Book 1, Chapter 1

I have often wondered by what arguments those who indicted ¹ Socrates could have persuaded the Athenians that his life was justly forfeit to the state. The indictment was to this effect: "Socrates is guilty of crime in refusing to recognise the gods acknowledged by the state, and importing strange divinities of his own; he is further guilty of corrupting the young."

I have often wondered what arguments Socrates’ accusers ¹ used to persuade the Athenians that the state was justified in putting him to death. The indictment was essentially this: "Socrates is guilty of refusing to recognize the gods acknowledged by the state and introducing strange gods of his own. He is also guilty of corrupting the young."

In the first place, what evidence did they produce that Socrates refused to recognise the gods acknowledged by the state? Was it that he did not sacrifice? or that he dispensed with divination? On the contrary, he was often to be seen engaged in sacrifice, at home or at the common altars of the state. Nor was his dependence on divination less manifest. Indeed that saying of his, "A divinity ² gives me a sign," was on everybody's lips. So much so that, if I am not mistaken, it lay at the root of the imputation that he imported novel divinities; though there was no greater novelty in his case than in that of other believers in oracular help, who commonly rely on omens of all sorts: the flight or cry of birds, the utterances of man, chance meetings, ³ or a victim's entrails. Even according to the popular conception, it is not the mere fowl, it is not the chance individual one meets, who knows what things are profitable for a man, but it is the gods who vouchsafe by such instruments to signify the same. This was also the tenet of Socrates. Only, whereas men ordinarily speak of being turned aside, or urged onwards by birds, or other creatures encountered on the path, Socrates suited his language to his conviction. "The divinity," said he, "gives me a sign." Further, he would constantly advise his associates to do this, or beware of doing that, upon the authority of this same divine voice; and, as a matter of fact, those who listened to his warnings prospered, whilst he who turned a deaf ear to them repented afterwards. ⁴ Yet, it will be readily conceded, he would hardly desire to present himself to his everyday companions in the character of either knave or fool. Whereas he would have appeared to be both, supposing ⁵ the God-given revelations had but revealed his own proneness to deception. It is plain he would not have ventured on forecast at all, but for his belief that the words he spoke would in fact be verified. Then on whom, or what, was the assurance rooted, if not upon God? And if he had faith in the gods, how could he fail to recognise them?

First, what evidence did they offer that Socrates refused to recognize the gods acknowledged by the state? Did he refuse to sacrifice? Did he do without divination? On the contrary, he was often seen making sacrifices, at home and at the state’s public altars. His reliance on divination was just as clear. Indeed, everyone was talking about his saying, "A divinity ² gives me a sign." If I am not mistaken, this saying was the reason he was accused of introducing new divinities. Yet he was no more novel than other people who believe in divine guidance. They commonly rely on all kinds of omens: the flight or cry of birds, what people say, chance meetings, ³ or the entrails of a sacrificed animal. Even in the popular view, it is not the bird or the person one happens to meet who knows what is good for someone. Rather, the gods use these means to make it known. Socrates believed the same. But people ordinarily say that birds or other creatures they encounter turn them aside or urge them onward. Socrates expressed what he believed. "The divinity," he said, "gives me a sign." Socrates also regularly advised his companions to do one thing or avoid another, on the authority of this same divine voice. In fact, those who listened to his warnings prospered, while anyone who ignored them regretted it afterward. ⁴ Yet surely he would hardly have wanted to appear either dishonest or foolish to his everyday companions. He would have appeared to be both if ⁵ the revelations he claimed came from God had only shown how easily he was deceived. Clearly, he would not have dared to make predictions unless he believed they would come true. What, then, could have given him that confidence, if not God? And if he had faith in the gods, how could he fail to recognize them?

But his mode of dealing with his intimates has another aspect. As regards the ordinary necessities of life, ⁶ his advice was, "Act as you believe ⁷ these things may best be done." But in the case of those darker problems, the issues of which are incalculable, he directed his friends to consult the oracle, whether the business should be undertaken or not. "No one," he would say, "who wishes to manage a house or city with success: no one aspiring to guide the helm of state aright, can afford to dipense with aid from above. Doubtless, skill in carpentering, building, smithying, farming, of the art of governing men, together with the theory of these processes, and the sciences of arithmetic, economy, strategy, are affairs of study, and within the grasp of human intelligence. Yet there is a side even of these, and that not the least important, which the gods reserve to themselves, the bearing of which is hidden from mortal vision. Thus, let a man sow a field or plant a farm never so well, yet he cannot foretell who will gather in the fruits: another may build him a house of fairest proportion, yet he knows not who will inhabit it. Neither can a general foresee whether it will profit him to conduct a campaign, nor a politician be certain whether his leadership will turn to evil or good. Nor can the man who weds a fair wife, looking forward to joy, know whether through her he shall not reap sorrow. Neither can he who has built up a powerful connection in the state know whether he shall not by means of it be cast out of his city. To suppose that all these matters lay within the scope of human judgment, to the exclusion of the preternatural, was preternatural folly. Nor was it less extravagant to go and consult the will of Heaven on any questions which it is given to us to decide by dint of learning. As though a man should inquire, "Am I to choose an expert driver as my coachman, or one who has never handled the reins?" "Shall I appoint a mariner to be skipper of my vessel, or a landsman?" And so with respect to all we may know by numbering, weighing, and measuring. To seek advice from Heaven on such points was a sort of profanity. "Our duty is plain," he would observe; "where we are permitted to work through our natural faculties, there let us by all means apply them. But in things which are hidden, let us seek to gain knowledge from above, by divination; for the gods," he added, "grant signs to those to whom they will be gracious."

