Laches, or Courage

LYSIMACHUS: You have seen the exhibition of the man fighting in armour, Nicias and Laches, but we did not tell you at the time the reason why my friend Melesias and I asked you to go with us and see him. I think that we may as well confess what this was, for we certainly ought not to have any reserve with you. The reason was, that we were intending to ask your advice. Some laugh at the very notion of advising others, and when they are asked will not say what they think. They guess at the wishes of the person who asks them, and answer according to his, and not according to their own, opinion. But as we know that you are good judges, and will say exactly what you think, we have taken you into our counsels. The matter about which I am making all this preface is as follows: Melesias and I have two sons; that is his son, and he is named Thucydides, after his grandfather; and this is mine, who is also called after his grandfather, Aristides. Now, we are resolved to take the greatest care of the youths, and not to let them run about as they like, which is too often the way with the young, when they are no longer children, but to begin at once and do the utmost that we can for them. And knowing you to have sons of your own, we thought that you were most likely to have attended to their training and improvement, and, if perchance you have not attended to them, we may remind you that you ought to have done so, and would invite you to assist us in the fulfilment of a common duty. I will tell you, Nicias and Laches, even at the risk of being tedious, how we came to think of this. Melesias and I live together, and our sons live with us; and now, as I was saying at first, we are going to confess to you. Both of us often talk to the lads about the many noble deeds which our own fathers did in war and peace—in the management of the allies, and in the administration of the city; but neither of us has any deeds of his own which he can show. The truth is that we are ashamed of this contrast being seen by them, and we blame our fathers for letting us be spoiled in the days of our youth, while they were occupied with the concerns of others; and we urge all this upon the lads, pointing out to them that they will not grow up to honour if they are rebellious and take no pains about themselves; but that if they take pains they may, perhaps, become worthy of the names which they bear. They, on their part, promise to comply with our wishes; and our care is to discover what studies or pursuits are likely to be most improving to them. Some one commended to us the art of fighting in armour, which he thought an excellent accomplishment for a young man to learn; and he praised the man whose exhibition you have seen, and told us to go and see him. And we determined that we would go, and get you to accompany us; and we were intending at the same time, if you did not object, to take counsel with you about the education of our sons. That is the matter which we wanted to talk over with you; and we hope that you will give us your opinion about this art of fighting in armour, and about any other studies or pursuits which may or may not be desirable for a young man to learn. Please to say whether you agree to our proposal.

LYSIMACHUS: Nicias and Laches, you have seen the demonstration of fighting in armour. But we did not tell you why my friend Melesias and I asked you to come and watch. I think we may as well explain, since we certainly ought to hide nothing from you. We wanted to ask your advice. Some people laugh at the very idea of advising others. When asked, they will not say what they really think. They guess what the person asking wants to hear, and answer according to his opinion rather than their own. But we know you have good judgment and will say exactly what you think. That is why we have brought you into our discussions. Here is the matter behind this long introduction. Melesias and I each have a son. That is his son, Thucydides, named after his grandfather. This is mine, Aristides, also named after his grandfather. We are determined to take the greatest care of these young men, rather than let them do whatever they please. Too often, young people are allowed that freedom once they are no longer children. Instead, we intend to begin at once and do everything we can for them. Since you have sons of your own, we thought you were especially likely to have considered their training and development. If you have not, we would remind you that you ought to have done so. We would also invite you to help us carry out our shared duty. Nicias and Laches, I will explain how we came to think about this, even at the risk of boring you. Melesias and I live together, and our sons live with us. Now, as I said at the start, we are going to speak openly with you. We both often tell the boys about our fathers’ many noble deeds in war and peace. We describe how our fathers managed relations with our allies and governed the city. But neither of us has any achievements of his own to show. The truth is, we are ashamed to have our sons see this contrast. We blame our fathers for letting us become spoiled when we were young, while they were busy with other people’s affairs. We press these points on the boys. We explain that they will not earn respect if they rebel and make no effort to improve themselves. But if they make that effort, they may perhaps become worthy of the names they bear. For their part, the boys promise to do as we wish. Our concern is to discover which studies or activities are likely to help them develop most. Someone recommended learning to fight in armour, saying it was an excellent skill for a young man to acquire. He praised the man whose demonstration you have seen and told us to go and watch him. So we decided to go and ask you to join us. At the same time, if you had no objection, we intended to ask your advice about our sons’ education. That is what we wanted to discuss with you. We hope you will tell us what you think about learning to fight in armour. We would also like your views on any other studies or activities a young man should or should not learn. Please tell us whether you agree to our proposal.

NICIAS: As far as I am concerned, Lysimachus and Melesias, I applaud your purpose, and will gladly assist you; and I believe that you, Laches, will be equally glad.

NICIAS: For my part, Lysimachus and Melesias, I applaud your goal and will gladly help you. And I believe you, Laches, will be just as glad to help.

LACHES: Certainly, Nicias; and I quite approve of the remark which Lysimachus made about his own father and the father of Melesias, and which is applicable, not only to them, but to us, and to every one who is occupied with public affairs. As he says, such persons are too apt to be negligent and careless of their own children and their private concerns. There is much truth in that remark of yours, Lysimachus. But why, instead of consulting us, do you not consult our friend Socrates about the education of the youths? He is of the same deme with you, and is always passing his time in places where the youth have any noble study or pursuit, such as you are enquiring after.

LACHES: Certainly, Nicias. I fully agree with Lysimachus’s remark about his own father and the father of Melesias. His remark applies not only to those fathers, but also to us and everyone involved in public affairs. As Lysimachus says, such people are too likely to neglect their own children and private affairs. There is much truth in your remark, Lysimachus. But why not ask our friend Socrates about educating the young men, instead of asking us? He belongs to the same deme, or local district, as you. He is always spending time wherever young people pursue worthwhile studies or activities, such as those you are asking about.

LYSIMACHUS: Why, Laches, has Socrates ever attended to matters of this sort?

LYSIMACHUS: Tell me, Laches, has Socrates ever paid attention to matters like these?

LACHES: Certainly, Lysimachus.

LACHES: Certainly, Lysimachus.

NICIAS: That I have the means of knowing as well as Laches; for quite lately he supplied me with a teacher of music for my sons,—Damon, the disciple of Agathocles, who is a most accomplished man in every way, as well as a musician, and a companion of inestimable value for young men at their age.

NICIAS: I have the means to know as well as Laches does. Just recently, he found a music teacher for my sons, Damon, a student of Agathocles. Damon is highly accomplished in every way, as well as being a musician. He is also an invaluable companion for young men of my sons’ age.

LYSIMACHUS: Those who have reached my time of life, Socrates and Nicias and Laches, fall out of acquaintance with the young, because they are generally detained at home by old age; but you, O son of Sophroniscus, should let your fellow demesman have the benefit of any advice which you are able to give. Moreover I have a claim upon you as an old friend of your father; for I and he were always companions and friends, and to the hour of his death there never was a difference between us; and now it comes back to me, at the mention of your name, that I have heard these lads talking to one another at home, and often speaking of Socrates in terms of the highest praise; but I have never thought to ask them whether the son of Sophroniscus was the person whom they meant. Tell me, my boys, whether this is the Socrates of whom you have often spoken?

