor abject dispositions; for such men never propose to conspire against any one. The second is, that they should have no confidence in each other; for while they have not this, the tyrant is safe enough from destruction. For which reason they are always at enmity with those of merit, as hurtful to their government; not only as they scorn to be governed despotically, but also because they can rely upon each other's fidelity, and others can rely upon theirs, and because they will not inform against their associates, nor any one else. The third is, that they shall be totally without the means of doing anything; for no one undertakes what is impossible for him to perform: so that without power a tyranny can never be destroyed. These, then, are the three objects which the inclinations of tyrants desire to see accomplished; for all their tyrannical plans tend to promote one of these three ends, that their people may neither have mutual confidence, power, nor spirit. This, then, is one of the two methods of preserving tyrannies: the other proceeds in a way quite contrary to what has been already described, and which may be discerned from considering to what the destruction of a kingdom is owing; for as one cause of that is, making the government approach near to a tyranny, so the safety of a tyranny consists in making the government nearly kingly; preserving only one thing, namely power, that not only the willing, but the unwilling also, must be obliged to submit; for if this is once lost, the tyranny is at an end. This, then, as the foundation, must be preserved: in other particulars carefully do and affect to seem like a king; first, appear to pay a great attention [1314b] to what belongs to the public; nor make such profuse presents as will offend the people; while they are to supply the money out of the hard labour of their own hands, and see it given in profusion to mistresses, foreigners, and fiddlers; keeping an exact account both of what you receive and pay; which is a practice some tyrants do actually follow, by which means they seem rather fathers of families than tyrants: nor need you ever fear the want of money while you have the supreme power of the state in your own hands. It is also much better for those tyrants who quit their kingdom to do this than to leave behind them money they have hoarded up; for their regents will be much less desirous of making innovations, and they are more to be dreaded by absent tyrants than the citizens; for such of them as he suspects he takes with him, but these regents must be left behind. He should also endeavour to appear to collect such taxes and require such services as the exigencies of the state demand, that whenever they are wanted they may be ready in time of war; and particularly to take care that he appear to collect and keep them not as his own property, but the public's. His appearance also should not be severe, but respectable, so that he should inspire those who approach him with veneration and not fear; but this will not be easily accomplished if he is despised. If, therefore, he will not take the pains to acquire any other, he ought to endeavour to be a man of political abilities, and to fix that opinion of himself in the judgment of his subjects. He should also take care not to appear to be guilty of the least offence against modesty, nor to suffer it in those under him: nor to permit the women of his family to treat others haughtily; for the haughtiness of women has been the ruin of many tyrants. With respect to the pleasures of sense, he ought to do directly contrary to the practice of some tyrants at present; for they do not only continually indulge themselves in them for many days together, but they seem also to desire to have other witnesses of it, that they may wonder at their happiness; whereas he ought really to be moderate in these, and, if not, to appear to others to avoid them-for it is not the sober man who is exposed either to plots or contempt, but the drunkard; not the early riser, but the sluggard. His conduct in general should also be contrary to what is reported of former tyrants; for he ought to improve and adorn his city, so as to seem a guardian and not a tyrant; and, moreover., always to [1315a] seem particularly attentive to the worship of the gods; for from persons of such a character men entertain less fears of suffering anything illegal while they suppose that he who governs them is religious and reverences the gods; and they will be less inclined to raise insinuations against such a one, as being peculiarly under their protection: but this must be so done as to give no occasion for any suspicion of hypocrisy. He should also take care to show such respect to men of merit in every particular, that they should not think they could be treated with greater distinction by their fellow-citizens in a free state. He should also let all honours flow immediately from himself, but every censure from his subordinate officers and judges. It is also a common protection of all monarchies not to make one person too great, or, certainly, not many; for they will support each other: but, if it is necessary to entrust any large powers to one person, to take care that it is not one of an ardent spirit; for this disposition is upon every opportunity most ready for a revolution: and, if it should seem necessary to deprive any one of his power, to do it by degrees, and not reduce him all at once. It is also necessary to abstain from all kinds of insolence; more particularly from corporal punishment; which you must be most cautious never to exercise over those who have a delicate sense of honour; for, as those who love money are touched to the quick when anything affects their property, so are men of honour and principle when they receive any disgrace: therefore, either never employ personal punishment, or, if you do, let it be only in the manner in which a father would correct his son, and not with contempt; and, upon the whole, make amends for any seeming disgrace by bestowing greater honours. But of all persons who are most likely to entertain designs against the person of a tyrant, those are chiefly to be feared and guarded against who regard as nothing the loss of their own lives, so that they can but accomplish their purpose: be very careful therefore of those who either think themselves affronted, or those who are dear to them; for those who are excited by anger to revenge regard as nothing their own persons: for, as Heraclitus says, it is dangerous to fight with an angry man who will purchase with his life the thing he aims at. As all cities are composed of two sorts of persons, the rich and the poor, it is necessary that both these should find equal protection from him who governs them, and that the one party should not have it in their power to injure the other; but that the tyrant should attach to himself that party which is the most powerful; which, if he does, he will have no occasion either to make his slaves free, or to deprive citizens of their arms; for the strength of either of the parties added to his own forces will render him superior to any conspiracy. It would be superfluous to go through all particulars; for the rule of conduct which the tyrant ought to pursue is evident enough, and that is, to affect to appear not the tyrant, but the king; the guardian of those he governs, not their plunderer, [1315b] but their protector, and to affect the middle rank in life, not one superior to all others: he should, therefore, associate his nobles with him and soothe his people; for his government will not only be necessarily more honourable and worthy of imitation, as it will be over men of worth, and not abject wretches who perpetually both hate and fear him; but it will be also more durable. Let him also frame his life so that his manners may be consentaneous to virtue, or at least let half of them be so, that he may not be altogether wicked, but only so in part.

