Book 2, Chapter 6

Again, in reference to the test to be applied, if we would gauge the qualifications of a friend worth the winning, the following remarks of Socrates could not fail, I think, to prove instructive. ¹

Socrates also offered advice on how to judge whether someone would be worth having as a friend. I think his remarks are sure to be helpful. ¹

Tell me (said Socrates, addressing Critobulus), supposing we stood in need of a good friend, how should we set about his discovery? We must, in the first place, I suppose, seek out one who is master of his appetites, not under the dominion, that is, of his belly, not addicted to the wine-cup or to lechery or sleep or idleness, since no one enslaved to such tyrants could hope to do his duty either by himself or by his friends, could he?

Tell me, said Socrates to Critobulus, if we needed a good friend, how would we find one? First, I suppose, we should look for someone who controls his appetites. He should not be ruled by his stomach or addicted to drink, lust, sleep, or idleness. For no one enslaved to such tyrants could hope to do his duty to himself or his friends, could he?

Certainly not (Critobulus answered).

Certainly not, Critobulus answered.

Soc. Do you agree, then, that we must hold aloof from every one so dominated?

Soc. Do you agree, then, that we must stay away from everyone so dominated?

Cri. Most assuredly.

Cri. Absolutely.

Well then (proceeded Socrates), what shall we say of the spendthrift who has lost his independence and is for ever begging of his neighbours; if he gets anything out of them he cannot repay, but if he fails to get anything, he hates you for not giving—do you not think that this man too would prove but a disagreeable friend?

“Well then,” Socrates continued, “what shall we say about the spendthrift who has lost his independence and is always begging from his neighbors? If he gets anything from them, he cannot repay them. But if he gets nothing, he hates you for not giving him anything. Don’t you think he would be an unpleasant friend too?”

Cri. Certainly.

Cri. Of course.

Soc. Then we must keep away from him too?

Soc. Then we must stay away from him too?

Cri. That we must.

Cri. We must do that.

Soc. Well! and what of the man whose strength lies in monetary transactions? ² His one craving is to amass money; and for that reason he is an adept at driving a hard bargain ³—glad enough to take in, but loath to pay out.

Soc. Well, what about the man whose strength is in money matters? ² All he wants is to accumulate money. So he is skilled at driving a hard bargain ³. He is happy to take money in, but reluctant to pay it out.

Cri. In my opinion he will prove even a worse fellow than the last.

Cri. I think he will turn out to be even worse than the last one.

Soc. Well! and what of that other whose passion for money-making is so absorbing that he has no leisure for anything else, save how he may add to his gains?

Soc. Well! What about the other man? He is so absorbed in making money that he has no time for anything else but finding ways to make more.

Cri. Hold aloof from him, say I, since there is no good to be got out of him or his society.

Cri. I say stay away from him, because no good can come from him or his company.

Soc. Well! what of the quarrelsome and factious person ⁴ whose main object is to saddle his friends with a host of enemies?

Soc. Well, what about the person who stirs up arguments and divisions ⁴, whose main aim is to burden his friends with many enemies?

Cri. For God's sake let us avoid him also.

Cri. For God's sake, let's avoid him too.

Soc. But now we will imagine a man exempt indeed from all the above defects—a man who has no objection to receive kindnesses, but it never enters into his head to do a kindness in return.

Soc. But now let us imagine a man who has none of the defects mentioned above. He is happy to accept kindness, but it never occurs to him to return it.

Cri. There will be no good in him either. But, Socrates, what kind of man shall we endeavour to make our friend? what is he like?

Cri. He won't be any good either. But, Socrates, what kind of man should we try to make our friend? What is he like?

Soc. I should say he must be just the converse of the above: he has control over the pleasures of the body, he is kindly disposed, ⁵ upright in all his dealings, ⁶ very zealous is he not to be outdone in kindness by his benefactors, if only his friends may derive some profit from his acquaintance.

