Chapter 4

We ought not to define a democracy as some do, who say simply, that it is a government where the supreme power is lodged in the people; for even in oligarchies the supreme power is in the majority. Nor should they define an oligarchy a government where the supreme power is in the hands of a few: for let us suppose the number of a people to be thirteen hundred, and that of these one thousand were rich, who would not permit the three hundred poor to have any share in the government, although they were free, and their equal in everything else; no one would say, that this government was a democracy. In like manner, if the poor, when few in number, should acquire the power over the rich, though more than themselves, no one would say, that this was an oligarchy; nor this, when the rest who are rich have no share in the administration. We should rather say, that a democracy is when the supreme power is in the [1290b] hands of the freemen; an oligarchy, when it is in the hands of the rich: it happens indeed that in the one case the many will possess it, in the other the few; because there are many poor and few rich. And if the power of the state was to be distributed according to the size of the citizens, as they say it is in Ethiopia, or according to their beauty, it would be an oligarchy: for the number of those who are large and beautiful is small.

We should not define democracy, as some do, simply as a government where the people hold supreme power. For even in oligarchies, the majority holds supreme power. Nor should we define oligarchy as a government where a few hold supreme power. Suppose a population numbered thirteen hundred, and one thousand were rich. Suppose these rich people denied the three hundred poor any share in government. The poor were free and equal to the rich in every other respect. No one would call this government a democracy. Likewise, suppose the poor were few but gained power over the rich, who outnumbered them. No one would call this government an oligarchy, with the remaining rich people excluded from governing. Instead, we should say that democracy exists when supreme power is in the [1290b] hands of free citizens. Oligarchy exists when supreme power is in the hands of the rich. In practice, the many hold power in a democracy, and the few hold power in an oligarchy. This is because there are many poor people and few rich people. And suppose state power were distributed according to the citizens’ size, as people say happens in Ethiopia, or their beauty. Such a government would be an oligarchy, because few people are large or beautiful.

Nor are those things which we have already mentioned alone sufficient to describe these states; for since there are many species both of a democracy and an oligarchy, the matter requires further consideration; as we cannot admit, that if a few persons who are free possess the supreme power over the many who are not free, that this government is a democracy: as in Apollonia, in Ionia, and in Thera: for in each of these cities the honours of the state belong to some few particular families, who first founded the colonies. Nor would the rich, because they are superior in numbers, form a democracy, as formerly at Colophon; for there the majority had large possessions before the Lydian war: but a democracy is a state where the freemen and the poor, being the majority, are invested with the power of the state. An oligarchy is a state where the rich and those of noble families, being few, possess it.

The features we have already mentioned are not enough to describe these states. Since democracy and oligarchy each have many forms, we need to consider the matter further. We cannot call a government a democracy if a few free people hold supreme power over many who are not free. Examples include Apollonia, in Ionia, and Thera. In each city, public offices belong to a few particular families who first founded the colonies. Nor does rule by the rich become a democracy because the rich are the majority, as formerly at Colophon. There, before the Lydian war, most people owned large estates. But a democracy is a state where the free and poor hold power and form the majority. An oligarchy is a state where the rich and those of noble families hold power and are few in number.

We have now proved that there are various forms of government and have assigned a reason for it; and shall proceed to show that there are even more than these, and what they are, and why; setting out with the principle we have already laid down. We admit that every city consists not of one, but many parts: thus, if we should endeavour to comprehend the different species of animals we should first of all note those parts which every animal must have, as a certain sensorium, and also what is necessary to acquire and retain food, as a mouth and a belly; besides certain parts to enable it to move from place to place. If, then, these are the only parts of an animal and there are differences between them; namely, in their various sorts of stomachs, bellies, and sensoriums: to which we must add their motive powers; the number of the combinations of all these must necessarily make up the different species of animals. For it is not possible that the same kind of animal should have any very great difference in its mouth or ears; so that when all these are collected, who happen to have these things similar in all, they make up a species of animals of which there are as many as there are of these general combinations of necessary parts.

