Advice

How fallacious it is to judge of the nature of things, by the ordinary and inconstant use of words, appeareth in nothing more, than in the confusion of Counsels, and Commands, arising from the Imperative manner of speaking in them both, and in many other occasions besides. For the words “Doe this,” are the words not onely of him that Commandeth; but also of him that giveth Counsell; and of him that Exhorteth; and yet there are but few, that see not, that these are very different things; or that cannot distinguish between them, when they perceive who it is that speaketh, and to whom the Speech is directed, and upon what occasion. But finding those phrases in mens writings, and being not able, or not willing to enter into a consideration of the circumstances, they mistake sometimes the Precepts of Counsellours, for the Precepts of them that command; and sometimes the contrary; according as it best agreeth with the conclusions they would inferre, or the actions they approve. To avoyd which mistakes, and render to those termes of Commanding, Counselling, and Exhorting, their proper and distinct significations, I define them thus.

Judging the nature of things by the ordinary, shifting use of words is misleading. Nothing shows this more clearly than the confusion between advice and commands. Both use the same form of speech, telling someone to act, as do many other kinds of speech. For the words “Do this” are used not only by someone giving a command. Someone offering advice or urging action also uses those words. Yet few people fail to see that commanding, advising, and urging are very different things. Few cannot distinguish between them when they know who is speaking, to whom, and on what occasion. But when readers find these phrases in writing, they may be unable or unwilling to consider the circumstances. They sometimes mistake advisers’ instructions for those of people giving commands, and sometimes make the opposite mistake. They choose whichever reading best suits the conclusions they want to draw or the actions they approve. To avoid these mistakes, and give commanding, advising, and urging their proper, distinct meanings, I define them as follows.

COMMAND is, where a man saith, “Doe this,” or “Doe this not,” without expecting other reason than the Will of him that sayes it. From this it followeth manifestly, that he that Commandeth, pretendeth thereby his own Benefit: For the reason of his Command is his own Will onely, and the proper object of every mans Will, is some Good to himselfe.

COMMAND is when someone says, “Do this,” or “Do not do this,” giving no reason except their own will. It clearly follows that whoever commands seeks their own benefit. For the only reason for their command is their own will, and everyone’s will aims at some good for themselves.

COUNSELL, is where a man saith, “Doe” or “Doe not this,” and deduceth his own reasons from the benefit that arriveth by it to him to whom he saith it. And from this it is evident, that he that giveth Counsell, pretendeth onely (whatsoever he intendeth) the good of him, to whom he giveth it.

ADVICE is when someone says, “Do” or “Do not do this,” and gives reasons based on the listener’s benefit. So it is clear that anyone giving advice claims to seek only the good of the person receiving it. This is their claim, whatever their actual intention.

Therefore between Counsell and Command, one great difference is, that Command is directed to a mans own benefit; and Counsell to the benefit of another man. And from this ariseth another difference, that a man may be obliged to do what he is Commanded; as when he hath covenanted to obey: But he cannot be obliged to do as he is Counselled, because the hurt of not following it, is his own; or if he should covenant to follow it, then is the Counsell turned into the nature of a Command. A third difference between them is, that no man can pretend a right to be of another mans Counsell; because he is not to pretend benefit by it to himselfe; but to demand right to Counsell another, argues a will to know his designes, or to gain some other Good to himselfe; which (as I said before) is of every mans will the proper object.

Therefore, one major difference between advice and commands is whose benefit they serve. A command serves the benefit of the person giving it. Advice serves the benefit of another person. From this follows another difference. A person may be obliged to do what he is commanded, as when he has agreed to obey. But he cannot be obliged to follow advice, because the harm from not following the advice is his own. If he agrees to follow the advice, however, the advice takes on the nature of a command. A third difference is that no one can claim a right to act as another person’s adviser. This is because an adviser is not supposed to seek any benefit for himself from giving advice. But demanding the right to advise someone shows a desire to learn that person’s plans or gain some other benefit. As I said before, everyone’s will is directed toward their own benefit.

