Book 4, Chapter 2

Or to come to a third kind—the class of people who are persuaded that they have received the best education, and are proud of their wisdom: his manner of dealing with these I will now describe.

Now I will turn to a third group. These people believe they have received the best education and are proud of their wisdom. I will describe how he dealt with them.

Euthydemus ¹ "the beautiful" had (Socrates was given to understand) collected a large library, consisting of the most celebrated poets and philosophers, ² by help of which he already believed himself to be more than a match for his fellows in wisdom, and indeed might presently expect to out-top them all in capacity of speech and action. ³ At first, as Socrates noted, the young man by reason of his youth had not as yet set foot in the agora, ⁴ but if he had anything to transact, his habit was to seat himself in a saddler's shop hard by. Accordingly to this same saddler's shop Socrates betook himself with some of those who were with him. And first the question was started by some one: "Was it through consorting with the wise, ⁵ or by his own unaided talent, that Themistocles came so to surpass his fellow-citizens that when the services of a capable man were needed the eyes of the whole community instinctively turned to him?" Socrates, with a view to stirring ⁶ Euthydemus, answered: There was certainly an ingenuous simplicity in the belief that superiority in arts of comparatively little worth could only be attained by aid of qualified teachers, but that the leadership of the state, the most important concern of all, was destined to drop into the lap of anybody, no matter whom, like an accidental windfall. ⁷

Socrates had heard that Euthydemus ¹ "the beautiful" had collected a large library of the most celebrated poets and philosophers. ² With its help, Euthydemus already believed himself wiser than his peers. He also expected soon to surpass them all in speech and action. ³ Socrates noticed that the young man had not yet entered the agora, ⁴ because of his youth. Instead, if he had business to conduct, he would sit in a nearby saddler's shop. So Socrates went to the same saddler's shop with some of his companions. Someone began by asking: "Did Themistocles come to surpass his fellow citizens by spending time with wise men, ⁵ or through his own natural talent? When a capable man was needed, the whole community instinctively looked to him." Socrates answered, hoping to provoke ⁶ Euthydemus. He said it was certainly naive to believe that excellence in relatively unimportant arts could only be achieved with qualified teachers. Yet, according to this belief, leadership of the state, the most important concern of all, could fall into anyone's lap by chance. ⁷

On a subsequent occasion, Euthydemus being present, though, as was plain to see, somewhat disposed to withdraw from the friendly concourse, ⁸ as if he would choose anything rather than appear to admire Socrates on the score of wisdom, the latter made the following remarks.

On another occasion, Euthydemus was present, though he clearly seemed inclined to withdraw from the friendly gathering. ⁸ He acted as if he would rather do anything than appear to admire Socrates for his wisdom. Socrates made the following remarks.

Soc. It is clear from his customary pursuits, is it not, sirs, that when our friend Euthydemus here is of full age, and the state propounds some question for solution, he will not abstain from offering the benefit of his advice? One can imagine the pretty exordium to his parliamentary speeches which, in his anxiety not to be thought to have learnt anything from anybody, he has ready for the occasion. ⁹ Clearly at the outset he will deliver himself thus: "Men of Athens, I have never at any time learnt anything from anybody; nor, if I have ever heard of any one as being an able statesman, well versed in speech and capable of action, have I sought to come across him individually. I have not so much as been at pains to provide myself with a teacher from amongst those who have knowledge; ¹⁰ on the contrary, I have persistently avoided, I will not say learning from others, but the very faintest suspicion of so doing. However, anything that occurs to me by the light of nature I shall be glad to place at your disposal."... How appropriate ¹¹ would such a preface sound on the lips of any one seeking, say, the office of state physician, ¹² would it not? How advantageously he might begin an address on this wise: "Men of Athens, I have never learnt the art of healing by help of anybody, nor have I sought to provide myself with any teacher among medical men. Indeed, to put it briefly, I have been ever on my guard not only against learning anything from the profession, but against the very notion of having studied medicine at all. If, however, you will be so good as to confer on me this post, I promise I will do my best to acquire skill by experimenting on your persons." Every one present laughed at the exordium (and there the matter dropped).

Soc. Gentlemen, judging by his usual pursuits, isn't it clear that our friend Euthydemus will offer his advice when he comes of age and the state puts a question to him? Imagine the fine opening he has prepared for his speeches to the assembly. He is anxious not to seem to have learned anything from anyone. ⁹ Surely he will begin like this: "Men of Athens, I have never learned anything from anyone. If I have heard of a skilled statesman, someone good at speaking and capable of action, I have not sought him out. I have not even taken the trouble to find a teacher among those with knowledge. ¹⁰ On the contrary, I have been careful to avoid not only learning from others, but even the slightest suspicion of doing so. Still, I will gladly share with you whatever comes to me naturally."... How fitting ¹¹ such an opening would be for someone seeking the office of state physician, ¹² wouldn't it? How well he might begin his speech like this: "Men of Athens, I have never learned medicine from anyone, nor have I sought a teacher among physicians. In short, I have always been careful to avoid not only learning anything from physicians, but even the suggestion that I have studied medicine at all. If, however, you are kind enough to give me this post, I promise to do my best to learn by experimenting on your bodies." Everyone present laughed at the opening, and the matter went no further.

