Justice and the Reason of Effects

In the letter On Injustice can come the ridiculousness of the law that the elder gets all. "My friend, you were born on this side of the mountain, it is therefore just that your elder brother gets everything."

The letter On Injustice can include the absurdity of the law that the elder gets everything. "My friend, you were born on this side of the mountain, so it is just that your elder brother gets everything."

"Why do you kill me?"

"Why do you kill me?"

He lives on the other side of the water.

He lives on the other side of the water.

"Why do you kill me? What! do you not live on the other side of the water? If you lived on this side, my friend, I should be an assassin, and it would be unjust to slay you in this manner. But since you live on the other side, I am a hero, and it is just."

"Why are you killing me? What? Don't you live on the other side of the water? If you lived on this side, my friend, I would be a murderer. It would be unjust to kill you like this. But since you live on the other side, I am a hero, and it is just."

On what shall man found the order of the world which he would govern?¹⁰⁹ Shall it be on the caprice of each individual? What confusion! Shall it be on justice? Man is ignorant of it.

What should man base the order of the world he wants to govern on?¹⁰⁹ On each person's whims? What confusion that would cause! On justice? Man does not know what justice is.

Certainly had he known it, he would not have established this maxim, the most general of all that obtain among men, that each should follow the custom of his own country. The glory of true equity would have brought all nations under subjection, and legislators would not have taken as their model the fancies and caprice of Persians and Germans instead of this unchanging justice. We should have seen it set up in all the States on earth and in all times; whereas we see neither justice nor injustice which does not change its nature with change in climate. Three degrees of latitude reverse all jurisprudence; a meridian decides the truth. Fundamental laws change after a few years of possession; right has its epochs; the entry of Saturn into the Lion marks to us the origin of such and such a crime. A strange justice that is bounded by a river! Truth on this side of the Pyrenees, error on the other side.

Surely, if he had known it, he would not have established the most widely accepted rule among people. That rule is that everyone should follow the customs of their own country. The glory of true fairness would have brought all nations under its rule. Lawmakers would have modeled their laws on this unchanging justice, not on the whims and fancies of Persians and Germans. We would have seen it established in every state on earth, at all times. Instead, we see no justice or injustice that does not change its nature when the climate changes. Three degrees of latitude overturn the whole system of law. A line of longitude decides what is true. Fundamental laws change after only a few years in force. Right has its eras. Saturn’s entry into Leo marks the origin of this or that crime for us. What strange justice, bounded by a river! Truth on one side of the Pyrenees, error on the other.

Men admit that justice does not consist in these customs, but that it resides in natural laws, common to every country. They would certainly maintain it obstinately, if reckless chance which has distributed human laws had encountered even one which was universal; but the farce is that the caprice of men has so many vagaries that there is no such law.

People admit that justice does not lie in these customs, but in natural laws shared by every country. They would certainly insist on this stubbornly if blind chance had produced even one universal human law. But the absurd truth is that human whims vary so much that no such law exists.

Theft, incest, infanticide, parricide, have all had a place among virtuous actions. Can anything be more ridiculous than that a man should have the right to kill me because he lives on the other side of the water, and because his ruler has a quarrel with mine, though I have none with him?

Theft, incest, killing infants, and killing one’s parents have all been considered virtuous acts. What could be more ridiculous than a man having the right to kill me because he lives across the water? His ruler has a quarrel with mine, even though I have no quarrel with him.

Doubtless there are natural laws; but good reason once corrupted has corrupted all. Nihil amplius nostrum est;¹¹⁰ quod nostrum dicimus, artis est. Ex senatus—consultis et plebiscitis crimina exercentur.¹¹¹ Ut olim vitiis, sic nunc legibus laboramus.¹¹²

There are surely natural laws, but once sound reason was corrupted, it corrupted everything. Nothing is ours anymore.¹¹⁰ What we call ours is artificial. Crimes are committed through decrees of the Senate and votes of the people.¹¹¹ Just as we once suffered from vices, we now suffer from laws.¹¹²

