From the contrariety of some of the Naturall Faculties of the Mind, one to another, as also of one Passion to another, and from their reference to Conversation, there has been an argument taken, to inferre an impossibility that any one man should be sufficiently disposed to all sorts of Civill duty. The Severity of Judgment, they say, makes men Censorious, and unapt to pardon the Errours and Infirmities of other men: and on the other side, Celerity of Fancy, makes the thoughts lesse steddy than is necessary, to discern exactly between Right and Wrong. Again, in all Deliberations, and in all Pleadings, the faculty of solid Reasoning, is necessary: for without it, the Resolutions of men are rash, and their Sentences unjust: and yet if there be not powerfull Eloquence, which procureth attention and Consent, the effect of Reason will be little. But these are contrary Faculties; the former being grounded upon principles of Truth; the other upon Opinions already received, true, or false; and upon the Passions and Interests of men, which are different, and mutable.
Some natural mental abilities conflict with one another, as do some passions. These conflicts, and how these abilities and passions affect social life, have led some to an argument. They argue that no one person can be sufficiently suited to every kind of civic duty. Strict judgment, they say, makes people harsh critics, unwilling to forgive the errors and weaknesses of others. On the other hand, a quick imagination makes thoughts less steady than needed to distinguish right from wrong precisely. Again, sound reasoning is necessary in all deliberations and all legal arguments. Without sound reasoning, people make rash decisions and give unjust judgments. Yet reason will have little effect without powerful eloquence to win attention and agreement. But sound reasoning and eloquence are conflicting abilities. Sound reasoning rests on principles of truth. Eloquence rests on accepted opinions, whether true or false, and on people's passions and interests, which differ and change.
And amongst the Passions, Courage, (by which I mean the Contempt of Wounds, and violent Death) enclineth men to private Revenges, and sometimes to endeavour the unsetling of the Publique Peace; And Timorousnesse, many times disposeth to the desertion of the Publique Defence. Both these they say cannot stand together in the same person.
Among the passions, courage inclines men to take personal revenge and sometimes to try to disturb the public peace. By courage, I mean disregard for wounds and violent death. And fearfulness often leads men to abandon the defense of the community. These two passions, they say, cannot exist together in the same person.
And to consider the contrariety of mens Opinions, and Manners in generall, It is they say, impossible to entertain a constant Civill Amity with all those, with whom the Businesse of the world constrains us to converse: Which Businesse consisteth almost in nothing else but a perpetuall contention for Honor, Riches, and Authority.
And consider how people differ in their opinions and ways of life in general. Given these differences, they say, it is impossible to maintain friendly relations with everyone worldly affairs force us to deal with. These affairs consist of almost nothing but a constant struggle for honor, wealth, and power.
To which I answer, that these are indeed great difficulties, but not Impossibilities: For by Education, and Discipline, they may bee, and are sometimes reconciled. Judgment, and Fancy may have place in the same man; but by turnes; as the end which he aimeth at requireth. As the Israelites in Egypt, were sometimes fastened to their labour of making Bricks, and other times were ranging abroad to gather Straw: So also may the Judgment sometimes be fixed upon one certain Consideration, and the Fancy at another time wandring about the world. So also Reason, and Eloquence, (though not perhaps in the Naturall Sciences, yet in the Morall) may stand very well together. For wheresoever there is place for adorning and preferring of Errour, there is much more place for adorning and preferring of Truth, if they have it to adorn. Nor is there any repugnancy between fearing the Laws, and not fearing a publique Enemy; nor between abstaining from Injury, and pardoning it in others. There is therefore no such Inconsistence of Humane Nature, with Civill Duties, as some think. I have known cleernesse of Judgment, and largenesse of Fancy; strength of Reason, and gracefull Elocution; a Courage for the Warre, and a Fear for the Laws, and all eminently in one man; and that was my most noble and honored friend Mr. Sidney Godolphin; who hating no man, nor hated of any, was unfortunately slain in the beginning of the late Civill warre, in the Publique quarrel, by an indiscerned, and an undiscerning hand.