Presently, when it became apparent that Euthydemus had got so far that he was disposed to pay attention to what was said, though he was still at pains not to utter a sound himself, as if he hoped by silence to attach to himself some reputation for sagacity, Socrates, wishing to cure him of that defect, proceeded.

Soon it became clear that Euthydemus had begun to pay attention to what was said. Yet he still took care not to utter a sound, as if he hoped his silence would earn him a reputation for wisdom. Wanting to cure him of this fault, Socrates continued.

Soc. Is it not surprising that people anxious to learn to play the harp or the flute, or to ride, or to become proficient in any like accomplishment, are not content to work unremittingly in private by themselves at whatever it is in which they desire to excel, but they must sit at the feet of the best-esteemed teachers, doing all things and enduring all things for the sake of following the judgment of those teachers in everything, as though they themselves could not otherwise become famous; whereas, among those who aspire to become eminent politically as orators and statesmen, ¹³ there are some who cannot see why they should not be able to do all that politics demand, at a moment's notice, by inspiration as it were, without any preliminary pains or preparations whatever? And yet it would appear that the latter concerns must be more difficult of achievement than the former, in proportion as there are more competitors in the field but fewer who reach the goal of their ambition, which is as much as to say that a more sustained effort of attention is needed on the part of those who embark upon the sea of politics than is elsewhere called for.

Soc. Isn’t it surprising how people try to learn the harp, the flute, riding, or any similar skill? They are not content to practice constantly on their own at whatever they want to master. They also study with the most highly regarded teachers. They do and endure everything so they can follow their teachers’ judgment in everything. They act as if they could not otherwise become famous. Yet some people who aspire to become prominent as political speakers and statesmen ¹³ see no reason why they cannot do everything politics demands at a moment’s notice. They expect to do it almost by inspiration, without any prior effort or preparation. And yet political success would seem harder to achieve than mastery of those other skills. More people compete for political success, but fewer reach their goal. This means that people entering politics need to keep their attention on their work more steadily than people in other fields.

Such were the topics on which Socrates was wont in the early days of their association to dilate in the hearing of Euthydemus; but when the philosopher perceived that the youth not only could tolerate the turns of the discussion more readily but was now become a somewhat eager listener, he went to the saddler's shop alone, ¹⁴ and when Euthydemus was seated by his side the following conversation took place.

These were the topics Socrates often discussed in Euthydemus’s hearing when they first became acquainted. But Socrates noticed that the young man could follow the discussions more easily and was becoming an eager listener. So he went to the saddler’s shop alone, ¹⁴ and when Euthydemus sat down beside him, they had the following conversation.

Soc. Pray tell me, Euthydemus, is it really true what people tell me, that you have made a large collection of the writings of "the wise," as they are called? ¹⁵

Soc. Tell me, Euthydemus, is it true what people say? Have you collected many writings by those they call "the wise"? ¹⁵

Euthydemus answered: Quite true, Socrates, and I mean to go on collecting until I possess all the books I can possibly lay hold of.

Euthydemus answered: That's true, Socrates, and I intend to keep collecting until I have all the books I can find.

Soc. By Hera! I admire you for wishing to possess treasures of wisdom rather than of gold and silver, which shows that you do not believe gold and silver to be the means of making men better, but that the thoughts ¹⁶ of the wise alone enrich with virtue their possessions.

Soc. By Hera! I admire you for wanting treasures of wisdom rather than gold and silver. Your wish shows that you do not believe gold and silver make people better. Instead, you believe that only the thoughts ¹⁶ of the wise enrich those who possess them with virtue.

And Euthydemus was glad when he heard that saying, for, thought he to himself, "In the eyes of Socrates I am on the high road to the acquisition of wisdom." But the latter, perceiving him to be pleased with the praise, continued.

Euthydemus was glad to hear this. He thought to himself, "Socrates thinks I am well on my way to gaining wisdom." But Socrates saw that Euthydemus was pleased by the praise and continued.

Soc. And what is it in which you desire to excel, Euthydemus, that you collect books?

Soc. And what do you hope to excel at by collecting books, Euthydemus?

And when Euthydemus was silent, considering what answer he should make, Socrates added: Possibly you want to be a great doctor? Why, the prescriptions ¹⁷ of the Pharmacopoeia would form a pretty large library by themselves.

Euthydemus was silent, thinking about how to answer. Socrates added: Perhaps you want to be a great doctor? Why, the prescriptions ¹⁷ in the Pharmacopoeia alone would make a fairly large library.

No, indeed, not I! (answered Euthydemus).

No, certainly not me! (Euthydemus answered).

Soc. Then do you wish to be an architect? That too implies a man of well-stored wit and judgment. ¹⁸

Soc. So, do you want to be an architect? That also requires a man with a wealth of knowledge and good judgment. ¹⁸

I have no such ambition (he replied).

