Preface

This translation of Kant’s essay on Perpetual Peace was undertaken by Miss Mary Campbell Smith at the suggestion of the late Professor Ritchie of St. Andrews, who had promised to write for it a preface, indicating the value of Kant’s work in relation to recent discussions regarding the possibility of “making wars to cease.” In view of the general interest which these discussions have aroused and of the vague thinking and aspiration which have too often characterised them, it seemed to Professor Ritchie that a translation of this wise and sagacious essay would be both opportune and valuable.¹ His untimely death has prevented the fulfilment of his promise, and I have been asked, in his stead, to introduce the translator’s work.

Miss Mary Campbell Smith translated Kant’s essay on Perpetual Peace at the suggestion of the late Professor Ritchie of St. Andrews. Professor Ritchie had promised to write a preface explaining the value of Kant’s work for recent discussions about “making wars to cease.” These discussions have attracted widespread interest, but too often vague thinking and hopes have marked them. For these reasons, Professor Ritchie thought a translation of this wise and insightful essay would be timely and valuable.¹ His untimely death prevented him from keeping his promise, and I have been asked to introduce the translator’s work instead.

This is, I think, the only complete translation into English of Kant’s essay, including all the notes as well as the text, and the translator has added a full historical Introduction, along with numerous notes of her own, so as (in Professor Ritchie’s words) “to meet the needs (1) of the student of Political Science who wishes to understand the relation of Kant’s theories to those of Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau etc., and (2) of the general reader who wishes to understand the significance of Kant’s proposals in connection with the ideals of Peace Congresses, and with the development of International Law from the end of the Middle Ages to the Hague Conference.”

I think this is the only complete English translation of Kant’s essay, including all his notes. The translator has also added a full historical introduction and many notes of her own. In Professor Ritchie’s words, these additions aim “to meet the needs (1) of students of Political Science. These students want to understand how Kant’s theories relate to those of Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and others. The additions also aim to meet the needs (2) of general readers who want to understand the significance of Kant’s proposals. These readers want to understand those proposals in relation to the ideals of Peace Congresses. They also want to understand the proposals in relation to the development of International Law. The period covered runs from the end of the Middle Ages to the Hague Conference.”

Although it is more than 100 years since Kant’s essay was written, its substantial value is practically unimpaired. Anyone who is acquainted with the general character of the mind of Kant will expect to find in him sound common-sense, clear recognition of the essential facts of the case and a remarkable power of analytically exhibiting the conditions on which the facts necessarily depend. These characteristics are manifest in the essay on Perpetual Peace. Kant is not pessimist enough to believe that a perpetual peace is an unrealisable dream or a consummation devoutly to be feared, nor is he optimist enough to fancy that it is an ideal which could easily be realised if men would but turn their hearts to one another. For Kant perpetual peace is an ideal, not merely as a speculative Utopian idea, with which in fancy we may play, but as a moral principle, which ought to be, and therefore can be, realised. Yet he makes it perfectly clear that we cannot hope to approach the realisation of it unless we honestly face political facts and get a firm grasp of the indispensable conditions of a lasting peace. To strive after the ideal in contempt or in ignorance of these conditions is a labour that must inevitably be either fruitless or destructive of its own ends. Thus Kant demonstrates the hopelessness of any attempt to secure perpetual peace between independent nations. Such nations may make treaties; but these are binding only for so long as it is not to the interest of either party to denounce them. To enforce them is impossible while the nations remain independent. “There is,” as Professor Ritchie put it (Studies in Political and Social Ethics, p. 169), “only one way in which war between independent nations can be prevented; and that is by the nations ceasing to be independent.” But this does not necessarily mean the establishment of a despotism, whether autocratic or democratic. On the other hand, Kant maintains that just as peace between individuals within a state can only be permanently secured by the institution of a “republican” (that is to say, a representative) government, so the only real guarantee of a permanent peace between nations is the establishment of a federation of free “republican” states. Such a federation he regards as practically possible. “For if Fortune ordains that a powerful and enlightened people should form a republic—which by its very nature is inclined to perpetual peace—this would serve as a centre of federal union for other states wishing to join, and thus secure conditions of freedom among the states in accordance with the idea of the law of nations. Gradually, through different unions of this kind, the federation would extend further and further.”