My answer is that these are indeed great difficulties, but they are not impossibilities. Education and discipline can reconcile these qualities, and sometimes do. Judgment and imagination can exist in the same person, but take turns as the person's goal requires. The Israelites in Egypt were sometimes tied to their work of making bricks. At other times, they roamed about gathering straw. In the same way, judgment may sometimes focus on one particular question, while imagination may roam the world at another time. Reason and eloquence can also work very well together, though perhaps not in the natural sciences, but in moral matters. Wherever error can be made attractive and promoted, truth can be made even more attractive and promoted more effectively. That is, if those using eloquence have truth to embellish. Nor is there any conflict between fearing the laws and not fearing a public enemy. Nor is there any conflict between refraining from harming others and forgiving others for causing harm. Human nature is therefore not as incompatible with civic duties as some think. I have known one man who combined clear judgment and wide-ranging imagination, strong reasoning and graceful speech. He also combined courage in war with fear of the laws. All these qualities were outstanding in my most noble and honored friend, Mr. Sidney Godolphin. He hated no one, and no one hated him. Yet he was, unfortunately, killed at the beginning of the recent Civil War, in the public conflict. The hand that killed him was both unknown and undiscerning.
To the Laws of Nature, declared in the 15. Chapter, I would have this added, “That every man is bound by Nature, as much as in him lieth, to protect in Warre, the Authority, by which he is himself protected in time of Peace.” For he that pretendeth a Right of Nature to preserve his owne body, cannot pretend a Right of Nature to destroy him, by whose strength he is preserved: It is a manifest contradiction of himselfe. And though this Law may bee drawn by consequence, from some of those that are there already mentioned; yet the Times require to have it inculcated, and remembred.
To the Laws of Nature set out in Chapter 15, I would add the following: “Everyone is bound by Nature to do all he can to protect, during war, the authority that protects him during peace.” For anyone who claims a natural right to preserve his own life cannot claim a natural right to destroy his protector. His protector’s strength keeps him safe, so such a claim plainly contradicts itself. Although this law may follow from some of the laws already mentioned, the times demand that it be stressed and remembered.
And because I find by divers English Books lately printed, that the Civill warres have not yet sufficiently taught men, in what point of time it is, that a Subject becomes obliged to the Conquerour; nor what is Conquest; nor how it comes about, that it obliges men to obey his Laws: Therefore for farther satisfaction of men therein, I say, the point of time, wherein a man becomes subject of a Conquerour, is that point, wherein having liberty to submit to him, he consenteth, either by expresse words, or by other sufficient sign, to be his Subject. When it is that a man hath the liberty to submit, I have showed before in the end of the 21. Chapter; namely, that for him that hath no obligation to his former Soveraign but that of an ordinary Subject, it is then, when the means of his life is within the Guards and Garrisons of the Enemy; for it is then, that he hath no longer Protection from him, but is protected by the adverse party for his Contribution. Seeing therefore such contribution is every where, as a thing inevitable, (notwithstanding it be an assistance to the Enemy,) esteemed lawfull; as totall Submission, which is but an assistance to the Enemy, cannot be esteemed unlawfull. Besides, if a man consider that they who submit, assist the Enemy but with part of their estates, whereas they that refuse, assist him with the whole, there is no reason to call their Submission, or Composition an Assistance; but rather a Detriment to the Enemy. But if a man, besides the obligation of a Subject, hath taken upon him a new obligation of a Souldier, then he hath not the liberty to submit to a new Power, as long as the old one keeps the field, and giveth him means of subsistence, either in his Armies, or Garrisons: for in this case, he cannot complain of want of Protection, and means to live as a Souldier: But when that also failes, a Souldier also may seek his Protection wheresoever he has most hope to have it; and may lawfully submit himself to his new Master. And so much for the Time when he may do it lawfully, if hee will. If therefore he doe it, he is undoubtedly bound to be a true Subject: For a Contract lawfully made, cannot lawfully be broken.
Several recently printed English books show me that the civil wars have not yet taught people enough about conquest. People still do not understand when a subject becomes bound to a conqueror, or what conquest is. Nor do they understand how conquest obliges people to obey the conqueror’s laws. So, to explain these matters further, I say that a man becomes a conqueror’s subject when he freely consents to submit. He must be free to submit and express his consent through words or some other sufficient sign. I have already explained when a man is free to submit, at the end of Chapter 21. Consider a man whose only obligation to his former sovereign is that of an ordinary subject. He is free to submit when his means of survival lie within the enemy’s guarded territory and garrisons. His former sovereign no longer protects him then. Instead, the opposing side protects him in return for payments. Such payments are everywhere considered lawful because they are unavoidable, even though they help the enemy. Therefore, complete submission, which likewise only helps the enemy, cannot be considered unlawful. Besides, those who submit help the enemy with only part of their property. Those who refuse help the enemy with all of it. So there is no reason to call their submission, or their negotiated settlement, help to the enemy. Rather, it is a loss to the enemy. But a man may have taken on a soldier’s additional obligation, beyond his obligation as a subject. Then he is not free to submit to a new power while the old power remains in the field and supports him. That support may be in its armies or its garrisons. In that case, he cannot complain that he lacks protection or the means to live as a soldier. But when that support also fails, a soldier too may seek protection wherever he has the greatest hope of finding it. He may lawfully submit to his new master. That explains when a man may lawfully submit, if he chooses. If he does submit, he is undoubtedly bound to be a faithful subject. For a contract lawfully made cannot lawfully be broken.