I have no such ambition, he replied.

Soc. Well, do you wish to be a mathematician, like Theodorus? ¹⁹

Soc. Well, do you want to be a mathematician like Theodorus? ¹⁹

Euth. No, nor yet a mathematician.

Euth. No, not a mathematician either.

Soc. Then do you wish to be an astronomer? ²⁰ or (as the youth signified dissent) possibly a rhapsodist? ²¹ (he asked), for I am told you have the entire works of Homer in your possession. ²²

Soc. Then do you want to be an astronomer? ²⁰ The young man indicated that he did not. “Perhaps you want to be a rhapsodist? ²¹ I’m told you own all of Homer’s works.” ²²

Nay, God forbid! not I! (ejaculated the youth). Rhapsodists have a very exact acquaintance with epic poetry, I know, of course; but they are empty-pated creatures enough themselves. ²³

“No, God forbid! Not me!” the young man exclaimed. “Of course, I know rhapsodists are very familiar with epic poetry. But they are rather empty-headed themselves.” ²³

At last Socrates said: Can it be, Euthydemus, that you are an aspirant to that excellence through which men become statesmen and administrators fit to rule and apt to benefit ²⁴ the rest of the world and themselves?

At last Socrates said: Euthydemus, are you seeking the excellence that makes men statesmen and administrators? The excellence that makes them fit to rule and able to benefit ²⁴ the rest of the world and themselves?

Yes (replied he), that is the excellence I desire—beyond measure.

Yes, he replied, that is the excellence I desire more than anything.

Upon my word (said Socrates), then you have indeed selected as the object of your ambition the noblest of virtues and the greatest of the arts, for this is the property of kings, and is entitled "royal"; but (he continued) have you considered whether it is possible to excel in these matters without being just and upright? ²⁵

“Indeed,” said Socrates, “you have chosen as your ambition the noblest virtue and the greatest art. For this is the art of kings, and is called ‘royal.’ But have you considered whether it is possible to excel in these matters without being just and upright?” ²⁵

Euth. Certainly I have, and I say that without justice and uprightness it is impossible to be a good citizen.

Euth. I certainly have, and I say that without justice and honesty, it is impossible to be a good citizen.

No doubt (replied Socrates) you have accomplished that initial step?

Surely you have taken that first step? Socrates replied.

Euth. Well, Socrates, I think I could hold my own against all comers as an upright man.

Euth. Well, Socrates, I think I could match anyone when it comes to being an honest man.

And have upright men (continued Socrates) their distinctive and appropriate works like those of carpenters or shoe-makers?

Socrates continued: Do upright men have their own particular work, like carpenters or shoemakers?

Euth. To be sure they have.

Euth. Yes, they certainly have.

Soc. And just as the carpenter is able to exhibit his works and products, the righteous man should be able to expound and set forth his, should he not?

Soc. Just as a carpenter can show his work and products, a righteous man should be able to explain and present his own, shouldn't he?

I see (replied Euthydemus) you are afraid I cannot expound the works of righteousness! Why, bless me! of course I can, and the works of unrighteousness into the bargain, since there are not a few of that sort within reach of eye and ear every day.

“I see you’re afraid I can’t explain acts of righteousness,” Euthydemus replied. “Goodness! Of course I can. I can explain acts of unrighteousness too, because we see and hear plenty of those every day.”

Shall we then (proceeded Socrates) write the letter R on this side, ²⁶ and on that side the letter W; and then anything that appears to us to be the product of righteousness we will place to the R account, and anything which appears to be the product of wrong-doing and iniquity to the account of W?

Shall we write the letter R on this side, ²⁶ Socrates continued, and the letter W on the other side? Then we can put anything that seems to result from righteousness under R. And we can put anything that seems to result from wrongdoing and injustice under W.

By all means do so (he answered), if you think that it assists matters.

“Certainly,” he answered, “if you think it will help.”

Accordingly Socrates drew the letters, as he had suggested, and continued.

So Socrates drew the letters as he had suggested and continued.

Soc. Lying exists among men, does it not?

Soc. People lie, don't they?

Euth. Certainly.

Euth. Of course.

To which side of the account then shall we place it? (he asked).

Which side of the account should we put it on, then? he asked.

Euth. Clearly on the side of wrong and injustice.

Euth. Clearly on the side of wrongdoing and injustice.

Soc. Deceit too is not uncommon?

Soc. Deceit isn't uncommon either?

Euth. By no means.

Euth. Not at all.

Soc. To which side shall we place deceit?

Soc. Which side should we put deceit on?

Euth. Deceit clearly on the side of wrong.

Euth. Deceit is clearly wrong.

Soc. Well, and chicanery ²⁷ or mischief of any sort?

Soc. Well, what about deceit ²⁷ or any kind of mischief?

Euth. That too.

Euth. That too.

Soc. And the enslavement of free-born men? ²⁸

Soc. And what about enslaving men born free? ²⁸

Euth. That too.

Euth. That too.

Soc. And we cannot allow any of these to lie on the R side of the account, to the side of right and justice, can we, Euthydemus?

