Chapter 5

But with respect to citizens there is a doubt remaining, whether those only are truly so who are allowed to share in the government, or whether the mechanics also are to be considered as such? for if those who are not permitted to rule are to be reckoned among them, it is impossible that the virtue of all the citizens should be the same, for these also are citizens; and if none of them are admitted to be citizens, where shall they be ranked? for they are neither [1278a] sojourners nor foreigners? or shall we say that there will no inconvenience arise from their not being citizens, as they are neither slaves nor freedmen: for this is certainly true, that all those are not citizens who are necessary to the existence of a city, as boys are not citizens in the same manner that men are, for those are perfectly so, the others under some conditions; for they are citizens, though imperfect ones: for in former times among some people the mechanics were either slaves or foreigners, for which reason many of them are so now: and indeed the best regulated states will not permit a mechanic to be a citizen; but if it be allowed them, we cannot then attribute the virtue we have described to every citizen or freeman, but to those only who are disengaged from servile offices. Now those who are employed by one person in them are slaves; those who do them for money are mechanics and hired servants: hence it is evident on the least reflection what is their situation, for what I have said is fully explained by appearances. Since the number of communities is very great, it follows necessarily that there will be many different sorts of citizens, particularly of those who are governed by others, so that in one state it may be necessary to admit mechanics and hired servants to be citizens, but in others it may be impossible; as particularly in an aristocracy, where honours are bestowed on virtue and dignity: for it is impossible for one who lives the life of a mechanic or hired servant to acquire the practice of virtue. In an oligarchy also hired servants are not admitted to be citizens; because there a man's right to bear any office is regulated by his fortune; but mechanics are, for many citizens are very rich.

But one question about citizens remains. Are only those allowed to share in government truly citizens, or should skilled workers also count? If people barred from ruling count as citizens, not all citizens can have the same virtue. For those people are citizens too. But if none of these workers are citizens, how should we classify them? They are neither [1278a] temporary residents nor foreigners. Or should we say that excluding them from citizenship creates no difficulty, since they are neither slaves nor freedmen? Certainly, not everyone necessary to a city’s existence is a citizen. Boys, for example, are not citizens in the same way as men. Men are full citizens, while boys are citizens only in a qualified sense. Boys are citizens, but incomplete ones. In earlier times, skilled workers among some peoples were either slaves or foreigners. For this reason, many skilled workers still belong to those groups today. Indeed, the best-governed states will not allow a skilled worker to be a citizen. But if skilled workers are admitted, we cannot attribute the virtue already described to every citizen or free person. We can attribute that virtue only to those free from servile work. Those who perform such work for one person are slaves. Those who perform it for pay are skilled workers and hired servants. Even a little reflection makes their position clear, since the facts fully support what I have said. Since there are many different political communities, there must also be many different kinds of citizens. This is especially true of citizens who are governed by others. So one state may need to admit skilled workers and hired servants as citizens, while another cannot admit them. This is particularly true of an aristocracy, where public honors are awarded for virtue and merit. For someone living as a skilled worker or hired servant cannot develop the practice of virtue. In an oligarchy, too, hired servants are excluded from citizenship. This is because a man’s right to hold any office depends on his wealth. But skilled workers are admitted, for many citizens are very rich.

There was a law at Thebes that no one could have a share in the government till he had been ten years out of trade. In many states the law invites strangers to accept the freedom of the city; and in some democracies the son of a free-woman is himself free. The same is also observed in many others with respect to natural children; but it is through want of citizens regularly born that they admit such: for these laws are always made in consequence of a scarcity of inhabitants; so, as their numbers increase, they first deprive the children of a male or female slave of this privilege, next the child of a free-woman, and last of all they will admit none but those whose fathers and mothers were both free.

At Thebes, the law barred anyone from taking part in government until he had spent ten years out of trade. In many states, the law invites foreigners to become citizens. In some democracies, the son of a free woman is also a citizen. Many other states also grant citizenship to children born outside marriage. But these states admit such children because there are too few citizens born within marriage. Laws like these are always introduced because there are too few inhabitants. So, as the population grows, these states first withdraw citizenship from children whose father or mother is a slave. Next, they withdraw it from the child of a free woman. Finally, they admit only those whose fathers and mothers were both free.

That there are many sorts of citizens, and that he may be said to be as completely who shares the honours of the state, is evident from what has been already said. Thus Achilles, in Homer, complains of Agamemnon's treating him like an unhonoured stranger; for a stranger or sojourner is one who does not partake of the honours of the state: and whenever the right to the freedom of the city is kept obscure, it is for the sake of the inhabitants. [1278b] From what has been said it is plain whether the virtue of a good man and an excellent citizen is the same or different: and we find that in some states it is the same, in others not; and also that this is not true of each citizen, but of those only who take the lead, or are capable of taking the lead, in public affairs, either alone or in conjunction with others.

As we have already shown, there are many kinds of citizens. A person who shares in the state's honors may be called a citizen in the fullest sense. Thus Achilles, in Homer, complains that Agamemnon treats him like a stranger without honor. For a stranger or temporary resident has no share in the state's honors. Whenever the right to citizenship is left unclear, it is for the sake of the inhabitants. [1278b] What we have said makes clear whether a good person's virtue and an excellent citizen's virtue are the same or different. In some states they are the same, but in others they are not. Even where they are the same, this does not apply to every citizen. It applies only to those who lead public affairs, or are capable of leading, either alone or with others.