LYSIMACHUS: Socrates, Nicias, and Laches, people my age lose touch with the young because old age usually keeps us at home. But you, son of Sophroniscus, should give a man from your own district whatever advice you can. Besides, I have a claim on your help as an old friend of your father. Your father and I were always companions and friends. We never had a disagreement, right up to the hour of his death. And now, hearing your name reminds me of something. I have heard these boys talking together at home, often praising Socrates in the highest terms. But I never thought to ask whether they meant the son of Sophroniscus. Tell me, my boys, is this the Socrates you have so often spoken about?

SON: Certainly, father, this is he.

SON: Yes, father, that’s definitely him.

LYSIMACHUS: I am delighted to hear, Socrates, that you maintain the name of your father, who was a most excellent man; and I further rejoice at the prospect of our family ties being renewed.

LYSIMACHUS: I am delighted to hear, Socrates, that you are living up to your father’s good name. He was an excellent man. I am also delighted at the prospect of renewing the ties between our families.

LACHES: Indeed, Lysimachus, you ought not to give him up; for I can assure you that I have seen him maintaining, not only his father's, but also his country's name. He was my companion in the retreat from Delium, and I can tell you that if others had only been like him, the honour of our country would have been upheld, and the great defeat would never have occurred.

LACHES: Indeed, Lysimachus, you should not give up on him. I can assure you that I have seen him uphold both his father's reputation and his country's. He was my companion during the retreat from Delium. And I can tell you that if others had been like him, our country's honor would have been upheld. That terrible defeat would never have happened.

LYSIMACHUS: That is very high praise which is accorded to you, Socrates, by faithful witnesses and for actions like those which they praise. Let me tell you the pleasure which I feel in hearing of your fame; and I hope that you will regard me as one of your warmest friends. You ought to have visited us long ago, and made yourself at home with us; but now, from this day forward, as we have at last found one another out, do as I say—come and make acquaintance with me, and with these young men, that I may continue your friend, as I was your father's. I shall expect you to do so, and shall venture at some future time to remind you of your duty. But what say you of the matter of which we were beginning to speak—the art of fighting in armour? Is that a practice in which the lads may be advantageously instructed?

LYSIMACHUS: That is high praise indeed, Socrates, from trustworthy witnesses, and for deeds like those they describe. Let me tell you how pleased I am to hear of your reputation. I hope you will count me among your closest friends. You should have visited us long ago and made yourself at home. But now that we have finally found one another, do as I ask from this day forward. Come and get to know me and these young men. Then I can remain your friend, just as I was your father's. I will expect you to come, and I will take the liberty of reminding you of your duty someday. But what do you think about the subject we were beginning to discuss, the art of fighting in armour? Is that a skill the boys might benefit from learning?

SOCRATES: I will endeavour to advise you, Lysimachus, as far as I can in this matter, and also in every way will comply with your wishes; but as I am younger and not so experienced, I think that I ought certainly to hear first what my elders have to say, and to learn of them, and if I have anything to add, then I may venture to give my opinion to them as well as to you. Suppose, Nicias, that one or other of you begin.

SOCRATES: I will try to advise you on this matter as best I can, Lysimachus. I will also do as you wish in every way. But since I am younger and less experienced, I think I should certainly hear my elders first and learn from them. Then, if I have anything to add, I may venture to give my opinion to them and to you. Nicias, why don't you or the other speaker begin?

NICIAS: I have no objection, Socrates; and my opinion is that the acquirement of this art is in many ways useful to young men. It is an advantage to them that among the favourite amusements of their leisure hours they should have one which tends to improve and not to injure their bodily health. No gymnastics could be better or harder exercise; and this, and the art of riding, are of all arts most befitting to a freeman; for they only who are thus trained in the use of arms are the athletes of our military profession, trained in that on which the conflict turns. Moreover in actual battle, when you have to fight in a line with a number of others, such an acquirement will be of some use, and will be of the greatest whenever the ranks are broken and you have to fight singly, either in pursuit, when you are attacking some one who is defending himself, or in flight, when you have to defend yourself against an assailant. Certainly he who possessed the art could not meet with any harm at the hands of a single person, or perhaps of several; and in any case he would have a great advantage. Further, this sort of skill inclines a man to the love of other noble lessons; for every man who has learned how to fight in armour will desire to learn the proper arrangement of an army, which is the sequel of the lesson: and when he has learned this, and his ambition is once fired, he will go on to learn the complete art of the general. There is no difficulty in seeing that the knowledge and practice of other military arts will be honourable and valuable to a man; and this lesson may be the beginning of them. Let me add a further advantage, which is by no means a slight one,—that this science will make any man a great deal more valiant and self-possessed in the field. And I will not disdain to mention, what by some may be thought to be a small matter;—he will make a better appearance at the right time; that is to say, at the time when his appearance will strike terror into his enemies. My opinion then, Lysimachus, is, as I say, that the youths should be instructed in this art, and for the reasons which I have given. But Laches may take a different view; and I shall be very glad to hear what he has to say.

NICIAS: I have no objection, Socrates. I believe learning this art is useful to young men in many ways. They benefit from having a favorite leisure activity that improves their physical health rather than harming it. No gymnastics could offer better or harder exercise. This art and riding are, of all arts, the most fitting for a free man. Only men trained in using weapons are the athletes of our military profession. They train in the skills that decide the battle. Moreover, this skill will be of some use in battle when you fight in line alongside others. It will be most useful when the ranks break and you have to fight alone. You may be pursuing someone and attacking him as he defends himself. Or you may be fleeing and defending yourself against an attacker. Certainly, a man with this skill could not be harmed by a single opponent, or perhaps even by several. In any case, he would have a great advantage. Further, this skill encourages a man to love other worthy subjects. Every man who learns to fight in armor will want to learn how to arrange an army. That is the next stage of his training. Once he has learned to arrange an army and his ambition is stirred, he will study a general’s full craft. Clearly, knowledge and practice of other military arts will bring a man honor and be valuable to him. Learning to fight in armor may be the beginning of that training. Let me add another advantage, and not a small one. This knowledge will make any man much braver and more composed on the battlefield. Nor will I hesitate to mention something that some may consider a small matter. He will look more impressive at the right moment, when his appearance will strike terror into his enemies. So my opinion, Lysimachus, is that the young men should learn this art, for the reasons I have given. But Laches may think differently, and I will be very glad to hear what he has to say.

