Book 4, Chapter 4

But indeed ¹ with respect to justice and uprightness he not only made no secret of the opinion he held, but gave practical demonstration of it, both in private by his law-abiding and helpful behaviour to all, ² and in public by obeying the magistrates in all that the laws enjoined, whether in the life of the city or in military service, so that he was a pattern of loyalty to the rest of the world, and on three several occasions in particular: first, when as president (Epistates) of the assembly he would not suffer the sovereign people to take an unconstitutional vote, ³ but ventured, on the side of the laws, to resist a current of popular feeling strong enough, I think, to have daunted any other man. Again, when the Thirty tried to lay some injunction on him contrary to the laws, he refused to obey, as for instance when they forbade his conversing with the young; ⁴ or again, when they ordered him and certain other citizens to arrest a man to be put to death, ⁵ he stood out single-handed on the ground that the injunctions laid upon him were contrary to the laws. And lastly, when he appeared as defendant in the suit instituted by Meletus, ⁶ notwithstanding that it was customary for litigants in the law courts to humour the judges in the conduct of their arguments by flattery and supplications contrary to the laws, ⁷ notwithstanding also that defendants owed their acquittal by the court to the employment of such methods, he refused to do a single thing however habitual in a court of law which was not strictly legal; and though by only a slight deflection from the strict path he might easily have been acquitted by his judges, ⁸ he preferred to abide by the laws and die rather than transgress them and live.

But indeed, ¹ he did not hide his views on justice and uprightness. He also put them into practice. In private, he obeyed the law and helped everyone. ² In public, he obeyed the magistrates in everything the laws required, both in the city and during military service. In this way, he set an example of loyalty for everyone else. Three occasions stand out in particular. First, as president (Epistates) of the assembly, he would not let the sovereign people take an unconstitutional vote. ³ He dared to stand up for the laws against a tide of popular feeling. I think that tide would have intimidated any other man. Again, when the Thirty tried to give him an order contrary to the laws, he refused to obey. For example, they forbade him to speak with the young. ⁴ They also ordered him and certain other citizens to arrest a man who was to be put to death. ⁵ He alone resisted, because the orders given to him were contrary to the laws. Finally, he appeared as a defendant in the suit brought by Meletus. ⁶ In court, litigants usually tried to win over the judges with flattery and pleas, contrary to the laws. ⁷ Defendants also owed their acquittal to such methods. Even so, he refused to do anything that was not strictly legal, however customary it was in court. He could easily have been acquitted by departing only slightly from the strict path. ⁸ But he preferred to obey the laws and die rather than break them and live.

These views he frequently maintained in conversation, now with one and now with another, and one particular discussion with Hippias of Elis ⁹ on the topic of justice and uprightness has come to my knowledge. ¹⁰

He often expressed these views in conversations with various people. I have learned of one particular discussion he had with Hippias of Elis ⁹ about justice and uprightness. ¹⁰

Hippias had just arrived at Athens after a long absence, and chanced to be present when Socrates was telling some listeners how astonishing it was that if a man wanted to get another taught to be a shoemaker or carpenter or coppersmith or horseman, he would have no doubt where to send him for the purpose: "People say," ¹¹ he added, "that if a man wants to get his horse or his ox taught in the right way, ¹² the world is full of instructors; but if he would learn himself, or have his son or his slave taught in the way of right, he cannot tell where to find such instruction."

Hippias had just returned to Athens after a long absence. He happened to be there when Socrates was speaking to some listeners. Socrates said it was astonishing that if a man wanted someone taught to be a shoemaker, carpenter, coppersmith, or horseman, he would have no doubt where to send him. "People say," ¹¹ he added, "that if a man wants his horse or ox trained properly, ¹² the world is full of instructors. But if he wants to learn how to do what is right, or have his son or slave taught, he cannot tell where to find such instruction."

Hippias, catching the words, exclaimed in a bantering tone: What! still repeating the same old talk, ¹³ Socrates, which I used to hear from you long ago?

