Differences in Human Behavior

By MANNERS, I mean not here, Decency of behaviour; as how one man should salute another, or how a man should wash his mouth, or pick his teeth before company, and such other points of the Small Morals; But those qualities of man-kind, that concern their living together in Peace, and Unity. To which end we are to consider, that the Felicity of this life, consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied. For there is no such Finis Ultimus, (utmost ayme,) nor Summum Bonum, (greatest good,) as is spoken of in the Books of the old Morall Philosophers. Nor can a man any more live, whose Desires are at an end, than he, whose Senses and Imaginations are at a stand. Felicity is a continuall progresse of the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being still but the way to the later. The cause whereof is, That the object of mans desire, is not to enjoy once onely, and for one instant of time; but to assure for ever, the way of his future desire. And therefore the voluntary actions, and inclinations of all men, tend, not only to the procuring, but also to the assuring of a contented life; and differ onely in the way: which ariseth partly from the diversity of passions, in divers men; and partly from the difference of the knowledge, or opinion each one has of the causes, which produce the effect desired.

By MANNERS, I do not mean polite behavior. I do not mean how people should greet one another, wash their mouths, or pick their teeth in company. Nor do I mean other minor points of conduct. Instead, I mean the human qualities that concern living together in peace and unity. To understand these qualities, we must recognize that happiness in this life does not mean a satisfied mind at rest. There is no Finis Ultimus (ultimate aim) or Summum Bonum (greatest good), as the ancient moral philosophers describe them. A person whose desires have ended can no more live than someone whose senses and imagination have stopped working. Happiness is a continual movement of desire from one object to another. Attaining the first object is always just the means of reaching the next. The reason is that people do not desire enjoyment only once, for a single moment. They want to secure forever the means of satisfying their future desires. So all people's voluntary actions and inclinations aim not only to obtain a contented life, but also to secure it. People differ only in how they pursue this aim. These differences arise partly from the different passions people have. They also arise from differences in people's knowledge or opinions about the causes that produce the results they desire.

So that in the first place, I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death. And the cause of this, is not alwayes that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more. And from hence it is, that Kings, whose power is greatest, turn their endeavours to the assuring it a home by Lawes, or abroad by Wars: and when that is done, there succeedeth a new desire; in some, of Fame from new Conquest; in others, of ease and sensuall pleasure; in others, of admiration, or being flattered for excellence in some art, or other ability of the mind.

First, then, I identify a general tendency in all humanity: a constant, restless desire for more and more power. This desire ends only in death. People do not always seek more power because they hope for greater pleasure than they already enjoy. Nor is it always because they cannot be content with a moderate amount of power. Rather, they cannot secure their present power and means of living well without gaining more. So kings, who have the greatest power, work to secure their power at home through laws, or abroad through wars. Once their power is secure, a new desire follows. Some desire fame through new conquests. Others desire ease and physical pleasure. Still others desire admiration, or flattery for their excellence in some art or other mental ability.

Competition of Riches, Honour, command, or other power, enclineth to Contention, Enmity, and War: because the way of one Competitor, to the attaining of his desire, is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repell the other. Particularly, competition of praise, enclineth to a reverence of Antiquity. For men contend with the living, not with the dead; to these ascribing more than due, that they may obscure the glory of the other.

Competition for wealth, honor, authority, or other power tends to lead to conflict, hostility, and war. This is because competitors achieve their aims by killing, subduing, displacing, or driving back their rivals. In particular, competition for praise tends to make people revere the past. For people compete with the living, not the dead. They praise the dead more than they deserve so that they may overshadow the glory of their living rivals.

Desire of Ease, and sensuall Delight, disposeth men to obey a common Power: because by such Desires, a man doth abandon the protection might be hoped for from his own Industry, and labour.

The desire for comfort and sensual pleasure makes people inclined to obey a common authority. This is because such desires lead people to abandon the protection they might hope for through their own efforts and work.

Fear of Death, and Wounds, disposeth to the same; and for the same reason. On the contrary, needy men, and hardy, not contented with their present condition; as also, all men that are ambitious of Military command, are enclined to continue the causes of warre; and to stirre up trouble and sedition: for there is no honour Military but by warre; nor any such hope to mend an ill game, as by causing a new shuffle.

Fear of death and injury leads to the same tendency, and for the same reason. By contrast, poor, bold men dissatisfied with their present situation tend to keep the causes of war alive. So do all men who seek military command. Both groups also tend to stir up unrest and rebellion. For military honor can only be won through war. And there is no better hope of improving a bad hand than forcing a new shuffle.