The result of this confusion is that one affirms the essence of justice to be the authority of the legislator; another, the interest of the sovereign;¹¹³ another, present custom,¹¹⁴ and this is the most sure. Nothing, according to reason alone, is just in itself; all changes with time. Custom creates the whole of equity, for the simple reason that it is accepted. It is the mystical foundation of its authority;¹¹⁵ whoever carries it back to first principles destroys it. Nothing is so faulty as those laws which correct faults. He who obeys them because they are just, obeys a justice which is imaginary, and not the essence of law; it is quite self-contained, it is law and nothing more. He who will examine its motive will find it so feeble and so trifling that if he be not accustomed to contemplate the wonders of human imagination, he will marvel that one century has gained for it so much pomp and reverence. The art of opposition and of revolution is to unsettle established customs, sounding them even to their source, to point out their want of authority and justice. We must, it is said, get back to the natural and fundamental laws of the State, which an unjust custom has abolished. It is a game certain to result in the loss of all; nothing will be just on the balance. Yet people readily lend their ear to such arguments. They shake off the yoke as soon as they recognise it; and the great profit by their ruin, and by that of these curious investigators of accepted customs. But from a contrary mistake men sometimes think they can justly do everything which is not without an example. That is why the wisest of legislators¹¹⁶ said that it was necessary to deceive men for their own good; and another, a good politician, Cum veritatem qua liberetur ignoret, expedit quod fallatur.¹¹⁷ We must not see the fact of usurpation; law was once introduced without reason, and has become reasonable. We must make it regarded as authoritative, eternal, and conceal its origin, if we do not wish that it should soon come to an end.

This confusion leads one person to say that justice rests on the authority of the legislator. Another says it rests on the ruler’s interest.¹¹³ Another says it rests on current custom,¹¹⁴ and this is the surest foundation. According to reason alone, nothing is just in itself. Everything changes with time. Custom creates all fairness, simply because it is accepted. This is the mystical foundation of its authority.¹¹⁵ Anyone who traces it back to first principles destroys it. No laws are as faulty as those that correct faults. Anyone who obeys laws because they are just obeys an imaginary justice, not the essence of law. Law stands entirely on its own. It is law and nothing more. Anyone who examines its basis will find it weak and trivial. Unless accustomed to the wonders of human imagination, he will be amazed at the pomp and reverence a single century has given it. The art of opposition and revolution is to unsettle established customs. It traces them to their source to expose their lack of authority and justice. We must, so the argument goes, return to the natural and fundamental laws of the State. An unjust custom has abolished those laws. This game is certain to end in the loss of all. Nothing will prove just when weighed in the balance. Yet people readily listen to such arguments. As soon as they recognize the yoke, they throw it off. The powerful profit from their ruin and from the ruin of these curious investigators of accepted customs. But the opposite mistake sometimes leads people to think they can justly do anything that has been done before. That is why the wisest of legislators¹¹⁶ said that people must be deceived for their own good. Another, a good politician, said, Cum veritatem qua liberetur ignoret, expedit quod fallatur.¹¹⁷ We must not see the fact that authority was seized. Law was first introduced without reason, and has become reasonable. We must make people regard it as authoritative and eternal. We must conceal its origin if we do not want it to end soon.

Mine, thine.—"This dog is mine," said those poor children; "that is my place in the sun." Here is the beginning and the image of the usurpation of all the earth.

Mine, yours. "This dog is mine," said those poor children. "That is my place in the sun." This is where the taking of all the earth begins, and what it looks like.

When the question for consideration is whether we ought to make war, and kill so many men—condemn so many Spaniards to death—only one man is judge, and he is an interested party. There should be a third, who is disinterested.

When the question is whether we should go to war and kill so many men, condemning so many Spaniards to death, only one man decides. He has a stake in the outcome. There should be a third party who has no stake in it.

Veri juris.¹¹⁸—We have it no more; if we had it, we should take conformity to the customs of a country as the rule of justice. It is here that, not finding justice, we have found force, etc.

Veri juris.¹¹⁸ We no longer have it. If we had it, we would take conformity to a country’s customs as the rule of justice. Here, finding no justice, we have found force instead, etc.

Justice, might.—It is right that what is just should be obeyed; it is necessary that what is strongest should be obeyed. Justice without might is helpless; might without justice is tyrannical. Justice without might is gainsaid, because there are always offenders; might without justice is condemned. We must then combine justice and might, and for this end make what is just strong, or what is strong just.

Justice, power. It is right to obey what is just. It is necessary to obey what is strongest. Justice without power is helpless. Power without justice is tyrannical. Justice without power is challenged because there are always those who break the rules. Power without justice is condemned. We must therefore combine justice and power. To do this, we must make what is just powerful, or make what is powerful just.

Justice is subject to dispute; might is easily recognised and is not disputed. So we cannot give might to justice, because might has gainsaid justice, and has declared that it is she herself who is just. And thus being unable to make what is just strong, we have made what is strong just.

