Chapter 9

Let us first determine what are the proper limits of an oligarchy and a democracy, and what is just in each of these states; for all men have some natural inclination to justice; but they proceed therein only to a certain degree; nor can they universally point out what is absolutely just; as, for instance, what is equal appears just, and is so; but not to all; only among those who are equals: and what is unequal appears just, and is so; but not to all, only amongst those who are unequals; which circumstance some people neglect, and therefore judge ill; the reason for which is, they judge for themselves, and every one almost is the worst judge in his own cause. Since then justice has reference to persons, the same distinctions must be made with respect to persons which are made with respect to things, in the manner that I have already described in my Ethics.

Let us first establish the proper limits of oligarchy and democracy, and what is just in each. For all people have some natural inclination toward justice, but their understanding of justice goes only so far. Nor can they explain what is absolutely just in every case. For example, equality seems just, and it is, but only among equals, not among everyone. Likewise, inequality seems just, and it is, but only among unequals, not among everyone. Some people overlook this distinction and therefore judge poorly. The reason is that they judge their own cases, and almost everyone is the worst judge of their own case. Since justice concerns people, we must make the same distinctions concerning people as we do concerning things. We must do so in the way I have already described in my Ethics.

As to the equality of the things, these they agree in; but their dispute is concerning the equality of the persons, and chiefly for the reason above assigned; because they judge ill in their own cause; and also because each party thinks, that if they admit what is right in some particulars, they have done justice on the whole: thus, for instance, if some persons are unequal in riches, they suppose them unequal in the whole; or, on the contrary, if they are equal in liberty, they suppose them equal in the whole: but what is absolutely just they omit; for if civil society was founded for the sake of preserving and increasing property, every one's right in the city would be equal to his fortune; and then the reasoning of those who insist upon an oligarchy would be valid; for it would not be right that he who contributed one mina should have an equal share in the hundred along with him who brought in all the rest, either of the original money or what was afterwards acquired.

They agree about equality in what people receive. But they disagree about equality among people, chiefly for the reason given above: people judge their own cases poorly. Also, each side thinks that recognizing what is just in some respects means doing justice overall. For example, if some people are unequal in wealth, one side assumes they are unequal in every respect. Conversely, if people are equal in freedom, the other side assumes they are equal in every respect. But both sides overlook what is just without qualification. If political society existed to preserve and increase property, each person's rights in the city would match their wealth. Then the argument of those who favor oligarchy would be valid. Suppose one person contributed one mina out of a hundred, while another contributed all the rest. The first should not receive an equal share of either the original money or anything later acquired.

Nor was civil society founded merely to preserve the lives of its members; but that they might live well: for otherwise a state might be composed of slaves, or the animal creation: but this is not so; for these have no share in the happiness of it; nor do they live after their own choice; nor is it an alliance mutually to defend each other from injuries, or for a commercial intercourse: for then the Tyrrhenians and Carthaginians, and all other nations between whom treaties of commerce subsist, would be citizens of one city; for they have articles to regulate their exports and imports, and engagements for mutual protection, and alliances for mutual defence; but [1280b] yet they have not all the same magistrates established among them, but they are different among the different people; nor does the one take any care, that the morals of the other should be as they ought, or that none of those who have entered into the common agreements should be unjust, or in any degree vicious, only that they do not injure any member of the confederacy. But whosoever endeavours to establish wholesome laws in a state, attends to the virtues and the vices of each individual who composes it; from whence it is evident, that the first care of him who would found a city, truly deserving that name, and not nominally so, must be to have his citizens virtuous; for otherwise it is merely an alliance for self-defence; differing from those of the same cast which are made between different people only in place: for law is an agreement and a pledge, as the sophist Lycophron says, between the citizens of their intending to do justice to each other, though not sufficient to make all the citizens just and good: and that this is faact is evident, for could any one bring different places together, as, for instance, enclose Megara and Corinth in a wall, yet they would not be one city, not even if the inhabitants intermarried with each other, though this inter-community contributes much to make a place one city. Besides, could we suppose a set of people to live separate from each other, but within such a distance as would admit of an intercourse, and that there were laws subsisting between each party, to prevent their injuring one another in their mutual dealings, supposing one a carpenter, another a husbandman, shoemaker, and the like, and that their numbers were ten thousand, still all that they would have together in common would be a tariff for trade, or an alliance for mutual defence, but not the same city. And why? not because their mutual intercourse is not near enough, for even if persons so situated should come to one place, and every one should live in his own house as in his native city, and there should be alliances subsisting between each party to mutually assist and prevent any injury being done to the other, still they would not be admitted to be a city by those who think correctly, if they preserved the same customs when they were together as when they were separate.

