Answering Poetry's Critics

With respect to critical difficulties and their solutions, the number and nature of the sources from which they may be drawn may be thus exhibited.

The number and nature of the sources of critical problems and their solutions may be shown as follows.

The poet being an imitator, like a painter or any other artist, must of necessity imitate one of three objects,—things as they were or are, things as they are said or thought to be, or things as they ought to be. The vehicle of expression is language,—either current terms or, it may be, rare words or metaphors. There are also many modifications of language, which we concede to the poets. Add to this, that the standard of correctness is not the same in poetry and politics, any more than in poetry and any other art. Within the art of poetry itself there are two kinds of faults, those which touch its essence, and those which are accidental. If a poet has chosen to imitate something, (but has imitated it incorrectly) through want of capacity, the error is inherent in the poetry. But if the failure is due to a wrong choice if he has represented a horse as throwing out both his off legs at once, or introduced technical inaccuracies in medicine, for example, or in any other art the error is not essential to the poetry. These are the points of view from which we should consider and answer the objections raised by the critics.

A poet is an imitator, like a painter or any other artist. A poet must therefore imitate one of three things: things as they were or are, things as people say or think they are, or things as they ought to be. The poet’s means of expression is language, using ordinary words or perhaps rare words or metaphors. We also allow poets many ways of modifying language. Furthermore, the standard of correctness is not the same in poetry and politics. Nor is it the same in poetry and any other art. Within poetry itself, there are two kinds of faults: those that affect its essence and those that are incidental. Suppose a poet chooses to imitate something but imitates it incorrectly because the poet lacks the ability. The error is then inherent in the poetry. But suppose the failure is due to a wrong choice. For example, the poet might portray a horse moving both legs on its right side forward at once. Or the poet might make technical mistakes in medicine or any other art. Such an error is not essential to the poetry. These are the points of view from which we should consider and answer critics’ objections.

First as to matters which concern the poet's own art. If he describes the impossible, he is guilty of an error; but the error may be justified, if the end of the art be thereby attained (the end being that already mentioned), if, that is, the effect of this or any other part of the poem is thus rendered more striking. A case in point is the pursuit of Hector. If, however, the end might have been as well, or better, attained without violating the special rules of the poetic art, the error is not justified: for every kind of error should, if possible, be avoided.

First, consider matters concerning the poet’s own art. If a poet describes something impossible, he makes an error. But the error may be justified if it achieves the aim of the art, which was mentioned earlier. That is, the error may be justified if it makes the effect of this or any other part of the poem more striking. The pursuit of Hector is an example. But the error is not justified if the aim could have been achieved as well or better without breaking the rules of poetic art. Every kind of error should be avoided if possible.

Again, does the error touch the essentials of the poetic art, or some accident of it? For example,—not to know that a hind has no horns is a less serious matter than to paint it inartistically.

Again, does the error concern an essential part of poetry or something incidental to it? For example, not knowing that a female deer has no antlers is less serious than painting one poorly.

Further, if it be objected that the description is not true to fact, the poet may perhaps reply,—'But the objects are as they ought to be': just as Sophocles said that he drew men as they ought to be; Euripides, as they are. In this way the objection may be met. If, however, the representation be of neither kind, the poet may answer,—This is how men say the thing is.' This applies to tales about the gods. It may well be that these stories are not higher than fact nor yet true to fact: they are, very possibly, what Xenophanes says of them. But anyhow, 'this is what is said.' Again, a description may be no better than the fact: 'still, it was the fact'; as in the passage about the arms: 'Upright upon their butt-ends stood the spears.' This was the custom then, as it now is among the Illyrians.

Further, if someone objects that a description is not true to fact, the poet may perhaps reply, “But things are as they ought to be.” Sophocles said that he portrayed people as they ought to be, while Euripides portrayed them as they are. This is one way to answer the objection. If, however, the portrayal is neither of these, the poet may answer, “This is how people say it is.” This applies to stories about the gods. These stories may well portray the gods as neither better than they are nor as they really are. They are very possibly what Xenophanes says they are. But in any case, “this is what people say.” Again, a description may portray something as no better than it really was. The poet can still say, “That was how it was.” An example is the passage about the weapons: “The spears stood upright on their butt ends.” That was the custom then, as it now is among the Illyrians.

Again, in examining whether what has been said or done by some one is poetically right or not, we must not look merely to the particular act or saying, and ask whether it is poetically good or bad. We must also consider by whom it is said or done, to whom, when, by what means, or for what end; whether, for instance, it be to secure a greater good, or avert a greater evil.