For this reason, the kingdom of the Molossi lasted so long. The Lacedaemonians’ kingdom also endured because its government was divided into two parts from the beginning. Theopompus further moderated the other parts of government and established the ephori. By reducing royal power, he made the kingdom last longer. In a sense, he made it greater, not smaller. His wife reportedly asked whether he was ashamed to leave his children a smaller kingdom than his ancestors had left him. He replied that he was not, because he was leaving it more lasting. Tyrannies are preserved in two completely opposite ways. One involves passing power from one ruler to another, and many tyrants govern their states this way. Periander reportedly established many of these practices. Many can also be found among the Persians. The measures already mentioned are as effective as any for preserving a tyranny. These include suppressing ambitious people and eliminating those who refuse to submit. A tyrant should allow no public meals, clubs, education, or anything of that kind. He must guard against everything that encourages independent spirits or mutual trust. He should not allow educated people with leisure to gather for discussion. He should use every possible means to keep people strangers to one another, because familiarity increases mutual trust. He should also make all strangers appear in public and live near the city gate, where their actions can be watched. People kept like slaves seldom have noble thoughts. In short, he should imitate everything the Persians and barbarians do, because all these practices help maintain slavery. He should also try to learn everything said and done by everyone under his power. For this purpose, he should employ spies, like the women the Syracusians called potagogides. Hiero also sent listeners wherever people gathered or talked. Fear of such people prevents free speech. If anyone does speak freely, the spies make concealment less likely. The tyrant should also encourage everyone in the community to accuse and fight one another. He should set friend against friend, common people against nobles, and rich people against one another. Poverty among all his subjects also benefits a tyranny, because poor people cannot organize an armed guard. And because they must work for their daily bread, they have no leisure to plot against their tyrants. The Pyramids of Egypt demonstrate this. So do the votive buildings of the Cyposelidse, the temple of Jupiter Olympus built by the Pisistratidae, and Polycrates’ works at Samos. All these projects achieved the same result: keeping the people poor. A tyrant must also increase taxes, as happened at Syracuse. There, Dionysius collected all his subjects’ private property into his own treasury within five years. A tyrant should also try to involve his subjects in war. War keeps them occupied and constantly dependent on their general. A king is protected by his friends. But no one can trust his friends less than a tyrant can. Everyone wants to destroy him, and his friends especially have the power to do so. A tyranny should also adopt all the practices of an extreme democracy. Women should be allowed great freedom within the household, so they will reveal their husbands’ secrets. Slaves should receive great indulgence for the same reason. For slaves and women do not plot against tyrants. When treated kindly, both groups support tyrants, as they also support extreme democracies. In such a democracy, the people themselves want to exercise despotic power. For this reason, flatterers are valued in both systems. In a democracy, the demagogue is the people’s particular flatterer. Under a tyrant, the flatterer slavishly adapts himself to the ruler’s moods, because this is the business of [1314a] flatterers. Tyrants therefore always love the worst people, because tyrants enjoy being flattered. No person of an independent spirit will stoop to flattery. Such people love the virtuous but flatter no one. Bad people are also suited to bad purposes. As the proverb says, "like to like." A tyrant should also show no favor to a worthy person or a free man. He should regard himself alone as deserving those descriptions. Anyone who maintains his dignity and supports freedom challenges the tyrant’s superiority and absolute power. Tyrants therefore naturally hate such people as threats to their rule. A tyrant should also welcome strangers to his table and into his confidence rather than citizens. Citizens are his enemies, while strangers have no designs against him. These and similar practices support tyranny, which embraces everything wicked. But all these practices fall into three categories, because tyranny pursues three aims. The first is to make citizens low-spirited and submissive. Such people never think of plotting against anyone. The second is to prevent citizens from trusting one another. As long as they lack mutual trust, the tyrant is reasonably safe from overthrow. This is why tyrants are always hostile to worthy people, whom they consider threats to their rule. Worthy people not only despise despotic government. They can also rely on one another’s loyalty, and others can rely on theirs. They will not inform against their associates or anyone else. The third aim is to leave citizens entirely without the means to act. No one attempts something impossible for them to accomplish. So without power, people can never overthrow a tyranny. These, then, are the three aims tyrants want to achieve. All their tyrannical schemes serve one of these ends: depriving their people of mutual trust, power, or spirit. This is one of the two methods of preserving tyrannies. The other takes exactly the opposite approach. We can understand this approach by considering what causes a kingdom’s destruction. One cause is making royal government resemble tyranny. By contrast, a tyranny’s