Chapter 9

There are two considerations which offer themselves with respect to the government established at Lacedaemon and Crete, and indeed in almost all other states whatsoever; one is whether their laws do or do not promote the best establishment possible? the other is whether there is anything, if we consider either the principles upon which it is founded or the executive part of it, which prevents the form of government that they had proposed to follow from being observed; now it is allowed that in every well-regulated state the members of it should be free from servile labour; but in what manner this shall be effected is not so easy to determine; for the Penestse have very often attacked the Thessalians, and the Helots the Lacedaemonians, for they in a manner continually watch an opportunity for some misfortune befalling them. But no such thing has ever happened to the Cretans; the [1269b] reason for which probably is, that although they are engaged in frequent wars with the neighbouring cities, yet none of these would enter into an alliance with the revolters, as it would be disadvantageous for them, who themselves also have their villains. But now there is perpetual enmity between the Lacedaemonians and all their neighbours, the Argives, the Messenians, and the Arcadians. Their slaves also first revolted from the Thessalians while they were engaged in wars with their neighbours the Acheans, the Perrabeans, and the Magnesians. It seems to me indeed, if nothing else, yet something very troublesome to keep upon proper terms with them; for if you are remiss in your discipline they grow insolent, and think themselves upon an equality with their masters; and if they are hardly used they are continually plotting against you and hate you. It is evident, then, that those who employ slaves have not as yet hit upon the right way of managing them.

Two questions arise about the governments established at Lacedaemon and Crete, and indeed in almost all other states. First, do their laws promote the best possible political system? Second, does anything in their founding principles or administration prevent them from maintaining their intended form of government? It is generally agreed that citizens in every well-governed state should be free from servile labor. But how to achieve this is not so easy to determine. The Penestse have very often attacked the Thessalians, and the Helots have very often attacked the Lacedaemonians. These subject peoples are, in effect, constantly watching for some misfortune to strike their masters. But nothing like this has ever happened to the Cretans. The [1269b] reason is probably that, although Cretan cities frequently fight their neighbors, none would ally with rebels. Such an alliance would harm those neighboring cities, since they also have their own serfs. By contrast, the Lacedaemonians face constant hostility from all their neighbors, the Argives, the Messenians, and the Arcadians. The Thessalians’ slaves also first revolted while their masters were fighting their neighbors, the Acheans, the Perrabeans, and the Magnesians. Even apart from anything else, maintaining a workable relationship with slaves seems to me very troublesome. If you relax discipline, slaves become insolent and consider themselves equal to their masters. But if you treat slaves harshly, they constantly plot against you and hate you. Clearly, then, those who employ slaves have not yet found the right way to manage them.

As to the indulging of women in any particular liberties, it is hurtful to the end of government and the prosperity of the city; for as a man and his wife are the two parts of a family, if we suppose a city to be divided into two parts, we must allow that the number of men and women will be equal.

Allowing women particular freedoms harms the purpose of government and the city's prosperity. For a husband and wife are the two parts of a family. Likewise, if we imagine a city divided into two parts, we must accept that men and women are equal in number.

In whatever city then the women are not under good regulations, we must look upon one half of it as not under the restraint of law, as it there happened; for the legislator, desiring to make his whole city a collection of warriors with respect to the men, he most evidently accomplished his design; but in the meantime the women were quite neglected, for they live without restraint in every improper indulgence and luxury. So that in such a state riches will necessarily be in general esteem, particularly if the men are governed by their wives, which has been the case with many a brave and warlike people except the Celts, and those other nations, if there are any such, who openly practise pederasty. And the first mythologists seem not improperly to have joined Mars and Venus together; for all nations of this character are greatly addicted either to the love of women or of boys, for which reason it was thus at Lacedaemon; and many things in their state were done by the authority of the women. For what is the difference, if the power is in the hands of the women, or in the hands of those whom they themselves govern? it must turn to the same account. As this boldness of the women can be of no use in any common occurrences, if it was ever so, it must be in war; but even here we find that the Lacedaemonian women were of the greatest disservice, as was proved at the time of the Theban invasion, when they were of no use at all, as they are in other cities, but made more disturbance than even the enemy.