Again, when judging whether something someone says or does is poetically right, we must not consider the act or statement alone. We must not simply ask whether the act or statement is poetically good or bad. We must also consider who says or does it, to whom, when, how, and for what purpose. For example, we must consider whether the purpose is to secure a greater good or prevent a greater evil.

Other difficulties may be resolved by due regard to the usage of language. We may note a rare word, as in {omicron upsilon rho eta alpha sigma / mu epsilon nu / pi rho omega tau omicron nu}, where the poet perhaps employs {omicron upsilon rho eta alpha sigma} not in the sense of mules, but of sentinels. So, again, of Dolon: 'ill-favoured indeed he was to look upon.' It is not meant that his body was ill-shaped, but that his face was ugly; for the Cretans use the word {epsilon upsilon epsilon iota delta epsilon sigma}, 'well-favoured,' to denote a fair face. Again, {zeta omega rho omicron tau epsilon rho omicron nu / delta epsilon / kappa epsilon rho alpha iota epsilon}, 'mix the drink livelier,' does not mean `mix it stronger' as for hard drinkers, but 'mix it quicker.'

Other difficulties may be resolved by paying attention to language use. For example, a word may have a rare meaning. In {omicron upsilon rho eta alpha sigma / mu epsilon nu / pi rho omega tau omicron nu}, the poet perhaps uses {omicron upsilon rho eta alpha sigma} to mean sentinels, not mules. Similarly, Dolon is described as 'ill-favoured indeed he was to look upon.' This does not mean that his body was misshapen, but that his face was ugly. The Cretans use the word {epsilon upsilon epsilon iota delta epsilon sigma}, 'well-favoured,' to describe a handsome face. Again, {zeta omega rho omicron tau epsilon rho omicron nu / delta epsilon / kappa epsilon rho alpha iota epsilon}, 'mix the drink livelier,' does not mean 'mix it stronger,' as for heavy drinkers. It means 'mix it quicker.'

Sometimes an expression is metaphorical, as 'Now all gods and men were sleeping through the night,'—while at the same time the poet says: 'Often indeed as he turned his gaze to the Trojan plain, he marvelled at the sound of flutes and pipes.' 'All' is here used metaphorically for 'many,' all being a species of many. So in the verse,—'alone she hath no part...,' {omicron iota eta}, 'alone,' is metaphorical; for the best known may be called the only one.

Sometimes an expression is metaphorical. For example, the poet says, 'Now all gods and men were sleeping through the night,' but also says: 'Often, as he looked toward the Trojan plain, he marveled at the sound of flutes and pipes.' Here, 'all' is used metaphorically to mean 'many,' since all is a kind of many. Likewise, in the verse, 'alone she has no part...,' {omicron iota eta}, 'alone,' is metaphorical. The best known may be called the only one.

Again, the solution may depend upon accent or breathing. Thus Hippias of Thasos solved the difficulties in the lines,—{delta iota delta omicron mu epsilon nu (delta iota delta omicron mu epsilon nu) delta epsilon / omicron iota,} and { tau omicron / mu epsilon nu / omicron upsilon (omicron upsilon) kappa alpha tau alpha pi upsilon theta epsilon tau alpha iota / omicron mu beta rho omega}.

Again, the solution may depend on an accent or breathing mark. Hippias of Thasos solved the difficulties in these lines in this way: {delta iota delta omicron mu epsilon nu (delta iota delta omicron mu epsilon nu) delta epsilon / omicron iota,} and { tau omicron / mu epsilon nu / omicron upsilon (omicron upsilon) kappa alpha tau alpha pi upsilon theta epsilon tau alpha iota / omicron mu beta rho omega}.

Or again, the question may be solved by punctuation, as in Empedocles,—'Of a sudden things became mortal that before had learnt to be immortal, and things unmixed before mixed.'

Or the question may be resolved by punctuation, as in Empedocles: ‘Suddenly, things that had learned to be immortal became mortal, and things that had been unmixed became mixed.’

Or again, by ambiguity of meaning,—as {pi alpha rho omega chi eta kappa epsilon nu / delta epsilon / pi lambda epsilon omega / nu upsilon xi}, where the word {pi lambda epsilon omega} is ambiguous.

Or again, through ambiguity of meaning, as in {pi alpha rho omega chi eta kappa epsilon nu / delta epsilon / pi lambda epsilon omega / nu upsilon xi}, where the word {pi lambda epsilon omega} has more than one meaning.