This also is incident to the nature of Counsell; that whatsoever it be, he that asketh it, cannot in equity accuse, or punish it: For to ask Counsell of another, is to permit him to give such Counsell as he shall think best; And consequently, he that giveth counsell to his Soveraign, (whether a Monarch, or an Assembly) when he asketh it, cannot in equity be punished for it, whether the same be conformable to the opinion of the most, or not, so it be to the Proposition in debate. For if the sense of the Assembly can be taken notice of, before the Debate be ended, they should neither ask, nor take any further Counsell; For the Sense of the Assembly, is the Resolution of the Debate, and End of all Deliberation. And generally he that demandeth Counsell, is Author of it; and therefore cannot punish it; and what the Soveraign cannot, no man else can. But if one Subject giveth Counsell to another, to do any thing contrary to the Lawes, whether that Counsell proceed from evill intention, or from ignorance onely, it is punishable by the Common-wealth; because ignorance of the Law, is no good excuse, where every man is bound to take notice of the Lawes to which he is subject.

Advice also has this feature: whoever asks for advice cannot justly accuse or punish the adviser for giving it. Asking someone for advice means allowing that person to give whatever advice they think best. So someone who advises their sovereign when asked cannot justly be punished for that advice. The sovereign may be a monarch or an assembly. The advice need not agree with the majority’s opinion, as long as it concerns the question under debate. For if the assembly’s position can be known before the debate ends, no further advice should be requested or accepted. The assembly’s position is the decision that settles the debate and ends all deliberation. In general, whoever requests advice authorizes that advice and therefore cannot punish the adviser for giving it. And what the sovereign cannot do, no one else can do. But if one subject advises another to do anything against the laws, the commonwealth may punish the adviser. This holds whether the advice comes from bad intentions or mere ignorance. For ignorance of the law is no valid excuse when everyone must know the laws they are subject to.

EXHORTATION, and DEHORTATION, is Counsell, accompanied with signes in him that giveth it, of vehement desire to have it followed; or to say it more briefly, Counsell Vehemently Pressed. For he that Exhorteth, doth not deduce the consequences of what he adviseth to be done, and tye himselfe therein to the rigour of true reasoning; but encourages him he Counselleth, to Action: As he that Dehorteth, deterreth him from it. And therefore they have in their speeches, a regard to the common Passions, and opinions of men, in deducing their reasons; and make use of Similitudes, Metaphors, Examples, and other tooles of Oratory, to perswade their Hearers of the Utility, Honour, or Justice of following their advise.

Exhortation and dehortation are advice given with signs of a strong desire to have the advice followed. More briefly, they are advice strongly urged. Someone who exhorts does not work out the consequences of the recommended action or stick to strict, sound reasoning. Instead, the speaker urges the person receiving the advice to act. Someone who dehorts, by contrast, discourages that person from acting. So, in presenting their reasons, these speakers appeal to people’s common emotions and opinions. They use similes, metaphors, examples, and other tools of public speaking. Their aim is to persuade their listeners that following their advice is useful, honorable, or just.

From whence may be inferred, First, that Exhortation and Dehortation, is directed to the Good of him that giveth the Counsell, not of him that asketh it, which is contrary to the duty of a Counsellour; who (by the definition of Counsell) ought to regard, not his own benefits, but his whom he adviseth. And that he directeth his Counsell to his own benefit, is manifest enough, by the long and vehement urging, or by the artificial giving thereof; which being not required of him, and consequently proceeding from his own occasions, is directed principally to his own benefit, and but accidentarily to the good of him that is Counselled, or not at all.

From this we may infer, first, that urging someone to act or not to act serves the adviser’s good. It does not serve the good of the person asking for advice. This is contrary to an adviser’s duty. By the definition of advice, an adviser should consider the interests of the person being advised, not their own. The adviser’s self-interest is clear enough from prolonged, forceful urging or from a calculated way of giving advice. Such efforts were not requested and therefore arise from the adviser’s own concerns. So these efforts serve mainly the adviser’s own benefit. They benefit the person being advised only incidentally, if at all.