In any city where women are not properly regulated, we must consider half the city beyond the law’s control. That was the case here. The lawgiver wanted to make the whole city a community of warriors, at least among the men. With the men, he clearly achieved his aim. But meanwhile, the women were entirely neglected. They live without restraint, indulging in every kind of improper pleasure and luxury. So wealth will necessarily be highly valued in such a state, especially if husbands are governed by their wives. This has happened among many brave, warlike peoples, except the Celts. Other nations that openly practice pederasty, if any exist, are also exceptions. The earliest storytellers seem to have had good reason to link Mars and Venus. For all such warlike nations are strongly drawn to the love of either women or boys. This explains the situation at Lacedaemon, where many public affairs were directed by women. For what difference does it make whether women hold power or those they control hold power? The result must be the same. Such boldness in women is useless in ordinary circumstances. If it could ever be useful, it would be in war. Yet even in war, the Lacedaemonian women proved extremely harmful, as the Theban invasion showed. Unlike women in other cities, they were no help at all. Instead, they caused even more disruption than the enemy.

The origin of this indulgence which the Lacedaemonian women enjoy is easily accounted for, from the long time the men were absent from home upon foreign expeditions [1270a] against the Argives, and afterwards the Arcadians and Messenians, so that, when these wars were at an end, their military life, in which there is no little virtue, prepared them to obey the precepts of their law-giver; but we are told, that when Lycurgus endeavoured also to reduce the women to an obedience to his laws, upon their refusal he declined it. It may indeed be said that the women were the causes of these things, and of course all the fault was theirs. But we are not now considering where the fault lies, or where it does not lie, but what is right and what is wrong; and when the manners of the women are not well regulated, as I have already said, it must not only occasion faults which are disgraceful to the state, but also increase the love of money. In the next place, fault may be found with his unequal division of property, for some will have far too much, others too little; by which means the land will come into few hands, which business is badly regulated by his laws. For he made it infamous for any one either to buy or sell their possessions, in which he did right; but he permitted any one that chose it to give them away, or bequeath them, although nearly the same consequences will arise from one practice as from the other. It is supposed that near two parts in five of the whole country is the property of women, owing to their being so often sole heirs, and having such large fortunes in marriage; though it would be better to allow them none, or a little, or a certain regulated proportion. Now every one is permitted to make a woman his heir if he pleases; and if he dies intestate, he who succeeds as heir at law gives it to whom he pleases. From whence it happens that although the country is able to support fifteen hundred horse and thirty thousand foot, the number does not amount to one thousand.

The freedom enjoyed by Lacedaemonian women is easily explained. The men spent long periods away from home on foreign campaigns [1270a] against the Argives, and later the Arcadians and Messenians. So, when these wars ended, military life had prepared the men to obey their lawgiver’s instructions. Military life, after all, involves considerable virtue. But we are told that Lycurgus also tried to bring the women under his laws. When they refused, he abandoned the attempt. It may indeed be said that the women caused these problems, and that all the fault was therefore theirs. But we are not now asking who is or is not to blame. We are asking what is right and wrong. As I have already said, poorly regulated conduct among women must cause failings that disgrace the state. It must also increase the love of money. Next, Lycurgus’s unequal distribution of property may be criticized. Some people will have far too much, and others too little. As a result, the land will come into the hands of a few. His laws regulate this matter badly. He made buying or selling one’s property disgraceful, and he was right to do so. But he allowed anyone who wished to give property away or leave it in a will. Yet these practices will have nearly the same consequences as buying and selling. Women are thought to own nearly two-fifths of the whole country. This is because they are so often sole heirs and receive such large dowries. Yet it would be better to allow them no dowry, a small one, or a fixed proportion. As matters stand, anyone may name a woman as his heir if he wishes. If a man dies without a will, his legal heir gives the property to whomever he pleases. As a result, although the country can support fifteen hundred cavalry and thirty thousand infantry, their number is below one thousand.

And from these facts it is evident, that this particular is badly regulated; for the city could not support one shock, but was ruined for want of men. They say, that during the reigns of their ancient kings they used to present foreigners with the freedom of their city, to prevent there being a want of men while they carried on long wars; it is also affirmed that the number of Spartans was formerly ten thousand; but be that as it will, an equality of property conduces much to increase the number of the people. The law, too, which he made to encourage population was by no means calculated to correct this inequality; for being willing that the Spartans should be as numerous as [1270b] possible, to make them desirous of having large families he ordered that he who had three children should be excused the night-watch, and that he who had four should pay no taxes: though it is very evident, that while the land was divided in this manner, that if the people increased there must many of them be very poor.