LACHES: I should not like to maintain, Nicias, that any kind of knowledge is not to be learned; for all knowledge appears to be a good: and if, as Nicias and as the teachers of the art affirm, this use of arms is really a species of knowledge, then it ought to be learned; but if not, and if those who profess to teach it are deceivers only; or if it be knowledge, but not of a valuable sort, then what is the use of learning it? I say this, because I think that if it had been really valuable, the Lacedaemonians, whose whole life is passed in finding out and practising the arts which give them an advantage over other nations in war, would have discovered this one. And even if they had not, still these professors of the art would certainly not have failed to discover that of all the Hellenes the Lacedaemonians have the greatest interest in such matters, and that a master of the art who was honoured among them would be sure to make his fortune among other nations, just as a tragic poet would who is honoured among ourselves; which is the reason why he who fancies that he can write a tragedy does not go about itinerating in the neighbouring states, but rushes hither straight, and exhibits at Athens; and this is natural. Whereas I perceive that these fighters in armour regard Lacedaemon as a sacred inviolable territory, which they do not touch with the point of their foot; but they make a circuit of the neighbouring states, and would rather exhibit to any others than to the Spartans; and particularly to those who would themselves acknowledge that they are by no means first-rate in the arts of war. Further, Lysimachus, I have encountered a good many of these gentlemen in actual service, and have taken their measure, which I can give you at once; for none of these masters of fence have ever been distinguished in war,—there has been a sort of fatality about them; while in all other arts the men of note have been always those who have practised the art, they appear to be a most unfortunate exception. For example, this very Stesilaus, whom you and I have just witnessed exhibiting in all that crowd and making such great professions of his powers, I have seen at another time making, in sober truth, an involuntary exhibition of himself, which was a far better spectacle. He was a marine on board a ship which struck a transport vessel, and was armed with a weapon, half spear, half scythe; the singularity of this weapon was worthy of the singularity of the man. To make a long story short, I will only tell you what happened to this notable invention of the scythe spear. He was fighting, and the scythe was caught in the rigging of the other ship, and stuck fast; and he tugged, but was unable to get his weapon free. The two ships were passing one another. He first ran along his own ship holding on to the spear; but as the other ship passed by and drew him after as he was holding on, he let the spear slip through his hand until he retained only the end of the handle. The people in the transport clapped their hands, and laughed at his ridiculous figure; and when some one threw a stone, which fell on the deck at his feet, and he quitted his hold of the scythe-spear, the crew of his own trireme also burst out laughing; they could not refrain when they beheld the weapon waving in the air, suspended from the transport. Now I do not deny that there may be something in such an art, as Nicias asserts, but I tell you my experience; and, as I said at first, whether this be an art of which the advantage is so slight, or not an art at all, but only an imposition, in either case such an acquirement is not worth having. For my opinion is, that if the professor of this art be a coward, he will be likely to become rash, and his character will be only more notorious; or if he be brave, and fail ever so little, other men will be on the watch, and he will be greatly traduced; for there is a jealousy of such pretenders; and unless a man be pre-eminent in valour, he cannot help being ridiculous, if he says that he has this sort of skill. Such is my judgment, Lysimachus, of the desirableness of this art; but, as I said at first, ask Socrates, and do not let him go until he has given you his opinion of the matter.

LACHES: I would not want to claim, Nicias, that any kind of knowledge should not be learned. For all knowledge seems to be good. If training in arms really is a kind of knowledge, as Nicias and its teachers claim, we should learn it. But suppose these supposed teachers are merely frauds, and what they teach is not knowledge. Or suppose it is knowledge, but has no real value. Then what is the point of learning it? I say this because, if this training were really valuable, I think the Lacedaemonians would have discovered it. They spend their whole lives discovering and practicing skills that give them an advantage over other nations in war. Even if the Lacedaemonians had not discovered this skill, its teachers would certainly have recognized their interest. Of all the Hellenes, the Lacedaemonians care most about such matters. A master of this skill who won honor among them would be sure to make his fortune elsewhere. The same is true of a tragic poet who wins honor among us. That is why anyone who thinks he can write a tragedy does not tour the neighboring states. Instead, he comes straight here and presents his work at Athens. And that is natural. Yet I notice that these armored fighters treat Lacedaemon as sacred ground, forbidden to them. They will not set even a toe on it. Instead, they tour the neighboring states and would rather perform for anyone than the Spartans. They especially favor audiences who would themselves admit they are far from first-rate in warfare. Further, Lysimachus, I have met quite a few of these gentlemen on active service and have judged their worth. I can tell you my judgment at once. None of these masters of armed combat has ever distinguished himself in war. A kind of curse seems to hang over them. In all other arts, the men who win distinction have always been those who practice the art. These men seem to be a most unfortunate exception. Take Stesilaus, whom you and I just watched performing before that crowd and making such grand claims about his abilities. I once saw him give a truly unintended performance, and it was a much better show. He was serving as a marine aboard a ship that rammed a transport vessel. His weapon was half spear, half scythe. The weapon was as peculiar as the man. To keep the story short, I will tell you only what happened to this remarkable invention, the scythe-spear. While he was fighting, the scythe caught in the other ship’s rigging and stuck fast. He pulled, but he could not free his weapon. The two ships were passing each other. At first, he ran along his own ship, still holding the spear. But as the other ship passed, it dragged him along because he would not let go. He let the spear slide through his hand until he held only the end of the handle. The people aboard the transport clapped and laughed at the ridiculous sight he made. Then someone threw a stone, which landed on the deck at his feet, and he released the scythe-spear. At that, the crew of his own trireme burst out laughing too. They could not help themselves when they saw the weapon swinging in the air, hanging from the transport. Now, I do not deny that this skill may have some value, as Nicias claims. But I am telling you my experience. As I said at first, perhaps this is a skill with very little benefit. Or perhaps it is no skill at all, but merely a fraud. Either way, it is not worth acquiring. In my opinion, a coward who learns this skill will probably become reckless, making his true character still more obvious. If he is brave but makes even the smallest mistake, others will watch closely and speak very badly of him. For people resent those who make such claims. Unless a man is exceptionally brave, he cannot avoid looking ridiculous if he claims to have this skill. That, Lysimachus, is my judgment about whether this skill is worth learning. But, as I said at first, ask Socrates. Do not let him leave until he has given you his opinion on the matter.

LYSIMACHUS: I am going to ask this favour of you, Socrates; as is the more necessary because the two councillors disagree, and some one is in a manner still needed who will decide between them. Had they agreed, no arbiter would have been required. But as Laches has voted one way and Nicias another, I should like to hear with which of our two friends you agree.

LYSIMACHUS: I am going to ask you this favor, Socrates. Your help is all the more necessary because our two advisers disagree. In a way, we still need someone to decide between them. If they had agreed, we would not have needed anyone to settle the matter. But Laches has voted one way and Nicias the other. So I would like to hear which of our two friends you agree with.

SOCRATES: What, Lysimachus, are you going to accept the opinion of the majority?

SOCRATES: What, Lysimachus, are you going to agree with the majority?

LYSIMACHUS: Why, yes, Socrates; what else am I to do?

LYSIMACHUS: Yes, of course, Socrates. What else can I do?

SOCRATES: And would you do so too, Melesias? If you were deliberating about the gymnastic training of your son, would you follow the advice of the majority of us, or the opinion of the one who had been trained and exercised under a skilful master?

SOCRATES: And would you do the same, Melesias? If you were deciding on your son’s physical training, would you follow the advice of most of us? Or would you follow the opinion of someone who had trained and practiced under a skilled teacher?

MELESIAS: The latter, Socrates; as would surely be reasonable.

MELESIAS: The second option, Socrates, as would certainly be reasonable.

SOCRATES: His one vote would be worth more than the vote of all us four?

SOCRATES: Would his one vote count for more than the votes of all four of us?

MELESIAS: Certainly.

MELESIAS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And for this reason, as I imagine,—because a good decision is based on knowledge and not on numbers?

SOCRATES: And is the reason, I suppose, that a good decision is based on knowledge, not numbers?

MELESIAS: To be sure.