Secondly, that the use of Exhortation and Dehortation lyeth onely, where a man is to speak to a Multitude; because when the Speech is addressed to one, he may interrupt him, and examine his reasons more rigorously, than can be done in a Multitude; which are too many to enter into Dispute, and Dialogue with him that speaketh indifferently to them all at once. Thirdly, that they that Exhort and Dehort, where they are required to give Counsell, are corrupt Counsellours, and as it were bribed by their own interest. For though the Counsell they give be never so good; yet he that gives it, is no more a good Counsellour, than he that giveth a Just Sentence for a reward, is a just Judge. But where a man may lawfully Command, as a Father in his Family, or a Leader in an Army, his Exhortations and Dehortations, are not onely lawfull, but also necessary, and laudable: But then they are no more Counsells, but Commands; which when they are for Execution of soure labour; sometimes necessity, and alwayes humanity requireth to be sweetned in the delivery, by encouragement, and in the tune and phrase of Counsell, rather then in harsher language of Command.

Secondly, urging people to act or not to act is useful only when speaking to a crowd. When a speaker addresses one person, that person can interrupt and examine the speaker’s reasons more closely than a crowd can. A crowd has too many people to debate or hold a dialogue with someone addressing them all at once. Thirdly, those who urge people to act or not to act when asked for advice are corrupt advisers. They are, in effect, bribed by their own interests. However good their advice may be, giving good advice does not make them good advisers. A judge who gives a just ruling for payment is no more a just judge. But someone with lawful authority to command may properly urge people to act or not to act. A father in his household or a commander in an army has such authority. In these cases, such urging is not only lawful but also necessary and praiseworthy. But then these are no longer pieces of advice, but commands. When such commands require hard and unpleasant work, necessity sometimes requires a gentler delivery, and humanity always does. Such commands should be softened with encouragement and expressed in the tone and language of advice, rather than harsh commands.

Examples of the difference between Command and Counsell, we may take from the formes of Speech that expresse them in Holy Scripture. “Have no other Gods but me; Make to thy selfe no graven Image; Take not Gods name in vain; Sanctifie the Sabbath; Honour thy Parents; Kill not; Steale not,” &c. are Commands; because the reason for which we are to obey them, is drawn from the will of God our King, whom we are obliged to obey. But these words, “Sell all thou hast; give it to the poore; and follow me,” are Counsell; because the reason for which we are to do so, is drawn from our own benefit; which is this, that we shall have “Treasure in Heaven.” These words, “Go into the village over against you, and you shall find an Asse tyed, and her Colt; loose her, and bring her to me,” are a Command: for the reason of their fact is drawn from the will of their Master: but these words, “Repent, and be Baptized in the Name of Jesus,” are Counsell; because the reason why we should so do, tendeth not to any benefit of God Almighty, who shall still be King in what manner soever we rebell; but of our selves, who have no other means of avoyding the punishment hanging over us for our sins.

We may find examples of the difference between command and advice in the language of Holy Scripture. “Have no other gods but me. Make no carved image for yourself. Do not take God’s name in vain. Keep the Sabbath holy. Honor your parents. Do not kill. Do not steal,” and so on, are commands. The reason we must obey these commands comes from the will of God our King, whom we are obliged to obey. But these words, “Sell all you have. Give it to the poor. And follow me,” are advice. The reason for following this advice comes from our own benefit: we will have “Treasure in Heaven.” These words are a command: “Go into the village opposite you, and you will find a donkey tied up, and her colt. Untie her, and bring her to me.” The reason for carrying out this action comes from their Master’s will. But these words, “Repent, and be baptized in the Name of Jesus,” are advice. The reason we should follow this advice is not to benefit God Almighty, but to benefit ourselves. God will still be King, however we rebel. But we have no other means of avoiding the punishment hanging over us for our sins.

As the difference of Counsell from Command, hath been now deduced from the nature of Counsell, consisting in a deducing of the benefit, or hurt that may arise to him that is to be Counselled, by the necessary or probable consequences of the action he propoundeth; so may also the differences between apt, and inept counsellours be derived from the same. For Experience, being but Memory of the consequences of like actions formerly observed, and Counsell but the Speech whereby that experience is made known to another; the Vertues, and Defects of Counsell, are the same with the Vertues, and Defects Intellectuall: And to the Person of a Common-wealth, his Counsellours serve him in the place of Memory, and Mentall Discourse. But with this resemblance of the Common-wealth, to a naturall man, there is one dissimilitude joyned, of great importance; which is, that a naturall man receiveth his experience, from the naturall objects of sense, which work upon him without passion, or interest of their own; whereas they that give Counsell to the Representative person of a Common-wealth, may have, and have often their particular ends, and passions, that render their Counsells alwayes suspected, and many times unfaithfull. And therefore we may set down for the first condition of a good Counsellour, That His Ends, And Interest, Be Not Inconsistent With The Ends And Interest Of Him He Counselleth.