What is just can be disputed. What is powerful is easily recognized and not disputed. So we cannot give power to justice. Power has opposed justice and claimed that it alone is just. Unable to make what is just powerful, we have made what is powerful just.

The only universal rules are the laws of the country in ordinary affairs, and of the majority in others. Whence comes this? From the might which is in them. Hence it comes that kings, who have power of a different kind, do not follow the majority of their ministers.

The only universal rules are the laws of the country in everyday matters, and the will of the majority in other matters. Why is this? Because of the power behind them. That is why kings, who have a different kind of power, do not follow the majority of their ministers.

No doubt equality of goods is just; but, being unable to cause might to obey justice, men have made it just to obey might. Unable to strengthen justice, they have justified might; so that the just and the strong should unite, and there should be peace, which is the sovereign good.

Without doubt, an equal distribution of goods is just. But people could not make power obey justice, so they made it just to obey power. Unable to give justice strength, they made power seem just. In this way, justice and power would be united, and there would be peace, the highest good.

"When a strong man armed keepeth his goods, his goods are in peace."¹¹⁹

"When a strong, armed man guards his possessions, they are safe."¹¹⁹

Why do we follow the majority? It is because they have more reason? No, because they have more power.

Why do we follow the majority? Is it because they are more reasonable? No, it is because they have more power.

Why do we follow the ancient laws and opinions? Is it because they are more sound? No, but because they are unique, and remove from us the root of difference.

Why do we follow ancient laws and opinions? Is it because they are more sound? No. It is because they are fixed and remove the source of disagreement among us.

... It is the effect of might, not of custom. For those who are capable of originality are few; the greater number will only follow, and refuse glory to those inventors who seek it by their inventions. And if these are obstinate in their wish to obtain glory, and despise those who do not invent, the latter will call them ridiculous names, and would beat them with a stick. Let no one then boast of his subtlety, or let him keep his complacency to himself.

... This is the effect of force, not habit. Few people are capable of original thought. Most will only follow others, and they deny glory to inventors who seek it through their inventions. If these inventors persist in seeking glory and look down on those who do not invent, the others will call them silly names and would beat them with a stick. So let no one boast of being clever, or let them keep their self-satisfaction to themselves.

Might is the sovereign of the world, and not opinion.—But opinion makes use of might.—It is might that makes opinion. Gentleness is beautiful in our opinion. Why? Because he who will dance on a rope will be alone,¹²⁰ and I will gather a stronger mob of people who will say that it is unbecoming.

Force rules the world, not opinion. But opinion uses force. Force shapes opinion. We think gentleness is beautiful. Why? Because anyone who wants to dance on a tightrope will stand alone,¹²⁰ while I can gather a stronger crowd to say it is improper.

The cords which bind the respect of men to each other are in general cords of necessity; for there must be different degrees, all men wishing to rule, and not all being able to do so, but some being able.

The ties that bind people to respect one another are generally ties of necessity. There must be different ranks. All people want to rule, but not all can. Only some can.

Let us then imagine we see society in the process of formation. Men will doubtless fight till the stronger party overcomes the weaker, and a dominant party is established. But when this is once determined, the masters, who do not desire the continuation of strife, then decree that the power which is in their hands shall be transmitted as they please. Some place it in election by the people, others in hereditary succession, etc.

Let us imagine society as it begins to form. People will surely fight until the stronger group defeats the weaker one and establishes its rule. Once this is settled, the rulers will not want the fighting to continue. They will therefore decree that power shall pass on as they choose. Some give the people the power to elect their rulers. Others make power hereditary, and so on.

And this is the point where imagination begins to play its part. Till now power makes fact; now power is sustained by imagination in a certain party, in France in the nobility, in Switzerland in the burgesses, etc.

This is where imagination begins to play its part. Until now, power has established the facts. Now imagination sustains the power of a particular group. In France, it sustains the power of the nobility. In Switzerland, it sustains the power of the citizens, and so on.

These cords which bind the respect of men to such and such an individual are therefore the cords of imagination.

The ties that make people respect one person or another are therefore ties of imagination.

The Swiss are offended by being called gentlemen, and prove themselves true plebeians in order to be thought worthy of great office.

The Swiss are offended when called gentlemen. To be considered worthy of high office, they prove that they are true commoners.

As duchies, kingships, and magistracies are real and necessary, because might rules all, they exist everywhere and always. But since only caprice makes such and such a one a ruler, the principle is not constant, but subject to variation, etc.