Soc. I would say he must be the exact opposite of the person described above. He controls his bodily pleasures, is kind, ⁵ and is honest in all his dealings. ⁶ He is eager not to be outdone in kindness by those who have helped him, if only his friends may benefit from knowing him.

Cri. But how are we to test these qualities, Socrates, before acquaintance?

Cri. But how can we test these qualities, Socrates, before getting to know someone?

Soc. How do we test the merits of a sculptor?—not by inferences drawn from the talk of the artist merely. No, we look to what he has already achieved. These former statues of his were nobly executed, and we trust he will do equally well with the rest.

Soc. How do we judge a sculptor’s skill? We do not judge it merely by what the artist says. No, we look at what he has already made. His earlier statues were beautifully made, so we trust him to do just as well with the rest.

Cri. You mean that if we find a man whose kindness to older friends is established, we may take it as proved that he will treat his newer friends as amiably?

Cri. Do you mean that if a man has shown kindness to old friends, we can take it as proof that he will be just as kind to new friends?

Soc. Why, certainly, if I see a man who has shown skill in the handling of horses previously, I argue that he will handle others no less skilfully again.

Soc. Certainly, if I see a man who has handled horses skillfully before, I reason that he will handle other horses just as skillfully.

Cri. Good! and when we have discovered a man whose friendship is worth having, how ought we to make him our friend?

Cri. Good! When we find a man whose friendship is worth having, how should we make him our friend?

Soc. First we ought to ascertain the will of Heaven whether it be advisable to make him our friend.

Soc. First, we should find out whether Heaven thinks we should make him our friend.

Cri. Well! and how are we to effect the capture of this friend of our choice, whom the gods approve? will you tell me that?

Cri. Well, how can we win over the friend we have chosen, the one the gods approve of? Can you tell me?

Not, in good sooth (replied Socrates), by running him down like a hare, nor by decoying him like a bird, or by force like a wild boar. ⁷ To capture a friend against his will is a toilsome business, and to bind him in fetters like a slave by no means easy. Those who are so treated are apt to become foes instead of friends. ⁸

“Certainly not,” Socrates replied, “by chasing him down like a hare, luring him like a bird, or capturing him by force like a wild boar. ⁷ Capturing a friend against his will is hard work. It is no easier to bind him in chains like a slave. People treated this way are likely to become enemies rather than friends. ⁸”

Cri. But how convert them into friends?

Cri. But how can I turn them into friends?

Soc. There are certain incantations, we are told, which those who know them have only to utter, and they can make friends of whom they list; and there are certain philtres also which those who have the secret of them may administer to whom they like and win their love.

Soc. We are told that certain spells can make anyone a friend. Those who know the spells need only say them. There are also love potions. Those who know their secret can give them to anyone and win that person's love.

Cri. From what source shall we learn them?

Cri. Where can we learn them?

Soc. You need not go farther than Homer to learn that which the Sirens sang to Odysseus, ⁹ the first words of which run, I think, as follows:

Soc. You only need to look at Homer to learn what the Sirens sang to Odysseus. ⁹ I think their song begins like this:

Cri. And did the magic words of this spell serve for all men alike? Had the Sirens only to utter this one incantation, and was every listener constrained to stay?

Cri. Did the magic words of this spell work the same way on all men? Did the Sirens only have to say this one incantation to make every listener stay?

Soc. No; this was the incantation reserved for souls athirst for fame, of virtue emulous.

Soc. No. This was the spell reserved for souls hungry for fame and eager to be virtuous.

Cri. Which is as much as to say, we must suit the incantation to the listener, so that when he hears the words he shall not think that the enchanter is laughing at him in his sleeve. I cannot certainly conceive a method better calculated to excite hatred and repulsion than to go to some one who knows that he is small and ugly and a weakling, and to breathe in his ears the flattering tale that he is beautiful and tall and stalwart. But do you know any other love-charms, Socrates?