We have distinguished advice from commands by examining the nature of advice. Advice explains the benefit or harm that may come to someone from an action they propose. It does so by tracing the action’s necessary or probable consequences. In the same way, we can distinguish capable advisers from incapable ones. Experience is simply the memory of consequences observed in similar actions in the past. Advice is simply speech that communicates that experience to someone else. Therefore, the strengths and weaknesses of advice are the same as the strengths and weaknesses of the intellect. For the person representing a commonwealth, advisers serve as memory and reasoning. But this comparison between a commonwealth and an individual person includes one very important difference. An individual gains experience from things perceived through the senses. Those things act upon the person without passions or interests of their own. By contrast, advisers to the person representing a commonwealth may have, and often do have, their own aims and passions. These private aims and passions make their advice always suspect and often unfaithful. We may therefore state the first requirement of a good adviser: the adviser’s aims and interests must not conflict with those of the person being advised.

Secondly, Because the office of a Counsellour, when an action comes into deliberation, is to make manifest the consequences of it, in such manner, as he that is Counselled may be truly and evidently informed; he ought to propound his advise, in such forme of speech, as may make the truth most evidently appear; that is to say, with as firme ratiocination, as significant and proper language, and as briefly, as the evidence will permit. And therefore Rash, And Unevident Inferences; (such as are fetched onely from Examples, or authority of Books, and are not arguments of what is good, or evill, but witnesses of fact, or of opinion,) Obscure, Confused, And Ambiguous Expressions, Also All Metaphoricall Speeches, Tending To The Stirring Up Of Passion, (because such reasoning, and such expressions, are usefull onely to deceive, or to lead him we Counsell towards other ends than his own) Are Repugnant To The Office Of A Counsellour.

Secondly, when an action is being considered, a counsellor’s duty is to make its consequences clear. The person receiving advice must be able to understand those consequences accurately and clearly. For this reason, the counsellor should present advice in language that makes the truth as clear as possible. The reasoning should be as sound, and the language as meaningful and precise, as possible. The advice should also be as brief as a clear explanation allows. Therefore, hasty and unsupported conclusions are contrary to a counsellor’s duty. These include conclusions drawn only from examples or the authority of books. Such sources do not establish what is good or bad, but merely report facts or opinions. Obscure, confused, and ambiguous expressions are also contrary to a counsellor’s duty, as is all metaphorical language intended to stir emotions. Such reasoning and language serve only to deceive or steer the person receiving advice toward goals other than their own.

Thirdly, Because the Ability of Counselling proceedeth from Experience, and long study; and no man is presumed to have experience in all those things that to the Administration of a great Common-wealth are necessary to be known, No Man Is Presumed To Be A Good Counsellour, But In Such Businesse, As He Hath Not Onely Been Much Versed In, But Hath Also Much Meditated On, And Considered. For seeing the businesse of a Common-wealth is this, to preserve the people at home, and defend them against forraign Invasion, we shall find, it requires great knowledge of the disposition of Man-kind, of the Rights of Government, and of the nature of Equity, Law, Justice, and Honour, not to be attained without study; And of the Strength, Commodities, Places, both of their own Country, and their Neighbours; as also of the inclinations, and designes of all Nations that may any way annoy them. And this is not attained to, without much experience. Of which things, not onely the whole summe, but every one of the particulars requires the age, and observation of a man in years, and of more than ordinary study. The wit required for Counsel, as I have said before is Judgement. And the differences of men in that point come from different education, of some to one kind of study, or businesse, and of others to another. When for the doing of any thing, there be Infallible rules, (as in Engines, and Edifices, the rules of Geometry,) all the experience of the world cannot equall his Counsell, that has learnt, or found out the Rule. And when there is no such Rule, he that hath most experience in that particular kind of businesse, has therein the best Judgement, and is the best Counsellour.