But there was another side to how he dealt with his close friends. On the ordinary necessities of life, ⁶ his advice was, "Do what you believe ⁷ is best." But when a problem was more uncertain and its outcome impossible to predict, he told his friends to consult the oracle. They should ask whether to undertake the task at all. "No one," he would say, "who wants to manage a household or city successfully can do without help from above. Nor can anyone who hopes to steer the state on the right course. Of course, carpentry, building, metalworking, farming, and governing people can be studied and understood by human intelligence. So can the principles behind these skills and the sciences of arithmetic, household management, and military strategy. Yet even in these fields, the gods reserve some things to themselves, and these are not the least important. Mortals cannot see what the gods' part will bring about. "A man may sow a field or plant a farm as well as possible, yet he cannot predict who will harvest the crops. Another may build a beautifully proportioned house, yet he does not know who will live in it. A general cannot foresee whether leading a campaign will benefit him. Nor can a politician be sure whether his leadership will bring him harm or good. A man may marry a beautiful wife and look forward to happiness, yet he cannot know whether she will bring him sorrow instead. Nor can a man who has built up powerful connections in the state know whether those connections will lead to his expulsion from the city." To suppose that all these matters were within human judgment, with no role for supernatural powers, was an extraordinary folly. It was just as unreasonable to consult the will of heaven on questions that people can decide through learning. It was as if someone were to ask, "Should I choose an expert driver as my coachman, or someone who has never held the reins?" or "Should I put a sailor in command of my ship, or someone who has never been to sea?" The same was true of anything people can know by counting, weighing, or measuring. To seek heaven's advice on such matters was a kind of irreverence. "Our duty is clear," he would say. "Where we can use our natural abilities, we should certainly use them. But when things are hidden from us, we should seek knowledge from above through divination. For the gods," he added, "grant signs to those they wish to favor."

Again, Socrates ever lived in the public eye; at early morning he was to be seen betaking himself to one of the promenades, or wrestling-grounds; at noon he would appear with the gathering crowds in the market-place; and as day declined, wherever the largest throng might be encountered, there was he to be found, talking for the most part, while any one who chose might stop and listen. Yet no one ever heard him say, or saw him do anything impious or irreverent. Indeed, in contrast to others he set his face against all discussion of such high matters as the nature of the Universe; how the "kosmos," as the savants ⁸ phrase it, came into being; ⁹ or by what forces the celestial phenomena arise. To trouble one's brain about such matters was, he argued, to play the fool. He would ask first: Did these investigators feel their knowledge of things human so complete that they betook themselves to these lofty speculations? Or did they maintain that they were playing their proper parts in thus neglecting the affairs of man to speculate on the concerns of God? He was astonished they did not see how far these problems lay beyond mortal ken; since even those who pride themselves most on their discussion of these points differ from each other, as madmen do. For just as some madmen, he said, have no apprehension of what is truly terrible, others fear where no fear is; some are ready to say and do anything in public without the slightest symptom of shame; ¹⁰ others think they ought not so much as to set foot among their fellow-men; some honour neither temple, nor altar, nor aught else sacred to the name of God; others bow down to stocks and stones and worship the very beasts:—so is it with those thinkers whose minds are cumbered with cares ¹¹ concerning the Universal Nature. One sect ¹² has discovered that Being is one and indivisible. Another ¹³ that it is infinite in number. If one ¹⁴ proclaims that all things are in a continual flux, another ¹⁵ replies that nothing can possibly be moved at any time. The theory of the universe as a process of birth and death is met by the counter theory, that nothing ever could be born or ever will die.

Again, Socrates always lived in public view. Early in the morning, he could be seen going to a promenade or wrestling ground. At noon, he appeared among the gathering crowds in the marketplace. As the day wore on, he could be found wherever the largest crowd gathered. Most of the time he was talking, and anyone who wished could stop and listen. Yet no one ever heard him say or saw him do anything impious or irreverent. Unlike others, he opposed all discussion of lofty matters such as the nature of the Universe. These included how the "kosmos," as the scholars ⁸ called it, came into being, ⁹ and what forces produced celestial phenomena. He argued that worrying about such matters was foolish. He would first ask whether these investigators considered their knowledge of human affairs complete enough to turn to such lofty questions. Or did they claim they were doing their proper duty by neglecting human affairs to speculate about the concerns of God? He was astonished that they did not see how far these problems lay beyond human understanding. Even those who took the greatest pride in discussing them disagreed with one another, as madmen do. He said that some madmen have no fear of things that are truly terrible, while others fear things that are not. Some are ready to say and do anything in public without the slightest sign of shame. ¹⁰ Others think they should not even set foot among other people. Some honor neither temple nor altar nor anything else sacred to God. Others bow down to blocks of wood and stones and worship even animals. The same is true of thinkers whose minds are burdened with concerns ¹¹ about Universal Nature. One school ¹² has discovered that Being is one and indivisible. Another ¹³ has discovered that beings are infinite in number. If one school ¹⁴ declares that all things are constantly changing, another ¹⁵ replies that nothing can ever move. The theory that the universe undergoes a process of birth and death is met by the opposite theory, that nothing could ever be born or will ever die.