By this also a man may understand, when it is, that men may be said to be Conquered; and in what the nature of Conquest, and the Right of a Conquerour consisteth: For this Submission is it implyeth them all. Conquest, is not the Victory it self; but the Acquisition by Victory, of a Right, over the persons of men. He therefore that is slain, is Overcome, but not Conquered; He that is taken, and put into prison, or chaines, is not Conquered, though Overcome; for he is still an Enemy, and may save himself if hee can: But he that upon promise of Obedience, hath his Life and Liberty allowed him, is then Conquered, and a Subject; and not before. The Romanes used to say, that their Generall had Pacified such a Province, that is to say, in English, Conquered it; and that the Countrey was Pacified by Victory, when the people of it had promised Imperata Facere, that is, To Doe What The Romane People Commanded Them: this was to be Conquered. But this promise may be either expresse, or tacite: Expresse, by Promise: Tacite, by other signes. As for example, a man that hath not been called to make such an expresse Promise, (because he is one whose power perhaps is not considerable;) yet if he live under their Protection openly, hee is understood to submit himselfe to the Government: But if he live there secretly, he is lyable to any thing that may bee done to a Spie, and Enemy of the State. I say not, hee does any Injustice, (for acts of open Hostility bear not that name); but that he may be justly put to death. Likewise, if a man, when his Country is conquered, be out of it, he is not Conquered, nor Subject: but if at his return, he submit to the Government, he is bound to obey it. So that Conquest (to define it) is the Acquiring of the Right of Soveraignty by Victory. Which Right, is acquired, in the peoples Submission, by which they contract with the Victor, promising Obedience, for Life and Liberty.
From this submission, we can also understand when people can be said to be conquered. We can understand the nature of conquest and the rights of a conqueror. For submission implies all these things. Conquest is not victory itself. It is gaining, through victory, a right over other people. Someone who is killed is therefore defeated, but not conquered. Someone captured and put in prison or chains is not conquered, though defeated. For the prisoner remains an enemy and may escape if he can. But someone allowed to keep his life and freedom in return for promising obedience is conquered and becomes a subject. He becomes a subject then, and not before. The Romans used to say that their general had pacified a province, meaning, in plain English, conquered it. They said a country was pacified by victory when its people had promised Imperata Facere. This means to do what the Roman people commanded them. Making this promise was what it meant to be conquered. But the promise may be either explicit or implied. It is explicit when made in words, and implied when shown by other signs. For example, a man may not have been asked to make an explicit promise, perhaps because his power is insignificant. Yet if he openly lives under the conquerors’ protection, he is understood to submit to their government. But if he lives there secretly, he is liable to any treatment that a spy and enemy of the state might receive. I do not say he commits an injustice, for acts of open hostility are not called injustices. But I do say he may justly be put to death. Likewise, if a man is outside his country when it is conquered, he is neither conquered nor a subject. But if he submits to the government when he returns, he is bound to obey it. So conquest, by definition, is gaining the right of sovereignty through victory. This right is gained through the people’s submission. By submitting, they make an agreement with the victor, promising obedience in return for life and freedom.
In the 29th Chapter I have set down for one of the causes of the Dissolutions of Common-wealths, their Imperfect Generation, consisting in the want of an Absolute and Arbitrary Legislative Power; for want whereof, the Civill Soveraign is fain to handle the Sword of Justice unconstantly, and as if it were too hot for him to hold: One reason whereof (which I have not there mentioned) is this, That they will all of them justifie the War, by which their Power was at first gotten, and whereon (as they think) their Right dependeth, and not on the Possession. As if, for example, the Right of the Kings of England did depend on the goodnesse of the cause of William the Conquerour, and upon their lineall, and directest Descent from him; by which means, there would perhaps be no tie of the Subjects obedience to their Soveraign at this day in all the world: wherein whilest they needlessely think to justifie themselves, they justifie all the successefull Rebellions that Ambition shall at any time raise against them, and their Successors. Therefore I put down for one of the most effectuall seeds of the Death of any State, that the Conquerours require not onely a Submission of mens actions to them for the future, but also an Approbation of all their actions past; when there is scarce a Common-wealth in the world, whose beginnings can in conscience be justified.