Soc. And we can't put any of these on the R side of the account, the side of right and justice, can we, Euthydemus?

It would be monstrous (he replied).

That would be terrible, he replied.

Soc. Very good. But supposing a man to be elected general, and he succeeds in enslaving an unjust, wicked, and hostile state, are we to say that he is doing wrong?

Soc. Very good. But suppose a man is elected general and succeeds in enslaving an unjust, wicked, and hostile state. Would we say he is doing wrong?

Euth. By no means.

Euth. Not at all.

Soc. Shall we not admit that he is doing what is right?

Soc. Shouldn't we admit that he is doing the right thing?

Euth. Certainly.

Euth. Certainly.

Soc. Again, suppose he deceives the foe while at war with them?

Soc. Again, suppose he deceives the enemy during a war?

Euth. That would be all fair and right also.

Euth. That would also be entirely fair and right.

Soc. Or steals and pillages their property? would he not be doing what is right?

Soc. Or steals and loots their property? Would he not be doing what is right?

Euth. Certainly; when you began I thought you were limiting the question to the case of friends.

Euth. Yes, of course. When you began, I thought you were asking only about friends.

Soc. So then everything which we set down on the side of Wrong will now have to be placed to the credit of Right?

Soc. So everything we put on the side of Wrong must now be put on the side of Right?

Euth. Apparently.

Euth. Apparently.

Soc. Very well then, let us so place them; and please, let us make a new definition—that while it is right to do such things to a foe, it is wrong to do them to a friend, but in dealing with the latter it behoves us to be as straightforward as possible. ²⁹

Soc. Very well, let us place them that way. And please, let us make a new definition. It is right to do such things to an enemy, but wrong to do them to a friend. Instead, we should be as straightforward as possible with a friend. ²⁹

I quite assent (replied Euthydemus).

I completely agree, replied Euthydemus.

So far so good (remarked Socrates); but if a general, seeing his troops demoralised, were to invent a tale to the effect that reinforcements were coming, and by means of this false statement should revive the courage of his men, to which of the two accounts shall we place that act of fraud? ³⁰

So far, so good, Socrates remarked. But suppose a general sees that his troops have lost heart and makes up a story that reinforcements are coming. If this false story restores his men’s courage, which of the two accounts should we put that act of deception in? ³⁰

On the side of right, to my notion (he replied).

On the side of what is right, I think (he replied).

Soc. Or again, if a man chanced to have a son ill and in need of medicine, which the child refused to take, and supposing the father by an act of deceit to administer it under the guise of something nice to eat, and by service of that lie to restore the boy to health, to which account shall we set down this fraud?

Soc. Or suppose a man has a sick son who needs medicine but refuses to take it. If the father tricks the boy into taking the medicine by disguising it as a treat, and the lie restores him to health, how should we classify this deception?

Euth. In my judgment it too should be placed to the same account.

Euth. I think it should be attributed to the same cause, too.

Soc. Well, supposing you have a friend in deplorably low spirits, and you are afraid he will make away with himself—accordingly you rob him of his knife or other such instrument: to which side ought we to set the theft?

Soc. Well, suppose a friend is in terribly low spirits, and you fear he will kill himself. So you take away his knife or another such object. Which side should we put the theft on?

Euth. That too must surely be placed to the score of right behaviour.

Euth. That too must surely count as right behavior.

Soc. I understand you to say that a straightforward course is not in every case to be pursued even in dealing with friends?

Soc. Do you mean that we should not always be straightforward, even with friends?

Heaven forbid! (the youth exclaimed). If you will allow me, I rescind my former statement. ³¹

“Heaven forbid!” the young man exclaimed. “If you’ll allow me, I take back what I said.” ³¹

Soc. Allow you! Of course you may—anything rather than make a false entry on our lists.... But there is just another point we ought not to leave uninvestigated. Let us take the case of deceiving a friend to his detriment: which is the more wrongful—to do so voluntarily or unintentionally?

Soc. Allow you? Of course you may. Anything rather than make a false entry on our lists.... But there is one more point we should examine. Suppose someone deceives a friend and harms them. Which is more wrongful: doing it deliberately or unintentionally?

Euth. Really, Socrates, I have ceased to believe in my own answers, for all my former admissions and conceptions seem to me other than I first supposed them. ³² Still, if I may hazard one more opinion, the intentional deceiver, I should say, is worse than the involuntary.

Euth. Really, Socrates, I no longer trust my own answers. All my earlier admissions and ideas seem different from what I first thought they were. ³² Still, if I may offer one more opinion, I would say that a deliberate deceiver is worse than an unintentional one.

Soc. And is it your opinion that there is a lore and science of Right and Justice just as there is of letters and grammar? ³³

Soc. And do you think right and justice can be studied, just like reading and grammar? ³³

Euth. That is my opinion.

Euth. That's what I think.

Soc. And which should you say was more a man of letters ³⁴—he who intentionally misspells or misreads, or he who does so unconsciously?