But the questioning of Socrates on the merits of these speculators sometimes took another form. The student of human learning expects, he said, to make something of his studies for the benefit of himself or others, as he likes. Do these explorers into the divine operations hope that when they have discovered by what forces the various phenomena occur, they will create winds and waters at will and fruitful seasons? Will they manipulate these and the like to suit their needs? or has no such notion perhaps ever entered their heads, and will they be content simply to know how such things come into existence? But if this was his mode of describing those who meddle with such matters as these, he himself never wearied of discussing human topics. What is piety? what is impiety? What is the beautiful? what the ugly? What the noble? what the base? What are meant by just and unjust? what by sobriety and madness? what by courage and cowardice? What is a state? what is a statesman? what is a ruler over men? what is a ruling character? and other like problems, the knowledge of which, as he put it, conferred a patent of nobility on the possessor, ¹⁶ whereas those who lacked the knowledge might deservedly be stigmatised as slaves.

But Socrates sometimes questioned the value of these speculators’ work in another way. He said that students of human affairs expect to use their studies to benefit themselves or others, as they choose. Do those who investigate divine workings have similar hopes? Once they discover what forces cause various phenomena, do they hope to create winds, waters, and fruitful seasons at will? Will they control these and similar things to suit their needs? Or perhaps no such thought has ever occurred to them. Will they be content simply to know how such things come into being? But while Socrates described people who meddled in such matters this way, he himself never tired of discussing human affairs. What is piety? What is impiety? What is beautiful? What is ugly? What is noble? What is base? What do justice and injustice mean? What do self-control and madness mean? What do courage and cowardice mean? What is a state? What is a statesman? What is a ruler of people? What kind of person is fit to rule? He also discussed other questions like these. As he put it, knowledge of such matters gave a person a title to nobility, ¹⁶ while those who lacked it deserved to be called slaves.

Now, in so far as the opinions of Socrates were unknown to the world at large, it is not surprising that the court should draw false conclusions respecting them; but that facts patent to all should have been ignored is indeed astonishing.

Since Socrates' opinions were not widely known, it is not surprising that the court drew false conclusions about them. But it is astonishing that the court ignored facts that were obvious to everyone.

At one time Socrates was a member of the Council, ¹⁷ he had taken the senatorial oath, and sworn "as a member of that house to act in conformity with the laws." It was thus he chanced to be President of the Popular Assembly, ¹⁸ when that body was seized with a desire to put the nine ¹⁹ generals, Thrasyllus, Erasinides, and the rest, to death by a single inclusive vote. Whereupon, in spite of the bitter resentment of the people, and the menaces of several influential citizens, he refused to put the question, esteeming it of greater importance faithfully to abide by the oath which he had taken, than to gratify the people wrongfully, or to screen himself from the menaces of the mighty. The fact being, that with regard to the care bestowed by the gods upon men, his belief differed widely from that of the multitude. Whereas most people seem to imagine that the gods know in part, and are ignorant in part, Socrates believed firmly that the gods know all things—both the things that are said and the things that are done, and the things that are counselled in the silent chambers of the heart. Moreover, they are present everywhere, and bestow signs upon man concerning all the things of man.

Socrates once served on the Council. ¹⁷ He had taken the senator’s oath and sworn "as a member of that house to act in conformity with the laws." While serving on the Council, he happened to be President of the Popular Assembly. ¹⁸ The Assembly wanted to put the nine ¹⁹ generals, Thrasyllus, Erasinides, and the others, to death in a single vote. Socrates refused to put the question to a vote, despite the people’s bitter anger and threats from several influential citizens. He thought it more important to keep his oath faithfully than to please the people by acting unlawfully or protect himself from the threats of powerful men. Socrates’ belief about the gods’ care for human beings differed greatly from that of most people. Most people seem to think that the gods know some things but not others. Socrates firmly believed that the gods know everything: what people say, what they do, and what they decide in the privacy of their hearts. He also believed that the gods are present everywhere and give people signs about all human affairs.

I can, therefore, but repeat my former words. It is a marvel to me how the Athenians came to be persuaded that Socrates fell short of sober-mindedness as touching the gods. A man who never ventured one impious word or deed against the gods we worship, but whose whole language concerning them, and his every act, closely coincided, word for word, and deed for deed, with all we deem distinctive of devoutest piety.

I can therefore only repeat what I said before. I am amazed that the Athenians came to believe that Socrates lacked proper reverence for the gods. He never said or did anything impious against the gods we worship. Everything he said and did concerning them matched, word for word and deed for deed, all that we consider the deepest piety.