In Chapter 29, I named flawed beginnings as one cause of the collapse of commonwealths. The flaw is the lack of absolute power to make laws at the ruler’s own discretion. Without this power, the civil sovereign must wield the sword of justice inconsistently, as if it were too hot to hold. One reason for this is something I did not mention there. All these rulers seek to justify the war through which they first gained power. They think their right to rule depends on that war, rather than on their possession of power. This is as if the right of the Kings of England depended on the justice of William the Conquerour’s cause. It is also as if their right depended on being his descendants in the most direct line. On that basis, perhaps no subjects anywhere in the world today would be bound to obey their sovereign. So, while these rulers needlessly try to justify themselves, they justify all successful rebellions that ambition may ever raise against them and their successors. I therefore count the following among the most powerful seeds of any state’s destruction. Conquerors demand not only that people submit their future actions to them, but also that people approve all their past actions. Yet scarcely any commonwealth in the world has beginnings that can be justified in good conscience.
And because the name of Tyranny, signifieth nothing more, nor lesse, than the name of Soveraignty, be it in one, or many men, saving that they that use the former word, are understood to bee angry with them they call Tyrants; I think the toleration of a professed hatred of Tyranny, is a Toleration of hatred to Common-wealth in general, and another evill seed, not differing much from the former. For to the Justification of the Cause of a Conqueror, the Reproach of the Cause of the Conquered, is for the most part necessary: but neither of them necessary for the Obligation of the Conquered. And thus much I have thought fit to say upon the Review of the first and second part of this Discourse.
The word tyranny means no more and no less than sovereignty, whether held by one person or many. The only difference is that people who use the first word are understood to resent those they call tyrants. Because of this, I think allowing people to openly declare their hatred of tyranny allows hatred of commonwealths in general. It also plants another harmful seed, not very different from the previous one. For justifying a conqueror’s cause usually requires condemning the cause of the conquered. But neither justification nor condemnation is necessary to establish the obligation of the conquered to obey. This is all I have thought it appropriate to say in reviewing the first and second parts of this work.
In the 35th Chapter, I have sufficiently declared out of the Scripture, that in the Common-wealth of the Jewes, God himselfe was made the Soveraign, by Pact with the People; who were therefore called his Peculiar People, to distinguish them from the rest of the world, over whom God reigned not by their Consent, but by his own Power: And that in this Kingdome Moses was Gods Lieutenant on Earth; and that it was he that told them what Laws God appointed to doe Execution; especially in Capitall Punishments; not then thinking it a matter of so necessary consideration, as I find it since. Wee know that generally in all Common-wealths, the Execution of Corporeall Punishments, was either put upon the Guards, or other Souldiers of the Soveraign Power; or given to those, in whom want of means, contempt of honour, and hardnesse of heart, concurred, to make them sue for such an Office. But amongst the Israelites it was a Positive Law of God their Soveraign, that he that was convicted of a capitall Crime, should be stoned to death by the People; and that the Witnesses should cast the first Stone, and after the Witnesses, then the rest of the People. This was a Law that designed who were to be the Executioners; but not that any one should throw a Stone at him before Conviction and Sentence, where the Congregation was Judge. The Witnesses were neverthelesse to be heard before they proceeded to Execution, unlesse the Fact were committed in the presence of the Congregation it self, or in sight of the lawfull Judges; for then there needed no other Witnesses but the Judges themselves. Neverthelesse, this manner of proceeding being not throughly understood, hath given occasion to a dangerous opinion, that any man may kill another, is some cases, by a Right of Zeal; as if the Executions done upon Offenders in the Kingdome of God in old time, proceeded not from the Soveraign Command, but from the Authority of Private Zeal: which, if we consider the texts that seem to favour it, is quite contrary.
