Chapter 11

Other particulars we will consider separately; but it seems proper to prove, that the supreme power ought to be lodged with the many, rather than with those of the better sort, who are few; and also to explain what doubts (and probably just ones) may arise: now, though not one individual of the many may himself be fit for the supreme power, yet when these many are joined together, it does not follow but they may be better qualified for it than those; and this not separately, but as a collective body; as the public suppers exceed those which are given at one person's private expense: for, as they are many, each person brings in his share of virtue and wisdom; and thus, coming together, they are like one man made up of a multitude, with many feet, many hands, and many intelligences: thus is it with respect to the manners and understandings of the multitude taken together; for which reason the public are the best judges of music and poetry; for some understand one part, some another, and all collectively the whole; and in this particular men of consequence differ from each of the many; as they say those who are beautiful do from those who are not so, and as fine pictures excel any natural objects, by collecting the several beautiful parts which were dispersed among different originals into one, although the separate parts, as the eye or any other, might be handsomer than in the picture.

We will consider the other details separately. But we should show why supreme power ought to belong to the many rather than to the few superior people. We should also explain the doubts that may arise, which are probably justified. Although no individual among the many may be fit to hold supreme power, the many together may be better qualified. They may be better qualified than the superior few, not individually, but as a group. In the same way, meals provided by many people surpass those paid for by one person alone. Because there are many people, each contributes a share of virtue and wisdom. Together, they become like one person with many feet, many hands, and many minds. The same is true of the character and understanding of the many when taken together. For this reason, the public are the best judges of music and poetry. Some understand one part, some another, and all together understand the whole. In this respect, distinguished people differ from each individual among the many. The difference resembles what people describe as the difference between beautiful people and those who are not beautiful. It also resembles the way fine paintings surpass anything found in nature. A painting brings together beautiful features scattered among different originals. Yet an individual feature in an original, such as an eye or another part, might be more beautiful than its painted counterpart.

But if this distinction is to be made between every people and every general assembly, and some few men of consequence, it may be doubtful whether it is true; nay, it is clear enough that, with respect to a few, it is not; since the same conclusion might be applied even to brutes: and indeed wherein do some men differ from brutes? Not but that nothing prevents what I have said being true of the people in some states. The doubt then which we have lately proposed, with all its consequences, may be settled in this manner; it is necessary that the freemen who compose the bulk of the people should have absolute power in some things; but as they are neither men of property, nor act uniformly upon principles of virtue, it is not safe to trust them with the first offices in the state, both on account of their iniquity and their ignorance; from the one of which they will do what is wrong, from the other they will mistake: and yet it is dangerous to allow them no power or share in the government; for when there are many poor people who are incapable of acquiring the honours of their country, the state must necessarily have many enemies in it; let them then be permitted to vote in the public assemblies and to determine causes; for which reason Socrates, and some other legislators, gave them the power of electing the officers of the state, and also of inquiring into their conduct when they came out of office, and only prevented their being magistrates by themselves; for the multitude when they are collected together have all of them sufficient understanding for these purposes, and, mixing among those of higher rank, are serviceable to the city, as some things, which alone are improper for food, when mixed with others make the whole more wholesome than a few of them would be.

But if this distinction applies to every people and every general assembly, compared with a few prominent men, its truth is doubtful. Indeed, it clearly does not hold for some peoples, since the same argument could apply even to animals. And how do some men differ from animals? Still, nothing prevents my argument from being true of the people in some states. The question we recently raised, along with its consequences, may therefore be settled in the following way. The free men who make up most of the people must have supreme authority in some matters. But they have neither property nor a consistent commitment to virtue. So it is unsafe to entrust them with the highest offices in the state, because of their injustice and ignorance. Their injustice will lead them to do wrong, and their ignorance will lead them to make mistakes. Yet it is dangerous to deny them all power or any share in government. For when many poor people cannot gain public honors, the state must necessarily contain many enemies. So let them vote in public assemblies and decide court cases. For this reason, Socrates and some other lawmakers allowed them to elect state officials. They also allowed them to examine officials' conduct after their terms ended. They only barred the people from holding office themselves. For when the people gather together, their combined understanding is sufficient for these purposes. And when they mix with those of higher rank, they benefit the city. Some things unsuitable as food on their own make a mixture more wholesome than a few ingredients would alone.

But there is a difficulty attending this form of government, for it seems, that the person who himself was capable of curing any one who was then sick, must be the best judge whom to employ as a physician; but such a one must be himself a physician; and the same holds true in every other practice and art: and as a physician ought [1282a] to give an account of his practice to a physician, so ought it to be in other arts: those whose business is physic may be divided into three sorts, the first of these is he who makes up the medicines; the second prescribes, and is to the other as the architect is to the mason; the third is he who understands the science, but never practises it: now these three distinctions may be found in those who understand all other arts; nor have we less opinion of their judgment who are only instructed in the principles of the art than of those who practise it: and with respect to elections the same method of proceeding seems right; for to elect a proper person in any science is the business of those who are skilful therein; as in geometry, of geometricians; in steering, of steersmen: but if some individuals should know something of particular arts and works, they do not know more than the professors of them: so that even upon this principle neither the election of magistrates, nor the censure of their conduct, should be entrusted to the many.

