Chapter 1

We have now gone through those particulars we proposed to speak of; it remains that we next consider from what causes and how alterations in government arise, and of what nature they are, and to what the destruction of each state is owing; and also to what form any form of polity is most likely to shift into, and what are the means to be used for the general preservation of governments, as well as what are applicable to any particular state; and also of the remedies which are to be applied either to all in general, or to any one considered separately, when they are in a state of corruption: and here we ought first to lay down this principle, that there are many governments, all of which approve of what is just and what is analogically equal; and yet have failed from attaining thereunto, as we have already mentioned; thus democracies have arisen from supposing that those who are equal in one thing are so in every other circumstance; as, because they are equal in liberty, they are equal in everything else; and oligarchies, from supposing that those who are unequal in one thing are unequal in all; that when men are so in point of fortune, that inequality extends to everything else. Hence it follows, that those who in some respects are equal with others think it right to endeavour to partake of an equality with them in everything; and those who are superior to others endeavour to get still more; and it is this more which is the inequality: thus most states, though they have some notion of what is just, yet are almost totally wrong; and, upon this account, when either party has not that share in the administration which answers to his expectations, he becomes seditious: but those who of all others have the greatest right to be so are the last that are; namely, those who excel in virtue; for they alone can be called generally superior. There are, too, some persons of distinguished families who, because they are so, disdain to be on an equality with others, for those esteem themselves noble who boast of their ancestors' merit and fortune: these, to speak truth, are the origin and fountain from whence seditions arise. The alterations which men may propose to make in governments are two; for either they may change the state already established into some other, as when they propose to erect an oligarchy where there is a democracy; or a democracy, or free state, where there is an oligarchy, or an aristocracy from these, or those from that; or else, when they have no objection to the established government, which they like very well, but choose to have the sole management in it themselves; either in the hands of a few or one only. They will also raise commotions concerning the degree in which they would have the established power; as if, for instance, the government is an oligarchy, to have it more purely so, and in the same manner if it is a democracy, or else to have it less so; and, in like manner, whatever may be the nature of the government, either to extend or contract its powers; or else to make some alterations in some parts of it; as to establish or abolish a particular magistracy, as some persons say Lysander endeavoured to abolish the kingly power in Sparta; and Pausanias that of the ephori. Thus in Epidamnus there was an alteration in one part of the constitution, for instead of the philarchi they established a senate. It is also necessary for all the magistrates at Athens; to attend in the court of the Helisea when any new magistrate is created: the power of the archon also in that state partakes of the nature of an oligarchy: inequality is always the occasion of sedition, but not when those who are unequal are treated in a different manner correspondent to that inequality. Thus kingly power is unequal when exercised over equals. Upon the whole, those who aim after an equality are the cause of seditions. Equality is twofold, either in number or value. Equality in number is when two things contain the same parts or the same quantity; equality in value is by proportion as two exceeds one, and three two by the same number-thus by proportion four exceeds two, and two one in the same degree, for two is the same part of four that one is of two; that is to say, half. Now, all agree in what is absolutely and simply just; but, as we have already said they dispute concerning proportionate value; for some persons, if they are equal in one respect, think themselves equal in all; others, if they are superior in one thing, think they may claim the superiority in all; from whence chiefly arise two sorts of governments, a democracy and an oligarchy; for nobility and virtue are to be found only [1302a] amongst a few; the contrary amongst the many; there being in no place a hundred of the first to be met with, but enough of the last everywhere. But to establish a government entirely upon either of these equalities is wrong, and this the example of those so established makes evident, for none of them have been stable; and for this reason, that it is impossible that whatever is wrong at the first and in its principles should not at last meet with a bad end: for which reason in some things an equality of numbers ought to take place, in others an equality in value. However, a democracy is safer and less liable to sedition than an oligarchy; for in this latter it may arise from two causes, for either the few in power may conspire against each other or against the people; but in a democracy only one; namely, against the few who aim at exclusive power; but there is no instance worth speaking of, of a sedition of the people against themselves. Moreover, a government composed of men of moderate fortunes comes much nearer to a democracy than an oligarchy, and is the safest of all such states.