MELESIAS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Must we not then first of all ask, whether there is any one of us who has knowledge of that about which we are deliberating? If there is, let us take his advice, though he be one only, and not mind the rest; if there is not, let us seek further counsel. Is this a slight matter about which you and Lysimachus are deliberating? Are you not risking the greatest of your possessions? For children are your riches; and upon their turning out well or ill depends the whole order of their father's house.

SOCRATES: Shouldn't we first ask whether any of us understands the matter we are discussing? If someone does, let us follow his advice, even if he alone understands, and disregard the rest. If no one does, let us seek more advice. Is the matter you and Lysimachus are considering unimportant? Aren't you putting your greatest possessions at risk? For your children are your wealth. And the whole order of their father's household depends on whether they turn out well or badly.

MELESIAS: That is true.

MELESIAS: That's true.

SOCRATES: Great care, then, is required in this matter?

SOCRATES: So this matter requires great care?

MELESIAS: Certainly.

MELESIAS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Suppose, as I was just now saying, that we were considering, or wanting to consider, who was the best trainer. Should we not select him who knew and had practised the art, and had the best teachers?

SOCRATES: As I was just saying, suppose we were considering, or wanted to consider, who was the best trainer. Shouldn't we choose someone who knew and had practiced the skill, and had learned from the best teachers?

MELESIAS: I think that we should.

MELESIAS: I think we should.

SOCRATES: But would there not arise a prior question about the nature of the art of which we want to find the masters?

SOCRATES: But shouldn't we first ask what the skill is before trying to find its masters?

MELESIAS: I do not understand.

MELESIAS: I don't understand.

SOCRATES: Let me try to make my meaning plainer then. I do not think that we have as yet decided what that is about which we are consulting, when we ask which of us is or is not skilled in the art, and has or has not had a teacher of the art.

SOCRATES: Let me try to make my meaning clearer, then. I don't think we've yet settled what we're discussing when we ask these questions: Who among us is skilled in the art, and who is not? Who has had a teacher of the art, and who has not?

NICIAS: Why, Socrates, is not the question whether young men ought or ought not to learn the art of fighting in armour?

NICIAS: But Socrates, isn't the question whether young men should learn to fight in armour or not?

SOCRATES: Yes, Nicias; but there is also a prior question, which I may illustrate in this way: When a person considers about applying a medicine to the eyes, would you say that he is consulting about the medicine or about the eyes?

SOCRATES: Yes, Nicias, but there is another question to ask first. I can illustrate the question with an example. Suppose someone is considering whether to apply medicine to the eyes. Would you say they are thinking about the medicine or about the eyes?

NICIAS: About the eyes.

NICIAS: About the eyes.

SOCRATES: And when he considers whether he shall set a bridle on a horse and at what time, he is thinking of the horse and not of the bridle?

SOCRATES: And when he considers whether and when to put a bridle on a horse, isn't he thinking about the horse, not the bridle?

NICIAS: True.

NICIAS: True.

SOCRATES: And in a word, when he considers anything for the sake of another thing, he thinks of the end and not of the means?

SOCRATES: So, in short, when he considers something as a means to a goal, he focuses on the goal, not the means?

NICIAS: Certainly.

NICIAS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And when you call in an adviser, you should see whether he too is skilful in the accomplishment of the end which you have in view?

SOCRATES: And when you consult an adviser, shouldn’t you check whether he too is skilled at achieving your goal?

NICIAS: Most true.

NICIAS: Absolutely true.

SOCRATES: And at present we have in view some knowledge, of which the end is the soul of youth?

SOCRATES: And are we now considering some kind of knowledge aimed at the souls of young people?

NICIAS: Yes.

NICIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And we are enquiring, Which of us is skilful or successful in the treatment of the soul, and which of us has had good teachers?

SOCRATES: And we are asking: Who among us is skilled or successful at caring for the soul? And who among us has had good teachers?

LACHES: Well but, Socrates; did you never observe that some persons, who have had no teachers, are more skilful than those who have, in some things?

LACHES: But Socrates, haven’t you noticed that some people without teachers are more skilled at certain things than those with teachers?

SOCRATES: Yes, Laches, I have observed that; but you would not be very willing to trust them if they only professed to be masters of their art, unless they could show some proof of their skill or excellence in one or more works.

SOCRATES: Yes, Laches, I have noticed that. But you would not be very willing to trust them just because they claimed to be masters of their craft. You would need some proof of their skill or excellence in one or more examples of their work.

LACHES: That is true.

LACHES: That's true.

SOCRATES: And therefore, Laches and Nicias, as Lysimachus and Melesias, in their anxiety to improve the minds of their sons, have asked our advice about them, we too should tell them who our teachers were, if we say that we have had any, and prove them to be in the first place men of merit and experienced trainers of the minds of youth and also to have been really our teachers. Or if any of us says that he has no teacher, but that he has works of his own to show; then he should point out to them what Athenians or strangers, bond or free, he is generally acknowledged to have improved. But if he can show neither teachers nor works, then he should tell them to look out for others; and not run the risk of spoiling the children of friends, and thereby incurring the most formidable accusation which can be brought against any one by those nearest to him. As for myself, Lysimachus and Melesias, I am the first to confess that I have never had a teacher of the art of virtue; although I have always from my earliest youth desired to have one. But I am too poor to give money to the Sophists, who are the only professors of moral improvement; and to this day I have never been able to discover the art myself, though I should not be surprised if Nicias or Laches may have discovered or learned it; for they are far wealthier than I am, and may therefore have learnt of others. And they are older too; so that they have had more time to make the discovery. And I really believe that they are able to educate a man; for unless they had been confident in their own knowledge, they would never have spoken thus decidedly of the pursuits which are advantageous or hurtful to a young man. I repose confidence in both of them; but I am surprised to find that they differ from one another. And therefore, Lysimachus, as Laches suggested that you should detain me, and not let me go until I answered, I in turn earnestly beseech and advise you to detain Laches and Nicias, and question them. I would have you say to them: Socrates avers that he has no knowledge of the matter—he is unable to decide which of you speaks truly; neither discoverer nor student is he of anything of the kind. But you, Laches and Nicias, should each of you tell us who is the most skilful educator whom you have ever known; and whether you invented the art yourselves, or learned of another; and if you learned, who were your respective teachers, and who were their brothers in the art; and then, if you are too much occupied in politics to teach us yourselves, let us go to them, and present them with gifts, or make interest with them, or both, in the hope that they may be induced to take charge of our children and of yours; and then they will not grow up inferior, and disgrace their ancestors. But if you are yourselves original discoverers in that field, give us some proof of your skill. Who are they who, having been inferior persons, have become under your care good and noble? For if this is your first attempt at education, there is a danger that you may be trying the experiment, not on the 'vile corpus' of a Carian slave, but on your own sons, or the sons of your friend, and, as the proverb says, 'break the large vessel in learning to make pots.' Tell us then, what qualities you claim or do not claim. Make them tell you that, Lysimachus, and do not let them off.