safety lies in making its government resemble kingship. The tyrant must preserve just one essential thing: the power to compel obedience from both willing and unwilling subjects. Once he loses this power, the tyranny ends. This foundation must therefore remain intact. In other respects, the tyrant should carefully act like a king and cultivate that appearance. First, he should appear to take great care [1314b] of public resources. He should not offend the people by giving extravagant gifts. The people earn the money through hard labor, then see it lavished on mistresses, foreigners, and musicians. He should keep exact accounts of his income and spending. Some tyrants actually follow this practice. It makes them seem more like household managers than tyrants. Nor need a tyrant ever fear running out of money while he holds supreme power in the state. Keeping such accounts is also much better for tyrants who leave their kingdoms than leaving behind hoarded money. Their regents will then be much less eager to change the government. Absent tyrants have more reason to fear their regents than their citizens. Tyrants take suspected citizens with them, but must leave their regents behind. The tyrant should also appear to collect taxes and demand services only as the state’s needs require. These resources should be ready when needed in wartime. Above all, he should appear to collect and preserve them as public property, not his own. His manner should inspire respect rather than seem harsh. Those who approach him should feel reverence, not fear. But he will not easily achieve this if people despise him. So, even if he makes no effort to acquire other qualities, he should try to develop political ability. He should also establish a reputation for that ability among his subjects. He should take care not to appear guilty of even the slightest indecency, or tolerate it among his subordinates. Nor should he allow the women of his family to treat others arrogantly. Women’s arrogance has ruined many tyrants. In physical pleasures, he should do the opposite of what some tyrants do today. They continually indulge themselves for many days at a time. They also seem to want others to witness their indulgence and marvel at their happiness. Instead, the tyrant should genuinely be moderate in these pleasures. If he is not moderate, he should at least appear to avoid them. The drunkard, not the sober man, is exposed to plots and contempt. So is the late sleeper, not the early riser. His general conduct should also contrast with what is reported of earlier tyrants. He should improve and beautify his city, appearing as its guardian rather than its tyrant. Moreover, he should always [1315a] appear especially devoted to worshipping the gods. People are less afraid of unlawful treatment when they believe their ruler is religious and reveres the gods. They will also be less inclined to plot against someone they regard as specially protected by the gods. But he must show this devotion without giving any grounds for suspecting hypocrisy. He should also show worthy people such respect in every matter that they could expect no greater distinction in a free state. He should grant all honors himself, but leave all blame and punishment to subordinate officials and judges. All monarchies also share a common safeguard: they should not make one person too powerful, and certainly not many. Powerful people will support one another. If one person must receive extensive powers, the ruler should ensure that person is not hotheaded. Such a temperament is especially ready to seek revolution whenever an opportunity arises. If someone must lose his power, the ruler should remove it gradually, not all at once. The tyrant must also avoid every kind of insulting treatment, especially physical punishment. He must be particularly careful never to inflict it on people with a strong sense of honor. Money-loving people are deeply hurt by attacks on their property. Likewise, people of honor and principle are deeply hurt by disgrace. So the tyrant should either never use physical punishment or use it only as a father corrects his son. He should not punish contemptuously. In general, he should make up for any apparent disgrace by granting greater honors. Among those likely to attack a tyrant, the most dangerous are people willing to die to achieve their purpose. The tyrant must especially fear and guard against them. He should therefore be very careful around people who believe they or their loved ones have been insulted. People driven to revenge by anger place no value on their own safety. As Heraclitus says, fighting an angry man is dangerous, because he will pay with his life for his goal. Since all cities contain two groups, the rich and the poor, the ruler must give both equal protection. Neither group should have the power to injure the other. But the tyrant should secure the support of whichever group is stronger. If he does, he will need neither to free his slaves nor to disarm citizens. Either group’s strength, added to his own forces, will make him stronger than any conspiracy. There is no need to discuss every detail, because the course a tyrant should follow is clear enough. He should try to appear not as a tyrant but as a king. He should seem the guardian of his subjects, not their plunderer, [1315b] but their protector. He should present himself as someone of moderate standing, not someone above everyone else. He should therefore make his nobles his companions and reassure his people. His government will necessarily be more honorable and more worthy of imitation. For he will rule worthy people, not degraded people who constantly hate and fear him. His government will also last longer. He should also shape his life so that his conduct agrees with virtue. Or at least half his conduct should, so that he is only partly wicked, not wholly so.