We have now proved that there are various forms of government and explained why. We will next show that there are still more forms, what they are, and why they exist. We begin with the principle already established. We agree that every city consists of many parts, not just one. Similarly, if we wanted to understand the different species of animals, we would first identify the parts every animal needs. These include some organ of sensation, along with the parts needed to obtain and retain food, such as a mouth and belly. Animals also need certain parts that allow them to move from place to place. Suppose, then, that these are an animal's only parts, and that these parts differ among animals. Such differences include the various kinds of stomachs, bellies, and sensory organs, together with the means of movement. The combinations of all these parts must necessarily account for the different species of animals. For animals of the same species cannot differ very greatly in their mouths or ears. So, when animals with all these features in common are grouped together, they form a species. There are as many species as there are general combinations of these necessary parts.

The same thing is true of what are called states; for a city is not made of one but many parts, as has already been often said; one of which is those who supply it with provisions, called husbandmen, another called mechanics, [1291a] whose employment is in the manual arts, without which the city could not be inhabited; of these some are busied about what is absolutely necessary, others in what contribute to the elegancies and pleasures of life; the third sort are your exchange-men, I mean by these your buyers, sellers, merchants, and victuallers; the fourth are your hired labourers or workmen; the fifth are the men-at-arms, a rank not less useful than the other, without you would have the community slaves to every invader; but what cannot defend itself is unworthy of the name of a city; for a city is self-sufficient, a slave not. So that when Socrates, in Plato's Republic, says that a city is necessarily composed of four sorts of people, he speaks elegantly but not correctly, and these are, according to him, weavers, husbandmen, shoe-makers, and builders; he then adds, as if these were not sufficient, smiths, herdsmen for what cattle are necessary, and also merchants and victuallers, and these are by way of appendix to his first list; as if a city was established for necessity, and not happiness, or as if a shoe-maker and a husbandman were equally useful. He reckons not the military a part before the increase of territory and joining to the borders of the neighbouring powers will make war necessary: and even amongst them who compose his four divisions, or whoever have any connection with each other, it will be necessary to have some one to distribute justice, and determine between man and man. If, then, the mind is a more valuable part of man than the body, every one would wish to have those things more regarded in his city which tend to the advantage of these than common matters, such are war and justice; to which may be added council, which is the business of civil wisdom (nor is it of any consequence whether these different employments are filled by different persons or one, as the same man is oftentimes both a soldier and a husbandman): so that if both the judge and the senator are parts of the city, it necessarily follows that the soldier must be so also. The seventh sort are those who serve the public in expensive employments at their own charge: these are called the rich. The eighth are those who execute the different offices of the state, and without these it could not possibly subsist: it is therefore necessary that there should be some persons capable of governing and filling the places in the city; and this either for life or in rotation: the office of senator, and judge, of which we have already sufficiently treated, are the only ones remaining. If, then, these things are necessary for a state, that it may be happy and just, it follows that the citizens who engage in public affairs should be men of abilities therein. [1291b] Several persons think, that different employments may be allotted to the same person; as a soldier's, a husbandman's, and an artificer's; as also that others may be both senators and judges.

The same is true of what we call states. As we have often said, a city consists of many parts, not just one. One part consists of those who supply food, called farmers. Another consists of craftspeople, [1291a] who practice the manual trades without which no one could live in the city. Some produce necessities, while others provide the comforts and pleasures of life. The third group consists of traders, meaning buyers, sellers, merchants, and food dealers. The fourth consists of hired laborers or workers. The fifth consists of soldiers, a group no less useful than the others, unless you want every invader to enslave the community. A community unable to defend itself does not deserve to be called a city. For a city is self-sufficient, while a slave is not. So when Socrates says in Plato's Republic that a city necessarily consists of four groups, he speaks elegantly but incorrectly. His four groups are weavers, farmers, shoemakers, and builders. Then, as though these were not enough, he adds smiths, herders for the necessary livestock, merchants, and food dealers. He treats these additions as an appendix to his original list. He speaks as though a city were founded to meet basic needs rather than achieve happiness. Or as though a shoemaker and a farmer were equally useful. He does not count soldiers as part of the city until territorial expansion brings it against neighboring powers, making war necessary. Yet even among his four groups, or any people who deal with one another, someone must administer justice and settle disputes. If, then, the mind is more valuable than the body, everyone would want their city to give greater attention to what benefits the mind than to ordinary matters. Such matters include war and justice. We may add deliberation, the work of political wisdom. It makes no difference whether different people perform these tasks or one person performs several. The same person is often both a soldier and a farmer. So if judges and council members are parts of the city, soldiers must necessarily be parts as well. The seventh group consists of those who perform costly public services at their own expense. These are called the rich. The eighth consists of those who hold the various public offices, without whom the state could not possibly survive. So there must be people capable of governing and holding office in the city, either for life or in rotation. The only roles left to consider are those of council members and judges, which we have already discussed sufficiently. If, then, these functions are necessary for a state to be happy and just, citizens engaged in public affairs must be capable of performing them. [1291b] Some people think one person may take on several occupations, such as soldier, farmer, and craftsperson. They also think others may serve as both council members and judges.

