Chapter 11

The government of Carthage seems well established, and in many respects superior to others; in some particulars it bears a near resemblance to the Lacedaemonians; and indeed these three states, the Cretans, the Lacedaemonians and the Carthaginians are in some things very like each other, in others they differ greatly. Amongst many excellent constitutions this may show how well their government is framed, that although the people are admitted to a share in the administration, the form of it remains unaltered, without any popular insurrections, worth notice, on the one hand, or degenerating into a tyranny on the other. Now the Carthaginians have these things in common with the Lacedaemonians: public tables for those who are connected together by the tie of mutual friendship, after the manner of their Phiditia; they have also a magistracy, consisting of an hundred and four persons, similar to the ephori, or rather selected with more judgment; for amongst the Lacedaemonians, all the citizens are eligible, but amongst the Carthaginians, they are chosen out of those of the better sort: there is also some analogy between the king and the senate in both these governments, though the Carthaginian method of appointing their kings is best, for they do not confine themselves to one family; nor do they permit the election to be at large, nor have they any regard to seniority; for if amongst the candidates there are any of greater merit than the rest, these they prefer to those who may be older; for as their power is very extensive, if they are [1273a] persons of no account, they may be very hurtful to the state, as they have always been to the Lacedaemonians; also the greater part of those things which become reprehensible by their excess are common to all those governments which we have described.

The government of Carthage seems stable and, in many respects, better than others. In some ways, it closely resembles the government of the Lacedaemonians. Indeed, the three states of the Cretans, the Lacedaemonians, and the Carthaginians are very similar in some ways. In others, they differ greatly. Among its many excellent features, one may show how well the Carthaginian government is designed. Although the people share in governing, the form of government remains unchanged. There have been no popular uprisings worth noting, nor has the government declined into tyranny. The Carthaginians share the following features with the Lacedaemonians. They have communal meals for groups bound together by mutual friendship, like the Lacedaemonians’ Phiditia. They also have a governing body of a hundred and four members, similar to the ephori. Its members, however, are chosen with better judgment. Among the Lacedaemonians, all citizens are eligible, but the Carthaginians choose members from among the more distinguished citizens. The kings and senates of the two governments are also somewhat alike. However, the Carthaginian method of appointing kings is better. They do not limit their choice to one family, nor do they allow an unrestricted choice. They also give no preference to age. If some candidates have greater merit than the others, they prefer those candidates to older ones. Since the kings have very extensive powers, if they are [1273a] men of little worth, they may seriously harm the state. Such kings have always harmed the Lacedaemonians. Also, most of the features that become objectionable when taken too far are common to all the governments we have described.

Now of those principles on which the Carthaginians have established their mixed form of government, composed of an aristocracy and democracy, some incline to produce a democracy, others an oligarchy: for instance, if the kings and the senate are unanimous upon any point in debate, they can choose whether they will bring it before the people or no; but if they disagree, it is to these they must appeal, who are not only to hear what has been approved of by the senate, but are finally to determine upon it; and whosoever chooses it, has a right to speak against any matter whatsoever that may be proposed, which is not permitted in other cases. The five, who elect each other, have very great and extensive powers; and these choose the hundred, who are magistrates of the highest rank: their power also continues longer than any other magistrates, for it commences before they come into office, and is prolonged after they are out of it; and in this particular the state inclines to an oligarchy: but as they are not elected by lot, but by suffrage, and are not permitted to take money, they are the greatest supporters imaginable of an aristocracy.

The Carthaginians have established a mixed government combining aristocracy and democracy. Some of its principles favor democracy, while others favor oligarchy. For example, if the kings and senate agree on an issue, they can decide whether to bring it before the people. But if they disagree, they must refer the issue to the people. The people do not merely hear what the senate has approved. They also make the final decision. Anyone who wishes may speak against any proposal, a right not permitted in other cases. The five, who elect one another, have very broad powers. They also choose the hundred, who are officials of the highest rank. The five hold power longer than any other officials. Their power begins before they take office and continues after they leave it. In this respect, the state leans toward oligarchy. But because they are elected by vote rather than by lot, and cannot receive payment, they provide the strongest possible support for aristocracy.