Soc. Which would you say is more literate ³⁴, someone who misspells or misreads on purpose, or someone who does so unknowingly?

Euth. He who does so intentionally, I should say, because he can spell or read correctly whenever he chooses.

Euth. I would say the person who does it intentionally, because he can spell or read correctly whenever he chooses.

Soc. Then the voluntary misspeller may be a lettered person, but the involuntary offender is an illiterate? ³⁵

Soc. So someone who misspells a word on purpose may be literate, but someone who does so unintentionally is illiterate? ³⁵

Euth. True, he must be. I do not see how to escape from that conclusion.

Euth. Yes, he must be. I don't see how I can reach any other conclusion.

Soc. And which of the two knows what is right—he who intentionally lies and deceives, or he who lies and deceives unconsciously? ³⁶

Soc. Which of the two knows what is right: the person who lies and deceives on purpose, or the person who does so without knowing it? ³⁶

Euth. The intentional and conscious liar clearly.

Euth. Clearly, the person who lies knowingly and deliberately.

Soc. Well then, your statement is this: on the one hand, the man who has the knowledge of letters is more lettered than he who has no such knowledge? ³⁷

Soc. So, on the one hand, you are saying that someone who knows how to read and write is more literate than someone who does not? ³⁷

Euth. Yes.

Euth. Yes.

Soc. And, on the other, he who has the knowledge of what is right is more righteous than he who lacks that knowledge?

Soc. And on the other hand, is someone who knows what is right more righteous than someone who does not?

Euth. I suppose it is, but for the life of me I cannot make head or tail of my own admission. ³⁸

Euth. I suppose it is, but I just can't make sense of what I admitted. ³⁸

Soc. Well (look at it like this). Suppose a man to be anxious to speak the truth, but he is never able to hold the same language about a thing for two minutes together. First he says: "The road is towards the east," and then he says, "No, it's towards the west"; or, running up a column of figures, now he makes the product this, and again he makes it that, now more, now less—what do you think of such a man?

Soc. Well, look at it this way. Suppose a man wants to tell the truth, but can never stick to the same account for two minutes. First he says, "The road goes east," and then he says, "No, it goes west." Or he adds up a column of figures and gets one total, then another, sometimes more, sometimes less. What do you think of such a man?

Euth. Heaven help us! clearly he does not know what he thought he knew.

Euth. Heaven help us! Clearly, he doesn't know what he thought he knew.

Soc. And you know the appellation given to certain people—"slavish," ³⁹ or, "little better than a slave?"

Soc. And you know the names given to certain people: "slavish," ³⁹ or "little better than a slave?"

Euth. I do.

Euth. I do.

Soc. Is it a term suggestive of the wisdom or the ignorance of those to whom it is applied?

Soc. Does the term suggest that the people it describes are wise or ignorant?

Euth. Clearly of their ignorance.

Euth. Clearly, of their ignorance.

Soc. Ignorance, for instance, of smithying?

Soc. Not knowing how to work metal, for example?

Euth. No, certainly not.

Euth. No, not at all.

Soc. Then possibly ignorance of carpentering?

Soc. Then perhaps not knowing how to do carpentry?

Euth. No, nor yet ignorance of carpentering.

Euth. No, nor is it ignorance of carpentry.

Soc. Well, ignorance of shoemaking?

Soc. Well, what about not knowing how to make shoes?

Euth. No, nor ignorance of any of these: rather the reverse, for the majority of those who do know just these matters are "little better than slaves."

Euth. No, nor is it ignorance of any of these things. In fact, the opposite is true. Most people who do know these things are "little better than slaves."

Soc. You mean it is a title particularly to those who are ignorant of the beautiful, the good, the just? ⁴⁰

Soc. You mean this title applies particularly to those who do not know what is beautiful, good, and just? ⁴⁰

It is, in my opinion (he replied).

I think it is, he replied.

Soc. Then we must in every way strain every nerve to avoid the imputation of being slaves?

Soc. Then we must do everything we can to avoid being thought of as slaves?

Euth. Nay, Socrates, by all that is holy, I did flatter myself that at any rate I was a student of philosophy, and on the right road to be taught everything essential to one who would fain make beauty and goodness his pursuit. ⁴¹ So that now you may well imagine my despair when, for all my pains expended, I cannot even answer the questions put to me about what most of all a man should know; and there is no path of progress open to me, no avenue of improvement left.

Euth. No, Socrates, I swear by all that is holy, I thought I was at least a student of philosophy. I thought I was on the right path to learning everything essential for someone who wants to pursue beauty and goodness. ⁴¹ So you can imagine my despair. Despite all my efforts, I cannot even answer questions about what a person should know above all else. And no path forward is open to me, no way to improve is left.

Thereupon Socrates: Tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever been to Delphi?

Then Socrates said: Tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever been to Delphi?

Yes, certainly; twice (said he).

Yes, certainly, twice, he said.

Soc. And did you notice an inscription somewhere on the temple: {GNOMI SEAUTON}—KNOW THYSELF?