Duchies, monarchies, and public offices are real and necessary because might rules all. They exist everywhere and always. But mere chance makes one person rather than another a ruler. So the principle is not constant, but varies, and so on.

The chancellor is grave, and clothed with ornaments, for his position is unreal. Not so the king, he has power, and has nothing to do with the imagination. Judges, physicians, etc. appeal only to the imagination.

The chancellor is solemn and wears ceremonial robes because his position has no real power. The king is different. He has power and has no need to appeal to the imagination. Judges, doctors, and others appeal only to the imagination.

The habit of seeing kings accompanied by guards, drums, officers, and all the paraphernalia which mechanically inspire respect and awe, makes their countenance, when sometimes seen alone without these accompaniments, impress respect and awe on their subjects; because we cannot separate in thought their persons from the surroundings with which we see them usually joined. And the world, which knows not that this effect is the result of habit, believes that it arises by a natural force, whence come these words, "The character of Divinity is stamped on his countenance," etc.

We are used to seeing kings surrounded by guards, drums, officers, and all the trappings that automatically inspire respect and awe. So even when their subjects sometimes see them alone, their faces still inspire respect and awe. We cannot separate kings in our minds from the surroundings we usually see them with. People do not know that this effect comes from habit. They believe it comes from a natural power. This is why they say things like, "The mark of divinity is stamped on his face."

Justice.—As custom determines what is agreeable, so also does it determine justice.

Justice. Custom determines what is agreeable. It also determines what is just.

King and tyrant.—I, too, will keep my thoughts secret.

King and tyrant. I, too, will keep my thoughts secret.

I will take care on every journey.

I will be careful on every journey.

Greatness of establishment, respect for establishment.

Greatness based on social position, respect based on social position.

The pleasure of the great is the power to make people happy.

The pleasure of powerful people is being able to make others happy.

The property of riches is to be given liberally.

Riches are meant to be given generously.

The property of each thing must be sought. The property of power is to protect.

We must look for the defining quality of each thing. The defining quality of power is to protect.

When force attacks humbug, when a private soldier takes the square cap off a first president, and throws it out of the window.

When force attacks empty show, when an ordinary soldier takes the square cap off a chief judge and throws it out the window.

The government founded on opinion and imagination reigns for some time, and this government is pleasant and voluntary; that founded on might lasts for ever. Thus opinion is the queen of the world, but might is its tyrant.

A government based on opinion and imagination rules for a time. Its rule is pleasant, and people accept it willingly. A government based on force lasts forever. So opinion is the queen of the world, but force is its tyrant.

Justice is what is established; and thus all our established laws will necessarily be regarded as just without examination, since they are established.

Justice is whatever is established. So all our established laws will necessarily be considered just without examination, simply because they are established.

Sound opinions of the people.—Civil wars are the greatest of evils.¹²¹ They are inevitable, if we wish to reward desert; for all will say they are deserving. The evil we have to fear from a fool who succeeds by right of birth, is neither so great nor so sure.

The people's sound opinions. Civil wars are the greatest of evils.¹²¹ They are inevitable if we try to reward merit, because everyone will claim to deserve a reward. The harm we must fear from a fool who inherits power by birth is neither as great nor as certain.

God has created all for Himself. He has bestowed upon Himself the power of pain and pleasure.

God created all things for himself. He gave himself the power to cause pain and pleasure.

You can apply it to God, or to yourself. If to God, the Gospel is the rule. If to yourself, you will take the place of God. As God is surrounded by persons full of charity, who ask of Him the blessings of charity that are in His power, so ... Recognise then and learn that you are only a king of lust, and take the ways of lust.

You can apply it to God or to yourself. If you apply it to God, the Gospel is the rule. If you apply it to yourself, you will take God's place. God is surrounded by people full of love. They ask him for the blessings of love that he has the power to give. In the same way ... Recognize, then, that you are only a king of lust, and learn to follow the ways of lust.

The reason of effects.—It is wonderful that men would not have me honour a man clothed in brocade, and followed by seven or eight lackeys! Why! He will have me thrashed, if I do not salute him. This custom is a force. It is the same with a horse in fine trappings in comparison with another! Montaigne¹²² is a fool not to see what difference there is, to wonder at our finding any, and to ask the reason. "Indeed," says he, "how comes it," etc....