In Chapter 35, I have shown sufficiently from Scripture that God himself became sovereign of the Jewish commonwealth by agreement with the people. They were therefore called his special people, to distinguish them from the rest of the world. God ruled the rest of the world not by their consent, but by his own power. I also showed that Moses was God's representative on earth in this kingdom. Moses told the people what laws God had established for carrying out punishments, especially death sentences. At the time, I did not think this matter needed such careful consideration as I have since found necessary. We know that, generally, in all commonwealths, the sovereign's guards or other soldiers were assigned to carry out bodily punishments. Alternatively, the task went to people whose poverty, disregard for honor, and hardness of heart together led them to seek such work. But among the Israelites, God their sovereign expressly established a law governing executions. Anyone convicted of a crime punishable by death was to be stoned to death by the people. The witnesses were to throw the first stone, followed by the rest of the people. This law specified who would carry out the execution. But the law did not authorize anyone to throw a stone before conviction and sentencing, when the congregation served as judge. The witnesses still had to be heard before the execution could proceed. The exception was when the offense occurred before the congregation itself or in sight of the lawful judges. In that case, no witnesses were needed other than the judges themselves. Nevertheless, misunderstanding this procedure has given rise to a dangerous opinion. According to this opinion, anyone may, in some cases, kill another person by a right arising from religious zeal. This treats executions of offenders in God's ancient kingdom as acts authorized by private zeal rather than by the sovereign's command. But if we examine the scriptural passages that seem to support this opinion, we find that they show the exact opposite.
First, where the Levites fell upon the People, that had made and worshipped the Golden Calfe, and slew three thousand of them; it was by the Commandement of Moses, from the mouth of God; as is manifest, Exod. 32.27. And when the Son of a woman of Israel had blasphemed God, they that heard it, did not kill him, but brought him before Moses, who put him under custody, till God should give Sentence against him; as appears, Levit. 25.11, 12. Again, (Numbers 25.6, 7.) when Phinehas killed Zimri and Cosbi, it was not by right of Private Zeale: Their Crime was committed in the sight of the Assembly; there needed no Witnesse; the Law was known, and he the heir apparent to the Soveraignty; and which is the principall point, the Lawfulnesse of his Act depended wholly upon a subsequent Ratification by Moses, whereof he had no cause to doubt. And this Presumption of a future Ratification, is sometimes necessary to the safety [of] a Common-wealth; as in a sudden Rebellion, any man that can suppresse it by his own Power in the Countrey where it begins, may lawfully doe it, and provide to have it Ratified, or Pardoned, whilest it is in doing, or after it is done. Also Numb. 35.30. it is expressely said, “Whosoever shall kill the Murtherer, shall kill him upon the word of Witnesses:” but Witnesses suppose a formall Judicature, and consequently condemn that pretence of Jus Zelotarum. The Law of Moses concerning him that enticeth to Idolatry, (that is to say, in the Kingdome of God to a renouncing of his Allegiance) (Deut. 13.8.) forbids to conceal him, and commands the Accuser to cause him to be put to death, and to cast the first stone at him; but not to kill him before he be Condemned. And (Deut. 17. ver.4, 5, 6.) the Processe against Idolatry is exactly set down: For God there speaketh to the People, as Judge, and commandeth them, when a man is Accused of Idolatry, to Enquire diligently of the Fact, and finding it true, then to Stone him; but still the hand of the Witnesse throweth the first stone. This is not Private Zeal, but Publique Condemnation. In like manner when a Father hath a rebellious Son, the Law is (Deut. 21. 18.) that he shall bring him before the Judges of the Town, and all the people of the Town shall Stone him. Lastly, by pretence of these Laws it was, that St. Steven was Stoned, and not by pretence of Private Zeal: for before hee was carried away to Execution, he had Pleaded his Cause before the High Priest. There is nothing in all this, nor in any other part of the Bible, to countenance Executions by Private Zeal; which being oftentimes but a conjunction of Ignorance and Passion, is against both the Justice and Peace of a Common-wealth.