Cri. In other words, we must tailor the incantation to the listener. When he hears the words, he must not think the enchanter is secretly laughing at him. I can hardly imagine a better way to provoke hatred and disgust than to flatter someone who knows he is short, ugly, and weak. Tell him he is handsome, tall, and strong, and that is what you will get. But do you know any other love-charms, Socrates?

Soc. I cannot say that I do; but I have heard that Pericles ¹⁰ was skilled in not a few, which he poured into the ear of our city and won her love.

Soc. I can’t say I do. But I’ve heard that Pericles ¹⁰ was skilled in quite a few. He poured them into our city’s ear and won her love.

Cri. And how did Themistocles ¹¹ win our city's love?

Cri. And how did Themistocles ¹¹ win the love of our city?

Soc. Ah, that was not by incantation at all. What he did was to encircle our city with an amulet of saving virtue. ¹²

Soc. Ah, that was not done by a magic spell at all. He surrounded our city with a protective amulet. ¹²

Cri. You would imply, Socrates, would you not, that if we want to win the love of any good man we need to be good ourselves in speech and action?

Cri. Socrates, are you saying that if we want to win the love of a good man, we must be good in what we say and do?

And did you imagine (replied Socrates) that it was possible for a bad man to make good friends?

And did you think a bad man could make good friends? Socrates replied.

Cri. Why, I could fancy I had seen some sorry speech-monger who was fast friends with a great and noble statesman; or again, some born commander and general who was boon companion with fellows quite incapable of generalship. ¹³

Cri. Well, I can imagine seeing a poor speaker who was close friends with a great and noble statesman. Or a born commander and general who was good friends with men completely incapable of leading an army. ¹³

Soc. But in reference to the point we were discussing, may I ask whether you know of any one who can attach a useful friend to himself without being of use in return? ¹⁴ Can service ally in friendship with disservice?

Soc. But returning to our discussion, may I ask if you know anyone who can gain a useful friend without being useful in return? ¹⁴ Can helping and harming go together in friendship?

Cri. In good sooth no. But now, granted it is impossible for a base man to be friends with the beautiful and noble, ¹⁴ I am concerned at once to discover if one who is himself of a beautiful and noble character can, with a wave of the hand, as it were, attach himself in friendship to every other beautiful and noble nature.

Cri. Certainly not. But let us grant that a base man cannot be friends with the good and noble. ¹⁴ I want to know at once whether a good and noble person can become friends with every other good and noble person, as if by a wave of the hand.

Soc. What perplexes and confounds you, Critobulus, is the fact that so often men of noble conduct, with souls aloof from baseness, are not friends but rather at strife and discord with one another, and deal more harshly by one another than they would by the most good-for-nothing of mankind.

Soc. What puzzles and confuses you, Critobulus, is how often honorable men who reject all that is base are not friends. Instead, they quarrel and disagree, and treat each other more harshly than they would treat the most worthless people.

Cri. Yes, and this holds true not of private persons only, but states, the most eager to pursue a noble policy and to repudiate a base one, are frequently in hostile relation to one another. As I reason on these things my heart fails me, and the question, how friends are to be acquired, fills me with despondency. The bad, as I see, cannot be friends with one another. For how can such people, the ungrateful, or reckless, or covetous, or faithless, or incontinent, adhere together as friends? Without hesitation I set down the bad as born to be foes not friends, and as bearing the birthmark of internecine hate. But then again, as you suggest, no more can these same people harmonise in friendship with the good. For how should they who do evil be friends with those who hate all evil-doing? And if, last of all, they that cultivate virtue are torn by party strife in their struggle for the headship of the states, envying one another, hating one another, who are left to be friends? where shall goodwill and faithfulness be found among men?