Thirdly, the ability to give advice comes from experience and long study. No one is presumed to know everything needed to govern a great commonwealth. So no one is presumed to be a good adviser except in matters they have practiced extensively and considered deeply. The business of a commonwealth is to protect its people at home and defend them against foreign invasion. This requires deep knowledge of human nature, the rights of government, and the nature of equity, law, justice, and honor. Such knowledge cannot be gained without study. It also requires knowledge of the strength, resources, and geography of both their own country and neighboring countries. Advisers must also know the inclinations and plans of all nations that may harm their country in any way. This knowledge cannot be gained without extensive experience. Not only the whole subject, but each part requires the maturity and observation of an older person with exceptional learning. As I have said before, the mental ability needed for giving advice is judgment. Differences in judgment come from differences in education. Some people are trained in one field of study or work, and others in another. When an activity has infallible rules, all the experience in the world cannot equal advice from someone who knows those rules. Such a person may have learned the rules or discovered them. Examples include the rules of geometry used in machines and buildings. But when no such rule exists, the person with the most experience in that particular business has the best judgment. That person is also the best adviser.

Fourthly, to be able to give Counsell to a Common-wealth, in a businesse that hath reference to another Common-wealth, It Is Necessary To Be Acquainted With The Intelligences, And Letters That Come From Thence, And With All The Records Of Treaties, And Other Transactions Of State Between Them; which none can doe, but such as the Representative shall think fit. By which we may see, that they who are not called to Counsell, can have no good Counsell in such cases to obtrude.

Fourthly, advising a commonwealth on matters involving another commonwealth requires knowing the intelligence reports and letters from that other commonwealth. It also requires knowing all records of treaties and other dealings between the two states. Only those whom the commonwealth’s representative considers suitable can have this knowledge. So we can see that those not invited to advise have no good advice to force on others in such cases.

Fifthly, Supposing the number of Counsellors equall, a man is better Counselled by hearing them apart, then in an Assembly; and that for many causes. First, in hearing them apart, you have the advice of every man; but in an Assembly may of them deliver their advise with I, or No, or with their hands, or feet, not moved by their own sense, but by the eloquence of another, or for feare of displeasing some that have spoken, or the whole Assembly, by contradiction; or for feare of appearing duller in apprehension, than those that have applauded the contrary opinion. Secondly, in an Assembly of many, there cannot choose but be some whose interests are contrary to that of the Publique; and these their Interests make passionate, and Passion eloquent, and Eloquence drawes others into the same advice. For the Passions of men, which asunder are moderate, as the heat of one brand; in Assembly are like many brands, that enflame one another, (especially when they blow one another with Orations) to the setting of the Common-wealth on fire, under pretence of Counselling it. Thirdly, in hearing every man apart, one may examine (when there is need) the truth, or probability of his reasons, and of the grounds of the advise he gives, by frequent interruptions, and objections; which cannot be done in an Assembly, where (in every difficult question) a man is rather astonied, and dazled with the variety of discourse upon it, than informed of the course he ought to take. Besides, there cannot be an Assembly of many, called together for advice, wherein there be not some, that have the ambition to be thought eloquent, and also learned in the Politiques; and give not their advice with care of the businesse propounded, but of the applause of their motly orations, made of the divers colored threds, or shreds of Authors; which is an Impertinence at least, that takes away the time of serious Consultation, and in the secret way of Counselling apart, is easily avoided. Fourthly, in Deliberations that ought to be kept secret, (whereof there be many occasions in Publique Businesse,) the Counsells of many, and especially in Assemblies, are dangerous; And therefore great Assemblies are necessitated to commit such affaires to lesser numbers, and of such persons as are most versed, and in whose fidelity they have most confidence.