First, the Levites attacked the people who had made and worshipped the Golden Calf, killing three thousand of them. They acted on Moses’ command, given by God himself, as Exodus 32:27 makes clear. And when the son of an Israelite woman blasphemed God, those who heard him did not kill him. Instead, they brought him before Moses, who held him in custody until God passed sentence against him. This appears in Leviticus 25:11, 12. Again, when Phinehas killed Zimri and Cosbi (Numbers 25:6, 7), he had no right to act from private religious zeal. Their crime was committed in sight of the assembly, so no witnesses were needed. The law was known, and Phinehas was the heir apparent to sovereign power. Most importantly, the lawfulness of his act depended entirely on Moses’ later approval, which Phinehas had no reason to doubt. And sometimes, a commonwealth’s safety requires acting on the assumption that approval will follow. For example, suppose a sudden rebellion breaks out. Anyone able to suppress the rebellion by his own power in the region where it begins may lawfully do so. He may arrange for approval or a pardon while suppressing the rebellion or afterward. Also, Numbers 35:30 expressly says, “Whoever kills a murderer must do so on the testimony of witnesses.” But witnesses imply a formal court proceeding, which therefore rules out the claimed Jus Zelotarum, or right of private religious zeal. The Law of Moses addresses anyone who entices others into idolatry (Deuteronomy 13:8). In the Kingdom of God, enticing someone into idolatry means enticing that person to renounce allegiance. The law forbids concealing the offender. It commands the accuser to have the offender put to death and to throw the first stone. But the accuser must not kill the offender before conviction. And Deuteronomy 17:4, 5, 6 sets out the procedure against idolatry precisely. There, God addresses the people as judges. He commands them to investigate the facts carefully when someone is accused of idolatry. If they find the accusation true, they must then stone the accused. But the witness must still throw the first stone. This is not private religious zeal, but a public judgment. Likewise, the law concerning a father with a rebellious son appears in Deuteronomy 21:18. The father must bring his son before the town’s judges, and all the townspeople must stone him. Finally, these laws were the claimed justification for stoning St. Stephen, not any claimed right of private religious zeal. Before being taken away for execution, he had presented his defense before the High Priest. Nothing in these passages, or anywhere else in the Bible, supports executions carried out through private religious zeal. Such zeal is often merely ignorance combined with passion, and it threatens both the justice and peace of a commonwealth.
In the 36th Chapter I have said, that it is not declared in what manner God spake supernaturally to Moses: Not that he spake not to him sometimes by Dreams and Visions, and by a supernaturall Voice, as to other Prophets: For the manner how he spake unto him from the Mercy-seat, is expressely set down (Numbers 7.89.) in these words, “From that time forward, when Moses entred into the Tabernacle of the Congregation to speak with God, he heard a Voice which spake unto him from over the Mercy-Seate, which is over the Arke of the Testimony, from between the Cherubins he spake unto him.” But it is not declared in what consisted the praeeminence of the manner of Gods speaking to Moses, above that of his speaking to other Prophets, as to Samuel, and to Abraham, to whom he also spake by a Voice, (that is, by Vision) Unlesse the difference consist in the cleernesse of the Vision. For Face to Face, and Mouth to Mouth, cannot be literally understood of the Infinitenesse, and Incomprehensibility of the Divine Nature.
In Chapter 36, I said that Scripture does not explain how God spoke supernaturally to Moses. I did not mean that God never spoke to him through dreams, visions, or a supernatural voice, as to other prophets. For Scripture explicitly describes how God spoke to Moses from the Mercy-seat (Numbers 7:89), in these words: “From that time onward, when Moses entered the Tabernacle of the Congregation to speak with God, he heard a voice. The voice spoke to him from above the Mercy-seat, over the Ark of the Testimony. God spoke to him from between the Cherubim.” But Scripture does not explain what made God's way of speaking to Moses superior to his way of addressing other prophets. God also spoke by a voice (that is, through a vision) to Samuel and Abraham. Perhaps the difference lay in the clarity of the vision. For “face to face” and “mouth to mouth” cannot be understood literally, given God's infinite and incomprehensible nature.
And as to the whole Doctrine, I see not yet, but the principles of it are true and proper; and the Ratiocination solid. For I ground the Civill Right of Soveraigns, and both the Duty and Liberty of Subjects, upon the known naturall Inclinations of Mankind, and upon the Articles of the Law of Nature; of which no man, that pretends but reason enough to govern his private family, ought to be ignorant. And for the Power Ecclesiasticall of the same Soveraigns, I ground it on such Texts, as are both evident in themselves, and consonant to the Scope of the whole Scripture. And therefore am perswaded, that he that shall read it with a purpose onely to be informed, shall be informed by it. But for those that by Writing, or Publique Discourse, or by their eminent actions, have already engaged themselves to the maintaining of contrary opinions, they will not bee so easily satisfied. For in such cases, it is naturall for men, at one and the same time, both to proceed in reading, and to lose their attention, in the search of objections to that they had read before: Of which, in a time wherein the interests of men are changed (seeing much of that Doctrine, which serveth to the establishing of a new Government, must needs be contrary to that which conduced to the dissolution of the old,) there cannot choose but be very many.