Hippias overheard him and said teasingly: What! Are you still repeating the same old talk, ¹³ Socrates, that I heard from you long ago?

Yes (answered Socrates), and what is still more strange, Hippias, it is not only the same old talk but about the same old subjects. Now you, I daresay, through versatility of knowledge, ¹⁴ never say the same thing twice over on the same subject?

Yes, Socrates answered, and what's even stranger, Hippias, is that it's not only the same old talk but also the same old subjects. Now you, I suppose, with your wide range of knowledge, ¹⁴ never say the same thing twice about the same subject?

To be sure (he answered), my endeavour is to say something new on all occasions.

Certainly, he answered, I try to say something new every time.

What (he asked) about things which you know, as for instance in a case of spelling, if any one asks you, "How many letters in Socrates, and what is their order?" ¹⁵ I suppose you try to run off one string of letters to-day and to-morrow another? or to a question of arithmetic, "Does twice five make ten?" your answer to-day will differ from that of yesterday?

“What about things you know?” he asked. “For example, suppose someone asks you about spelling: ‘How many letters are in Socrates, and what is their order?’ ¹⁵ I suppose you give one sequence of letters today and another tomorrow? Or suppose someone asks you an arithmetic question: ‘Does twice five make ten?’ Will your answer today differ from yesterday’s?”

Hipp. No; on these topics, Socrates, I do as you do and repeat myself. However, to revert to justice (and uprightness), ¹⁶ I flatter myself I can at present furnish you with some remarks which neither you nor any one else will be able to controvert.

Hipp. No, Socrates. On these topics, I do as you do and repeat myself. But to return to justice (and uprightness), ¹⁶ I believe I can now offer some remarks that neither you nor anyone else can refute.

By Hera! ¹⁷ (he exclaimed), what a blessing to have discovered! ¹⁸ Now we shall have no more divisions of opinion on points of right and wrong; judges will vote unanimously; citizens will cease wrangling; there will be no more litigation, no more party faction, states will reconcile their differences, and wars are ended. For my part I do not know how I can tear myself away from you, until I have heard from your own lips all about the grand discovery you have made.

By Hera! ¹⁷ he exclaimed. What a wonderful discovery! ¹⁸ Now we will no longer disagree about right and wrong. Judges will vote unanimously. Citizens will stop arguing. There will be no more lawsuits or political factions. States will settle their differences, and wars will end. I don't know how I can leave you until I hear all about your great discovery from your own lips.

You shall hear all in good time (Hippias answered), but not until you make a plain statement of your own belief. What is justice? We have had enough of your ridiculing all the rest of the world, questioning and cross-examining first one and then the other, but never a bit will you render an account to any one yourself or state a plain opinion upon a single topic. ¹⁹

“You’ll hear everything in good time,” Hippias answered. “But not until you clearly state what you believe. What is justice? We’ve had enough of you making fun of everyone else, questioning and cross-examining one person after another. Yet you never explain yourself to anyone or state a clear opinion on a single subject.” ¹⁹

What, Hippias (Socrates retorted), have you not observed that I am in a chronic condition of proclaiming what I regard as just and upright?

Socrates retorted, “Hippias, haven’t you noticed that I’m constantly proclaiming what I consider just and right?”

Hipp. And pray what is this theory ²⁰ of yours on the subject? Let us have it in words.

Hipp. And what is your theory ²⁰ on the subject? Tell us.

Soc. If I fail to proclaim it in words, at any rate I do so in deed and in fact. Or do you not think that a fact is worth more as evidence than a word? ²¹

Soc. If I fail to proclaim it in words, at least I do so through my actions. Don't you think actions are better evidence than words? ²¹

Worth far more, I should say (Hippias answered), for many a man with justice and right on his lips commits injustice and wrong, but no doer of right ever was a misdoer or could possibly be.

“Worth far more, I would say,” Hippias answered. “Many people speak of justice and right but act unjustly and wrongly. But no one who does right has ever done wrong or could possibly do so.”

Soc. I ask then, have you ever heard or seen or otherwise perceived me bearing false witness or lodging malicious information, or stirring up strife among friends or political dissension in the city, or committing any other unjust and wrongful act?