Desire of Knowledge, and Arts of Peace, enclineth men to obey a common Power: For such Desire, containeth a desire of leasure; and consequently protection from some other Power than their own.

The desire for knowledge and the arts of peace inclines people to obey a common authority. For this desire includes a desire for leisure, and therefore for protection from a power other than their own.

Desire of Praise, disposeth to laudable actions, such as please them whose judgement they value; for of these men whom we contemn, we contemn also the Praises. Desire of Fame after death does the same. And though after death, there be no sense of the praise given us on Earth, as being joyes, that are either swallowed up in the unspeakable joyes of Heaven, or extinguished in the extreme torments of Hell: yet is not such Fame vain; because men have a present delight therein, from the foresight of it, and of the benefit that may rebound thereby to their posterity: which though they now see not, yet they imagine; and any thing that is pleasure in the sense, the same also is pleasure in the imagination.

The desire for praise leads people to praiseworthy actions, actions that please those whose judgment they value. For we also scorn the praise of people we scorn. The desire for fame after death has the same effect. Although after death we cannot feel the pleasure of praise given to us on Earth, such fame is not pointless. Those pleasures are either swallowed up in the indescribable joys of Heaven or extinguished in the extreme torments of Hell. Yet people take pleasure now in imagining their future fame and the benefits it may bring to their descendants. Although they cannot now see those benefits, they imagine them. And anything that gives pleasure when experienced also gives pleasure when imagined.

To have received from one, to whom we think our selves equall, greater benefits than there is hope to Requite, disposeth to counterfiet love; but really secret hatred; and puts a man into the estate of a desperate debtor, that in declining the sight of his creditor, tacitely wishes him there, where he might never see him more. For benefits oblige; and obligation is thraldome; which is to ones equall, hateful. But to have received benefits from one, whom we acknowledge our superiour, enclines to love; because the obligation is no new depession: and cheerfull acceptation, (which men call Gratitude,) is such an honour done to the obliger, as is taken generally for retribution. Also to receive benefits, though from an equall, or inferiour, as long as there is hope of requitall, disposeth to love: for in the intention of the receiver, the obligation is of ayd, and service mutuall; from whence proceedeth an Emulation of who shall exceed in benefiting; the most noble and profitable contention possible; wherein the victor is pleased with his victory, and the other revenged by confessing it.

Receiving more benefits than we can hope to repay from someone we consider our equal leads us to pretend love. But in truth, we secretly hate the giver. We become like a desperate debtor who avoids his creditor's sight. In silence, the debtor wishes his creditor somewhere he would never have to see him again. For benefits put us under an obligation, and obligation is bondage. Being bound to an equal is hateful. But receiving benefits from someone we acknowledge as our superior leads us to love them. This is because the obligation does not lower our standing any further. And cheerful acceptance, which people call gratitude, gives the benefactor an honor generally regarded as repayment. Receiving benefits also leads us to love the giver, even an equal or inferior, as long as repayment seems possible. For the receiver intends the obligation to involve mutual help and service. This leads to a rivalry over who can give more benefits, the noblest and most useful contest possible. The winner takes pleasure in winning, and the loser gets revenge by admitting the winner's victory.

To have done more hurt to a man, than he can, or is willing to expiate, enclineth the doer to hate the sufferer. For he must expect revenge, or forgivenesse; both which are hatefull.

Harming a man more than you can or are willing to make amends for tends to make you hate him. For you must expect either revenge or forgiveness, and both are hateful to you.

Feare of oppression, disposeth a man to anticipate, or to seek ayd by society: for there is no other way by which a man can secure his life and liberty.

Fear of oppression leads a person to act first or seek help by joining with others. That is because these are the only ways a person can protect their life and freedom.

Men that distrust their own subtilty, are in tumult, and sedition, better disposed for victory, than they that suppose themselves wise, or crafty. For these love to consult, the other (fearing to be circumvented,) to strike first. And in sedition, men being alwayes in the procincts of Battell, to hold together, and use all advantages of force, is a better stratagem, than any that can proceed from subtilty of Wit.

In unrest and rebellion, men who doubt their own cleverness are better prepared to win than men who consider themselves wise or cunning. For men who think themselves clever prefer to discuss plans. Men who doubt their cleverness prefer to strike first, fearing they will be outwitted. And in rebellion, men are always on the brink of battle. So sticking together and using every advantage of force is a better strategy than any clever scheme.