As for the doctrine as a whole, I have yet to see any reason to doubt its principles or reasoning. Its principles are true and appropriate, and its reasoning is sound. For I base sovereigns’ civil rights, and subjects’ duties and freedoms, on humanity’s known natural inclinations and the laws of nature. No one who claims enough reason to manage a household should be ignorant of these inclinations and laws. I also base these sovereigns’ authority over religious affairs on passages that are clear in themselves. These passages also agree with the purpose of Scripture as a whole. I am therefore convinced that anyone who reads this work solely to learn will learn from it. But some people have already committed themselves to defending opposing views through writing, public speaking, or prominent actions. These people will not be so easily satisfied. For in such cases, people naturally keep reading while losing focus as they search for objections to what they read earlier. At a time when people’s interests have changed, there are bound to be very many such objections. For much of the doctrine that helps establish a new government must oppose what helped bring down the old one.
In that part which treateth of a Christian Common-wealth, there are some new Doctrines, which, it may be, in a State where the contrary were already fully determined, were a fault for a Subject without leave to divulge, as being an usurpation of the place of a Teacher. But in this time, that men call not onely for Peace, but also for Truth, to offer such Doctrines as I think True, and that manifestly tend to Peace and Loyalty, to the consideration of those that are yet in deliberation, is no more, but to offer New Wine, to bee put into New Cask, that bothe may be preserved together. And I suppose, that then, when Novelty can breed no trouble, nor disorder in a State, men are not generally so much inclined to the reverence of Antiquity, as to preferre Ancient Errors, before New and well proved Truth.
The part dealing with a Christian Commonwealth contains some new doctrines. Perhaps a subject would be wrong to publish them without permission in a state that had already settled the opposite teachings. Doing so would mean taking on the role of a teacher without authority. But now people call not only for peace but also for truth. I offer doctrines I believe are true and that clearly promote peace and loyalty. I offer them for consideration by those who are still deciding. This is no more than offering new wine to be put into new casks, so both may be preserved together. And I suppose that when new ideas can cause no trouble or disorder in a state, people generally welcome well-proven truths. Their respect for ancient teachings is not so great that they prefer ancient errors to new and well-proven truths.
There is nothing I distrust more than my Elocution; which neverthelesse I am confident (excepting the Mischances of the Presse) is not obscure. That I have neglected the Ornament of quoting ancient Poets, Orators, and Philosophers, contrary to the custome of late time, (whether I have done well or ill in it,) proceedeth from my judgment, grounded on many reasons. For first, all Truth of Doctrine dependeth either upon Reason, or upon Scripture; both which give credit to many, but never receive it from any Writer. Secondly, the matters in question are not of Fact, but of Right, wherein there is no place for Witnesses. There is scarce any of those old Writers, that contradicteth not sometimes both himself, and others; which makes their Testimonies insufficient. Fourthly, such Opinions as are taken onely upon Credit of Antiquity, are not intrinsically the Judgment of those that cite them, but Words that passe (like gaping) from mouth to mouth. Fiftly, it is many times with a fraudulent Designe that men stick their corrupt Doctrine with the Cloves of other mens Wit. Sixtly, I find not that the Ancients they cite, took it for an Ornament, to doe the like with those that wrote before them. Seventhly, it is an argument of Indigestion, when Greek and Latine Sentences unchewed come up again, as they use to doe, unchanged. Lastly, though I reverence those men of Ancient time, that either have written Truth perspicuously, or set us in a better way to find it out our selves; yet to the Antiquity it self I think nothing due: For if we will reverence the Age, the Present is the Oldest. If the Antiquity of the Writer, I am not sure, that generally they to whom such honor is given, were more Ancient when they wrote, than I am that am Writing: But if it bee well considered, the praise of Ancient Authors, proceeds not from the reverence of the Dead, but from the competition, and mutuall envy of the Living.