The reason behind appearances. It is astonishing that people would not have me honor a man dressed in brocade and followed by seven or eight servants! Why, he will have me beaten if I do not salute him. This custom has real force. It is the same with a horse in fine trappings compared with another horse! Montaigne¹²² is a fool not to see the difference. He wonders that we see one and asks why. "Indeed," he says, "how does it happen," etc....

Sound opinions of the people.—To be spruce is not altogether foolish, for it proves that a great number of people work for one. It shows by one's hair, that one has a valet, a perfumer, etc., by one's band, thread, lace, ... etc. Now it is not merely superficial nor merely outward show to have many arms at command. The more arms one has, the more powerful one is. To be spruce is to show one's power.

Sound opinions of the people. Dressing smartly is not entirely foolish. It shows that many people work for you. Your hair shows that you have a valet, a perfumer, and others. Your collar shows that you have people making thread, lace, and so on. Having many hands at your command is not merely superficial or outward show. The more hands you have, the more powerful you are. Dressing smartly shows your power.

Deference means, "Put yourself to inconvenience." This is apparently silly, but is quite right. For it is to say, "I would indeed put myself to inconvenience if you required it, since indeed I do so when it is of no service to you." Deference further serves to distinguish the great. Now if deference was displayed by sitting in an arm-chair, we should show deference to everybody, and so no distinction would be made; but, being put to inconvenience, we distinguish very well.

Deference means, "Put yourself to inconvenience." This may seem silly, but it is quite right. It is a way of saying, "I would put myself to inconvenience if you asked. After all, I do so even when it is no help to you." Deference also serves to distinguish people of high rank. If we showed deference by sitting in an armchair, we would show it to everyone. Then no distinction would be made. But by putting ourselves to inconvenience, we distinguish them very well.

He has four lackeys.

He has four servants.

How rightly do we distinguish men by external appearances rather than by internal qualities! Which of us two shall have precedence? Who will give place to the other? The least clever. But I am as clever as he. We should have to fight over this. He has four lackeys, and I have only one. This can be seen; we have only to count. It falls to me to yield, and I am a fool if I contest the matter. By this means we are at peace, which is the greatest of boons.

How right we are to judge people by outward appearances rather than inner qualities! Which of us should go first? Who should give way to the other? The less clever one. But I am as clever as he is. We would have to fight over it. He has four servants, and I have only one. That is plain to see. We only have to count them. So I must give way, and I would be a fool to dispute it. This way, we have peace, the greatest of blessings.

The most unreasonable things in the world become most reasonable, because of the unruliness of men. What is less reasonable than to choose the eldest son of a queen to rule a State? We do not choose as captain of a ship the passenger who is of the best family.

The most unreasonable things in the world become the most reasonable because people are so unruly. What could be less reasonable than choosing a queen’s eldest son to rule a country? We do not choose the passenger from the best family to captain a ship.

This law would be absurd and unjust; but because men are so themselves, and always will be so, it becomes reasonable and just. For whom will men choose, as the most virtuous and able? We at once come to blows, as each claims to be the most virtuous and able. Let us then attach this quality to something indisputable. This is the king's eldest son. That is clear, and there is no dispute. Reason can do no better, for civil war is the greatest of evils.

This law would be absurd and unjust. But because people themselves are absurd and unjust, and always will be, it becomes reasonable and just. Whom will people choose as the most virtuous and capable? They immediately come to blows, since each claims to be the most virtuous and capable. So let us assign this status on a basis no one can dispute: the king’s eldest son. That is clear, and there is no dispute. Reason can do no better, since civil war is the greatest of evils.

Children are astonished to see their comrades respected.

Children are surprised to see their companions treated with respect.

To be of noble birth is a great advantage. In eighteen years it places a man within the select circle, known and respected, as another would have merited in fifty years. It is a gain of thirty years without trouble.

Being born into a noble family is a great advantage. By the age of eighteen, a man is part of a select circle, known and respected. Another man would have to earn the same standing over fifty years. It is a gain of thirty years without effort.

What is the Ego?

What is the self?

Suppose a man puts himself at a window to see those who pass by. If I pass by, can I say that he placed himself there to see me? No; for he does not think of me in particular. But does he who loves someone on account of beauty really love that person? No; for the small-pox, which will kill beauty without killing the person, will cause him to love her no more.

Suppose a man stands at a window to watch people pass by. If I pass by, can I say he stood there to see me? No, because he was not thinking of me in particular. But does someone who loves a person for her beauty really love her? No. Smallpox can destroy her beauty without killing her, and then he will no longer love her.