Cri. Yes, and this is true not only of individuals but also of states. Even states most eager to pursue honorable policies and reject dishonorable ones are often hostile to one another. When I think about these things, I lose heart. The question of how to make friends fills me with despair. As I see it, bad people cannot be friends with one another. How can people who are ungrateful, reckless, greedy, untrustworthy, or lacking in self-control stick together as friends? I have no hesitation in saying that bad people are born to be enemies, not friends. They bear the mark of an inborn hatred for one another. But then, as you suggest, bad people cannot be friends with good people either. How can those who do evil be friends with those who hate all wrongdoing? And finally, if people who practice virtue are torn by factional strife as they struggle to lead their states, envying and hating one another, who is left to be friends? Where can goodwill and faithfulness be found among people?

Soc. The fact is there is some subtlety in the texture of these things. ¹⁵ Seeds of love are implanted in man by nature. Men have need of one another, feel pity, help each other by united efforts, and in recognition of the fact show mutual gratitude. But there are seeds of war implanted also. The same objects being regarded as beautiful or agreeable by all alike, they do battle for their possession; a spirit of disunion ¹⁶ enters, and the parties range themselves in adverse camps. Discord and anger sound a note of war: the passion of more-having, staunchless avarice, threatens hostility; and envy is a hateful fiend. ¹⁷

Soc. The truth is, these matters are complicated. ¹⁵ Nature plants the seeds of love in people. People need one another, feel pity, and help each other by working together. They recognize this and show gratitude to one another. But nature also plants the seeds of war. Everyone finds the same things beautiful or pleasing, so people fight to possess them. Division ¹⁶ takes hold, and people line up on opposing sides. Discord and anger signal war. The desire to have more, an insatiable greed, threatens hostility, and envy is a hateful demon. ¹⁷

But nevertheless, through all opposing barriers friendship steals her way and binds together the beautiful and good among mankind. ¹⁸ Such is their virtue that they would rather possess scant means painlessly than wield an empire won by war. In spite of hunger and thirst they will share their meat and drink without a pang. Not bloom of lusty youth, nor love's delights can warp their self-control; nor will they be tempted to cause pain where pain should be unknown. It is theirs not merely to eschew all greed of riches, not merely to make a just and lawful distribution of wealth, but to supply what is lacking to the needs of one another. Theirs it is to compose strife and discord not in painless oblivion simply, but to the general advantage. Theirs also to hinder such extravagance of anger as shall entail remorse hereafter. And as to envy they will make a clean sweep and clearance of it: the good things which a man possesses shall be also the property of his friends, and the goods which they possess are to be looked upon as his. Where then is the improbability that the beautiful and noble should be sharers in the honours ¹⁹ of the state not only without injury, but even to their mutual advantage?

Nevertheless, friendship finds its way through every barrier and binds together the beautiful and good among humanity. ¹⁸ Their virtue is such that they would rather live peacefully with little than rule an empire won through war. Even when hungry and thirsty, they share their food and drink without hesitation. Neither the bloom of vigorous youth nor the pleasures of love can weaken their self-control. Nor will they be tempted to cause pain where there should be none. They not only avoid all greed for riches and divide wealth fairly and lawfully. They also provide what one another lacks. They settle disputes and disagreements not simply without hard feelings, but to everyone’s advantage. They also keep anger from becoming so extreme that it leads to later regret. They rid themselves completely of envy. Whatever good things a person has also belong to their friends, and their friends’ possessions are regarded as their own. Why, then, should it seem unlikely that the beautiful and noble could share in the honors ¹⁹ of the state? They could do so not only without harming one another, but even to their mutual advantage.