Soc. And did you notice an inscription somewhere on the temple: {GNOMI SEAUTON}, KNOW YOURSELF?

Euth. I did.

Euth. I did.

Soc. Did you, possibly, pay no regard to the inscription? or did you give it heed and try to discover who and what you were?

Soc. Did you perhaps ignore the inscription? Or did you pay attention to it and try to discover who and what you were?

I can safely say I did not (he answered). That much I made quite sure I knew, at any rate; since if I did not know even myself, what in the world did I know?

I can safely say I did not, he answered. At least I made sure I knew myself. If I didn't even know myself, what on earth did I know?

Soc. Can a man be said, do you think, to know himself who knows his own name and nothing more? or must he not rather set to work precisely like the would-be purchaser of a horse, who certainly does not think that he has got the knowledge he requires until he has discovered whether the beast is tractable or stubborn, strong or weak, quick or slow, and how it stands with the other points, serviceable or the reverse, in reference to the use and purpose of a horse? So, I say, must a man in like manner interrogate his own nature in reference to a man's requirements, and learn to know his own capacities, must he not?

Soc. Do you think a man knows himself if he knows only his own name? Or must he instead act like someone who wants to buy a horse? A buyer certainly does not think he knows enough until he has examined the horse. He needs to know whether it is easy to handle or stubborn, strong or weak, fast or slow. He also needs to know how well suited it is in other ways to the uses and purposes of a horse. So must a man likewise examine his own nature in light of what is required of a man? Must he learn to know his own abilities?

Euth. Yes, so it strikes me: he who knows not his own ability knows not himself.

Euth. Yes, that seems right to me: anyone who doesn't know their own abilities doesn't know themselves.

Soc. And this too is plain, is it not: that through self-knowledge men meet with countless blessings, and through ignorance of themselves with many evils? Because, the man who knows himself knows what is advantageous to himself; he discerns the limits of his powers, and by doing what he knows, he provides himself with what he needs and so does well; or, conversely, by holding aloof from what he knows not, he avoids mistakes and thereby mishaps. And having now a test to gauge other human beings he uses their need as a stepping-stone to provide himself with good and to avoid evil. Whereas he who does not know himself, but is mistaken as to his own capacity, is in like predicament to the rest of mankind and all human matters else; he neither knows what he wants, nor what he is doing, nor the people whom he deals with; and being all abroad in these respects, he misses what is good and becomes involved in what is ill.

Soc. And isn’t this clear too? Through self-knowledge, people gain countless blessings, while ignorance of themselves brings them many troubles. For a person who knows himself knows what is good for him and recognizes the limits of his abilities. By doing what he knows how to do, he provides for his needs and prospers. Conversely, by staying away from what he does not know, he avoids mistakes and the troubles they bring. Self-knowledge also gives him a way to judge other people. He uses their needs as a stepping-stone to gain what is good for himself and avoid what is harmful. But a person who does not know himself and is mistaken about his own abilities is similarly mistaken about other people and human affairs. He knows neither what he wants, nor what he is doing, nor the people he deals with. Because he is confused about all these things, he misses out on what is good and becomes involved in what is harmful.

Again, he that knows what he is doing through the success of his performance attains to fame and honour; his peers and co-mates are glad to make use of him, whilst his less successful neighbours, failing in their affairs, are anxious to secure his advice, his guidance, his protection; ⁴² they place their hopes of happiness in him, and for all these causes ⁴³ single him out as the chief object of their affection. He, on the contrary, who knows not what he does, who chooses amiss and fails in what he puts his hands to, not only incurs loss and suffers chastisement through his blunders, but step by step loses reputation and becomes a laughing-stock, and in the end is doomed to a life of dishonour and contempt.

Again, a person who knows what he is doing gains fame and honor through his success. His peers and companions are glad to make use of his skills. Less successful neighbors, when their affairs go badly, are eager to secure his advice, guidance, and protection. ⁴² They place their hopes of happiness in him. For all these reasons, ⁴³ they single him out as the person they love most. By contrast, a person who does not know what he is doing makes poor choices and fails in his undertakings. His mistakes not only cause him loss and punishment, but gradually ruin his reputation. He becomes a laughingstock and is eventually doomed to a life of dishonor and contempt.

What is true of individuals is true also of communities. ⁴⁴ That state which in ignorance of its power goes to war with a stronger than itself ends by being uprooted or else reduced to slavery.

What is true of individuals is also true of communities. ⁴⁴ A state that goes to war with a stronger state, unaware of its own power, ends up uprooted or enslaved.

Thereupon Euthydemus: Be assured I fully concur in your opinion; the precept KNOW THYSELF cannot be too highly valued; but what is the application? What the starting-point of self-examination? I look to you for an explanation, if you would kindly give one. ⁴⁵

Euthydemus then said: You can be sure I completely agree with you. The advice KNOW THYSELF cannot be valued too highly. But how does one apply it? Where does self-examination begin? I hope you will explain, if you would be kind enough to do so. ⁴⁵

Well (replied Socrates), I presume you know quite well the distinction between good and bad things: your knowledge may be relied upon so far?

