Second Supplement
A SECRET ARTICLE FOR PERPETUAL PEACE
A SECRET CLAUSE FOR LASTING PEACE
A secret article in negotiations concerning public right is, when looked at objectively or with regard to the meaning of the term, a contradiction. When we view it, however, from the subjective standpoint, with regard to the character and condition of the person who dictates it, we see that it might quite well involve some private consideration, so that he would regard it as hazardous to his dignity to acknowledge such an article as originating from him.
Objectively, a secret clause in negotiations about public right is a contradiction in terms. But consider the subjective side: the character and circumstances of the person who dictates the clause. The clause might well involve some private concern. As a result, he might consider acknowledging himself as its source a threat to his dignity.
The only article of this kind is contained in the following proposition:—“The opinions of philosophers, with regard to the conditions of the possibility of a public peace, shall be taken into consideration by states armed for war.”
The only article of this kind is as follows: “States armed for war must consider philosophers’ views on the conditions that make public peace possible.”
It seems, however, to be derogatory to the dignity of the legislative authority of a state—to which we must of course attribute all wisdom—to ask advice from subjects (among whom stand philosophers) about the rules of its behaviour to other states. At the same time, it is very advisable that this should be done. Hence the state will silently invite suggestion for this purpose, while at the same time keeping the fact secret. This amounts to saying that the state will allow philosophers to discuss freely and publicly the universal principles governing the conduct of war and establishment of peace; for they will do this of their own accord, if no prohibition is laid upon them. The arrangement between states, on this point, does not require that a special agreement should be made, merely for this purpose; for it is already involved in the obligation imposed by the universal reason of man which gives the moral law. We would not be understood to say that the state must give a preference to the principles of the philosopher, rather than to the opinions of the jurist, the representative of state authority; but only that he should be heard. The latter, who has chosen for a symbol the scales of right and the sword of justice, generally uses that sword not merely to keep off all outside influences from the scales; for, when one pan of the balance will not go down, he throws his sword into it; and then Væ victis! The jurist, not being a moral philosopher, is under the greatest temptation to do this, because it is his business only to apply existing laws and not to investigate whether these are not themselves in need of improvement; and this actually lower function of his profession he looks upon as the nobler, because it is linked to power (as is the case also in both the other faculties, theology and medicine). Philosophy occupies a very low position compared with this combined power. So that it is said, for example, that she is the handmaid of theology; and the same has been said of her position with regard to law and medicine. It is not quite clear, however, “whether she bears the torch before these gracious ladies, or carries the train.”
Still, asking subjects, including philosophers, for advice seems beneath the dignity of a state’s legislative authority. We must, of course, credit that authority with all wisdom. The advice concerns the rules governing the state’s conduct toward other states. Yet seeking such advice is very sensible. So the state will quietly invite suggestions while keeping the invitation secret. In other words, the state will let philosophers freely and publicly discuss the universal principles governing war and establishing peace. Philosophers will do so on their own, provided they are not forbidden. States need no special agreement on this point. For this arrangement already follows from the obligation imposed by universal human reason, which gives us the moral law. We do not mean that the state must favor the philosopher’s principles over the opinions of the jurist, who represents state authority. We mean only that the philosopher should be heard. The jurist has chosen the scales of right and the sword of justice as his symbols. Generally, he uses the sword for more than keeping outside influences away from the scales. For when one side of the scales will not sink, he throws his sword onto it. And then Væ victis! The jurist, who is not a moral philosopher, faces the greatest temptation to do this. For his job is only to apply existing laws, not to examine whether those laws themselves need improvement. Yet he considers this actually lower function of his profession the nobler one because it is linked to power. The same is true of the other two faculties, theology and medicine. Philosophy holds a very low position compared with this combined power. Thus, for example, philosophy is called the handmaid of theology. The same has been said of philosophy’s position in relation to law and medicine. It is not quite clear, however, “whether she carries the torch ahead of these gracious ladies or carries their trains.”
Montesquieu praises the English state: “As the enjoyment of liberty, and even its support and preservation, consists in every man’s being allowed to speak his thoughts and to lay open his sentiments, a citizen in this state will say or write whatever the laws do not expressly forbid to be said or written.” (Esprit des Lois, XIX. Ch. 27.) Hobbes opposes all free discussion of political questions. He also opposes freedom, seeing it as a danger to the state. [Tr.]
Kant does not mean the sword of justice in the moral sense here. Instead, he means a sword symbolizing the power to enforce existing law. [Tr.]
That kings should philosophise, or philosophers become kings, is not to be expected. But neither is it to be desired; for the possession of power is inevitably fatal to the free exercise of reason. But it is absolutely indispensable, for their enlightenment as to the full significance of their vocations, that both kings and sovereign nations, which rule themselves in accordance with laws of equality, should not allow the class of philosophers to disappear, nor forbid the expression of their opinions, but should allow them to speak openly. And since this class of men, by their very nature, are incapable of instigating rebellion or forming unions for purposes of political agitation, they should not be suspected of propagandism.
We cannot expect kings to become philosophers or philosophers to become kings. Nor should we want them to, because holding power inevitably destroys the ability to reason freely. But kings and sovereign nations that govern themselves under laws of equality must fully understand their roles. For that understanding, they must not let philosophers disappear as a group or forbid philosophers from expressing their opinions. Instead, they must allow philosophers to speak openly. By their very nature, philosophers are incapable of stirring up rebellion or organizing groups for political agitation. So philosophers should not be suspected of spreading propaganda.