Vain-glorious men, such as without being conscious to themselves of great sufficiency, delight in supposing themselves gallant men, are enclined onely to ostentation; but not to attempt: Because when danger or difficulty appears, they look for nothing but to have their insufficiency discovered.

Vain men enjoy imagining themselves brave and admirable, though they have no sense of possessing any great ability. Such men are inclined only to show off, not to take action. This is because, when danger or difficulty appears, they expect only to have their lack of ability exposed.

Vain-glorious men, such as estimate their sufficiency by the flattery of other men, or the fortune of some precedent action, without assured ground of hope from the true knowledge of themselves, are enclined to rash engaging; and in the approach of danger, or difficulty, to retire if they can: because not seeing the way of safety, they will rather hazard their honour, which may be salved with an excuse; than their lives, for which no salve is sufficient.

Vain men judge their abilities by others’ flattery or by the good fortune of some past action. Their confidence has no firm basis in a true understanding of themselves. Such men tend to rush into action recklessly. But when danger or difficulty approaches, they retreat if they can, because they see no path to safety. They would rather risk their honor, which an excuse may repair, than their lives, whose loss nothing can repair.

Men that have a strong opinion of their own wisdome in matter of government, are disposed to Ambition. Because without publique Employment in counsell or magistracy, the honour of their wisdome is lost. And therefore Eloquent speakers are enclined to Ambition; for Eloquence seemeth wisdome, both to themselves and others

Men who think highly of their own wisdom in government tend to be ambitious. This is because their wisdom goes unrecognized unless they hold public office as advisers or officials. Eloquent speakers therefore tend to be ambitious, because eloquence seems like wisdom both to the speakers themselves and to others.

Pusillanimity disposeth men to Irresolution, and consequently to lose the occasions, and fittest opportunities of action. For after men have been in deliberation till the time of action approach, if it be not then manifest what is best to be done, tis a signe, the difference of Motives, the one way and the other, are not great: Therefore not to resolve then, is to lose the occasion by weighing of trifles; which is pusillanimity.

Timidity makes people indecisive, causing them to miss chances to act and the best opportunities. For people may deliberate until the time for action approaches, yet still not see clearly what is best to do. If so, the reasons for one choice do not greatly outweigh the reasons for another. Therefore, failing to decide then means missing the opportunity by weighing trivial differences. Such indecision is timidity.

Frugality,(though in poor men a Vertue,) maketh a man unapt to atchieve such actions, as require the strength of many men at once: For it weakeneth their Endeavour, which is to be nourished and kept in vigor by Reward.

Although frugality is a virtue in poor men, it makes a man ill-suited to tasks requiring many men's combined strength. For frugality weakens those men's efforts. Those efforts need rewards to sustain them and keep them strong.

Confidence In Others From Ignorance Of The Marks Of Wisdome and Kindnesse Eloquence, with flattery, disposeth men to confide in them that have it; because the former is seeming Wisdome, the later seeming Kindnesse. Adde to them Military reputation, and it disposeth men to adhaere, and subject themselves to those men that have them. The two former, having given them caution against danger from him; the later gives them caution against danger from others.

Trust in Others Through Ignorance of the Signs of Wisdom and Kindness: Eloquence combined with flattery inclines people to trust those who possess these qualities. This is because eloquence seems like wisdom, and flattery seems like kindness. Add a military reputation, and people are inclined to follow and submit to those who possess all three. Eloquence and flattery have reassured people against danger from the person who possesses them. A military reputation reassures people against danger from others.

Want of Science, that is, Ignorance of causes, disposeth, or rather constraineth a man to rely on the advise, and authority of others. For all men whom the truth concernes, if they rely not on their own, must rely on the opinion of some other, whom they think wiser than themselves, and see not why he should deceive them.

Lack of knowledge, meaning ignorance of causes, leads a person, or rather forces them, to trust others’ advice and authority. For everyone concerned with the truth must rely on someone else’s judgment if they do not trust their own. They must consider that person wiser than themselves and see no reason why that person would deceive them.

Ignorance of the signification of words; which is, want of understanding, disposeth men to take on trust, not onely the truth they know not; but also the errors; and which is more, the non-sense of them they trust: For neither Error, nor non-sense, can without a perfect understanding of words, be detected.

Not knowing what words mean is a lack of understanding, and leads people to accept on trust truths they do not know. But it also leads them to accept the errors and, worse still, the nonsense of those they trust. For neither errors nor nonsense can be detected without fully understanding the words.