Fifthly, with the same number of advisers, a person gets better advice by hearing them separately than in an assembly. There are many reasons for this. First, by hearing advisers separately, you get each person’s own advice. But in an assembly, many express their advice by saying yes or no, or by gestures of hands or feet. They do so not from their own judgment, but because another speaker’s eloquence sways them. Or they fear displeasing earlier speakers, or the whole assembly, by disagreeing. Or they fear seeming slower to understand than those who have applauded the opposite opinion. Secondly, any large assembly will inevitably include some whose interests conflict with the public interest. Their interests stir their passions, and passion makes them eloquent. Their eloquence then draws others toward the same advice. People’s passions, when they are apart, are moderate, like the heat of a single burning stick. In an assembly, those passions resemble many burning sticks that set one another alight. This happens especially when speeches fan the flames. The result is to set the state on fire under the pretense of advising it. Thirdly, by hearing each person separately, you can test the truth or likelihood of the reasons behind their advice. When necessary, you can do this through frequent interruptions and objections. This cannot be done in an assembly. On every difficult question, the variety of speeches overwhelms and dazzles you rather than showing you what course to take. Besides, every large assembly called together for advice includes some who want to seem eloquent and knowledgeable about politics. They give advice not out of concern for the business at hand, but to win applause for their patchwork speeches. These speeches are woven from authors’ multicolored threads, or scraps. At the very least, such irrelevant displays waste time meant for serious discussion. They are easily avoided when advisers are heard separately and in private. Fourthly, some discussions must be kept secret, as is often necessary in public affairs. In such cases, taking advice from many people is dangerous, especially in assemblies. Large assemblies must therefore entrust such matters to smaller groups. They choose those with the most experience and whose loyalty they trust most.

To conclude, who is there that so far approves the taking of Counsell from a great Assembly of Counsellours, that wisheth for, or would accept of their pains, when there is a question of marrying his Children, disposing of his Lands, governing his Household, or managing his private Estate, especially if there be amongst them such as wish not his prosperity? A man that doth his businesse by the help of many and prudent Counsellours, with every one consulting apart in his proper element, does it best, as he that useth able Seconds at Tennis play, placed in their proper stations. He does next best, that useth his own Judgement only; as he that has no Second at all. But he that is carried up and down to his businesse in a framed Counsell, which cannot move but by the plurality of consenting opinions, the execution whereof is commonly (out of envy, or interest) retarded by the part dissenting, does it worst of all, and like one that is carried to the ball, though by good Players, yet in a Wheele-barrough, or other frame, heavy of it self, and retarded also by the inconcurrent judgements, and endeavours of them that drive it; and so much the more, as they be more that set their hands to it; and most of all, when there is one, or more amongst them, that desire to have him lose. And though it be true, that many eys see more then one; yet it is not to be understood of many Counsellours; but then only, when the finall Resolution is in one man. Otherwise, because many eyes see the same thing in divers lines, and are apt to look asquint towards their private benefit; they that desire not to misse their marke, though they look about with two eyes, yet they never ayme but with one; And therefore no great Popular Common-wealth was ever kept up; but either by a forraign Enemy that united them; or by the reputation of some one eminent Man amongst them; or by the secret Counsell of a few; or by the mutuall feare of equall factions; and not by the open Consultations of the Assembly. And as for very little Common-wealths, be they Popular, or Monarchicall, there is no humane wisdome can uphold them, longer then the Jealousy lasteth of their potent Neighbours.

To conclude, who values advice from a large assembly of advisers enough to want or accept their help with private affairs? Would anyone consult them about marrying off his children, disposing of his land, running his household, or managing his property? Especially if some of the advisers do not wish him well? A man manages his affairs best by consulting many wise advisers, each separately and within his own field. He is like a tennis player who uses skilled assistants, each in the right position. The next best course is to rely on his own judgment alone, like a player with no assistant. But a man does worst when a formally organized council steers his affairs and can act only by majority agreement. Those who disagree commonly delay the council’s decisions from envy or self-interest. Such a man is like a tennis player carried toward the ball in a wheelbarrow or some other heavy contraption. Although those carrying him are good players, the contraption itself is heavy. Their conflicting judgments and efforts slow him down further. The more people pushing, the greater the delay. Worst of all is when one or more of them wants him to lose. Although many eyes do indeed see more than one, this does not apply simply to having many advisers. It applies only when one man makes the final decision. Otherwise, many eyes see the same thing from different angles and tend to glance sideways toward their own advantage. Those who do not want to miss their target look around with two eyes, but always aim with only one. Therefore, no large popular commonwealth has ever survived except through one of four things. These are a foreign enemy that united its people, the reputation of one outstanding man among them, the secret advice of a few, or mutual fear between equally powerful factions. Such commonwealths have never survived through the assembly’s open discussions. As for very small commonwealths, whether popular or monarchical, no human wisdom can preserve them beyond a certain point. They last only as long as their powerful neighbors remain jealous of one another.