The determining all causes by the same magistrates, and not orae in one court and another in another, as at Lacedaemon, has the same influence. The constitution of Carthage is now shifting from an aristocracy to an oligarchy, in consequence of an opinion which is favourably entertained by many, who think that the magistrates in the community ought not to be persons of family only, but of fortune also; as it is impossible for those who are in bad circumstances to support the dignity of their office, or to be at leisure to apply to public business. As choosing men of fortune to be magistrates make a state incline to an oligarchy, and men of abilities to an aristocracy, so is there a third method of proceeding which took place in the polity of Carthage; for they have an eye to these two particulars when they elect their officers, particularly those of the highest rank, their kings and their generals. It must be admitted, that it was a great fault in their legislator not to guard against the constitution's degenerating from an aristocracy; for this is a most necessary thing to provide for at first, that those citizens who have the best abilities should never be obliged to do anything unworthy their character, but be always at leisure to serve the public, not only when in office, but also when private persons; for if once you are obliged to look among the wealthy, that you may have men at leisure to serve you, your greatest offices, of king and general, will soon become venal; in consequence of which, riches will be more honourable than virtue and a love of money be the ruling principle in the city-for what those who have the chief power regard as honourable will necessarily be the object which the [1273b] citizens in general will aim at; and where the first honours are not paid to virtue, there the aristocratic form of government cannot flourish: for it is reasonable to conclude, that those who bought their places should generally make an advantage of what they laid out their money for; as it is absurd to suppose, that if a man of probity who is poor should be desirous of gaining something, a bad man should not endeavour to do the same, especially to reimburse himself; for which reason the magistracy should be formed of those who are most able to support an aristocracy. It would have been better for the legislature to have passed over the poverty of men of merit, and only to have taken care to have ensured them sufficient leisure, when in office, to attend to public affairs.

Having the same magistrates decide all cases has the same effect. Cases are not divided among different courts, as they are at Lacedaemon. The constitution of Carthage is now shifting from an aristocracy to an oligarchy because of a widely supported opinion. Many believe that public officials should have not only noble birth but also wealth. They argue that poor people cannot uphold the dignity of their office or have enough leisure for public business. Choosing officials for their wealth draws a state toward oligarchy, while choosing them for their ability draws it toward aristocracy. Carthage has adopted a third approach. When electing officials, the citizens consider both wealth and ability, especially for the highest offices, their kings and generals. We must admit that their lawgiver made a serious mistake by failing to protect the constitution from declining from aristocracy. Above all, the original arrangements must ensure that the most capable citizens never have to do anything beneath their character. These citizens must always have enough leisure to serve the public, whether they hold office or are private citizens. For if you must seek wealthy men to find people with leisure to serve, the consequences will soon follow. Your highest offices, those of king and general, will become available for purchase. As a result, wealth will be honored more than virtue, and love of money will become the city's guiding principle. For whatever those in power honor will necessarily become the goal that the [1273b] citizens generally pursue. Where virtue does not receive the highest honors, aristocratic government cannot flourish. It is reasonable to expect people who bought their offices generally to profit from what they paid for. A poor but honest man may want to gain something. It would be absurd to suppose that a bad man would not try to do the same, especially to recover his money. For this reason, public officials should be those best able to sustain an aristocracy. It would have been better for the lawmakers to overlook the poverty of deserving men. They should only have ensured that these men had enough leisure, while in office, to attend to public affairs.

It seems also improper, that one person should execute several offices, which was approved of at Carthage; for one business is best done by one person; and it is the duty of the legislator to look to this, and not make the same person a musician and a shoemaker: so that where the state is not small it is more politic and more popular to admit many persons to have a share in the government; for, as I just now said, it is not only more usual, but everything is better and sooner done, when one thing only is allotted to one person: and this is evident both in the army and navy, where almost every one, in his turn, both commands and is under command. But as their government inclines to an oligarchy, they avoid the ill effects of it by always appointing some of the popular party to the government of cities to make their fortunes. Thus they consult this fault in their constitution and render it stable; but this is depending on chance; whereas the legislator ought to frame his government, that there the no room for insurrections. But now, if there should be any general calamity, and the people should revolt from their rulers, there is no remedy for reducing them to obedience by the laws. And these are the particulars of the Lacedaemonian, the Cretan, and the Carthaginian governments which seem worthy of commendation.

It also seems wrong for one person to hold several offices, as was approved at Carthage. One task is best done by one person. The lawmaker must see to this and not make the same person both a musician and a shoemaker. So, where the state is not small, letting many people share in government is wiser and more democratic. For, as I just said, assigning only one task to each person is not only more usual. It also means that everything is done better and faster. This is clear in both the army and the navy, where almost everyone takes turns commanding and serving under command. But because the Carthaginian government tends toward oligarchy, they avoid its harmful effects through appointments. They always appoint some members of the popular party to govern cities so they can make their fortunes. In this way, they address this flaw in their constitution and keep it stable. But this approach depends on chance. The lawmaker should instead design a government that leaves no room for uprisings. As things stand, if a general disaster occurs and the people revolt against their rulers, the laws offer no remedy. There is no legal means of bringing the people back into obedience. These, then, are the features of the Lacedaemonian, Cretan, and Carthaginian governments that seem worthy of praise.