They indeed who covet and desire the honours and offices in a state for the sake of the liberty thereby given them to embezzle the public moneys, to deal violently by their fellow-creatures, and to batten in luxury themselves, may well be regarded as unjust and villainous persons incapable of harmony with one another. But if a man desire to obtain these selfsame honours in order that, being himself secure against wrong-doing, he may be able to assist his friends in what is right, and, raised to a high position, ²⁰ may essay to confer some blessing on the land of his fathers, what is there to hinder him from working in harmony with some other of a like spirit? Will he, with the "beautiful and noble" at his side, be less able to aid his friends? or will his power to benefit the community be shortened because the flower of that community are fellow-workers in that work? Why, even in the contests of the games it is obvious that if it were possible for the stoutest combatants to combine against the weakest, the chosen band would come off victors in every bout, and would carry off all the prizes. This indeed is against the rules of the actual arena; but in the field of politics, where the beautiful and good hold empery, and there is nought to hinder any from combining with whomsoever a man may choose to benefit the state, it will be a clear gain, will it not, for any one engaged in state affairs to make the best men his friends, whereby he will find partners and co-operators in his aims instead of rivals and antagonists? And this at least is obvious: in case of foreign war a man will need allies, but all the more if in the ranks opposed to him should stand the flower of the enemy. ²¹ Moreover, those who are willing to fight your battles must be kindly dealt with, that goodwill may quicken to enthusiasm; and one good man ²² is better worth your benefiting that a dozen knaves, since a little kindness goes a long way with the good, but with the base the more you give them the more they ask for.

Those who seek honors and offices in a state so they can steal public money, use violence against others, and live in luxury may well be considered unjust villains. They are incapable of working in harmony with one another. But suppose a man seeks these same honors so that he can protect himself from being wronged and help his friends do what is right. Suppose, too, that he hopes his high position ²⁰ will let him do some good for his homeland. What would prevent him from working in harmony with someone who shares his aims? Would he be less able to help his friends with the "beautiful and noble" at his side? Would he be less able to benefit the community because its finest members worked alongside him? Even in athletic contests, the answer is obvious. If the strongest competitors could join forces against the weakest, the chosen group would win every contest and carry off all the prizes. The rules of the arena forbid this. But in politics, where the beautiful and good hold power, nothing prevents a man from joining with anyone he chooses to benefit the state. So anyone involved in public affairs would clearly gain by making the best men his friends, would he not? He would then find partners and helpers in pursuing his aims, rather than rivals and opponents. And this much is obvious: in a foreign war, a man will need allies. He will need them all the more if the enemy's finest men are fighting against him. ²¹ Moreover, he must treat those willing to fight for him kindly, so that their goodwill grows into enthusiasm. One good man ²² is more worth helping than a dozen scoundrels. A little kindness goes a long way with good people, but the more you give to base people, the more they ask for.

So keep a good heart, Critobulus; only try to become good yourself, and when you have attained, set to your hand to capture the beautiful and good. Perhaps I may be able to give you some help in this quest, being myself an adept in Love's lore. ²³ No matter who it is for whom my heart is aflame; in an instant my whole soul is eager to leap forth. With vehemence I speed to the mark. I, who love, demand to be loved again; this desire in me must be met by counter desire in him; this thirst for his society by thirst reciprocal for mine. And these will be your needs also, I foresee, whenever you are seized with longing to contract a friendship. Do not hide from me, therefore, whom you would choose as a friend, since, owing to the pains I take to please him who pleases me, I am not altogether unversed, I fancy, in the art of catching men. ²⁴

So take heart, Critobulus. Just try to become good yourself, and once you have done so, set about winning those who are beautiful and good. Perhaps I can help you in this pursuit, since I am skilled in the ways of love. ²³ Whoever sets my heart aflame, my whole soul is instantly eager to leap out to him. I pursue him with passion. When I love someone, I demand that he love me in return. My desire for him must be matched by his desire for me. My thirst for his company must be matched by his thirst for mine. I foresee that you too will have these needs whenever you long to form a friendship. So do not hide from me whom you would choose as a friend. I take pains to please anyone who pleases me, so I think I know something about the art of catching men. ²⁴

Critobulus replied: Why, these are the very lessons of instruction, Socrates, for which I have been long athirst, and the more particularly if this same love's lore will enable me to capture those who are good of soul and those who are beautiful of person.

Critobulus replied: Socrates, these are the very lessons I have long wanted to learn. I want them all the more if this knowledge of love will help me win over people with good souls and beautiful bodies.

