Chapter 1
Every one who inquires into the nature of government, and what are its different forms, should make this almost his first question, What is a city? For upon this there is a dispute: for some persons say the city did this or that, while others say, not the city, but the oligarchy, or the tyranny. We see that the city is the only object which both the politician and legislator have in view in all they do: but government is a certain ordering of those who inhabit a city. As a city is a collective body, and, like other wholes, composed of many parts, it is evident our first inquiry must be, what a citizen is: for a city is a certain number of citizens. So that we must consider whom we ought to call citizen, and who is one; for this is often doubtful: for every one will not allow that this character is applicable to the same person; for that man who would be a citizen in a republic would very often not be one in an oligarchy. We do not include in this inquiry many of those who acquire this appellation out of the ordinary way, as honorary persons, for instance, but those only who have a natural right to it.
Anyone studying the nature of government and its different forms should begin with a basic question: What is a city? For people disagree about this. Some say the city did this or that. Others say it was not the city, but the oligarchy or the tyranny. We see that the city is the sole concern of both politicians and lawmakers in everything they do. But government is a particular way of organizing the people who live in a city. A city is a collective body and, like other wholes, consists of many parts. So clearly, our first question must be what a citizen is, since a city consists of a number of citizens. We must therefore consider whom we should call a citizen and who actually is one. This is often uncertain, because not everyone agrees that the same person qualifies as a citizen. Someone who would be a citizen in a republic would very often not be one in an oligarchy. Our inquiry excludes many who receive the title of citizen through unusual means, such as honorary citizens. It concerns only those who have a natural right to citizenship.
Now it is not residence which constitutes a man a citizen; for in this sojourners and slaves are upon an equality with him; nor will it be sufficient for this purpose, that you have the privilege of the laws, and may plead or be impleaded, for this all those of different nations, between whom there is a mutual agreement for that purpose, are allowed; although it very often happens, that sojourners have not a perfect right therein without the protection of a patron, to whom they are obliged to apply, which shows that their share in the community is incomplete. In like manner, with respect to boys who are not yet enrolled, or old men who are past war, we admit that they are in some respects citizens, but not completely so, but with some exceptions, for these are not yet arrived to years of maturity, and those are past service; nor is there any difference between them. But what we mean is sufficiently intelligible and clear, we want a complete citizen, one in whom there is no deficiency to be corrected to make him so. As to those who are banished, or infamous, there may be the same objections made and the same answer given. There is nothing that more characterises a complete citizen than having a share in the judicial and executive part of the government.
Living in a place does not make a man a citizen. In this respect, foreign residents and slaves are equal to citizens. Nor is it enough to have legal rights and be able to sue or be sued. These rights extend to all people from different nations whose nations have agreements allowing them. Yet foreign residents very often lack full access to these rights without a patron’s protection. They must turn to that patron for help, showing that their membership in the community is incomplete. Similarly, boys not yet enrolled as citizens and old men past military service are citizens in some respects. But neither group has full citizenship without qualifications. The boys have not yet reached maturity, while the old men are past service. In this respect, there is no difference between the two groups. But our meaning is clear enough. We are looking for a full citizen, someone who lacks nothing needed for citizenship. The same objections may be raised about people who are banished or disgraced, and the same answer may be given. Nothing defines a full citizen more clearly than a share in the judicial and executive functions of government.
With respect to offices, some are fixed to a particular time, so that no person is, on any account, permitted to fill them twice; or else not till some certain period has intervened; others are not fixed, as a juryman's, and a member of the general assembly: but probably some one may say these are not offices, nor have the citizens in these capacities any share in the government; though surely it is ridiculous to say that those who have the principal power in the state bear no office in it. But this objection is of no weight, for it is only a dispute about words; as there is no general term which can be applied both to the office of a juryman and a member of the assembly. For the sake of distinction, suppose we call it an indeterminate office: but I lay it down as a maxim, that those are citizens who could exercise it. Such then is the description of a citizen who comes nearest to what all those who are called citizens are. Every one also should know, that of the component parts of those things which differ from each other in species, after the first or second remove, those which follow have either nothing at all or very little common to each.
Some offices have fixed terms, and no one may hold them twice under any circumstances. Or they may hold them again only after a certain period has passed. Others have no fixed term, such as serving on a jury or in the general assembly. But perhaps someone may say these are not offices, and citizens serving in these roles have no share in government. Yet surely it is ridiculous to say that those with the greatest power in the state hold no office. But this objection carries no weight, since it is only a dispute about words. There is no general term covering both service on a jury and membership in the assembly. To distinguish this kind of service, let us call it an indefinite office. But I take it as a basic principle that those eligible to hold this office are citizens. This description of a citizen comes closest to covering all those who are called citizens. Everyone should also recognize something about the parts of things that differ in kind. Beyond the first or second level, the parts that follow have little or nothing in common with one another.
Now we see that governments differ from each other in their form, and that some of them are defective, others [1275b] as excellent as possible: for it is evident, that those which have many deficiencies and degeneracies in them must be far inferior to those which are without such faults. What I mean by degeneracies will be hereafter explained. Hence it is clear that the office of a citizen must differ as governments do from each other: for which reason he who is called a citizen has, in a democracy, every privilege which that station supposes. In other forms of government he may enjoy them; but not necessarily: for in some states the people have no power; nor have they any general assembly, but a few select men.
We see that governments differ in form. Some are flawed, while others are [1275b] as good as possible. Clearly, governments with many flaws and corruptions must be far inferior to governments without such faults. I will explain later what I mean by corruptions. So the role of a citizen must differ according to the form of government. For this reason, in a democracy, anyone called a citizen has every privilege that citizenship carries. In other forms of government, a citizen may enjoy these privileges, but not necessarily. For in some states, the people have no power. Nor do they have a general assembly, but only a few selected men.
The trial also of different causes is allotted to different persons; as at Lacedaemon all disputes concerning contracts are brought before some of the ephori: the senate are the judges in cases of murder, and so on; some being to be heard by one magistrate, others by another: and thus at Carthage certain magistrates determine all causes. But our former description of a citizen will admit of correction; for in some governments the office of a juryman and a member of the general assembly is not an indeterminate one; but there are particular persons appointed for these purposes, some or all of the citizens being appointed jurymen or members of the general assembly, and this either for all causes and all public business whatsoever, or else for some particular one: and this may be sufficient to show what a citizen is; for he who has a right to a share in the judicial and executive part of government in any city, him we call a citizen of that place; and a city, in one word, is a collective body of such persons sufficient in themselves to all the purposes of life.
Different kinds of cases are also assigned to different officials. At Lacedaemon, for example, all contract disputes come before some of the ephori. The senate judges murder cases, and so on. Some cases are heard by one magistrate, others by another. Similarly, at Carthage, certain magistrates decide all cases. But our earlier description of a citizen needs some correction. In some governments, serving on a jury or in the general assembly is not an office without defined limits. Instead, particular people are appointed to these roles. Some or all citizens are appointed as jurors or members of the general assembly. Their appointment covers either all cases and all public business, or only a particular case or matter. This may be enough to explain what a citizen is. We call someone a citizen of a city if they have the right to share in its judicial and executive government. In short, a city is a body of such people large enough to provide for all life's needs.