SOCRATES: So, Laches and Nicias, Lysimachus and Melesias have asked our advice because they are eager to improve their sons’ minds. We too should name our teachers, if we claim to have had any. We should first show that our teachers were worthy men, experienced in developing young people’s minds. We should also show that they really did teach us. Or perhaps one of us claims to have had no teacher, but can show achievements of his own. Then he should name the people he is widely recognized as having improved, whether Athenians or foreigners, enslaved or free. But if he can show neither teachers nor achievements, he should tell these fathers to look elsewhere. He should not risk ruining his friends’ children. That would expose him to the most terrible accusation anyone can face from those closest to him. For my part, Lysimachus and Melesias, I am the first to admit that no one has taught me virtue. Yet I have wanted such a teacher since my earliest youth. But I am too poor to pay the Sophists, who alone offer to teach people how to become better. And to this day, I have never managed to discover the art myself. Still, I would not be surprised if Nicias or Laches had discovered or learned it. They are much wealthier than I am, so they may have learned from others. They are older too, so they have had more time to make the discovery. And I really believe they can educate a person. Otherwise, they would never have spoken so confidently about activities that help or harm a young man. I trust them both, but I am surprised that they disagree. So, Lysimachus, Laches suggested that you keep me here until I answered. Now I urge you just as earnestly to keep Laches and Nicias here and question them. I suggest you say to them: Socrates says he knows nothing about this matter. He cannot decide which of you is right. He has neither discovered nor studied anything of this kind. But you, Laches and Nicias, should each name the most skilled educator you have ever known. Tell us whether you developed the art yourselves or learned it from someone else. If you learned it, who were your teachers, and who else practiced the art alongside them? Then, if politics keeps you too busy to teach us yourselves, let us go to those teachers. We can offer gifts, use our influence with them, or both. We hope to persuade them to take charge of our children and yours. Then our children will not grow up to be lesser men and disgrace their ancestors. But if you discovered this art yourselves, give us some proof of your skill. Who has changed from a lesser person into someone good and noble under your care? For if this is your first attempt at education, you may be experimenting on your own sons or your friend’s sons. You would not be experimenting on the 'worthless body' of a Carian slave. As the proverb says, you may 'break the large vessel while learning to make pots.' So tell us what abilities you claim to have, and what abilities you do not claim. Make them answer these questions, Lysimachus, and do not let them off.

LYSIMACHUS: I very much approve of the words of Socrates, my friends; but you, Nicias and Laches, must determine whether you will be questioned, and give an explanation about matters of this sort. Assuredly, I and Melesias would be greatly pleased to hear you answer the questions which Socrates asks, if you will: for I began by saying that we took you into our counsels because we thought that you would have attended to the subject, especially as you have children who, like our own, are nearly of an age to be educated. Well, then, if you have no objection, suppose that you take Socrates into partnership; and do you and he ask and answer one another's questions: for, as he has well said, we are deliberating about the most important of our concerns. I hope that you will see fit to comply with our request.

LYSIMACHUS: I strongly agree with what Socrates has said, my friends. But you, Nicias and Laches, must decide whether you will answer questions and explain your views on these matters. Certainly, Melesias and I would be very pleased to hear your answers to Socrates’ questions, if you are willing. As I said at the start, we asked for your advice because we thought you had considered the subject. You have particular reason to consider it, since your children, like ours, are nearly old enough to be educated. So, if you have no objection, why not bring Socrates into the discussion? You and he can ask and answer one another’s questions. For, as he rightly said, we are discussing the most important of our concerns. I hope you will agree to our request.

NICIAS: I see very clearly, Lysimachus, that you have only known Socrates' father, and have no acquaintance with Socrates himself: at least, you can only have known him when he was a child, and may have met him among his fellow-wardsmen, in company with his father, at a sacrifice, or at some other gathering. You clearly show that you have never known him since he arrived at manhood.

NICIAS: I can see very clearly, Lysimachus, that you knew only Socrates' father, not Socrates himself. At least, you can only have known Socrates as a child. You may have met him with his father among others from their district, at a sacrifice or some other gathering. You make it clear that you have never known Socrates as an adult.

LYSIMACHUS: Why do you say that, Nicias?

LYSIMACHUS: Why do you say that, Nicias?

NICIAS: Because you seem not to be aware that any one who has an intellectual affinity to Socrates and enters into conversation with him is liable to be drawn into an argument; and whatever subject he may start, he will be continually carried round and round by him, until at last he finds that he has to give an account both of his present and past life; and when he is once entangled, Socrates will not let him go until he has completely and thoroughly sifted him. Now I am used to his ways; and I know that he will certainly do as I say, and also that I myself shall be the sufferer; for I am fond of his conversation, Lysimachus. And I think that there is no harm in being reminded of any wrong thing which we are, or have been, doing: he who does not fly from reproof will be sure to take more heed of his after-life; as Solon says, he will wish and desire to be learning so long as he lives, and will not think that old age of itself brings wisdom. To me, to be cross-examined by Socrates is neither unusual nor unpleasant; indeed, I knew all along that where Socrates was, the argument would soon pass from our sons to ourselves; and therefore, I say that for my part, I am quite willing to discourse with Socrates in his own manner; but you had better ask our friend Laches what his feeling may be.

NICIAS: Because you seem unaware of what happens to anyone who shares Socrates’ intellectual interests and starts talking with him. Such a person is likely to be drawn into an argument. Whatever subject he starts with, Socrates will keep leading him around in circles. Eventually, he finds he must explain how he lives now and how he has lived in the past. Once he is caught, Socrates will not let him go until he has questioned him thoroughly. Now, I am used to his ways. I know he will certainly do as I say, and I will be the one put through the ordeal. For I enjoy talking with him, Lysimachus. And I think there is no harm in being reminded of anything wrong we are doing or have done. Anyone who does not run from criticism is sure to take greater care with his life from then on. As Solon says, he will want and hope to keep learning as long as he lives. He will not think that old age alone brings wisdom. Being questioned by Socrates is neither unusual nor unpleasant for me. In fact, I knew all along that, with Socrates here, the discussion would soon turn from our sons to ourselves. So, for my part, I am quite willing to talk with Socrates in his own way. But you had better ask our friend Laches how he feels.

LACHES: I have but one feeling, Nicias, or (shall I say?) two feelings, about discussions. Some would think that I am a lover, and to others I may seem to be a hater of discourse; for when I hear a man discoursing of virtue, or of any sort of wisdom, who is a true man and worthy of his theme, I am delighted beyond measure: and I compare the man and his words, and note the harmony and correspondence of them. And such an one I deem to be the true musician, attuned to a fairer harmony than that of the lyre, or any pleasant instrument of music; for truly he has in his own life a harmony of words and deeds arranged, not in the Ionian, or in the Phrygian mode, nor yet in the Lydian, but in the true Hellenic mode, which is the Dorian, and no other. Such an one makes me merry with the sound of his voice; and when I hear him I am thought to be a lover of discourse; so eager am I in drinking in his words. But a man whose actions do not agree with his words is an annoyance to me; and the better he speaks the more I hate him, and then I seem to be a hater of discourse. As to Socrates, I have no knowledge of his words, but of old, as would seem, I have had experience of his deeds; and his deeds show that free and noble sentiments are natural to him. And if his words accord, then I am of one mind with him, and shall be delighted to be interrogated by a man such as he is, and shall not be annoyed at having to learn of him: for I too agree with Solon, 'that I would fain grow old, learning many things.' But I must be allowed to add 'of the good only.' Socrates must be willing to allow that he is a good teacher, or I shall be a dull and uncongenial pupil: but that the teacher is younger, or not as yet in repute—anything of that sort is of no account with me. And therefore, Socrates, I give you notice that you may teach and confute me as much as ever you like, and also learn of me anything which I know. So high is the opinion which I have entertained of you ever since the day on which you were my companion in danger, and gave a proof of your valour such as only the man of merit can give. Therefore, say whatever you like, and do not mind about the difference of our ages.