Soc. Nay, now I warn you, Critobulus, it is not within the province of my science to make the beautiful endure him who would lay hands upon them. And that is why men fled from Scylla, I am persuaded, because she laid hands upon them; but the Sirens were different—they laid hands on nobody, but sat afar off and chanted their spells in the ears of all; and therefore, it is said, all men endured to listen, and were charmed.

Soc. No, Critobulus, I warn you, my skills cannot make beautiful people tolerate a man who tries to touch them. I am convinced that men fled from Scylla because she laid hands on them. But the Sirens were different. They touched no one. Instead, they sat at a distance and sang their enchantments for everyone to hear. And so, it is said, all men could bear to listen and were charmed.

Cri. I promise I will not lay violent hands on any; therefore, if you have any good device for winning friends, instruct your pupil.

Cri. I promise I won’t use violence against anyone. So, if you know a good way to win friends, teach your pupil.

Soc. And if there is to be no laying on of the hands, there must be no application either of the lips; is it agreed?

Soc. And if there is to be no touching with the hands, there must be no kissing either. Agreed?

Cri. No, nor application of the lips to any one—not beautiful.

Cri. No, nor kissing anyone who isn't beautiful.

Soc. See now! you cannot open your mouth without some luckless utterance. Beauty suffers no such liberty, however eagerly the ugly may invite it, making believe some quality of soul must rank them with the beautiful.

Soc. See? You can't open your mouth without saying something unfortunate. Beauty allows no such freedom, however eagerly ugly people may invite it. They pretend that some quality of their soul must put them on a level with the beautiful.

Cri. Be of good cheer then; let the compact stand thus: "Kisses for the beautiful, and for the good a rain of kisses." So now teach us the art of catching friends.

Cri. Cheer up, then. Let’s agree to this: "Kisses for the beautiful, and a shower of kisses for the good." Now teach us how to catch friends.

Soc. Well then, when you wish to win some one's affection, you will allow me to lodge information against you to the effect that you admire him and desire to be his friend?

Soc. Well then, when you want to win someone's affection, will you let me tell him what you're guilty of? That you admire him and want to be his friend?

Cri. Lodge the indictment, with all my heart. I never heard of any one who hated his admirers.

Cri. Go ahead and bring the charge. I’ve never heard of anyone who hated their admirers.

Soc. And if I add to the indictment the further charge that through your admiration you are kindly disposed towards him, you will not feel I am taking away your character?

Soc. And if I add that you like him because you admire him, you won't feel I'm damaging your reputation?

Cri. Why, no; for myself I know a kindly feeling springs up in my heart towards any one whom I conceive to be kindly disposed to me.

Cri. Why, no. I know that I feel warmth toward anyone I believe feels kindly toward me.

Soc. All this I shall feel empowered to say about you to those whose friendship you seek, and I can promise further help; only there is a comprehensive "if" to be considered: if you will further authorise me to say that you are devoted to your friends; that nothing gives you so much joy as a good friend; that you pride yourself no less on the fine deeds of those you love than on your own; and on their good things equally with your own; that you never weary of plotting and planning to procure them a rich harvest of the same; and lastly, that you have discovered a man's virtue is to excel his friends in kindness and his foes in hostility. If I am authorised thus to report of you, I think you will find me a serviceable fellow-hunter in the quest of friends, which is the conquest of the good.

Soc. I can tell all this about you to those whose friendship you seek, and I can promise further help. But there is a big "if": you must also allow me to say that you are devoted to your friends. I must be able to say that nothing gives you more joy than a good friend. You take as much pride in the fine deeds of those you love as in your own. Their good fortune pleases you as much as your own. You never tire of making plans to bring them more such good things. Finally, you must allow me to say that you have discovered what makes a man virtuous: surpassing his friends in kindness and his enemies in hostility. If you allow me to say all this, I think you will find me a useful partner in the hunt for friends, which means winning over good people.

Cri. Why this appeal to me?—as if you had not free permission to say exactly what you like about me.