Soc. So I ask: Have you ever heard, seen, or otherwise known me to give false testimony or make malicious accusations? Have you known me to stir up conflict among friends or political division in the city? Have you known me to commit any other unjust or wrongful act?

No, I cannot say that I have (he answered).

No, I can't say that I have, he answered.

Soc. And do you not regard it as right and just to abstain from wrong? ²²

Soc. And don't you think it is right and just to avoid doing wrong? ²²

Hipp. Now you are caught, Socrates, plainly trying to escape from a plain statement. When asked what you believe justice to be, you keep telling us not what the just man does, but what he does not do.

Hipp. Now we have caught you, Socrates. You are clearly trying to avoid giving a straight answer. When asked what you think justice is, you keep telling us what a just person does not do, rather than what a just person does.

Why, I thought for my part (answered Socrates) that the refusal to do wrong and injustice was a sufficient warrent in itself of righteousness and justice, but if you do not agree, see if this pleases you better: I assert that what is "lawful" is "just and righteous."

“Well, I thought that refusing to do wrong and act unjustly was sufficient proof of righteousness and justice,” Socrates answered. “But if you disagree, see if you like this better: I say that what is ‘lawful’ is ‘just and righteous.’”

Do you mean to assert (he asked) that lawful and just are synonymous terms?

Are you saying that lawful and just mean the same thing? he asked.

Soc. I do.

Soc. I do.

I ask (Hippias added), for I do not perceive what you mean by lawful, nor what you mean by just. ²³

“I ask,” Hippias added, “because I do not understand what you mean by lawful or just.” ²³

Soc. You understand what is meant by laws of a city or state?

Soc. Do you understand what the laws of a city or state are?

Yes (he answered).

Yes, he answered.

Soc. What do you take them to be?

Soc. What do you think they are?

Hipp. The several enactments drawn up by the citizens or members of a state in agreement as to what things should be done or left undone.

Hipp. The laws that citizens or members of a state agree on, setting out what should and should not be done.

Then I presume (Socrates continued) that a member of a state who regulates his life in accordance with these enactments will be law-abiding, while the transgressor of the same will be law-less?

Then I suppose, Socrates continued, that a citizen who lives by these laws is law-abiding, while one who breaks them is lawless?

Certainly (he answered).

“Certainly,” he answered.

Soc. And I presume the law-loving citizen will do what is just and right, while the lawless man will do what is unjust and wrong?

Soc. And I suppose a law-abiding citizen will do what is just and right, while a lawless person will do what is unjust and wrong?

Hipp. Certainly.

Hipp. Certainly.

Soc. And I presume that he who does what is just is just, and he who does what is unjust is unjust?

Soc. And I suppose that someone who acts justly is just, and someone who acts unjustly is unjust?

Hipp. Of course.

Hipp. Of course.

Soc. It would appear, then, that the law-loving man is just, and the lawless unjust?

Soc. So it seems that a man who respects the law is just, and a man who breaks it is unjust?

Then Hippias: Well, but laws, Socrates, how should any one regard as a serious matter either the laws themselves, or obedience to them, which laws the very people who made them are perpetually rejecting and altering?

Then Hippias said: But Socrates, how can anyone take laws or obedience to them seriously? The very people who make laws are constantly rejecting and changing them.

Which is also true of war (Socrates replied); cities are perpetually undertaking war and then making peace again.

The same is true of war, Socrates replied. Cities are constantly going to war and then making peace again.

Most true (he answered).

Very true (he answered).

Soc. If so, what is the difference between depreciating obedience to law because laws will be repealed, and depreciating good discipline in war because peace will one day be made? But perhaps you object to enthusiasm displayed in defence of one's home and fatherland in war?

Soc. If so, how is it different to dismiss obedience to laws because they will be repealed? Would you also dismiss good discipline in war because peace will one day be made? But perhaps you object to enthusiasm for defending one's home and country in war?

No, indeed I do not! I heartily approve of it (he answered).