LACHES: I have just one feeling about discussions, Nicias. Or should I say two feelings? Some would think I love discussion, while to others I may seem to hate it. When I hear a man discussing virtue or any kind of wisdom, I am delighted beyond measure. But he must be a man of integrity, worthy of his subject. I compare the man with his words and notice how well they agree. I consider such a man the true musician. His harmony is finer than the harmony of a lyre or any other pleasing musical instrument. In his own life, his words and actions are in harmony. His life follows neither the Ionian nor the Phrygian nor the Lydian mode. It follows the true Hellenic mode, the Dorian, and no other. The sound of such a man's voice makes me happy. When I listen to him, people think I love discussion, so eagerly do I drink in his words. But a man whose actions do not match his words annoys me. The better he speaks, the more I hate him. Then I seem to hate discussion. As for Socrates, I do not know his words. But it seems I have long had experience of his actions. His actions show that a free and noble spirit comes naturally to him. If his words agree with his actions, then I am of one mind with him. I will be delighted to be questioned by such a man and will not resent learning from him. For I too agree with Solon, 'that I would gladly grow old, learning many things.' But I must be allowed to add 'only from good people.' Socrates must be willing to acknowledge that he is a good teacher. Otherwise, I will be a slow and unresponsive pupil. But whether the teacher is younger or has not yet made a name for himself means nothing to me. So, Socrates, let me tell you that you may teach me and prove me wrong as much as you like. You may also learn from me anything I know. I have held you in such high regard ever since the day we faced danger together. You then showed the kind of courage that only a man of real worth can show. So say whatever you like, and do not worry about the difference in our ages.

SOCRATES: I cannot say that either of you show any reluctance to take counsel and advise with me.

SOCRATES: I cannot say either of you seems unwilling to discuss things with me and offer advice.

LYSIMACHUS: But this is our proper business; and yours as well as ours, for I reckon you as one of us. Please then to take my place, and find out from Nicias and Laches what we want to know, for the sake of the youths, and talk and consult with them: for I am old, and my memory is bad; and I do not remember the questions which I am going to ask, or the answers to them; and if there is any interruption I am quite lost. I will therefore beg of you to carry on the proposed discussion by your selves; and I will listen, and Melesias and I will act upon your conclusions.

LYSIMACHUS: But this is our responsibility, and yours too, because I count you as one of us. So please take my place. Find out from Nicias and Laches what we want to know, for the young men's sake. Talk it over with them and ask their advice. For I am old, and my memory is poor. I cannot remember the questions I mean to ask or the answers to them. And if there is any interruption, I am completely lost. So I ask you to carry on the discussion yourselves, as planned. I will listen, and Melesias and I will act on your conclusions.

SOCRATES: Let us, Nicias and Laches, comply with the request of Lysimachus and Melesias. There will be no harm in asking ourselves the question which was first proposed to us: 'Who have been our own instructors in this sort of training, and whom have we made better?' But the other mode of carrying on the enquiry will bring us equally to the same point, and will be more like proceeding from first principles. For if we knew that the addition of something would improve some other thing, and were able to make the addition, then, clearly, we must know how that about which we are advising may be best and most easily attained. Perhaps you do not understand what I mean. Then let me make my meaning plainer in this way. Suppose we knew that the addition of sight makes better the eyes which possess this gift, and also were able to impart sight to the eyes, then, clearly, we should know the nature of sight, and should be able to advise how this gift of sight may be best and most easily attained; but if we knew neither what sight is, nor what hearing is, we should not be very good medical advisers about the eyes or the ears, or about the best mode of giving sight and hearing to them.

SOCRATES: Nicias and Laches, let us do what Lysimachus and Melesias ask. There is no harm in asking ourselves the question first put to us: 'Who taught us this kind of training, and whom have we improved?' But the other way of examining the question will lead us to the same point. And it will be more like starting from first principles. Suppose we knew that adding something would improve something else, and we could make that addition. Then, clearly, we must know how to obtain that improvement best and most easily. Perhaps you do not understand what I mean. Let me explain more clearly. Suppose we knew that adding sight improves the eyes that receive this gift. Suppose we could also give sight to the eyes. Then, clearly, we would know what sight is. And we could advise how to obtain this gift of sight best and most easily. But suppose we knew neither what sight is nor what hearing is. Then we would not be very good medical advisers about the eyes or ears. Nor could we advise very well on the best way to give them sight and hearing.

LACHES: That is true, Socrates.

LACHES: That's true, Socrates.

SOCRATES: And are not our two friends, Laches, at this very moment inviting us to consider in what way the gift of virtue may be imparted to their sons for the improvement of their minds?

SOCRATES: And Laches, aren't our two friends asking us right now to consider how their sons may gain virtue to improve their minds?

LACHES: Very true.

LACHES: Absolutely true.

SOCRATES: Then must we not first know the nature of virtue? For how can we advise any one about the best mode of attaining something of which we are wholly ignorant?

SOCRATES: Then don't we first need to know what virtue is? For how can we advise anyone on the best way to gain something we know nothing about?

LACHES: I do not think that we can, Socrates.

LACHES: I don’t think we can, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Then, Laches, we may presume that we know the nature of virtue?

SOCRATES: Then, Laches, can we assume we know what virtue is?

LACHES: Yes.

LACHES: Yes.

SOCRATES: And that which we know we must surely be able to tell?

SOCRATES: And surely we must be able to explain what we know?

LACHES: Certainly.

LACHES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: I would not have us begin, my friend, with enquiring about the whole of virtue; for that may be more than we can accomplish; let us first consider whether we have a sufficient knowledge of a part; the enquiry will thus probably be made easier to us.

SOCRATES: My friend, I would not have us begin by examining virtue as a whole. That task may be more than we can manage. Let us first consider whether we know enough about one part of virtue. Our inquiry will probably be easier that way.

LACHES: Let us do as you say, Socrates.

LACHES: Let's do as you say, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Then which of the parts of virtue shall we select? Must we not select that to which the art of fighting in armour is supposed to conduce? And is not that generally thought to be courage?

SOCRATES: Then which part of virtue should we choose? Mustn't we choose the part that training in fighting in armour is supposed to develop? And isn't that part generally thought to be courage?

LACHES: Yes, certainly.

LACHES: Yes, certainly.

SOCRATES: Then, Laches, suppose that we first set about determining the nature of courage, and in the second place proceed to enquire how the young men may attain this quality by the help of studies and pursuits. Tell me, if you can, what is courage.

SOCRATES: Then, Laches, let’s first try to work out what courage is. After that, let’s ask how young men may develop courage through studies and activities. Tell me, if you can, what is courage?

LACHES: Indeed, Socrates, I see no difficulty in answering; he is a man of courage who does not run away, but remains at his post and fights against the enemy; there can be no mistake about that.

LACHES: Indeed, Socrates, I have no trouble answering. A courageous man does not run away but stays at his post and fights the enemy. There can be no doubt about that.