Cri. Why appeal to me? It's as if you weren't free to say exactly what you like about me.

Soc. No; that I deny, on the authority of Aspasia. ²⁵ I have it from her own lips. "Good matchmakers," she said tome, "were clever hands at cementing alliances between people, provided the good qualities they vouched for were truthfully reported; but when it came to their telling lies, for her part she could not compliment them. ²⁶ Their poor deluded dupes ended by hating each other and the go-betweens as well." Now I myself am so fully persuaded of the truth of this that I feel it is not in my power to say aught in your praise which I cannot say with truth.

Soc. No, I deny that, on Aspasia’s authority. ²⁵ I heard it from her own lips. "Good matchmakers," she told me, "were skilled at bringing people together, provided they spoke truthfully about their good qualities. But she could not praise matchmakers who lied. ²⁶ The poor people they deceived ended up hating each other and the matchmakers too." I am so convinced that she was right that I cannot praise you for anything that is not true.

Cri. Really, Socrates, you are a wonderfully good friend to me—in so far as I have any merit which will entitle me to win a friend, you will lend me a helping hand, it seems; otherwise you would rather not forge any petty fiction for my benefit.

Cri. Really, Socrates, you are a wonderfully good friend to me. It seems you will help me if I have any merit that would help me win a friend. Otherwise, you would rather not make up even a little story to help me.

Soc. But tell me, how shall I assist you best, think you? By praising you falsely or by persuading you to try to be a good man? Or if it is not plain to you thus, look at the matter by the light of some examples. I wish to introduce you to a shipowner, or to make him your friend: I begin by singing your praises to him falsely thus, "You will find him a good pilot"; he catches at the phrase, and entrusts his ship to you, who have no notion of guiding a vessel. What can you expect but to make shipwreck of the craft and yourself together? or suppose by similar false assertions I can persuade the state at large to entrust her destinies to you—"a man with a fine genius for command," I say, "a practised lawyer," "a politician born," and so forth. The odds are, the state and you may come to grief through you. Or to take an instance from everyday life. By my falsehoods I persuade some private person to entrust his affairs to you as "a really careful and business-like person with a head for economy." When put to the test would not your administration prove ruinous, and the figure you cut ridiculous? No, my dear friend, there is but one road, the shortest, safest, best, and it is simply this: In whatsoever you desire to be deemed good, endeavour to be good. For of all the virtues namable among men, consider, and you will find there is not one but may be increased by learning and practice. For my part then, Critobulus, these are the principles on which we ought to go a-hunting; but if you take a different view, I am all attention, please instruct me.

Soc. But tell me, how do you think I can help you most? Should I praise you falsely, or persuade you to try to be a good man? If the answer is not clear, consider some examples. Suppose I want to introduce you to a shipowner or make him your friend. I begin by falsely praising you to him. "You will find him a good pilot," I say. He seizes on my words and entrusts his ship to you, though you know nothing about steering a ship. What can you expect but to wreck both the ship and yourself? Or suppose I use similar false claims to persuade the state to entrust its future to you. I call you "a man with a fine talent for command," "an experienced lawyer," "a born politician," and so on. The chances are that, because of you, both the state and you may come to grief. Or take an example from everyday life. I tell lies to persuade someone to entrust his affairs to you. I call you "a truly careful and businesslike person with a talent for saving money." When put to the test, would your management not ruin his affairs and make you look ridiculous? No, my dear friend, there is only one way. It is the shortest, safest, and best. Whatever you want to be thought good at, try to be good at it. Consider all the virtues people can name. You will find that every one of them can be increased through learning and practice. For my part, Critobulus, I think these are the principles that should guide our search. But if you see things differently, I am listening. Please teach me.

Then Critobulus: Nay, Socrates, I should be ashamed to gainsay what you have said; if I did, it would neither be a noble statement nor a true. ²⁷

Then Critobulus said: No, Socrates, I would be ashamed to contradict you. If I did, my statement would be neither honorable nor true. ²⁷