I distrust nothing more than my way of expressing myself. Nevertheless, I am confident that my meaning is clear, apart from any printing errors. Unlike many writers today, I have not decorated my work with quotations from ancient Poets, Orators, and Philosophers. Whether I was right or wrong to leave them out, my decision rests on many reasons. First, the truth of all teaching depends either on Reason or on Scripture. Both give authority to many writers, but neither receives authority from any writer. Second, the questions at issue concern not facts, but rights, where witnesses have no place. Hardly any of those ancient writers avoids sometimes contradicting both himself and others. These contradictions make their testimony inadequate. Fourth, opinions accepted only on the authority of antiquity are not truly the judgments of those who quote them. They are words passed from mouth to mouth, like yawning. Fifth, people often have a dishonest purpose when they stud their corrupt teachings with the cloves of other people's wit. Sixth, I do not find that the ancient writers they quote thought such borrowing from earlier writers was an ornament. Seventh, bringing up undigested Greek and Latin sentences is a sign of indigestion. Yet people commonly bring those sentences up again unchanged. Finally, I respect ancient writers who either explained the truth clearly or showed us a better way to discover it ourselves. But I think antiquity itself deserves nothing. For if we respect age, the present age is the oldest. If we mean the writer's age, I am not sure those commonly honored were older when writing than I am now. But on closer consideration, praise of ancient authors does not come from respect for the dead. It comes from rivalry and mutual envy among the living.
To conclude, there is nothing in this whole Discourse, nor in that I writ before of the same Subject in Latine, as far as I can perceive, contrary either to the Word of God, or to good Manners; or to the disturbance of the Publique Tranquillity. Therefore I think it may be profitably printed, and more profitably taught in the Universities, in case they also think so, to whom the judgment of the same belongeth. For seeing the Universities are the Fountains of Civill, and Morall Doctrine, from whence the Preachers, and the Gentry, drawing such water as they find, use to sprinkle the same (both from the Pulpit, and in their Conversation) upon the People, there ought certainly to be great care taken, to have it pure, both from the Venime of Heathen Politicians, and from the Incantation of Deceiving Spirits. And by that means the most men, knowing their Duties, will be the less subject to serve the Ambition of a few discontented persons, in their purposes against the State; and be the lesse grieved with the Contributions necessary for their Peace, and Defence; and the Governours themselves have the lesse cause, to maintain at the Common charge any greater Army, than is necessary to make good the Publique Liberty, against the Invasions and Encroachments of forraign Enemies.
To conclude, as far as I can see, nothing in this whole work contradicts the Word of God or good morals. Nor does anything in my earlier Latin work on the same subject. Neither work threatens public peace. I therefore think this work could usefully be printed, and even more usefully taught in universities. This depends on the agreement of those responsible for judging such matters. For universities are the sources of political and moral teaching. Preachers and the gentry draw whatever water they find there and sprinkle it on the people. They do so both from the pulpit and in everyday conversation. Great care must therefore be taken to keep that water pure. It must be free from the poison of pagan political thinkers and the spells of deceiving spirits. By these means, most people will know their duties. They will then be less likely to serve the ambitions of a few discontented people plotting against the state. They will also resent less the contributions needed for their peace and defense. And rulers themselves will have less reason to maintain an unnecessarily large army at public expense. They will need only an army large enough to protect public liberty against invasions and encroachments by foreign enemies.
And thus I have brought to an end my Discourse of Civill and Ecclesiasticall Government, occasioned by the disorders of the present time, without partiality, without application, and without other designe, than to set before mens eyes the mutuall Relation between Protection and Obedience; of which the condition of Humane Nature, and the Laws Divine, (both Naturall and Positive) require an inviolable observation. And though in the revolution of States, there can be no very good Constellation for Truths of this nature to be born under, (as having an angry aspect from the dissolvers of an old Government, and seeing but the backs of them that erect a new;) yet I cannot think it will be condemned at this time, either by the Publique Judge of Doctrine, or by any that desires the continuance of Publique Peace. And in this hope I return to my interrupted Speculation of Bodies Naturall; wherein, (if God give me health to finish it,) I hope the Novelty will as much please, as in the Doctrine of this Artificiall Body it useth to offend. For such Truth, as opposeth no man profit, nor pleasure, is to all men welcome.
And so I have finished my discussion of civil and church government, prompted by the disorders of the present time. I have written without taking sides, without targeting particular cases, and with only one purpose. That purpose is to show people the mutual relationship between protection and obedience. Human nature and divine laws, both natural and explicitly given, require that this relationship be observed without exception. Although governments are changing, truths of this kind can be born under no very favorable stars. Those who overthrow an old government look angrily on these truths, while those who establish a new government turn their backs. Yet I cannot think my discussion will now be condemned by the public authority responsible for judging doctrine. Nor can I think anyone who wants public peace to continue will condemn it. With this hope, I return to my interrupted study of natural bodies. If God gives me the health to finish that study, I hope its novelty will please readers. I hope it will please them as much as novelty usually offends them in the study of this artificial body, the state. For truth that threatens no one's profit or pleasure is welcome to everyone.
FINIS
THE END