Book 3, Chapter 8

Once when Aristippus ¹ set himself to subject Socrates to a cross-examination, such as he had himself undergone at the hands of Socrates on a former occasion, ² Socrates, being minded to benefit those who were with him, gave his answers less in the style of a debater guarding against perversions of his argument, than of a man persuaded of the supreme importance of right conduct. ³

Once, Aristippus ¹ set out to cross-examine Socrates, just as Socrates had cross-examined him before. ² Socrates wanted to benefit those with him. So he answered less like a debater guarding against distortions of his argument and more like someone convinced that right conduct was of the greatest importance. ³

Aristippus asked him "if he knew of anything good," ⁴ intending in case he assented and named any particular good thing, like food or drink, or wealth, or health, or strength, or courage, to point out that the thing named was sometimes bad. But he, knowing that if a thing troubles us, we immediately want that which will put an end to our trouble, answered precisely as it was best to do. ⁵

Aristippus asked him "if he knew of anything good." ⁴ If he agreed and named something good, Aristippus intended to show that it was sometimes bad. For example, he might name food, drink, wealth, health, strength, or courage. But he knew that when something troubles us, we immediately want whatever will end our trouble. So he gave exactly the answer best suited to the question. ⁵

Soc. Do I understand you to ask me whether I know anything good for fever?

Soc. Are you asking if I know anything that helps with a fever?

No (he replied), that is not my question.

No, he replied, that's not my question.

Soc. Then for inflammation of the eyes?

Soc. And for inflamed eyes?

Aristip. No, nor yet that.

Aristip. No, not that either.

Soc. Well then, for hunger?

Soc. All right, what about hunger?

Aristip. No, nor yet for hunger.

Aristip. No, nor for hunger.

Well, but (answered Socrates) if you ask me whether I know of any good thing which is good for nothing, I neither know of it nor want to know.

“Well, but,” Socrates replied, “if you ask whether I know of anything good that is good for nothing, I don’t. And I don’t want to.”

And when Aristippus, returning to the charge, asked him "if he knew of any thing beautiful."

And when Aristippus pressed him again, asking "if he knew of anything beautiful."

He answered: Yes, many things.

He replied: Yes, many things.

Aristip. Are they all like each other?

Aristip. Are they all alike?

Soc. On the contrary, they are often as unlike as possible.

Soc. In fact, they are often as different as possible.

How then (he asked) can that be beautiful which is unlike the beautiful?

“How, then,” he asked, “can something be beautiful if it is unlike what is beautiful?”

Soc. Bless me! for the simple reason that it is possible for a man who is a beautiful runner to be quite unlike another man who is a beautiful boxer, ⁶ or for a shield, which is a beautiful weapon for the purpose of defence, to be absolutely unlike a javelin, which is a beautiful weapon of swift and sure discharge.

Soc. Good heavens! A man who is a beautiful runner can be quite unlike a man who is a beautiful boxer. ⁶ Likewise, a shield is a beautiful weapon for defense, yet it is completely unlike a javelin, a beautiful weapon for swift and accurate throwing.

Aristip. Your answers are no better now than ⁷ when I asked you whether you knew any good thing. They are both of a pattern.

Aristip. Your answers are no better now than ⁷ when I asked if you knew anything good. Both answers are alike.

Soc. And so they should be. Do you imagine that one thing is good and another beautiful? Do not you know that relatively to the same standard all things are at once beautiful and good? ⁸ In the first place, virtue is not a good thing relatively to one standard and a beautiful thing relatively to another standard; and in the next place, human beings, on the same principle ⁹ and relatively to the same standard, are called "beautiful and good"; and so the bodily frames of men relatively to the same standards are seen to be "beautiful and good," and in general all things capable of being used by man are regarded as at once beautiful and good relatively to the same standard—the standing being in each case what the thing happens to be useful for. ¹⁰

Soc. And so they should be. Do you think that one thing is good and another is beautiful? Don't you know that, by the same standard, all things are both beautiful and good? ⁸ First, virtue is not good by one standard and beautiful by another. Second, on the same principle ⁹ and by the same standard, human beings are called "beautiful and good." Men's bodies, too, are seen as "beautiful and good" by the same standards. In general, everything people can use is considered both beautiful and good by the same standard. In each case, the standard is what the thing is useful for. ¹⁰

Aristip. Then I presume even a basket for carrying dung ¹¹ is a beautiful thing?