Well, Socrates replied, I assume you know the difference between good and bad things quite well. Can I rely on your knowledge at least that far?

Why, yes, to be sure (replied the youth); for without that much discernment I should indeed be worse than any slave. ⁴⁶

“Yes, of course,” the young man replied. “Without that much judgment, I would be worse than any slave.” ⁴⁶

Come then (said he), do you give me an explanation of the things so termed.

“Then,” he said, “explain to me what these things mean.”

That is fortunately not hard (replied the youth). First of all, health in itself I hold to be a good, and disease in itself an evil; and in the next place the sources of either of those aforenamed, meats and drinks, and habits of life, ⁴⁷ I regard as good or evil according as they contribute either to health or to disease.

Fortunately, that is not hard, replied the young man. First, I believe health is good in itself, and disease is evil in itself. Next, I regard the sources of health and disease, food, drink, and habits of life, ⁴⁷ as good or evil according to whether they contribute to health or disease.

Soc. Then health and disease themselves when they prove to be sources of any good are good, but when of any evil, evil?

Soc. So health and disease are good when they lead to something good, but evil when they lead to something evil?

And when (asked he), can health be a source of evil, or disease a source of good?

And when, he asked, can health be a source of evil, or disease a source of good?

Why, bless me! often enough (replied Socrates). In the event, for instance, of some ill-starred expedition or of some disastrous voyage or other incident of the sort, of which veritably there are enough to spare—when those who owing to their health and strength take a part in the affair are lost; whilst those who were left behind—as hors de combat, on account of ill-health of other feebleness—are saved.

“Why, goodness! Often enough,” Socrates replied. “Take an ill-fated expedition, a disastrous voyage, or some other such incident. There are certainly more than enough of them. Those who are healthy and strong enough to take part are killed. But those who are left behind because of illness or other weakness are saved.”

Euth. Yes, you are right; but you will admit that there are advantages to be got from strength and lost through weakness.

Euth. Yes, you are right. But you will admit that strength brings advantages, and weakness can cost you those advantages.

Soc. Even so; but ought we to regard those things which at one moment benefit and at another moment injure us in any strict sense good rather than evil?

Soc. Yes. But should we really call things good rather than evil if they help us at one moment and harm us at another?

Euth. No, certainly not, according to that line of argument. But wisdom, ⁴⁸ Socrates, you must on your side admit, is irrefragably a good; since there is nothing which or in which a wise man would not do better than a fool.

Euth. No, certainly not, according to that argument. But Socrates, you must admit that wisdom, ⁴⁸ for its part, is unquestionably good. A wise man would do better than a fool in anything and in any situation.

Soc. What say you? Have you never heard of Daedalus, ⁴⁹ how he was seized by Minos on account of his wisdom, and forced to be his slave, and robbed of fatherland and freedom at one swoop? and how, while endeavouring to make his escape with his son, he caused the boy's death without effecting his own salvation, but was carried off among barbarians and again enslaved?

Soc. What do you say? Haven't you heard of Daedalus, ⁴⁹ whom Minos seized for his wisdom and forced into slavery? Minos deprived him of his homeland and freedom at once. And when Daedalus tried to escape with his son, he caused the boy's death without saving himself. Instead, he was carried off among barbarians and enslaved again.

Yes, I know the old story (he answered). ⁵⁰

Yes, I know the old story, he replied. ⁵⁰

Soc. Or have you not heard of the "woes of Palamedes," ⁵¹ that commonest theme of song, how for his wisdom's sake Odysseus envied him and slew him?

Soc. Or haven't you heard of the "woes of Palamedes," ⁵¹ the most common theme of songs? They tell how Odysseus envied Palamedes for his wisdom and killed him.

Euth. That tale also is current.

Euth. That story is also widely told.

Soc. And how many others, pray, do you suppose have been seized on account of their wisdom, and despatched to the great king and at his court enslaved? ⁵²

Soc. And how many others do you suppose have been seized because of their wisdom, sent to the great king, and enslaved at his court? ⁵²

Well, prosperity, well-being ⁵³ (he exclaimed), must surely be a blessing, and that the most indisputable, Socrates?

Well, prosperity, well-being ⁵³, he exclaimed, must surely be a blessing. And it must be the most indisputable blessing, Socrates?

It might be so (replied the philosopher) if it chanced not to be in itself a compound of other questionable blessings.

That might be so, the philosopher replied, if it were not itself made up of other questionable blessings.

Euth. And which among the components of happiness and well-being can possibly be questionable?

Euth. And which part of happiness and well-being could possibly be questionable?

None (he retorted), unless of course we are to include among these components beauty, or strength, or wealth, or reputation, or anything else of that kind?

None, he retorted, unless we count beauty, strength, wealth, reputation, or anything else of that kind as components.

Euth. By heaven! of course we are to include these, for what would happiness be without these?

Euth. Good heavens! Of course we must include these. What would happiness be without them?