From the same it proceedeth, that men give different names, to one and the same thing, from the difference of their own passions: As they that approve a private opinion, call it Opinion; but they that mislike it, Haeresie: and yet haeresie signifies no more than private opinion; but has onely a greater tincture of choler.

For the same reason, people give different names to the same thing because their own feelings differ. Those who approve of a private opinion call it opinion. But those who dislike it call it heresy. Yet heresy means no more than private opinion, only with a stronger tinge of anger.

From the same also it proceedeth, that men cannot distinguish, without study and great understanding, between one action of many men, and many actions of one multitude; as for example, between the one action of all the Senators of Rome in killing Catiline, and the many actions of a number of Senators in killing Caesar; and therefore are disposed to take for the action of the people, that which is a multitude of actions done by a multitude of men, led perhaps by the perswasion of one.

For the same reason, people cannot make the following distinction without study and deep understanding. One action carried out by many people differs from many separate actions carried out by a crowd. For example, all the Senators of Rome acted together in killing Catiline. By contrast, a number of Senators carried out separate actions in killing Caesar. So people tend to mistake many actions by many people for a single action of the people. Those many people may perhaps have been persuaded by just one person.

Adhaerence To Custome, From Ignorance Of The Nature Of Right And Wrong Ignorance of the causes, and originall constitution of Right, Equity, Law, and Justice, disposeth a man to make Custome and Example the rule of his actions; in such manner, as to think that Unjust which it hath been the custome to punish; and that Just, of the impunity and approbation whereof they can produce an Example, or (as the Lawyers which onely use the false measure of Justice barbarously call it) a Precedent; like little children, that have no other rule of good and evill manners, but the correction they receive from their Parents, and Masters; save that children are constant to their rule, whereas men are not so; because grown strong, and stubborn, they appeale from custome to reason, and from reason to custome, as it serves their turn; receding from custome when their interest requires it, and setting themselves against reason, as oft as reason is against them: Which is the cause, that the doctrine of Right and Wrong, is perpetually disputed, both by the Pen and the Sword: whereas the doctrine of Lines, and Figures, is not so; because men care not, in that subject what be truth, as a thing that crosses no mans ambition, profit, or lust. For I doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary to any mans right of dominion, or to the interest of men that have dominion, That The Three Angles Of A Triangle Should Be Equall To Two Angles Of A Square; that doctrine should have been, if not disputed, yet by the burning of all books of Geometry, suppressed, as farre as he whom it concerned was able.

Following Custom Through Ignorance of Right and Wrong People who do not understand the causes and origins of right, fairness, law, and justice make custom and example their guide. They think an action unjust if punishing it has been customary. They think an action just if they can give an example of it going unpunished and meeting with approval. Lawyers who use only this false measure of justice give such an example the barbarous name of precedent. Such people resemble little children, whose only guide to good and bad behavior is correction from parents and teachers. But children follow their rule consistently, while adults do not. Having grown strong and stubborn, adults appeal from custom to reason, and from reason to custom, whenever either suits them. They abandon custom when their interests require it. And they oppose reason whenever reason goes against them. This is why questions of right and wrong are endlessly fought over, both in writing and with swords. Questions about lines and shapes are not. In geometry, people do not care what the truth is, because it threatens no one's ambition, profit, or desires. For I have no doubt what would happen if a geometrical principle threatened anyone's right to rule, or rulers' interests. Suppose that principle stated that a triangle's three angles equal two angles of a square. Even if no one disputed the principle, anyone whose interests it threatened would suppress it as far as they could. They would do so by burning all books on geometry.

Adhaerence To Private Men, From Ignorance Of The Causes Of Peace Ignorance of remote causes, disposeth men to attribute all events, to the causes immediate, and Instrumentall: For these are all the causes they perceive. And hence it comes to passe, that in all places, men that are grieved with payments to the Publique, discharge their anger upon the Publicans, that is to say, Farmers, Collectors, and other Officers of the publique Revenue; and adhaere to such as find fault with the publike Government; and thereby, when they have engaged themselves beyond hope of justification, fall also upon the Supreme Authority, for feare of punishment, or shame of receiving pardon.

Loyalty to Private Individuals Through Ignorance of the Causes of Peace: Ignorance of deeper causes leads people to attribute all events to immediate causes and the agents involved. For these are the only causes people perceive. As a result, everywhere, people who resent payments to the state vent their anger on revenue officials. These officials include tax farmers (private contractors who collect taxes), tax collectors, and other public revenue officers. These resentful people then side with those who criticize the government. Once their involvement goes beyond any hope of justifying their actions, they also turn against the supreme authority. They do so because they fear punishment or feel ashamed to accept a pardon.