Besides, every one supposes himself a man of political abilities, and that he is qualified for almost every department in the state. But the same person cannot at once be poor and rich: for which reason the most obvious division of the city is into two parts, the poor and rich; moreover, since for the generality the one are few, the other many, they seem of all the parts of a city most contrary to each other; so that as the one or the other prevail they form different states; and these are the democracy and the oligarchy.

Besides, everyone believes he has political ability and is qualified for almost every role in the state. But the same person cannot be both poor and rich. For this reason, the most obvious division of a city is between the poor and the rich. Moreover, the rich are generally few, while the poor are many. So these two groups seem more opposed to each other than any other groups in a city. As a result, different forms of government arise depending on whether the poor or the rich hold power. These forms are democracy and oligarchy.

But that there are many different states, and from what causes they arise, has been already mentioned: and that there are also different species both of democracies and oligarchies we will now show. Though this indeed is evident from what we have already said: there are also many different sorts of common people, and also of those who are called gentlemen. Of the different sorts of the first are husbandmen, artificers, exchange-men, who are employed in buying and selling, seamen, of which some are engaged in war, some in traffic, some in carrying goods and passengers from place to place, others in fishing, and of each of these there are often many, as fishermen at Tarentum and Byzantium, masters of galleys at Athens, merchants at AEgina and Chios, those who let ships on freight at Tenedos; we may add to these those who live by their manual labour and have but little property; so that they cannot live without some employ: and also those who are not free-born on both sides, and whatever other sort of common people there may be. As for gentlemen, they are such as are distinguished either by their fortune, their birth, their abilities, or their education, or any such-like excellence which is attributed to them.

We have already discussed the many different forms of government and the causes that produce them. We will now show that democracies and oligarchies also come in different varieties. This variety is already clear from what we have said. There are many different groups among both the common people and those called gentlemen. The common people include farmers, craftspeople, traders who buy and sell, and seamen. Some seamen serve in war, some engage in trade, some transport goods and passengers, and others fish. Each of these groups is often numerous in particular places. Examples include fishermen at Tarentum and Byzantium, galley captains at Athens, and merchants at AEgina and Chios. At Tenedos, there are many who hire out ships to carry freight. We may also include people who live by manual labor and own little property, so they cannot live without work. There are also people whose parents were not both free-born, and whatever other groups of common people there may be. As for gentlemen, they stand out through wealth, birth, ability, education, or some similar excellence attributed to them.

The most pure democracy is that which is so called principally from that equality which prevails in it: for this is what the law in that state directs; that the poor shall be in no greater subjection than the rich; nor that the supreme power shall be lodged with either of these, but that both shall share it. For if liberty and equality, as some persons suppose, are chiefly to be found in a democracy, it must be most so by every department of government being alike open to all; but as the people are the majority, and what they vote is law, it follows that such a state must be a democracy. This, then, is one species thereof. Another is, when the magistrates are elected by a certain census; but this should be but small, and every one who was included in it should be eligible, but as soon as he was below it should lose that right. [1292a] Another sort is, in which every citizen who is not infamous has a share in the government, but where the government is in the laws. Another, where every citizen without exception has this right. Another is like these in other particulars, but there the people govern, and not the law: and this takes place when everything is determined by a majority of votes, and not by a law; which happens when the people are influenced by the demagogues: for where a democracy is governed by stated laws there is no room for them, but men of worth fill the first offices in the state: but where the power is not vested in the laws, there demagogues abound: for there the people rule with kingly power: the whole composing one body; for they are supreme, not as individuals but in their collective capacity.