Or by the usage of language. Thus any mixed drink is called {omicron iota nu omicron sigma}, 'wine.' Hence Ganymede is said 'to pour the wine to Zeus,' though the gods do not drink wine. So too workers in iron are called {chi alpha lambda kappa epsilon alpha sigma}, or workers in bronze. This, however, may also be taken as a metaphor.

Or a difficulty may be resolved by how language is used. For example, any mixed drink is called {omicron iota nu omicron sigma}, 'wine.' That is why Ganymede is said 'to pour the wine to Zeus,' though the gods do not drink wine. Similarly, ironworkers are called {chi alpha lambda kappa epsilon alpha sigma}, or bronze workers. This, however, may also be understood as a metaphor.

Again, when a word seems to involve some inconsistency of meaning, we should consider how many senses it may bear in the particular passage. For example: 'there was stayed the spear of bronze'—we should ask in how many ways we may take 'being checked there.' The true mode of interpretation is the precise opposite of what Glaucon mentions. Critics, he says, jump at certain groundless conclusions; they pass adverse judgment and then proceed to reason on it; and, assuming that the poet has said whatever they happen to think, find fault if a thing is inconsistent with their own fancy. The question about Icarius has been treated in this fashion. The critics imagine he was a Lacedaemonian. They think it strange, therefore, that Telemachus should not have met him when he went to Lacedaemon. But the Cephallenian story may perhaps be the true one. They allege that Odysseus took a wife from among themselves, and that her father was Icadius not Icarius. It is merely a mistake, then, that gives plausibility to the objection.

Again, when a word seems to have an inconsistent meaning, we should consider its possible meanings in that passage. For example, consider the phrase 'there was stayed the spear of bronze'. We should ask how many ways 'being checked there' can be understood. The right approach to interpretation is the exact opposite of what Glaucon describes. He says critics jump to unfounded conclusions and make unfavorable judgments. They then reason from those judgments, assuming the poet meant whatever they happen to think. If something conflicts with their own assumptions, they find fault. Critics have treated the question of Icarius in this way. They assume he was a Lacedaemonian. So they find it strange that Telemachus did not meet him when he went to Lacedaemon. But the Cephallenian story may perhaps be true. The Cephallenians say that Odysseus married a woman from among them, and that her father was Icadius, not Icarius. The objection seems plausible only because of a mistake.

In general, the impossible must be justified by reference to artistic requirements, or to the higher reality, or to received opinion. With respect to the requirements of art, a probable impossibility is to be preferred to a thing improbable and yet possible. Again, it may be impossible that there should be men such as Zeuxis painted. 'Yes,' we say, 'but the impossible is the higher thing; for the ideal type must surpass the reality.' To justify the irrational, we appeal to what is commonly said to be. In addition to which, we urge that the irrational sometimes does not violate reason; just as 'it is probable that a thing may happen contrary to probability.'

In general, the impossible must be justified by the needs of art, a higher reality, or common opinion. In art, a believable impossibility is preferable to something possible but unbelievable. For example, people like those Zeuxis painted may not exist. 'Yes,' we say, 'but the impossible is better, because the ideal must surpass reality.' To justify what seems irrational, we appeal to what people commonly say is true. We also argue that the irrational does not always go against reason, just as 'it is probable that something may happen contrary to probability.'

Things that sound contradictory should be examined by the same rules as in dialectical refutation whether the same thing is meant, in the same relation, and in the same sense. We should therefore solve the question by reference to what the poet says himself, or to what is tacitly assumed by a person of intelligence.

Things that sound contradictory should be examined by the same rules used to test arguments for contradictions. Ask whether they refer to the same thing, in the same relation, and in the same sense. So we should resolve the question by considering what the poet himself says or what an intelligent person would take for granted.

The element of the irrational, and, similarly, depravity of character, are justly censured when there is no inner necessity for introducing them. Such is the irrational element in the introduction of Aegeus by Euripides and the badness of Menelaus in the Orestes.

Irrational elements and morally corrupt characters are rightly criticized when there is no compelling reason to include them. Examples are the irrational introduction of Aegeus by Euripides and the wickedness of Menelaus in the Orestes.

Thus, there are five sources from which critical objections are drawn. Things are censured either as impossible, or irrational, or morally hurtful, or contradictory, or contrary to artistic correctness. The answers should be sought under the twelve heads above mentioned.

There are five grounds for critical objections. Things are criticized as impossible, irrational, morally harmful, contradictory, or artistically incorrect. Answers should be sought under the twelve headings mentioned above.