Aristip. Then I suppose even a basket for carrying dung ¹¹ is beautiful?

Soc. To be sure, and a spear of gold an ugly thing, if for their respective uses—the former is well and the latter ill adapted.

Soc. Of course. A golden spear can be ugly, too, if the former is well suited to its use and the latter is not.

Aristip. Do you mean to assert that the same things may be beautiful and ugly?

Aristip. Are you saying that the same things can be beautiful and ugly?

Soc. Yes, to be sure; and by the same showing things may be good and bad: as, for instance, what is good for hunger may be bad for fever, and what is good for fever bad for hunger; or again, what is beautiful for wrestling is often ugly for running; and in general everything is good and beautiful when well adapted for the end in view, bad and ugly when ill adapted for the same.

Soc. Yes, of course. By the same reasoning, things may be both good and bad. For example, what is good for hunger may be bad for fever, and what is good for fever may be bad for hunger. Likewise, what is beautiful for wrestling is often ugly for running. In general, everything is good and beautiful when well suited to its purpose, and bad and ugly when poorly suited to it.

Similarly when he spoke about houses, ¹² and argued that "the same house must be at once beautiful and useful"—I could not help feeling that he was giving a good lesson on the problem: "how a house ought to be built." He investigated the matter thus:

Similarly, when he spoke about houses, ¹² he argued that "the same house must be both beautiful and useful." I felt he was giving a good lesson on "how a house should be built." He explored the question like this:

Soc. "Do you admit that any one purposing to build a perfect house ¹³ will plan to make it at once as pleasant and as useful to live in as possible?" and that point being admitted, ¹⁴ the next question would be:

Soc. "Do you agree that anyone planning to build a perfect house ¹³ will make it as pleasant and useful to live in as possible?" Once this was agreed, ¹⁴ the next question would be:

"It is pleasant to have one's house cool in summer and warm in winter, is it not?" and this proposition also having obtained assent, "Now, supposing a house to have a southern aspect, sunshine during winter will steal in under the verandah, ¹⁵ but in summer, when the sun traverses a path right over our heads, the roof will afford an agreeable shade, will it not? If, then, such an arrangement is desirable, the southern side of a house should be built higher to catch the rays of the winter sun, and the northern side lower to prevent the cold winds finding ingress; in a word, it is reasonable to suppose that the pleasantest and most beautiful dwelling place will be one in which the owner can at all seasons of the year find the pleasantest retreat, and stow away his goods with the greatest security."

"Isn't it pleasant to have a house that is cool in summer and warm in winter?" When this point was agreed to, he continued, "Now, suppose a house faces south. In winter, sunlight will reach under the veranda, ¹⁵ but in summer, when the sun passes directly overhead, the roof will provide pleasant shade, won't it? If this arrangement is desirable, the south side of the house should be built higher to catch the winter sunlight. The north side should be lower to keep out the cold winds. In short, it's reasonable to suppose that the most pleasant and beautiful home will provide its owner with the most pleasant retreat in every season and the greatest security for storing belongings."

Paintings ¹⁶ and ornamental mouldings are apt (he said) to deprive one of more joy ¹⁷ than they confer.

He said that paintings ¹⁶ and decorative moldings tend to take away more joy ¹⁷ than they give.

The fittest place for a temple or an altar (he maintained) was some site visible from afar, and untrodden by foot of man: ¹⁸ since it was a glad thing for the worshipper to lift up his eyes afar off and offer up his orison; glad also to wend his way peaceful to prayer unsullied. ¹⁹

He maintained that the best place for a temple or an altar was somewhere visible from far away and untouched by human feet. ¹⁸ For a worshipper was glad to look up from afar and offer a prayer. It was also a joy to make the peaceful journey to prayer without becoming defiled. ¹⁹