And if one loves me for my judgment, memory, he does not love me, for I can lose these qualities without losing myself. Where, then, is this Ego, if it be neither in the body nor in the soul? And how love the body or the soul, except for these qualities which do not constitute me, since they are perishable? For it is impossible and would be unjust to love the soul of a person in the abstract, and whatever qualities might be therein. We never, then, love a person, but only qualities.

If someone loves me for my judgment or memory, they do not love me. I can lose these qualities without losing myself. Where, then, is this self, if it is neither in the body nor in the soul? And how can we love the body or the soul except for these qualities? They do not make up me, since they can be lost. It is impossible and would be unjust to love a person's soul in the abstract, regardless of its qualities. So we never love a person, only qualities.

Let us, then, jeer no more at those who are honoured on account of rank and office; for we love a person only on account of borrowed qualities.

So let us stop mocking those who are honored for their rank and position. After all, we love a person only for qualities they have borrowed.

The people have very sound opinions, for example:

Ordinary people have very sound opinions, for example:

1. In having preferred diversion and hunting to poetry. The half-learned laugh at it, and glory in being above the folly of the world; but the people are right for a reason which these do not fathom.

1. In preferring entertainment and hunting to poetry. The half-educated laugh at this. They pride themselves on being above the world's foolishness. But ordinary people are right for a reason the half-educated do not understand.

2. In having distinguished men by external marks, as birth or wealth. The world again exults in showing how unreasonable this is; but it is very reasonable. Savages laugh at an infant king.¹²³

2. In distinguishing people by outward signs, such as birth or wealth. The world again delights in showing how unreasonable this is. But it is very reasonable. Savages laugh at a baby king.¹²³

3. In being offended at a blow, on in desiring glory so much. But it is very desirable on account of the other essential goods which are joined to it; and a man who has received a blow, without resenting it, is overwhelmed with taunts and indignities.

3. In taking offense at a blow, or in desiring glory so much. But glory is highly desirable because other essential goods come with it. A man who receives a blow without resenting it is overwhelmed with mockery and insults.

4. In working for the uncertain; in sailing on the sea; in walking over a plank.

4. In working for an uncertain outcome, in sailing at sea, in walking across a plank.

Montaigne is wrong. Custom should be followed only because it is custom, and not because it is reasonable or just. But people follow it for this sole reason, that they think it just. Otherwise they would follow it no longer, although it were the custom; for they will only submit to reason or justice. Custom without this would pass for tyranny; but the sovereignty of reason and justice is no more tyrannical than that of desire. They are principles natural to man.

Montaigne is wrong. We should follow custom only because it is custom, not because it is reasonable or just. But people follow it solely because they think it is just. Otherwise, they would no longer follow it, even though it was the custom. They will submit only to reason or justice. Without this belief, custom would seem like tyranny. But the rule of reason and justice is no more tyrannical than the rule of desire. These are principles natural to human beings.

It would therefore be right to obey laws and customs, because they are laws; but we should know that there is neither truth nor justice to introduce into them, that we know nothing of these, and so must follow what is accepted. By this means we would never depart from them. But people cannot accept this doctrine; and, as they believe that truth can be found, and that it exists in law and custom, they believe them, and take their antiquity as a proof of their truth, and not simply of their authority apart from truth. Thus they obey laws, but they are liable to revolt when these are proved to be valueless; and this can be shown of all, looked at from a certain aspect.

It would therefore be right to obey laws and customs simply because they are established. But we should recognize that we know nothing of truth or justice to bring to them. We must therefore follow what is accepted. In this way, we would never depart from them. But people cannot accept this view. They believe truth can be found and that it exists in laws and customs. So they trust them and take their age as proof of their truth, not merely of their authority. Thus, people obey laws, but they may rebel when the laws are shown to be worthless. And all laws can be shown to be worthless when viewed from a certain angle.

Injustice.—It is dangerous to tell the people that the laws are unjust; for they obey them only because they think them just. Therefore it is necessary to tell them at the same time that they must obey them because they are laws, just as they must obey superiors, not because they are just, but because they are superiors. In this way all sedition is prevented, if this can be made intelligible, and it be understood what is the proper definition of justice.

Injustice. It is dangerous to tell people that the laws are unjust. They obey the laws only because they believe them to be just. So we must also tell them that they must obey the laws because they are laws. They must likewise obey their superiors, not because they are just, but because they are superiors. If this can be made clear, and the proper definition of justice understood, all rebellion is prevented.

