Chapter 13

It seems, then, requisite for the establishment of a state, that all, or at least many of these particulars should be well canvassed and inquired into; and that virtue and education may most justly claim the right of being considered as the necessary means of making the citizens happy, as we have already said. As those who are equal in one particular are not therefore equal in all, and those who are unequal in one particular are not therefore unequal in all, it follows that all those governments which are established upon a principle which supposes they are, are erroneous.

It seems, then, that establishing a state requires careful discussion and examination of all, or at least many, of these matters. And, as we have already said, virtue and education may rightly be considered necessary means of making citizens happy. People who are equal in one respect are not therefore equal in every respect. Likewise, people who are unequal in one respect are not therefore unequal in every respect. It follows that all governments founded on either of these mistaken assumptions are flawed.

We have already said, that all the members of the community will dispute with each other for the offices of the state; and in some particulars justly, but not so in general; the rich, for instance, because they have the greatest landed property, and the ultimate right to the soil is vested in the community; and also because their fidelity is in general most to be depended on. The freemen and men of family will dispute the point with each other, as nearly on an equality; for these latter have a right to a higher regard as citizens than obscure persons, for honourable descent is everywhere of great esteem: nor is it an improper conclusion, that the descendants of men of worth will be men of worth themselves; for noble birth is the fountain of virtue to men of family: for the same reason also we justly say, that virtue has a right to put in her pretensions. Justice, for instance, is a virtue, and so necessary to society, that all others must yield her the precedence.

We have already said that all members of the community will compete with one another for public office. Their claims are justified in some respects, but not in general. The rich, for example, base their claim on owning the most land, since ultimate ownership rests with the community. They also base their claim on being generally the most trustworthy. Free citizens and people of noble birth will press their competing claims on nearly equal terms. For people of noble birth deserve greater respect as citizens than people of obscure origins. Honorable ancestry is highly valued everywhere. Nor is it unreasonable to conclude that descendants of worthy people will themselves be worthy. For noble birth is the source of virtue in noble families. For the same reason, we rightly say that virtue also has a claim to public office. Justice, for example, is a virtue so necessary to society that all other virtues must give it first place.

Let us now see what the many have to urge on their side against the few; and they may say, that if, when collectively taken, they are compared with them, they are stronger, richer, and better than they are. But should it ever happen that all these should inhabit the [1283b] same city, I mean the good, the rich, the noble, as well as the many, such as usually make up the community, I ask, will there then be any reason to dispute concerning who shall govern, or will there not? for in every community which we have mentioned there is no dispute where the supreme power should be placed; for as these differ from each other, so do those in whom that is placed; for in one state the rich enjoy it, in others the meritorious, and thus each according to their separate manners. Let us however consider what is to be done when all these happen at the same time to inhabit the same city. If the virtuous should be very few in number, how then shall we act? shall we prefer the virtuous on account of their abilities, if they are capable of governing the city? or should they be so many as almost entirely to compose the state?

Let us now consider what the many can argue against the few. They may say that, taken together, they are stronger, richer, and better than the few. But suppose all these groups were to live in the [1283b] same city. I mean the good, the rich, the noble, and the many who usually make up the community. Would there then be any reason to dispute who should govern, or not? In each type of community we have mentioned, there is no dispute about who should hold supreme power. Just as these communities differ, so do the people who hold supreme power in them. In one state, the rich hold power, while in others, those with merit hold it. Each state distributes power according to its own character. But let us consider what should happen when all these groups live in the same city at the same time. If the virtuous are very few, what should we do? Should we give the virtuous priority because of their abilities, if they are capable of governing the city? Or should the virtuous be so numerous that they make up almost the entire state?

There is also a doubt concerning the pretensions of all those who claim the honours of government: for those who found them either on fortune or family have nothing which they can justly say in their defence; since it is evident upon their principle, that if any one person can be found richer than all the rest, the right of governing all these will be justly vested in this one person. In the same manner, one man who is of the best family will claim it from those who dispute the point upon family merit: and probably in an aristocracy the same dispute might arise on the score of virtue, if there is one man better than all the other men of worth who are in the same community; it seems just, by the same reasoning, that he should enjoy the supreme power. And upon this principle also, while the many suppose they ought to have the supreme command, as being more powerful than the few, if one or more than one, though a small number should be found stronger than themselves, these ought rather to have it than they.