Although Kant’s essay was written more than 100 years ago, its main value remains almost unchanged. Anyone familiar with Kant’s way of thinking will expect sound common sense and a clear grasp of the essential facts. They will also expect a remarkable ability to analyze the conditions on which those facts necessarily depend. These qualities are clear in his essay on Perpetual Peace. Kant is not pessimistic enough to believe that lasting peace is an impossible dream or something we should deeply fear. Nor is he optimistic enough to imagine that people could easily achieve peace simply by opening their hearts to one another. For Kant, perpetual peace is an ideal, but not merely an imagined Utopia to play with in our minds. It is a moral principle that ought to be realized and therefore can be realized. Yet he makes clear that progress toward lasting peace requires us to face political facts honestly. We must also firmly understand the conditions essential to lasting peace. Pursuing the ideal while ignoring or dismissing these conditions must inevitably be either fruitless or self-defeating. Kant thus shows that any attempt to secure perpetual peace between independent nations is hopeless. Such nations may sign treaties, but those treaties remain binding only while neither party benefits from rejecting them. Enforcing the treaties is impossible while the nations remain independent. As Professor Ritchie put it (Studies in Political and Social Ethics, p. 169), “There is only one way to prevent war between independent nations: the nations must cease to be independent.” But ending their independence does not necessarily mean establishing a despotic government, whether autocratic or democratic. Instead, Kant argues that lasting peace between individuals within a state requires a “republican” government, meaning a representative government. Just as such a government secures peace within a state, a federation of free “republican” states alone guarantees lasting peace between nations. He regards such a federation as possible in practice. “For if Fortune leads a powerful and enlightened people to form a republic, that republic could become a centre of federal union. A republic is, by its very nature, inclined toward perpetual peace. Other states wishing to join could gather around it. Such a union would secure freedom among states in keeping with the idea of the law of nations. Gradually, through different unions of this kind, the federation would spread further and further.”

Readers who are acquainted with the general philosophy of Kant will find many traces of its influence in the essay on Perpetual Peace. Those who have no knowledge of his philosophy may find some of his forms of statement rather difficult to understand, and it may therefore not be out of place for me to indicate very briefly the meaning of some terms which he frequently uses, especially in the Supplements and Appendices. Thus at the beginning of the First Supplement, Kant draws a distinction between the mechanical and the teleological view of things, between “nature” and “Providence”, which depends upon his main philosophical position. According to Kant, pure reason has two aspects, theoretical and practical. As concerning knowledge, strictly so called, the a priori principles of reason (e.g. substance and attribute, cause and effect etc.) are valid only within the realm of possible sense-experience. Such ideas, for instance, cannot be extended to God, since He is not a possible object of sense-experience. They are limited to the world of phenomena. This world of phenomena (“nature” or the world of sense-experience) is a purely mechanical system. But in order to understand fully the phenomenal world, the pure theoretical reason must postulate certain ideas (the ideas of the soul, the world and God), the objects of which transcend sense-experience. These ideas are not theoretically valid, but their validity is practically established by the pure practical reason, which does not yield speculative truth, but prescribes its principles “dogmatically” in the form of imperatives to the will. The will is itself practical reason, and thus it imposes its imperatives upon itself. The fundamental imperative of the practical reason is stated by Kant in Appendix I. (p. 175):—“Act so that thou canst will that thy maxim should be a universal law, be the end of thy action what it will.” If the end of perpetual peace is a duty, it must be necessarily deduced from this general law. And Kant does regard it as a duty. “We must desire perpetual peace not only as a material good, but also as a state of things resulting from our recognition of the precepts of duty” (loc. cit.). This is further expressed in the maxim (p. 177):—“Seek ye first the kingdom of pure practical reason and its righteousness, and the object of your endeavour, the blessing of perpetual peace, will be added unto you.” The distinction between the moral politician and the political moralist, which is developed in Appendix I., is an application of the general distinction between duty and expediency, which is a prominent feature of the Kantian ethics. Methods of expediency, omitting all reference to the pure practical reason, can only bring about re-arrangements of circumstances in the mechanical course of nature. They can never guarantee the attainment of their end: they can never make it more than a speculative ideal, which may or may not be practicable. But if the end can be shown to be a duty, we have, from Kant’s point of view, the only reasonable ground for a conviction that it is realisable. We cannot, indeed, theoretically know that it is realisable. “Reason is not sufficiently enlightened to survey the series of predetermining causes which would make it possible for us to predict with certainty the good or bad results of human action, as they follow from the mechanical laws of nature; although we may hope that things will turn out as we should desire” (p. 163). On the other hand, since the idea of perpetual peace is a moral ideal, an “idea of duty”, we are entitled to believe that it is practicable. “Nature guarantees the coming of perpetual peace, through the natural course of human propensities; not indeed with sufficient certainty to enable us to prophesy the future of this ideal theoretically, but yet clearly enough for practical purposes” (p. 157). One might extend this discussion indefinitely; but what has been said may suffice for general guidance.