These facts make it clear that this matter is badly regulated. The city could not withstand even one blow, but collapsed for lack of men. It is said that under their ancient kings, foreigners were granted citizenship to prevent shortages of men during long wars. It is also claimed that there were once ten thousand Spartans. Whatever the truth of these claims, equal property ownership does much to increase the population. Nor was the law he made to encourage population growth at all suited to correcting this inequality. He wanted the Spartans to be as numerous as [1270b] possible, so he offered incentives for large families. He ordered that anyone with three children should be excused from night-watch duty. Anyone with four children should pay no taxes. Yet it is very clear that, with the land divided this way, population growth would leave many people very poor.

Nor was he less blamable for the manner in which he constituted the ephori; for these magistrates take cognisance of things of the last importance, and yet they are chosen out of the people in general; so that it often happens that a very poor person is elected to that office, who, from that circumstance, is easily bought. There have been many instances of this formerly, as well as in the late affair at Andros. And these men, being corrupted with money, went as far as they could to ruin the city: and, because their power was too great and nearly tyrannical, their kings were obliged to natter them, which contributed greatly to hurt the state; so that it altered from an aristocracy to a democracy. This magistracy is indeed the great support of the state; for the people are easy, knowing that they are eligible to the first office in it; so that, whether it took place by the intention of the legislator, or whether it happened by chance, this is of great service to their affairs; for it is necessary that every member of the state should endeavour that each part of the government should be preserved, and continue the same. And upon this principle their kings have always acted, out of regard to their honour; the wise and good from their attachment to the senate, a seat wherein they consider as the reward of virtue; and the common people, that they may support the ephori, of whom they consist. And it is proper that these magistrates should be chosen out of the whole community, not as the custom is at present, which is very ridiculous. The ephori are the supreme judges in causes of the last consequence; but as it is quite accidental what sort of persons they may be, it is not right that they should determine according to their own opinion, but by a written law or established custom. Their way of life also is not consistent with the manners of the city, for it is too indulgent; whereas that of others is too severe; so that they cannot support it, but are obliged privately to act contrary to law, that they may enjoy some of the pleasures of sense. There are also great defects in the institution of their senators. If indeed they were fitly trained to the practice of every human virtue, every one would readily admit that they would be useful to the government; but still it might be debated whether they should be continued judges for life, to determine points of the greatest moment, since the mind has its old age as well as the body; but as they are so brought up, [1271a] that even the legislator could not depend upon them as good men, their power must be inconsistent with the safety of the state: for it is known that the members of that body have been guilty both of bribery and partiality in many public affairs; for which reason it had been much better if they had been made answerable for their conduct, which they are not. But it may be said the ephori seem to have a check upon all the magistrates. They have indeed in this particular very great power; but I affirm that they should not be entrusted with this control in the manner they are. Moreover, the mode of choice which they make use of at the election of their senators is very childish. Nor is it right for any one to solicit for a place he is desirous of; for every person, whether he chooses it or not, ought to execute any office he is fit for. But his intention was evidently the same in this as in the other parts of his government. For making his citizens ambitious after honours, with men of that disposition he has filled his senate, since no others will solicit for that office; and yet the principal part of those crimes which men are deliberately guilty of arise from ambition and avarice.

He was no less at fault in the way he established the ephori. These officials deal with matters of the greatest importance, yet they are chosen from the people at large. As a result, a very poor person is often elected and, because of that poverty, is easily bribed. There have been many examples in the past, as well as in the recent affair at Andros. Once bribed, these men did everything they could to ruin the city. Their power was excessive and almost tyrannical, so their kings were forced to flatter them. This greatly harmed the state, turning it from an aristocracy into a democracy. Yet the office of the ephori is the state's main support. The people are content because they know they are eligible for its highest office. Whether the lawgiver intended this result or it happened by chance, it greatly benefits the state. Every member of the state must work to preserve each part of the government and keep it unchanged. The kings have always acted on this principle out of concern for their honor. The wise and good do so because of their attachment to the senate. They regard a seat in the senate as a reward for virtue. The common people do so to support the ephori, who come from their own ranks. These officials should indeed be chosen from the whole community. But the current method of choosing them is ridiculous. The ephori are the highest judges in cases of the greatest importance. Yet the kind of people elected to this office is entirely a matter of chance. So they should not judge according to their own opinions, but according to written law or established custom. Their way of life also conflicts with the city's customs because it is too indulgent. By contrast, the way of life imposed on everyone else is too harsh. People cannot endure it, so they are forced to break the law in private to enjoy some physical pleasures. There are also serious flaws in the institution of the senate. If the senators were properly trained to practice every human virtue, everyone would readily acknowledge their usefulness to the government. Even then, it would be debatable whether they should remain judges for life, deciding matters of the greatest importance. The mind grows old just as the body does. But their upbringing is such [1271a] that even the lawgiver could not rely on them to be good men. Their power must therefore endanger the state's safety. Members of the senate are known to have accepted bribes and shown favoritism in many public matters. It would therefore have been much better to make them answer for their conduct, but they are not accountable. Someone may object that the ephori seem to exercise control over all the officials. The ephori do indeed have very great power in this respect. But I maintain that they should not be entrusted with this control in its present form. Moreover, the method used to elect senators is very childish. Nor is it right for anyone to campaign for an office he wants. Everyone should serve in any office he is fit for, whether he wants to or not. But the lawgiver's intention here was plainly the same as in the other parts of his government. By making his citizens eager for honors, he has filled his senate with ambitious men. No one else will campaign for that office. Yet ambition and greed cause most of the crimes people commit deliberately.