SOCRATES: Very good, Laches; and yet I fear that I did not express myself clearly; and therefore you have answered not the question which I intended to ask, but another.

SOCRATES: Very good, Laches. But I’m afraid I didn’t make myself clear. So you answered a different question from the one I meant to ask.

LACHES: What do you mean, Socrates?

LACHES: What do you mean, Socrates?

SOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain; you would call a man courageous who remains at his post, and fights with the enemy?

SOCRATES: I’ll try to explain. Would you call a man courageous if he stays at his post and fights the enemy?

LACHES: Certainly I should.

LACHES: I certainly would.

SOCRATES: And so should I; but what would you say of another man, who fights flying, instead of remaining?

SOCRATES: So would I. But what would you say about another man who fights while retreating instead of standing his ground?

LACHES: How flying?

LACHES: What do you mean, fleeing?

SOCRATES: Why, as the Scythians are said to fight, flying as well as pursuing; and as Homer says in praise of the horses of Aeneas, that they knew 'how to pursue, and fly quickly hither and thither'; and he passes an encomium on Aeneas himself, as having a knowledge of fear or flight, and calls him 'an author of fear or flight.'

SOCRATES: Well, as the Scythians are said to fight, retreating as well as pursuing. And Homer praises the horses of Aeneas for knowing 'how to pursue, and retreat quickly in every direction'. Homer also praises Aeneas himself for his knowledge of fear or flight. He calls Aeneas 'a maker of fear or flight.'

LACHES: Yes, Socrates, and there Homer is right: for he was speaking of chariots, as you were speaking of the Scythian cavalry, who have that way of fighting; but the heavy-armed Greek fights, as I say, remaining in his rank.

LACHES: Yes, Socrates, and Homer is right about that, because he was talking about chariots. You were talking about the Scythian cavalry, who fight that way. But heavily armed Greek soldiers fight as I said, staying in their ranks.

SOCRATES: And yet, Laches, you must except the Lacedaemonians at Plataea, who, when they came upon the light shields of the Persians, are said not to have been willing to stand and fight, and to have fled; but when the ranks of the Persians were broken, they turned upon them like cavalry, and won the battle of Plataea.

SOCRATES: Yet, Laches, you must make an exception for the Lacedaemonians at Plataea. They are said to have refused to stand and fight when they encountered the Persians with their light shields. Instead, the Lacedaemonians fled. But when the Persian ranks broke apart, the Lacedaemonians turned on the Persians like cavalry and won the battle of Plataea.

LACHES: That is true.

LACHES: That's true.

SOCRATES: That was my meaning when I said that I was to blame in having put my question badly, and that this was the reason of your answering badly. For I meant to ask you not only about the courage of heavy-armed soldiers, but about the courage of cavalry and every other style of soldier; and not only who are courageous in war, but who are courageous in perils by sea, and who in disease, or in poverty, or again in politics, are courageous; and not only who are courageous against pain or fear, but mighty to contend against desires and pleasures, either fixed in their rank or turning upon their enemy. There is this sort of courage—is there not, Laches?

SOCRATES: I meant that I was to blame for asking my question badly, which led you to answer badly. I meant to ask about courage not only among heavily armed soldiers, but also among cavalry and every other kind of soldier. Nor did I mean only courage in war. I also meant courage when facing dangers at sea, illness, poverty, or political life. And I meant not only courage in facing pain or fear, but also strength in resisting desires and pleasures. Such people may hold their ground or turn to face their enemy. There is courage of this kind too, isn't there, Laches?

LACHES: Certainly, Socrates.

LACHES: Of course, Socrates.

SOCRATES: And all these are courageous, but some have courage in pleasures, and some in pains: some in desires, and some in fears, and some are cowards under the same conditions, as I should imagine.

SOCRATES: And all these people are courageous, but some show courage in pleasure, and some in pain. Some show courage in desire, and some in fear. And some, I would imagine, are cowardly under the same conditions.

LACHES: Very true.

LACHES: Absolutely true.

SOCRATES: Now I was asking about courage and cowardice in general. And I will begin with courage, and once more ask, What is that common quality, which is the same in all these cases, and which is called courage? Do you now understand what I mean?

SOCRATES: Now, I was asking about courage and cowardice in general. I’ll start with courage and ask again: What is the shared quality in all these cases that we call courage? Do you now understand what I mean?

LACHES: Not over well.

LACHES: Not very well.

SOCRATES: I mean this: As I might ask what is that quality which is called quickness, and which is found in running, in playing the lyre, in speaking, in learning, and in many other similar actions, or rather which we possess in nearly every action that is worth mentioning of arms, legs, mouth, voice, mind;—would you not apply the term quickness to all of them?

SOCRATES: Here is what I mean. Suppose I asked what the quality called quickness is. We find quickness in running, playing the lyre, speaking, learning, and many other similar activities. Or rather, we show quickness in nearly every activity worth mentioning that involves our arms, legs, mouth, voice, or mind. Wouldn't you use the word quickness for all of these?

LACHES: Quite true.

LACHES: Absolutely true.

SOCRATES: And suppose I were to be asked by some one: What is that common quality, Socrates, which, in all these uses of the word, you call quickness? I should say the quality which accomplishes much in a little time—whether in running, speaking, or in any other sort of action.

SOCRATES: And suppose someone asked me: Socrates, what common quality do you call quickness in all these uses of the word? I would say it is the quality of accomplishing much in a short time. That applies to running, speaking, or any other kind of action.

LACHES: You would be quite correct.

LACHES: You would be completely right.

SOCRATES: And now, Laches, do you try and tell me in like manner, What is that common quality which is called courage, and which includes all the various uses of the term when applied both to pleasure and pain, and in all the cases to which I was just now referring?

SOCRATES: Now, Laches, try to answer in the same way. What common quality do we call courage? What quality covers all uses of the word, whether applied to pleasure or pain, in all the cases I just mentioned?

LACHES: I should say that courage is a sort of endurance of the soul, if I am to speak of the universal nature which pervades them all.

LACHES: I would say courage is a kind of endurance of the soul, if I am to describe what all forms of courage have in common.

SOCRATES: But that is what we must do if we are to answer the question. And yet I cannot say that every kind of endurance is, in my opinion, to be deemed courage. Hear my reason: I am sure, Laches, that you would consider courage to be a very noble quality.

SOCRATES: But that is what we must do if we are to answer the question. Yet I don't think every kind of endurance should count as courage. Here is my reason: I am sure, Laches, that you would consider courage a very noble quality.

LACHES: Most noble, certainly.

LACHES: Very noble, certainly.

SOCRATES: And you would say that a wise endurance is also good and noble?

SOCRATES: And would you say that endurance guided by wisdom is also good and noble?

LACHES: Very noble.

LACHES: Very noble.

SOCRATES: But what would you say of a foolish endurance? Is not that, on the other hand, to be regarded as evil and hurtful?

SOCRATES: But what would you say about foolish endurance? Shouldn't foolish endurance, by contrast, be seen as bad and harmful?

LACHES: True.

LACHES: True.

SOCRATES: And is anything noble which is evil and hurtful?

SOCRATES: And can anything be noble if it is evil and harmful?

LACHES: I ought not to say that, Socrates.

LACHES: I shouldn't say that, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Then you would not admit that sort of endurance to be courage—for it is not noble, but courage is noble?