Civil society was not founded merely to keep its members alive, but to enable them to live well. Otherwise, a state could consist of slaves or animals. But that is not possible, because slaves and animals have no share in its happiness and cannot choose how to live. Nor is a state merely an alliance for protection against injuries or for trade. If it were, the Tyrrhenians, Carthaginians, and all other nations with trade treaties would be citizens of one city. These nations have agreements governing exports and imports, commitments to mutual protection, and alliances for mutual defense. But [1280b] they do not all share the same governing officials. Each people has its own. Nor does one people concern itself with whether another people's conduct is right. Neither side ensures that everyone covered by their agreements is free from injustice or any other vice. Their only concern is that no one harms any member of the alliance. But anyone seeking to establish sound laws in a state considers the virtues and vices of every individual within it. Clearly, then, anyone founding a city that truly deserves the name must first ensure that its citizens are virtuous. Otherwise, the city is merely an alliance for self-defense. It differs from similar alliances between separate peoples only because its members live in one place. For law, as the sophist Lycophron says, is an agreement and a pledge among citizens to treat one another justly. Yet law alone is not enough to make all citizens just and good. The following example makes this clear. Suppose someone brought separate places together, enclosing Megara and Corinth within a single wall. They would still not form one city, even if their inhabitants married one another. Yet such intermarriage contributes greatly to making a place one city. Consider, too, people living apart, but close enough to have dealings with one another. Suppose they had laws preventing them from harming one another in those dealings. One might be a carpenter, another a farmer, another a shoemaker, and so on. Even if they numbered ten thousand, they would share only a trade agreement or an alliance for mutual defense. They would not share a single city. Why not? Not because their dealings with one another are too distant. Suppose these people moved to one place, each living in his own house as in his native city. Suppose they also maintained alliances to help one another and prevent harm to one another. Even then, those who judge correctly would not consider them a city if they kept their former ways of life. Living together would not make them a city if they lived just as they had when apart.

It is evident, then, that a city is not a community of place; nor established for the sake of mutual safety or traffic with each other; but that these things are the necessary consequences of a city, although they may all exist where there is no city: but a city is a society of people joining together with their families and their children to live agreeably for the sake of having their lives as happy and as independent as possible: and for this purpose it is necessary that they should live in one place and intermarry with each other: hence in all cities there are family-meetings, clubs, sacrifices, and public entertainments to promote friendship; for a love of sociability is friendship itself; so that the end then for which a city is established is, that the inhabitants of it may live happy, and these things are conducive to that end: for it is a community of families and villages for the sake of a perfect independent life; that is, as we have already said, for the sake of living well and happily. It is not therefore founded for the purpose of men's merely [1281a] living together, but for their living as men ought; for which reason those who contribute most to this end deserve to have greater power in the city than those who are their equals in family and freedom, but their inferiors in civil virtue, or those who excel them in wealth but are below them in worth. It is evident from what has been said, that in all disputes upon government each party says something that is just.

Clearly, then, a city is not simply a community sharing a place. Nor is it established for mutual safety or trade. These things necessarily follow from a city’s existence, although all can exist without a city. Rather, a city is a community of people, together with their families and children, united to live well together. Their purpose is to make their lives as happy and independent as possible. For this purpose, they must live in one place and marry one another. This is why all cities have family gatherings, clubs, sacrifices, and public celebrations to promote friendship. For the love of social life is itself friendship. So a city is established so that its inhabitants may live happily, and these activities help achieve that purpose. A city is a community of families and villages seeking a complete, independent life. That means, as we have already said, living well and happily. It is therefore founded not merely for people [1281a] to live together, but for them to live as they ought. For this reason, those who contribute most to this purpose deserve greater power in the city. They deserve more power than those equal to them in family background and freedom, but inferior in civic virtue. They also deserve more power than those who surpass them in wealth but fall below them in worth. What has been said makes one thing clear: in all disputes about government, each side says something just.