We have now covered the subjects we proposed to discuss. Next, we must consider why governments change, how these changes happen, and what kinds of changes occur. We must also examine what causes the destruction of each kind of state. We must consider which form of government each is most likely to become. We must examine ways to preserve governments generally, and measures suited to particular states. Finally, we must consider remedies for governments that have become corrupt, both generally and in particular cases. We should begin with this principle: many governments accept justice and proportional equality, yet fail to achieve them. We have already mentioned this failure. Democracies arose from the belief that people equal in one respect are equal in every respect. Because people are equally free, they are assumed to be equal in everything else. Oligarchies arose from the belief that people unequal in one respect are unequal in every respect. Inequality in wealth is assumed to extend to everything else. Consequently, people equal to others in some respects think they should seek equality with them in everything. Those superior to others seek a greater share, and this greater share constitutes inequality. Thus, although most states have some understanding of justice, they are almost entirely mistaken. For this reason, either group rebels when its share in government falls short of its expectations. Yet those with the strongest right to rebel are the least likely to do so: those who excel in virtue. They alone can be called superior overall. Some people from distinguished families also consider equality with others beneath them. Those who boast of their ancestors’ merit and wealth consider themselves noble. These, in truth, are the sources from which rebellions arise. People may seek two kinds of change in government. First, they may replace the existing constitution with another. They may seek an oligarchy in place of a democracy, or a democracy or constitutional government in place of an oligarchy. They may seek an aristocracy instead of these forms, or these forms instead of an aristocracy. Alternatively, they may have no objection to the existing government and may like it very much. Yet they want exclusive control themselves, either as a small group or as a single ruler. People also cause unrest over the extent of the established power. In an oligarchy, for example, they may want the government to become more thoroughly oligarchic. The same applies to a democracy, or they may want either government to become less so. Likewise, whatever the form of government, they may seek to expand or limit its powers. Alternatively, they may seek changes in particular parts of government, such as establishing or abolishing a particular office. Some say Lysander tried to abolish the kingly power in Sparta, and Pausanias tried to abolish the ephori. In Epidamnus, one part of the constitution changed when a senate replaced the philarchi. At Athens, all magistrates must also attend the court of the Helisea whenever a new magistrate is appointed. The power of the archon in that state also has an oligarchic character. Inequality always gives rise to rebellion, except when unequal people receive different treatment corresponding to their inequality. Thus, kingly power creates inequality when exercised over equals. Overall, those who seek equality cause rebellions. Equality takes two forms: equality in number and equality in value. Numerical equality means having the same number of parts or the same quantity. Equality in value depends on proportion. Two exceeds one by the same number that three exceeds two. By proportion, four exceeds two to the same degree that two exceeds one. Two is the same fraction of four that one is of two: half. Now, everyone agrees about what is just in an absolute and straightforward sense. But, as we have already said, people disagree about proportionate value. Some people think that equality in one respect makes them equal in every respect. Others think that superiority in one respect entitles them to superiority in every respect. These beliefs are the chief sources of two forms of government: democracy and oligarchy. Noble birth and virtue are found only [1302a] among a few, while their opposites are found among the many. Nowhere can a hundred people of the first kind be found, but people of the second kind are plentiful everywhere. Yet building a government entirely on either kind of equality is wrong. The experience of governments established on these principles makes this clear, since none has been stable. The reason is that anything wrong in its beginnings and principles must eventually end badly. Therefore, numerical equality should apply in some matters, and equality in value in others. However, democracy is safer and less vulnerable to rebellion than oligarchy. In an oligarchy, rebellion can arise in two ways. The few in power may plot against one another or against the people. In a democracy, rebellion arises in only one way: against the few who seek exclusive power. There is no significant example of the people rebelling against themselves. Moreover, a government made up of people of moderate wealth is much closer to democracy than to oligarchy. It is also the safest of all such states.