The world is a good judge of things, for it is in natural ignorance, which is man's true state.¹²⁴ The sciences have two extremes which meet. The first is the pure natural ignorance in which all men find themselves at birth. The other extreme is that reached by great intellects, who, having run through all that men can know, find they know nothing, and come back again to that same ignorance from which they set out; but this is a learned ignorance which is conscious of itself. Those between the two, who have departed from natural ignorance and not been able to reach the other, have some smattering of this vain knowledge, and pretend to be wise. These trouble the world, and are bad judges of everything. The people and the wise constitute the world; these despise it, and are despised. They judge badly of everything, and the world judges rightly of them.

The world judges things well because it lives in natural ignorance, which is humanity’s true state.¹²⁴ Knowledge has two extremes that meet. The first is the pure, natural ignorance in which all people find themselves at birth. The other is reached by great minds. Having explored everything people can know, they find that they know nothing. They return to the same ignorance from which they began. But this is a learned ignorance, aware of itself. Those between these extremes have left natural ignorance but have not been able to reach the other. They have a little of this vain knowledge and pretend to be wise. They trouble the world and judge everything badly. Ordinary people and the wise make up the world. Those in between despise the world and are despised by it. They judge everything badly, and the world judges them rightly.

The reason of effects.—Continual alternation of pro and con.

The reason for effects. A constant back and forth between arguments for and against.

We have then shown that man is foolish, by the estimation he makes of things which are not essential; and all these opinions are destroyed. We have next shown that all these opinions are very sound, and that thus, since all these vanities are well founded, the people are not so foolish as is said. And so we have destroyed the opinion which destroyed that of the people.

We have shown that people are foolish in the value they place on things that are not essential. In doing so, we have destroyed all these opinions. We have next shown that all these opinions are quite reasonable. Since all these seemingly trivial concerns are well founded, ordinary people are not as foolish as they are said to be. In this way, we have destroyed the opinion that destroyed the opinions of ordinary people.

But we must now destroy this last proposition, and show that it remains always true that the people are foolish, though their opinions are sound; because they do not perceive the truth where it is, and, as they place it where it is not, their opinions are always very false and very unsound.

But now we must refute this last claim. We must show that the people are always foolish, even when their opinions are sound. They do not see the truth where it is, and they place it where it is not. For this reason, their opinions are always very false and very unsound.

The reason of effects.—The weakness of man is the reason why so many things are considered fine, as to be good at playing the lute. It is only an evil because of our weakness.

The reason for effects. Human weakness is why so many things are considered admirable, such as being good at playing the lute. It is an evil only because of our weakness.

The power of kings is founded on the reason and on the folly of the people, and specially on their folly. The greatest and most important thing in the world has weakness for its foundation, and this foundation is wonderfully sure; for there is nothing more sure than this, that the people will be weak. What is based on sound reason is very ill founded, as the estimate of wisdom.

The power of kings rests on the people's reason and folly, especially their folly. The greatest and most important thing in the world rests on weakness. Yet this foundation is remarkably secure. Nothing is more certain than that people will be weak. What rests on sound reason has a very shaky foundation, as does the esteem given to wisdom.

We can only think of Plato and Aristotle in grand academic robes. They were honest men, like others, laughing with their friends, and when they diverted themselves with writing their Laws and the Politics, they did it as an amusement. That part of their life was the least philosophic and the least serious; the most philosophic was to live simply and quietly. If they wrote on politics, it was as if laying down rules for a lunatic asylum; and if they presented the appearance of speaking of a great matter, it was because they knew that the madmen, to whom they spoke, thought they were kings and emperors. They entered into their principles in order to make their madness as little harmful as possible.

We can only imagine Plato and Aristotle in grand academic robes. They were decent men, like everyone else, laughing with their friends. When they amused themselves by writing their Laws and the Politics, they did it for pleasure. That part of their lives was the least philosophical and the least serious. The most philosophical thing was to live simply and quietly. If they wrote about politics, it was like setting rules for a mental institution. If they seemed to be discussing a great matter, it was because they knew the people they were addressing were mad. Those people thought they were kings and emperors. Plato and Aristotle adopted their assumptions to make their madness as harmless as possible.

Tyranny consists in the desire of universal power beyond its scope.

Tyranny is the desire for power over everything, beyond its rightful limits.

There are different assemblies of the strong, the fair, the sensible, the pious, in which each man rules at home, not elsewhere. And sometimes they meet, and the strong and the fair foolishly fight as to who shall be master, for their mastery is of different kinds. They do not understand one another, and their fault is the desire to rule everywhere. Nothing can effect this, not even might, which is of no use in the kingdom of the wise, and is only mistress of external actions.