Readers familiar with Kant’s general philosophy will find many signs of its influence in the essay on Perpetual Peace. Readers unfamiliar with his philosophy may find some of his wording difficult to understand. So a brief explanation of some terms he often uses may be helpful, especially in the Supplements and Appendices. At the beginning of the First Supplement, Kant distinguishes between mechanical and teleological views of things, between “nature” and “Providence”. This distinction depends on his central philosophical position. According to Kant, pure reason has two aspects, theoretical and practical. For knowledge in the strict sense, reason’s a priori principles apply only within the range of possible sensory experience. These principles include substance and attribute, cause and effect, e.g. Such ideas cannot, for instance, be extended to God, since he cannot be an object of sensory experience. These principles are limited to the world of phenomena. This world of phenomena (“nature” or the world of sensory experience) is a purely mechanical system. But to understand the phenomenal world fully, pure theoretical reason must assume certain ideas: the soul, the world, and God. The objects of these ideas lie beyond sensory experience. These ideas have no theoretical validity, but pure practical reason establishes their validity in practice. Pure practical reason does not provide speculative truth. Instead, it lays down its principles “dogmatically” as commands to the will. The will is itself practical reason, so the will imposes these commands on itself. Kant states the fundamental command of practical reason in Appendix I (p. 175): “Act only on a principle you can will to become a universal law, whatever your action’s aim may be.” If pursuing perpetual peace is a duty, that duty must necessarily follow from this general law. And Kant does regard pursuing perpetual peace as a duty. “We must desire perpetual peace not only as a material good. We must also desire peace as a state resulting from our recognition of the commands of duty” (same passage). The following principle expresses this further (p. 177): “Seek first the kingdom of pure practical reason and its righteousness. Then the goal you seek, the blessing of perpetual peace, will be given to you as well.” Appendix I develops a distinction between the moral politician and the political moralist. This applies the broader distinction between duty and expediency, a central feature of Kantian ethics. Methods based on expediency leave pure practical reason entirely out of account. Such methods can only rearrange circumstances within nature’s mechanical course. These methods can never guarantee that their goal will be achieved. They can never make that goal more than a speculative ideal, which may or may not be achievable. But if the goal can be shown to be a duty, Kant sees a reasonable basis for believing it achievable. From his standpoint, this is the only reasonable basis for that conviction. We cannot, however, theoretically know that the goal is achievable. “Reason lacks sufficient insight to trace the chain of causes that predetermine events. Such insight would let us predict with certainty the good or bad results of human action under nature’s mechanical laws. Still, we may hope that things will turn out as we wish” (p. 163). On the other hand, perpetual peace is a moral ideal, an “idea of duty”. We are therefore entitled to believe that perpetual peace is achievable. “Nature guarantees that perpetual peace will come through the natural course of human tendencies. This guarantee is not certain enough to let us predict the future of this ideal on theoretical grounds. But the guarantee is clear enough for practical purposes” (p. 157). This discussion could continue indefinitely, but what has been said may be enough for general guidance.

The “wise and sagacious” thought of Kant is not expressed in a simple style, and the translation has consequently been a very difficult piece of work. But the translator has shown great skill in manipulating the involutions, parentheses and prodigious sentences of the original. In this she has had the valuable help of Mr. David Morrison, M.A., who revised the whole translation with the greatest care and to whom she owes the solution of a number of difficulties. Her work will have its fitting reward if it succeeds in familiarising the English-speaking student of politics with a political essay of enduring value, written by one of the master thinkers of modern times.

Kant’s “wise and sagacious” thought is not expressed simply, so translating it has been very difficult. But the translator has shown great skill in handling the original’s tangled phrasing, parenthetical remarks, and extraordinarily long sentences. She received valuable help from Mr. David Morrison, M.A., who revised the entire translation with the greatest care. She also owes him the solutions to several difficulties. Her work will be properly rewarded if it helps English-speaking students of politics become familiar with this lasting political essay. The essay was written by one of the great thinkers of modern times.

R. LATTA.

R. LATTA.

University of Glasgow, May 1903.

University of Glasgow, May 1903.