No, I certainly don't! I strongly approve of it (he answered).

Soc. Then have you laid to heart the lesson taught by Lycurgus to the Lacedaemonians, ²⁴ and do you understand that if he succeeded in giving Sparta a distinction above other states, it was only by instilling into her, beyond all else, a spirit of obedience to the laws? And among magistrates and rulers in the different states, you would scarcely refuse the palm of superiority to those who best contribute to make their fellow-citizens obedient to the laws? And you would admit that any particular state in which obedience to the laws is the paramount distinction of the citizens flourishes most in peace time, and in time of war is irresistible? But, indeed, of all the blessings which a state may enjoy, none stands higher than the blessing of unanimity. "Concord among citizens"—that is the constant theme of exhortation emphasised by the councils of elders ²⁵ and by the choice spirits of the community; ²⁶ at all times and everywhere through the length and breadth of all Hellas it is an established law that the citizens be bound together by an oath of concord; ²⁷ everywhere they do actually swear this oath; not of course as implying that citizens shall all vote for the same choruses, or give their plaudits to the same flute-players, or choose the same poets, or limit themselves to the same pleasures, but simply that they shall pay obedience to the laws, since in the end that state will prove most powerful and most prosperous in which the citizens abide by these; but without concord neither can a state be well administered nor a household well organised.

Soc. Then have you taken to heart the lesson Lycurgus taught the Lacedaemonians? ²⁴ Do you understand how he succeeded in making Sparta stand out among other states? He did it only by instilling in her, above all else, a spirit of obedience to the laws. And among magistrates and rulers in different states, you would hardly deny that the best are those who do most to make their fellow citizens obey the laws? Would you also agree that a state whose citizens are distinguished above all by their obedience to the laws flourishes most in peacetime and is irresistible in war? But of all the blessings a state can enjoy, none is greater than unanimity. "Concord among citizens" is what councils of elders ²⁵ and the finest members of the community ²⁶ constantly urge. Throughout all Hellas, it is always and everywhere an established law that citizens bind themselves by an oath of concord. ²⁷ Everywhere they actually swear this oath. Of course, the oath does not mean that all citizens should vote for the same choruses, applaud the same flute players, choose the same poets, or restrict themselves to the same pleasures. It means simply that they should obey the laws. For in the end, the state whose citizens obey the laws will be the most powerful and prosperous. But without concord, neither a state nor a household can be well run.

And if we turn to private life, what better protection can a man have than obedience to the laws? This shall be his safeguard against penalties, his guarantee of honours at the hands of the community; it shall be a clue to thread his way through the mazes of the law courts unbewildered, secure against defeat, assured of victory. ²⁸ It is to him, the law-loving citizen, that men will turn in confidence when seeking a guardian of the most sacred deposits, be it of money or be it their sons or daughters. He, in the eyes of the state collectively, is trustworthy—he and no other; who alone may be depended on to render to all alike their dues—to parents and kinsmen and servants, to friends and fellow-citizens and foreigners. This is he whom the enemy will soonest trust to arrange an armistice, or a truce, or a treaty of peace. They would like to become the allies of this man, and to fight on his side. This is he to whom the allies ²⁹ of his country will most confidently entrust the command of their forces, or of a garrison, or their states themselves. This, again, is he who may be counted on to recompense kindness with gratitude, and who, therefore, is more sure of kindly treatment than another whose sense of gratitude is fuller. ³⁰ The most desirable among friends, the enemy of all others to be avoided, clearly he is not the person whom a foreign state would choose to go to war with; encompassed by a host of friends and exempt from foes, his very character has a charm to compel friendship and alliance, and before him hatred and hostility melt away.