But this form of government presents a difficulty. It seems that whoever could cure a sick person must be the best judge of whom to employ as a physician. But such a judge must himself be a physician. The same holds true in every other practice and art. Just as a physician should [1282a] account for his practice to another physician, so should practitioners of other arts. Those concerned with medicine may be divided into three groups. The first prepares medicines. The second prescribes them and stands in relation to the first as an architect does to a mason. The third understands medical science but never practices it. These three distinctions may be found among those who understand all other arts. We value the judgment of those taught only an art’s principles no less than the judgment of its practitioners. The same approach seems right for elections. Choosing a suitable person in any science is the task of those skilled in that science. Geometers should choose in geometry, and steersmen in steering. But if some individuals know something about particular arts and crafts, they do not know more than their practitioners. So even on this principle, neither the election of magistrates nor the judgment of their conduct should be entrusted to the many.

But probably all that has been here said may not be right; for, to resume the argument I lately used, if the people are not very brutal indeed, although we allow that each individual knows less of these affairs than those who have given particular attention to them, yet when they come together they will know them better, or at least not worse; besides, in some particular arts it is not the workman only who is the best judge; namely, in those the works of which are understood by those who do not profess them: thus he who builds a house is not the only judge of it, for the master of the family who inhabits it is a better; thus also a steersman is a better judge of a tiller than he who made it; and he who gives an entertainment than the cook. What has been said seems a sufficient solution of this difficulty; but there is another that follows: for it seems absurd that the power of the state should be lodged with those who are but of indifferent morals, instead of those who are of excellent characters. Now the power of election and censure are of the utmost consequence, and this, as has been said, in some states they entrust to the people; for the general assembly is the supreme court of all, and they have a voice in this, and deliberate in all public affairs, and try all causes, without any objection to the meanness of their circumstances, and at any age: but their treasurers, generals, and other great officers of state are taken from men of great fortune and worth. This difficulty also may be solved upon the same principle; and here too they may be right, for the power is not in the man who is member of the assembly, or council, but the assembly itself, and the council, and the people, of which each individual of the whole community are the parts, I mean as senator, adviser, or judge; for which reason it is very right, that the many should have the greatest powers in their own hands; for the people, the council, and the judges are composed of them, and the property of all these collectively is more than the property of any person or a few who fill the great offices of the state: and thus I determine these points.

But perhaps not everything said here is right. Let me return to my earlier argument. Suppose the people are not utterly uncivilized. We may admit that each person knows less about these matters than those who have studied them closely. Yet when people come together, they will understand these matters better than the experts, or at least no worse. Besides, in some crafts, the craftsman is not the only person best qualified to judge the work. This is true when people outside the craft can understand its products. A house, for example, can be judged by someone other than its builder. The head of the household who lives there is a better judge. Likewise, a steersman judges a tiller better than its maker does, and a host judges a meal better than the cook. What has been said seems to resolve this difficulty adequately. But another difficulty follows. It seems absurd to give power over the state to people of ordinary morals rather than people of excellent character. The powers to elect officials and judge their conduct are extremely important. Yet, as already noted, some states entrust these powers to the people. The general assembly is the highest court of all. The people have a voice in the assembly, debate all public affairs, and judge all cases. Neither their poverty nor their age disqualifies them. But treasurers, generals, and other high officials are chosen from men of great wealth and merit. This difficulty too may be resolved by the same principle, and these arrangements may also be right. Power belongs not to the individual member of the assembly or council, but to the assembly, council, and people collectively. Each individual in the community forms part of these bodies by serving as a council member, adviser, or judge. For this reason, it is entirely right for the many to hold the greatest powers. The people, the council, and the courts are made up of the many. Their combined property exceeds that of any one person, or of the few who hold the state's highest offices. This, then, is my conclusion on these questions.

The first question that we stated shows plainly, that the supreme power should be lodged in laws duly made and that the magistrate or magistrates, either one or more, should be authorised to determine those cases which the laws cannot particularly speak to, as it is impossible for them, in general language, to explain themselves upon everything that may arise: but what these laws are which are established upon the best foundations has not been yet explained, but still remains a matter of some question: but the laws of every state will necessarily be like every state, either trifling or excellent, just or unjust; for it is evident, that the laws must be framed correspondent to the constitution of the government; and, if so, it is plain, that a well-formed government will have good laws, a bad one, bad ones.

The first question we raised makes clear that supreme power should rest with properly made laws. One or more magistrates should be authorized to decide cases the laws cannot specifically address. Laws use general language, so they cannot cover every situation that may arise. But we have not yet explained what laws rest on the best foundations. That question remains open to some debate. Still, the laws of every state will necessarily reflect the state itself, whether worthless or excellent, just or unjust. For laws clearly must be framed to match the government's constitution. If so, a well-formed government will have good laws, and a bad government will have bad laws.