There is also a question about the claims of all who seek the honors of government. Those who base their claims on wealth or family have no just defense of their position. For their own principle clearly implies that if one person is richer than all the rest, he should rightfully govern them all. Likewise, the man from the best family will claim power over others who base their claims on family standing. In an aristocracy, a similar dispute might probably arise over virtue. Suppose one man is better than all the other men of merit in the community. By the same reasoning, it seems just that he should hold supreme power. The same principle also applies when the many believe they should rule because they are stronger than the few. Suppose one person, or a small number of people, proves stronger than the many. Then that person or small group should rule instead of the many.

All these things seem to make it plain, that none of these principles are justly founded on which these persons would establish their right to the supreme power; and that all men whatsoever ought to obey them: for with respect to those who claim it as due to their virtue or their fortune, they might have justly some objection to make; for nothing hinders but that it may sometimes happen, that the many may be better or richer than the few, not as individuals, but in their collective capacity.

All these considerations seem to show that none of these principles justifies these people's claim to supreme power. Nor do these principles justify their claim that everyone must obey them. For there may be valid objections to those who claim power because of their virtue or wealth. Nothing prevents the many from sometimes being better or richer than the few, not individually, but as a group.

As to the doubt which some persons have proposed and objected, we may answer it in this manner; it is this, whether a legislator, who would establish the most perfect system of laws, should calculate them for the use of the better part of the citizens, or the many, in the circumstances we have already mentioned? The rectitude of anything consists in its equality; that therefore which is equally right will be advantageous to the whole state, and to every member of it in common.

We may answer a question some people have raised as an objection in the following way. Should a lawmaker seeking the most perfect system of laws design them for the better citizens or the majority? The question concerns the circumstances we have already mentioned. What makes anything right is its fairness. Therefore, what is equally fair will benefit the whole state and every member of it alike.

Now, in general, a citizen is one who both shares in the government and also in his turn submits to be governed; [1284a] their condition, it is true, is different in different states: the best is that in which a man is enabled to choose and to persevere in a course of virtue during his whole life, both in his public and private state. But should there be one person, or a very few, eminent for an uncommon degree of virtue, though not enough to make up a civil state, so that the virtue of the many, or their political abilities, should be too inferior to come in comparison with theirs, if more than one; or if but one, with his only; such are not to be considered as part of the city; for it would be doing them injustice to rate them on a level with those who are so far their inferiors in virtue and political abilities, that they appear to them like a god amongst men. From whence it is evident, that a system of laws must be calculated for those who are equal to each other in nature and power. Such men, therefore, are not the object of law; for they are themselves a law: and it would be ridiculous in any one to endeavour to include them in the penalties of a law: for probably they might say what Antisthenes tells us the lions did to the hares when they demanded to be admitted to an equal share with them in the government. And it is on this account that democratic states have established the ostracism; for an equality seems the principal object of their government. For which reason they compel all those who are very eminent for their power, their fortune, their friendships, or any other cause which may give them too great weight in the government, to submit to the ostracism, and leave the city for a stated time; as the fabulous histories relate the Argonauts served Hercules, for they refused to take him with them in the ship Argo on account of his superior valour. For which reason those who hate a tyranny and find fault with the advice which Periander gave to Thrasybulus, must not think there was nothing to be said in its defence; for the story goes, that Periander said nothing to the messenger in answer to the business he was consulted about, but striking off those ears of corn which were higher than the rest, reduced the whole crop to a level; so that the messenger, without knowing the cause of what was done, related the fact to Thrasybulus, who understood by it that he must take off all the principal men in the city. Nor is this serviceable to tyrants only; nor is it tyrants only who do it; for the same thing is practised both in oligarchies and democracies: for the ostracism has in a manner nearly the same power, by restraining and banishing those who are too great; and what is done in one city is done also by those who have the supreme power in separate states; as the Athenians with respect to the Samians, the Chians, and the Lesbians; for when they suddenly acquired the superiority over all Greece, they brought the other states into subjection, contrary to the treaties which subsisted between them. The King of Persia also very often reduces the Medes and Babylonians when they assume upon their former power: [1284b] and this is a principle which all governments whatsoever keep in their eye; even those which are best administered, as well as those which are not, do it; these for the sake of private utility, the others for the public good.