There are different groups of the strong, the beautiful, the wise, and the devout. Each person rules within their own group, but not elsewhere. Sometimes they meet, and the strong and the beautiful foolishly fight over who should rule. But their power is of different kinds. They do not understand one another. Their mistake is wanting to rule everywhere. Nothing can achieve this, not even physical strength. It is useless in the realm of the wise and controls only outward actions.

Tyranny— ... So these expressions are false and tyrannical: "I am fair, therefore I must be feared. I am strong, therefore I must be loved. I am ..."

Tyranny. ... So these statements are false and tyrannical: "I am beautiful, so I must be feared. I am strong, so I must be loved. I am ..."

Tyranny is the wish to have in one way what can only be had in another. We render different duties to different merits; the duty of love to the pleasant; the duty of fear to the strong; the duty of belief to the learned.

Tyranny is the desire to get by one means what can only be obtained by another. We owe different kinds of respect to different qualities. We owe love to those who are pleasant, fear to those who are strong, and belief to those who are learned.

We must render these duties; it is unjust to refuse them, and unjust to ask others. And so it is false and tyrannical to say, "He is not strong, therefore I will not esteem him; he is not able, therefore I will not fear him."

We must fulfill these duties. It is unjust to refuse them, and unjust to demand different ones. So it is wrong and tyrannical to say, "He is not strong, so I will not respect him. He is not capable, so I will not fear him."

Have you never seen people who, in order to complain of the little fuss you make about them, parade before you the example of great men who esteem them? In answer I reply to them, "Show me the merit whereby you have charmed these persons, and I also will esteem you."

Have you never seen people complain that you pay them too little attention? They point to great men who hold them in high regard. I reply, "Show me the qualities that won these people over, and I will hold you in high regard too."

The reason of effects.—Lust and force are the source of all our actions; lust causes voluntary actions, force involuntary ones.

The explanation of effects. Desire and force are the source of all our actions. Desire causes voluntary actions. Force causes involuntary ones.

The reason of effects.—It is then true to say that all the world is under a delusion; for, although the opinions of the people are sound, they are not so as conceived by them, since they think the truth to be where it is not. Truth is indeed in their opinions, but not at the point where they imagine it. [Thus] it is true that we must honour noblemen, but not because noble birth is real superiority, etc.

The reason for effects. It is therefore true that everyone is under a delusion. Although the people’s opinions are sound, they are not sound as the people understand them. They think the truth lies where it does not. There is truth in their opinions, but not where they imagine it to be. [Thus] it is true that we must honor noblemen, but not because noble birth makes them truly superior, etc.

The reason of effects.—We must keep our thought secret, and judge everything by it, while talking like the people.

The reason for what happens. We must keep our thoughts secret and judge everything by them, while speaking like everyone else.

The reason of effects.—Degrees. The people honour persons of high birth. The semi-learned despise them, saying that birth is not a personal, but a chance superiority. The learned honour them, not for popular reasons, but for secret reasons. Devout persons, who have more zeal than knowledge, despise them, in spite of that consideration which makes them honoured by the learned, because they judge them by a new light which piety gives them. But perfect Christians honour them by another and higher light. So arise a succession of opinions for and against, according to the light one has.

The reason behind things. Degrees. Ordinary people honor those of noble birth. The partly educated look down on them. They say that birth is an advantage of chance, not a personal achievement. The learned honor them, not for the reasons ordinary people do, but for hidden reasons. Devout people with more zeal than knowledge look down on them. They do so despite the reason the learned honor them. They judge them by a new light that devotion gives them. But true Christians honor them by a different and higher light. So opinions alternate for and against, according to the light each person has.

True Christians nevertheless comply with folly, not because they respect folly, but the command of God, who for the punishment of men has made them subject to these follies. Omnis creatura subjecta est vanitati.¹²⁵ Liberabitur.¹²⁶ Thus Saint Thomas¹²⁷ explains the passage in Saint James on giving place to the rich, that if they do it not in the sight of God, they depart from the command of religion.

True Christians nevertheless submit to folly. They do so not because they respect it, but because they respect God's command. To punish people, God has made them subject to these follies. Omnis creatura subjecta est vanitati.¹²⁵ Liberabitur.¹²⁶ Saint Thomas¹²⁷ explains the passage in Saint James about giving the rich places of honor in this way. If people do this without regard for God, they depart from the command of religion.