Chapter 3

But admitting that it is most advantageous for a city to be one as much as possible, it does not seem to follow that this will take place by permitting all at once to say this is mine, and this is not mine (though this is what Socrates regards as a proof that a city is entirely one), for the word All is used in two senses; if it means each individual, what Socrates proposes will nearly take place; for each person will say, this is his own son, and his own wife, and his own property, and of everything else that may happen to belong to him, that it is his own. But those who have their wives and children in common will not say so, but all will say so, though not as individuals; therefore, to use the word all is evidently a fallacious mode of speech; for this word is sometimes used distributively, and sometimes collectively, on account of its double meaning, and is the cause of inconclusive syllogisms in reasoning. Therefore for all persons to say the same thing was their own, using the word all in its distributive sense, would be well, but is impossible: in its collective sense it would by no means contribute to the concord of the state. Besides, there would be another inconvenience attending this proposal, for what is common to many is taken least care of; for all men regard more what is their own than what others share with them in, to which they pay less attention than is incumbent on every one: let me add also, that every one is more negligent of what another is to see to, as well as himself, than of his own private business; as in a family one is often worse served by many servants than by a few. Let each citizen then in the state have a thousand children, but let none of them be considered as the children of that individual, but let the relation of father and child be common to them all, and they will all be neglected. Besides, in consequence of this, [1262a] whenever any citizen behaved well or ill, every person, be the number what it would, might say, this is my son, or this man's or that; and in this manner would they speak, and thus would they doubt of the whole thousand, or of whatever number the city consisted; and it would be uncertain to whom each child belonged, and when it was born, who was to take care of it: and which do you think is better, for every one to say this is mine, while they may apply it equally to two thousand or ten thousand; or as we say, this is mine in our present forms of government, where one man calls another his son, another calls that same person his brother, another nephew, or some other relation, either by blood or marriage, and first extends his care to him and his, while another regards him as one of the same parish and the same tribe; and it is better for any one to be a nephew in his private capacity than a son after that manner. Besides, it will be impossible to prevent some persons from suspecting that they are brothers and sisters, fathers and mothers to each other; for, from the mutual likeness there is between the sire and the offspring, they will necessarily conclude in what relation they stand to each other, which circumstance, we are informed by those writers who describe different parts of the world, does sometimes happen; for in Upper Africa there are wives in common who yet deliver their children to their respective fathers, being guided by their likeness to them. There are also some mares and cows which naturally bring forth their young so like the male, that we can easily distinguish by which of them they were impregnated: such was the mare called Just, in Pharsalia.

But suppose it is best for a city to be as united as possible. It does not seem to follow that this unity comes from everyone saying this is mine and this is not mine. Yet Socrates considers this a proof that a city is completely united. The word all has two meanings. If it means each individual, the result will be close to what Socrates proposes. Each person will call a particular child his own son, a particular woman his own wife, and particular possessions his own. He will say the same of anything else that belongs to him. But people who share wives and children will not speak this way as individuals. They will all speak this way only as a group. So using the word all in this way is clearly misleading. The word can refer either to each person separately or to everyone collectively. This double meaning leads to inconclusive arguments. It would be good if everyone, individually, called the same thing their own, but this is impossible. If everyone does so only collectively, this would contribute nothing to harmony in the state. Besides, the proposal would have another drawback. What belongs to the greatest number receives the least care. All people care more about what belongs to them than about what they share with others. They give shared possessions less attention than each person should. Moreover, everyone neglects something more when someone else is also responsible for it than when it is their own business. Just so, a household often receives worse service from many servants than from a few. Suppose, then, that each citizen has a thousand children. But suppose no child belongs to any particular individual, and all citizens share the relationship of parent and child. All the children will be neglected. Besides, under this arrangement, [1262a] whenever a citizen behaved well or badly, everyone could call that citizen their son. Whatever the number of citizens, each could say this is my son, or this man's son, or that man's. They would speak this way while remaining uncertain about the whole thousand, or whatever number made up the city. No one would know whose child each was, or who was responsible for the child when it was born. Which arrangement do you think is better? Should everyone call someone their own when the claim applies equally to two thousand or ten thousand people? Or should people say this is mine as we do under our present forms of government? Here, one man calls someone his son. Another calls the same person his brother, another his nephew, or some other relative by blood or marriage. He gives his first care to that person and those belonging to him. Another regards that person as belonging to the same parish and tribe. It is better to be someone's nephew in a private family than to be a son in the proposed arrangement. Besides, some people will inevitably suspect that they are one another's brothers and sisters, fathers and mothers. The resemblance between parents and children will necessarily lead them to conclusions about their relationship. Writers who describe different parts of the world tell us that this sometimes happens. In Upper Africa, wives are shared, yet they give their children to the respective fathers, guided by their resemblance. Some mares and cows also naturally produce young so like the father that we can easily identify the male responsible. Such was the mare called Just, in Pharsalia.