In general, a citizen is someone who shares in governing and, in turn, submits to being governed. [1284a] The citizen’s position does differ from one state to another. The best position allows a man to choose virtue and follow it throughout his life, both publicly and privately. But suppose one person, or a very few, possesses exceptional virtue, though too few to form a state. Suppose the many are so inferior in virtue or political ability that they cannot compare with these few, or this one. Such people should not be considered part of the city. It would be unjust to place them on the same level as people so far below them in virtue and political ability. Such exceptional people seem like a god among men. Clearly, then, laws must be designed for people who are equal in nature and power. Such exceptional people are therefore not subject to law, because they are themselves a law. It would be ridiculous to try to subject them to the penalties of a law. They might well give the answer that, according to Antisthenes, the lions gave the hares. The hares had demanded an equal share with the lions in government. This is why democratic states established ostracism, since equality seems to be their government’s main aim. They therefore force anyone with outstanding power, wealth, friendships, or any other source of excessive political influence into ostracism. Such people must leave the city for a fixed period. According to the legends, the Argonauts treated Hercules this way. They refused to take him aboard the Argo because of his superior courage. For this reason, those who hate tyranny and criticize Periander’s advice to Thrasybulus must recognize that something supports that advice. According to the story, Periander gave the messenger no spoken answer to the question he had been asked. Instead, he cut off the ears of grain that stood above the rest, making the whole crop level. The messenger did not understand why Periander had done this, but reported what happened to Thrasybulus. Thrasybulus understood that he must eliminate all the leading men in the city. Nor does this practice benefit only tyrants, and tyrants are not the only ones who use it. Oligarchies and democracies do the same thing. Ostracism has nearly the same effect, by restraining and banishing those who become too powerful. What happens within a city also happens between states, when one holds supreme power over others. The Athenians treated the Samians, the Chians, and the Lesbians this way. When the Athenians suddenly gained supremacy over all Greece, they subjected the other states to their rule, violating their existing treaties. The King of Persia also very often weakens the Medes and Babylonians when they grow proud of their former power. [1284b] All governments keep this principle in mind, both the best administered and those that are not. The latter act for private advantage, while the former act for the public good.

The same thing is to be perceived in the other arts and sciences; for a painter would not represent an animal with a foot disproportionally large, though he had drawn it remarkably beautiful; nor would the shipwright make the prow or any other part of the vessel larger than it ought to be; nor will the master of the band permit any who sings louder and better than the rest to sing in concert with them. There is therefore no reason that a monarch should not act in agreement with free states, to support his own power, if they do the same thing for the benefit of their respective communities; upon which account when there is any acknowledged difference in the power of the citizens, the reason upon which the ostracism is founded will be politically just; but it is better for the legislator so to establish his state at the beginning as not to want this remedy: but if in course of time such an inconvenience should arise, to endeavour to amend it by some such correction. Not that this was the use it was put to: for many did not regard the benefit of their respective communities, but made the ostracism a weapon in the hand of sedition.

The same principle can be seen in the other arts and sciences. A painter would not give an animal an oversized foot, even if he had painted the foot beautifully. Nor would a shipbuilder make the prow or any other part of a vessel larger than it should be. Nor would a bandleader allow someone who sings louder and better than the others to sing with them. So there is no reason a monarch should not follow the example of free states to support his own power, if those states act in the same way for their communities’ benefit. On these grounds, when citizens differ noticeably in power, the reasoning behind ostracism is politically just. But it is better for lawmakers to establish the state from the outset so that this remedy is unnecessary. If such a problem arises over time, however, they should try to remedy it through some correction of this kind. Yet ostracism was not used for this purpose. Many ignored their communities’ benefit and instead made ostracism a weapon of political strife.

It is evident, then, that in corrupt governments it is partly just and useful to the individual, though probably it is as clear that it is not entirely just: for in a well-governed state there may be great doubts about the use of it, not on account of the pre-eminence which one may have in strength, riches, or connection: but when the pre-eminence is virtue, what then is to be done? for it seems not right to turn out and banish such a one; neither does it seem right to govern him, for that would be like desiring to share the power with Jupiter and to govern him: nothing then remains but what indeed seems natural, and that is for all persons quietly to submit to the government of those who are thus eminently virtuous, and let them be perpetually kings in the separate states.

Clearly, then, in corrupt governments, the practice is partly just and useful to the individual. Yet it is probably just as clear that the practice is not entirely just. In a well-governed state, there may be serious doubts about using it. These doubts do not concern someone's superiority in strength, wealth, or connections. But when someone's superiority lies in virtue, what should be done? It seems wrong to expel and banish such a person. Nor does it seem right to rule him. Ruling him would be like wanting to share power with Jupiter and rule over him. So only one course remains, and it does indeed seem natural. Everyone should peacefully accept the rule of those whose virtue is so outstanding. They should let these people remain kings forever in their respective states.