The purest democracy gets its name chiefly from the equality that prevails in it. The law in such a state requires that the poor be no more subject to others than the rich. Neither group should hold supreme power alone, but both should share it. Some people suppose that liberty and equality are found chiefly in a democracy. If so, both must be greatest when every part of government is equally open to all. But the people form the majority, and whatever they vote for becomes law. It follows that such a state must be a democracy. This, then, is one kind of democracy. In another kind, eligibility for public office depends on meeting a property qualification. But the required amount should be small, and everyone who meets the qualification should be eligible. Anyone whose property falls below that amount should lose eligibility. [1292a] In another kind, every citizen who is not publicly disgraced has a share in government, but the laws govern. In another, every citizen without exception has this right. Another kind resembles these in other respects, but the people govern rather than the law. This happens when everything is decided by a majority vote rather than by law. Such a situation arises when demagogues influence the people. For where a democracy is governed by established laws, there is no room for demagogues. Instead, people of worth hold the highest offices in the state. But where power does not rest with the laws, demagogues abound. For there the people rule with the power of a king, together forming a single body. They hold supreme power not as individuals, but collectively.

Homer also discommends the government of many; but whether he means this we are speaking of, or where each person exercises his power separately, is uncertain. When the people possess this power they desire to be altogether absolute, that they may not be under the control of the law, and this is the time when flatterers are held in repute. Nor is there any difference between such a people and monarchs in a tyranny: for their manners are the same, and they both hold a despotic power over better persons than themselves. For their decrees are like the others' edicts; their demagogues like the others' flatterers: but their greatest resemblance consists in the mutual support they give to each other, the flatterer to the tyrant, the demagogue to the people: and to them it is owing that the supreme power is lodged in the votes of the people, and not in the laws; for they bring everything before them, as their influence is owing to their being supreme whose opinions they entirely direct; for these are they whom the multitude obey. Besides, those who accuse the magistrates insist upon it, that the right of determining on their conduct lies in the people, who gladly receive their complaints as the means of destroying all their offices.

Homer also criticizes rule by many. But it is unclear whether he means the kind we are discussing or one where each person exercises power separately. When the people hold this power, they want absolute authority so that they are not subject to the law. At such times, flatterers are highly respected. There is no difference between such a people and tyrannical monarchs. Their behavior is the same, and both exercise despotic power over people better than themselves. The people's decrees resemble tyrants' edicts, and their demagogues resemble tyrants' flatterers. But the strongest resemblance lies in their mutual support: flatterers support tyrants, and demagogues support the people. Because of demagogues, supreme power rests with the people's votes rather than with the laws. Demagogues bring everything before the people because their influence depends on the people's supreme power. They completely control the people's opinions, since the multitude obeys them. Besides, those who accuse public officials insist that the people have the right to judge those officials' conduct. The people gladly welcome these complaints as a means of destroying all public offices.

Any one, therefore, may with great justice blame such a government as being a democracy, and not a free state; for where the government is not in the laws, then there is no free state, for the law ought to be supreme over all things; and particular incidents which arise should be determined by the magistrates or the state. If, therefore, a democracy is to be reckoned a free state, it is evident that any such establishment which centres all power in the votes of the people cannot, properly speaking, be a democracy: for their decrees cannot be general in their extent. Thus, then, we may describe the several species of democracies.

Anyone, then, may rightly criticize such a government as a democracy rather than a free state. For where laws do not govern, there is no free state. The law should be supreme over everything, and magistrates or the state should decide particular cases as they arise. If, then, a democracy counts as a free state, the conclusion is clear. Any system that places all power in the people's votes cannot, strictly speaking, be a democracy. For the people's decrees cannot apply generally. This, then, is how we may describe the different kinds of democracy.