Ignorance of naturall causes disposeth a man to Credulity, so as to believe many times impossibilities: for such know nothing to the contrary, but that they may be true; being unable to detect the Impossibility. And Credulity, because men love to be hearkened unto in company, disposeth them to lying: so that Ignorance it selfe without Malice, is able to make a man bothe to believe lyes, and tell them; and sometimes also to invent them.

Ignorance of natural causes makes people gullible, so they often believe things that are impossible. They know nothing that rules out those things being true, because they cannot recognize the impossibility. And gullibility makes people more likely to lie, because people love being listened to in company. So ignorance alone, without malice, can make people both believe lies and tell them, and sometimes even invent them.

Anxiety for the future time, disposeth men to enquire into the causes of things: because the knowledge of them, maketh men the better able to order the present to their best advantage.

Anxiety about the future leads people to investigate the causes of things. Knowing these causes helps people arrange the present to their best advantage.

Curiosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws a man from consideration of the effect, to seek the cause; and again, the cause of that cause; till of necessity he must come to this thought at last, that there is some cause, whereof there is no former cause, but is eternall; which is it men call God. So that it is impossible to make any profound enquiry into naturall causes, without being enclined thereby to believe there is one God Eternall; though they cannot have any Idea of him in their mind, answerable to his nature. For as a man that is born blind, hearing men talk of warming themselves by the fire, and being brought to warm himself by the same, may easily conceive, and assure himselfe, there is somewhat there, which men call Fire, and is the cause of the heat he feeles; but cannot imagine what it is like; nor have an Idea of it in his mind, such as they have that see it: so also, by the visible things of this world, and their admirable order, a man may conceive there is a cause of them, which men call God; and yet not have an Idea, or Image of him in his mind.

Curiosity, or the love of knowing causes, leads a person from considering an effect to seeking its cause. Then they seek the cause of that cause. Eventually, they must reach the thought that some cause has no earlier cause but is eternal. This is what people call God. So it is impossible to investigate natural causes deeply without being led toward belief in one eternal God. Yet people cannot form a mental image of him that corresponds to his nature. For example, a person born blind may hear people talk about warming themselves by a fire. They may then be brought to the fire to warm themselves. They can easily understand and be certain that something people call Fire causes the heat they feel. But they cannot imagine what fire looks like or form the mental image that sighted people have. In the same way, the visible things of this world and their wonderful order may suggest a cause. A person may understand that such a cause exists, and that people call this cause God. Yet they may have no idea or image of him in their mind.

And they that make little, or no enquiry into the naturall causes of things, yet from the feare that proceeds from the ignorance it selfe, of what it is that hath the power to do them much good or harm, are enclined to suppose, and feign unto themselves, severall kinds of Powers Invisible; and to stand in awe of their own imaginations; and in time of distresse to invoke them; as also in the time of an expected good successe, to give them thanks; making the creatures of their own fancy, their Gods. By which means it hath come to passe, that from the innumerable variety of Fancy, men have created in the world innumerable sorts of Gods. And this Feare of things invisible, is the naturall Seed of that, which every one in himself calleth Religion; and in them that worship, or feare that Power otherwise than they do, Superstition.

People who do little or nothing to investigate the natural causes of things still fear what they do not understand. They do not know what has the power to bring them great good or harm. This ignorance itself creates fear, which inclines them to imagine various kinds of invisible powers. They stand in awe of what they themselves have imagined. In times of distress, they call on these powers for help. When they expect success, they also give these powers thanks. In this way, they make the creations of their own imagination into their gods. Because human imagination takes countless forms, people have created countless kinds of gods in the world. This fear of invisible things is the natural seed of what everyone calls religion in themselves. But when others worship or fear that power differently, they call it superstition.

And this seed of Religion, having been observed by many; some of those that have observed it, have been enclined thereby to nourish, dresse, and forme it into Lawes; and to adde to it of their own invention, any opinion of the causes of future events, by which they thought they should best be able to govern others, and make unto themselves the greatest use of their Powers.

Many have noticed this seed of religion. As a result, some have been inclined to nurture and shape it into laws. They have also added their own invented opinions about the causes of future events. They chose opinions they thought would best help them govern others and make the most of their powers.