Soc. By heaven! yes; only then we shall be including the commonest sources of mischief which befall mankind. How many are ruined by their fair faces at the hand of admirers driven to distraction ⁵⁴ by the sight of beauty in its bloom! how many, tempted by their strength to essay deeds beyond their power, are involved in no small evils! how many, rendered effeminate by reason of their wealth, have been plotted against and destroyed! ⁵⁵ how many through fame and political power have suffered a world of woe!

Soc. By heaven, yes! Only then will we include the most common sources of trouble that befall people. How many are ruined because of their good looks, at the hands of admirers driven wild ⁵⁴ by youthful beauty! How many are tempted by their strength to attempt things beyond their ability and suffer serious harm! How many have been plotted against and destroyed because wealth made them soft! ⁵⁵ How many have suffered terribly because of fame and political power!

Well (the youth replied) if I am not even right in praising happiness, I must confess I know not for what one ought to supplicate the gods in prayer. ⁵⁶

“Well,” the young man replied, “if I’m not even right to praise happiness, I admit I don’t know what to ask the gods for in prayer.” ⁵⁶

Nay, these are matters (proceeded Socrates) which perhaps, through excessive confidence in your knowledge of them, you have failed to examine into; but since the state, which you are preparing yourself to direct, is democratically constituted, ⁵⁷ of course you know what a democracy is.

“No,” Socrates continued, “perhaps you have not examined these matters because you are too confident that you understand them. But the state you are preparing to govern is a democracy, ⁵⁷ so of course you know what a democracy is.”

Euth. I presume I do, decidedly.

Euth. I think I do, definitely.

Soc. Well, now, is it possible to know what a popular state is without knowing who the people are?

Soc. Well, can you know what a democracy is without knowing who the people are?

Euth. Certainly not.

Euth. Certainly not.

Soc. And whom do you consider to be the people?

Soc. And who do you think the people are?

Euth. The poor citizens, I should say.

Euth. I would say the poor citizens.

Soc. Then you know who the poor are, of course?

Soc. Then, of course, you know who the poor are?

Euth. Of course I do.

Euth. Of course I do.

Soc. I presume you also know who the rich are?

Soc. I suppose you also know who the rich are?

Euth. As certainly as I know who are the poor.

Euth. Just as surely as I know who the poor are.

Soc. Whom do you understand by poor and rich?

Soc. Who do you consider poor, and who do you consider rich?

Euth. By poor I mean those who have not enough to pay for their necessaries, ⁵⁸ and by rich those who have more means than sufficient for all their needs.

Euth. By poor, I mean those who cannot afford basic necessities. ⁵⁸ By rich, I mean those who have more than enough for all their needs.

Soc. Have you noticed that some who possess a mere pittance not only find this sufficient, but actually succeed in getting a surplus out of it; while others do not find a large fortune large enough?

Soc. Have you noticed that some people have very little, yet not only find it enough but even save some? Others have a large fortune but still don't find it enough.

I have, most certainly; and I thank you for the reminder (replied Euthydemus). One has heard of crowned heads and despotic rulers being driven by want to commit misdeeds like the veriest paupers.

I certainly have, and thank you for reminding me, Euthydemus replied. People have heard of kings and despotic rulers driven by need to do wrong, just like the poorest beggars.

Then, if that is how matters stand (continued Socrates), we must class these same crowned heads with the commonalty; and some possessors of scant fortunes, provided they are good economists, with the wealthy?

Then, if that is how things stand, Socrates continued, must we class these same kings with ordinary people? And must we count some people with small fortunes as wealthy, provided they manage their money well?

Then Euthydemus: It is the poverty of my own wit which forces me to this admission. I bethink me it is high time to keep silence altogether; a little more, and I shall be proved to know absolutely nothing. And so he went away crestfallen, in an agony of self-contempt, persuaded that he was verily and indeed no better than a slave.

Then Euthydemus said: My own lack of intelligence forces me to admit this. I think it is time for me to stop speaking altogether. If I say much more, I will be shown to know absolutely nothing. And so he went away crestfallen, in an agony of self-contempt, convinced that he really was no better than a slave.

Amongst those who were reduced to a like condition by Socrates, many refused to come near him again, whom he for his part looked upon as dolts and dullards. ⁵⁹ But Euthydemus had the wit to understand that, in order to become worthy of account, his best plan was to associate as much as possible with Socrates; and from that moment, save for some necessity, he never left him—in some points even imitating him in his habits and pursuits. Socrates, on his side, seeing that this was the young man's disposition, disturbed him as little as possible, but in the simplest and plainest manner initiated him into everything which he held to be needful to know or important to practise.

Many others whom Socrates had reduced to a similar condition refused to go near him again. For his part, Socrates regarded them as fools and dullards. ⁵⁹ But Euthydemus was wise enough to understand that his best chance of becoming someone worthy of respect was to spend as much time as possible with Socrates. From that moment on, he never left Socrates unless he had to. He even copied some of Socrates' habits and pursuits. Socrates saw the young man's attitude and troubled him as little as possible. Instead, he taught Euthydemus, as simply and clearly as he could, everything he thought necessary to know or important to practice.