And if we turn to private life, what better protection can a man have than obeying the laws? Obedience will protect him from penalties and guarantee him honors from the community. It will guide him through the complexities of the courts without confusion, safe from defeat and assured of victory. ²⁸ People will confidently turn to this law-abiding citizen to guard their most sacred trusts, whether their money, sons, or daughters. The state as a whole regards him, and no one else, as trustworthy. He alone can be relied on to give everyone what they are due: parents, relatives, servants, friends, fellow citizens, and foreigners alike. The enemy will trust him above all others to arrange a ceasefire, a truce, or a peace treaty. They would like to be his allies and fight at his side. His country’s allies ²⁹ will trust him above all others to command their forces, a garrison, or even their states. He can also be counted on to repay kindness with gratitude. He is therefore more certain to be treated kindly than someone whose sense of gratitude is greater. ³⁰ He is the most desirable of friends and the enemy to avoid above all others. Clearly, a foreign state would not choose to go to war with him. Surrounded by friends and free from enemies, his very character draws others into friendship and alliance. Hatred and hostility melt away before him.

And now, Hippias, I have done my part; that is my proof and demonstration that the "lawful" and "law-observant" are synonymous with the "upright" and the "just"; do you, if you hold a contrary view, instruct us. ³¹

And now, Hippias, I have done my part. I have shown that "lawful" and "law-observant" mean the same as "upright" and "just." If you disagree, please explain your view to us. ³¹

Then Hippias: Nay, upon my soul, Socrates, I am not aware of holding any contrary opinion to what you have uttered on the theme of justice. ³²

Then Hippias said: No, I swear, Socrates, I don't think I disagree with anything you've said about justice. ³²

Soc. But now, are you aware, Hippias, of certain unwritten laws? ³³

Soc. But now, Hippias, do you know of any unwritten laws? ³³

Yes (he answered), those held in every part of the world, and in the same sense.

Yes, he answered, those held everywhere in the world, and in the same sense.

Can you then assert (asked Socrates) of these unwritten laws that men made them?

Can you then say that people made these unwritten laws? Socrates asked.

Nay, how (he answered) should that be, for how could they all have come together from the ends of the earth? and even if they had so done, men are not all of one speech? ³⁴

No, he replied, how could that be? How could they all have come together from the ends of the earth? And even if they had, people do not all speak the same language, do they? ³⁴

Soc. Whom then do you believe to have been the makers of these laws.

Soc. Who, then, do you think made these laws?

Hipp. For my part, I think that the gods must have made these laws for men, and I take it as proof that first and foremost it is a law and custom everywhere to worship and reverence the gods.

Hipp. I think the gods must have made these laws for people. My first and strongest evidence is that everywhere, law and custom call for people to worship and respect the gods.

Soc. And, I presume, to honour parents is also customary everywhere?

Soc. And I suppose people everywhere also honor their parents?

Yes, that too (he answered).

Yes, that too, he answered.

Soc. And, I presume, also the prohibition of intermarriage between parents and children?

Soc. And I suppose parents and children are also forbidden to marry each other?

Hipp. No; at that point I stop, Socrates. That does not seem to me to be a law of God.

Hipp. No, Socrates, that's where I draw the line. That doesn't seem to me to be a law of God.

Now, why? (he asked).

Now, why? he asked.

Because I perceive it is not infrequently transgressed (he answered). ³⁵

Because I see that it is often broken, he answered. ³⁵

Soc. Well, but there are a good many other things which people do contrary to law; only the penalty, I take it, affixed to the transgression of the divine code is certain; there is no escape for the offender after the manner in which a man may transgress the laws of man with impunity, slipping through the fingers of justice by stealth, or avoiding it by violence.

Soc. Well, people break many other laws too. But I think punishment for breaking divine law is certain. An offender cannot escape it as someone who breaks human laws might escape punishment, either by hiding from justice or by using force.

Hipp. And what is the inevitable penalty paid by those who, being related as parents and children, intermingle in marriage?

Hipp. And what penalty must parents and children inevitably pay if they marry each other?

Soc. The greatest of all penalties; for what worse calamity can human beings suffer in the production of offspring than to misbeget? ³⁶

Soc. The greatest penalty of all. For what worse misfortune can people suffer in having children than to produce poorly bred offspring? ³⁶

Hipp. But how or why should they breed them ill where nothing hinders them, being of a good stock themselves and producing from stock as good?