We will inquire at another time whether the office of a king is useful to the state: thus much is certain, that they should be chosen from a consideration of their conduct and not as they are now. But that the legislator himself did not expect to make all his citizens honourable and completely virtuous is evident from this, that he distrusts them as not being good men; for he sent those upon the same embassy that were at variance with each other; and thought, that in the dispute of the kings the safety of the state consisted. Neither were their common meals at first well established: for these should rather have been provided at the public expense, as at Crete, where, as at Lacedaemon, every one was obliged to buy his portion, although he might be very poor, and could by no means bear the expense, by which means the contrary happened to what the legislator desired: for he intended that those public meals should strengthen the democratic part of his government: but this regulation had quite the contrary effect, for those who were very poor could not take part in them; and it was an observation of their forefathers, that the not allowing those who could not contribute their proportion to the common tables to partake of them, would be the ruin of the state. Other persons have censured his laws concerning naval affairs, and not without reason, as it gave rise to disputes. For the commander of the fleet is in a manner set up in opposition to the kings, who are generals of the army for life.

We will consider another time whether the office of king benefits the state. But one thing is certain: kings should be chosen for their conduct, not as they are now. Yet the lawgiver himself did not expect to make all his citizens honorable and completely virtuous. His distrust of them shows that he did not consider them good men. For he sent men who disagreed with one another on the same embassy. He also thought the state's safety depended on disputes between the kings. The common meals were not properly organized at the outset either. These meals should instead have been publicly funded, as at Crete. There, as at Lacedaemon, everyone had to pay for his portion, even if he was very poor. Some could not possibly afford the expense. As a result, the arrangement had the opposite effect from what the lawgiver intended. He meant the public meals to strengthen the democratic element of his government. But this rule had precisely the opposite effect, since the very poor could not take part. Their ancestors had observed that excluding those unable to pay their share of the common meals would ruin the state. Others have criticized his laws on naval affairs, and with good reason, since these laws gave rise to disputes. For the fleet commander is, in a sense, set up as a rival to the kings. The kings command the army for life.

[1271b] There is also another defect in his laws worthy of censure, which Plato has given in his book of Laws; that the whole constitution was calculated only for the business of war: it is indeed excellent to make them conquerors; for which reason the preservation of the state depended thereon. The destruction of it commenced with their victories: for they knew not how to be idle, or engage in any other employment than war. In this particular also they were mistaken, that though they rightly thought, that those things which are the objects of contention amongst mankind are better procured by virtue than vice, yet they wrongfully preferred the things themselves to virtue. Nor was the public revenue well managed at Sparta, for the state was worth nothing while they were obliged to carry on the most extensive wars, and the subsidies were very badly raised; for as the Spartans possessed a large extent of country, they were not exact upon each other as to what they paid in. And thus an event contrary to the legislator's intention took place; for the state was poor, the individuals avaricious. Enough of the Lacedaemonian government; for these seem the chief defects in it.

[1271b] There is another flaw in his laws that deserves criticism, as Plato points out in his Laws. The entire constitution was designed only for war. It is indeed excellent at making the Spartans conquerors, and so the state's survival depended on conquest. The state's downfall began with their victories. For the Spartans did not know how to live at leisure or pursue any activity other than war. They were also mistaken in another respect. They rightly believed that virtue, rather than vice, better secures the things people compete for. Yet they wrongly valued those things more than virtue itself. Public revenue was also poorly managed at Sparta. The state had no money, even when it had to fight wars on the largest scale. Taxes were also very badly collected. Because the Spartans owned large amounts of land, they did not hold one another strictly accountable for their payments. The result was the opposite of what the lawgiver intended: the state was poor, and individuals were greedy. Enough about the Lacedaemonian government, for these seem to be its chief flaws.