Hipp. But how or why would they breed them badly when nothing prevents them from doing it well? They themselves come from good stock, and they breed with stock just as good.

Soc. Because, forsooth, in order to produce good children, it is not simply necessary that the parents should be good and of a good stock, but that both should be equally in the prime and vigour of their bodies. ³⁷ Do you suppose that the seed of those who are at their prime is like theirs who either have not yet reached their prime, or whose prime has passed?

Soc. Because, of course, producing good children requires more than parents who are good and come from good families. Both parents must also be equally in their physical prime. ³⁷ Do you think the seed of people in their prime is like that of people who have not yet reached it? Or is it like that of people whose prime has passed?

Hipp. No, it is reasonable to expect that the seed will differ.

Hipp. No, it is reasonable to expect the seed to be different.

Soc. And for the better—which?

Soc. And which is for the better?

Hipp. Theirs clearly who are at their prime.

Hipp. Clearly, those in their prime.

Soc. It would seem that the seed of those who are not yet in their prime or have passed their prime is not good?

Soc. It seems that the seed of those who are not yet in their prime or have passed it is not good?

Hipp. It seems most improbable it should be.

Hipp. That seems very unlikely.

Soc. Then the right way to produce children is not that way?

Soc. So that isn't the right way to have children?

Hipp. No, that is not the right way.

Hipp. No, that is not the right way.

Soc. Then children who are so produced are produced not as they ought to be?

Soc. Then are children produced in this way not produced as they should be?

Hipp. So it appears to me.

Hipp. That's how it seems to me.

What offspring then (he asked) will be ill produced, ill begotten, and ill born, if not these?

He asked, “What children, if not these, would be badly conceived, badly bred, and badly born?”

I subscribe to that opinion also (replied Hippias).

I agree with that opinion too, replied Hippias.

Soc. Well, it is a custom universally respected, is it not, to return good for good, and kindness with kindness?

Soc. Well, everyone respects the custom of returning good for good and kindness for kindness, don't they?

Hipp. Yes, a custom, but one which again is apt to be transgressed.

Hipp. Yes, but that custom, too, is often broken.

Soc. Then he that so transgresses it pays penalty in finding himself isolated; bereft of friends who are good, and driven to seek after those who love him not. Or is it not so that he who does me kindness in my intercourse with him is my good friend, but if I requite not this kindness to my benefactor, I am hated by him for my ingratitude, and yet I must needs pursue after him and cling to him because of the great gain to me of his society?

Soc. Then anyone who breaks it pays the penalty of being isolated. He is left without good friends and driven to seek out those who do not love him. Isn't someone who is kind to me in our dealings a good friend to me? But if I do not return his kindness, he hates me for my ingratitude. Yet I must seek him out and stay close to him because I gain so much from his company.

Hipp. Yes, Socrates. In all these cases, I admit, there is an implication of divine authority; ³⁸ that a law should in itself be loaded with the penalty of its transgression does suggest to my mind a higher than human type of legislator.

Hipp. Yes, Socrates. I admit that all these cases suggest divine authority. ³⁸ The fact that a law carries its own penalty for breaking it suggests to me a lawgiver higher than any human.

Soc. And in your opinion, Hippias, is the legislation of the gods just and righteous, or the reverse of what is just and righteous?

Soc. And what do you think, Hippias? Are the laws of the gods just and righteous, or unjust and unrighteous?

Hipp. Not the reverse of what is just and righteous, Socrates, God forbid! for scarcely could any other legislate aright, of not God himself.

Hipp. Certainly not the opposite of what is just and right, Socrates. God forbid! For hardly anyone but God himself could make laws rightly.

Soc. It would seem then, Hippias, the gods themselves are well pleased that "the lawful" and "the just" should be synonymous? ³⁹

Soc. So it seems, Hippias, that the gods themselves are pleased that "the lawful" and "the just" mean the same thing? ³⁹

By such language and by such conduct, through example and precept alike, he helped to make those who approached him more upright and more just.

Through his words and actions, he taught by both example and instruction. In this way, he helped those who came to him become more upright and just.