SOCRATES: Then you wouldn’t call that kind of endurance courage, because that endurance isn’t noble, but courage is?

LACHES: You are right.

LACHES: You're right.

SOCRATES: Then, according to you, only the wise endurance is courage?

SOCRATES: So, in your view, only wise endurance counts as courage?

LACHES: True.

LACHES: True.

SOCRATES: But as to the epithet 'wise,'—wise in what? In all things small as well as great? For example, if a man shows the quality of endurance in spending his money wisely, knowing that by spending he will acquire more in the end, do you call him courageous?

SOCRATES: But when you say 'wise,' wise in what? In all things, small as well as great? For example, suppose a man shows endurance by spending his money wisely, knowing he will gain more in the end. Do you call him courageous?

LACHES: Assuredly not.

LACHES: Definitely not.

SOCRATES: Or, for example, if a man is a physician, and his son, or some patient of his, has inflammation of the lungs, and begs that he may be allowed to eat or drink something, and the other is firm and refuses; is that courage?

SOCRATES: Or, for example, suppose a man is a doctor, and his son or a patient has inflamed lungs. The sick person begs to be allowed to eat or drink something. If the doctor stands firm and refuses, is that courage?

LACHES: No; that is not courage at all, any more than the last.

LACHES: No, that is not courage at all, any more than the last was.

SOCRATES: Again, take the case of one who endures in war, and is willing to fight, and wisely calculates and knows that others will help him, and that there will be fewer and inferior men against him than there are with him; and suppose that he has also advantages of position; would you say of such a one who endures with all this wisdom and preparation, that he, or some man in the opposing army who is in the opposite circumstances to these and yet endures and remains at his post, is the braver?

SOCRATES: Again, consider a man who stands firm in battle and is willing to fight. Suppose he carefully weighs the situation and knows others will help him. He also knows his side outnumbers the enemy and has better soldiers. Suppose he also has the advantage of position. Would you say the man who stands firm with all this wisdom and preparation is braver? Or is a man in the opposing army braver, if he faces the opposite conditions yet stands his ground?

LACHES: I should say that the latter, Socrates, was the braver.

LACHES: I’d say the second one was braver, Socrates.

SOCRATES: But, surely, this is a foolish endurance in comparison with the other?

SOCRATES: But surely this kind of endurance is foolish compared with the other kind?

LACHES: That is true.

LACHES: That's true.

SOCRATES: Then you would say that he who in an engagement of cavalry endures, having the knowledge of horsemanship, is not so courageous as he who endures, having no such knowledge?

SOCRATES: Then would you say a skilled rider who stands firm in a cavalry battle is less courageous than someone who stands firm without that skill?

LACHES: So I should say.

LACHES: I would say so.

SOCRATES: And he who endures, having a knowledge of the use of the sling, or the bow, or of any other art, is not so courageous as he who endures, not having such a knowledge?

SOCRATES: And is someone who stands firm, knowing how to use a sling, a bow, or any other skill, less courageous than someone who stands firm without that knowledge?

LACHES: True.

LACHES: True.

SOCRATES: And he who descends into a well, and dives, and holds out in this or any similar action, having no knowledge of diving, or the like, is, as you would say, more courageous than those who have this knowledge?

SOCRATES: And what about someone who goes down into a well, dives, and keeps going without knowing how to dive? In diving or any similar activity, would you say someone without the relevant knowledge is more courageous than someone with it?

LACHES: Why, Socrates, what else can a man say?

LACHES: Well, Socrates, what else can a person say?

SOCRATES: Nothing, if that be what he thinks.

SOCRATES: Nothing, if that's what he thinks.

LACHES: But that is what I do think.

LACHES: But that really is what I think.

SOCRATES: And yet men who thus run risks and endure are foolish, Laches, in comparison of those who do the same things, having the skill to do them.

SOCRATES: Yet, Laches, men who take such risks and endure are foolish compared with those who do so with skill.

LACHES: That is true.

LACHES: That's true.

SOCRATES: But foolish boldness and endurance appeared before to be base and hurtful to us.

SOCRATES: But earlier, foolish boldness and endurance seemed shameful and harmful to us.

LACHES: Quite true.

LACHES: Absolutely true.

SOCRATES: Whereas courage was acknowledged to be a noble quality.

SOCRATES: But we agreed that courage was a noble quality.

LACHES: True.

LACHES: True.

SOCRATES: And now on the contrary we are saying that the foolish endurance, which was before held in dishonour, is courage.

SOCRATES: And now we are saying the opposite: foolish endurance, which we previously looked down on, is courage.

LACHES: Very true.

LACHES: Absolutely true.

SOCRATES: And are we right in saying so?

SOCRATES: And are we right to say so?

LACHES: Indeed, Socrates, I am sure that we are not right.

LACHES: Yes, Socrates, I’m sure we’re wrong.

SOCRATES: Then according to your statement, you and I, Laches, are not attuned to the Dorian mode, which is a harmony of words and deeds; for our deeds are not in accordance with our words. Any one would say that we had courage who saw us in action, but not, I imagine, he who heard us talking about courage just now.

SOCRATES: Then according to you, Laches, you and I are out of tune with the Dorian mode. That mode brings words and deeds into harmony, but our deeds do not match our words. Anyone who saw us in action would say we were courageous. But I imagine anyone who heard us talking about courage just now would not.

LACHES: That is most true.

LACHES: That is absolutely true.

SOCRATES: And is this condition of ours satisfactory?

SOCRATES: And is our current situation satisfactory?

LACHES: Quite the reverse.

LACHES: Just the opposite.

SOCRATES: Suppose, however, that we admit the principle of which we are speaking to a certain extent.

SOCRATES: But suppose we accept the principle we're discussing to a certain extent.

LACHES: To what extent and what principle do you mean?

LACHES: How far do you mean, and what principle are you referring to?

SOCRATES: The principle of endurance. We too must endure and persevere in the enquiry, and then courage will not laugh at our faint-heartedness in searching for courage; which after all may, very likely, be endurance.

SOCRATES: The principle of endurance. We too must endure and keep going with our inquiry. Then courage will not laugh at us for being faint-hearted in our search for courage. After all, courage may very well be endurance.

LACHES: I am ready to go on, Socrates; and yet I am unused to investigations of this sort. But the spirit of controversy has been aroused in me by what has been said; and I am really grieved at being thus unable to express my meaning. For I fancy that I do know the nature of courage; but, somehow or other, she has slipped away from me, and I cannot get hold of her and tell her nature.

LACHES: I am ready to go on, Socrates, though I am not used to exploring questions like these. But what has been said has stirred my desire to argue. And I am truly upset that I cannot express what I mean. For I think I do know what courage is. But somehow she has slipped away from me, and I cannot grasp her and explain her nature.

SOCRATES: But, my dear friend, should not the good sportsman follow the track, and not be lazy?

SOCRATES: But, my dear friend, shouldn't a good hunter follow the trail and not be lazy?

LACHES: Certainly, he should.

LACHES: He certainly should.

SOCRATES: And shall we invite Nicias to join us? he may be better at the sport than we are. What do you say?

SOCRATES: And should we invite Nicias to join us? He may be better at the game than we are. What do you think?

LACHES: I should like that.

LACHES: I'd like that.

SOCRATES: Come then, Nicias, and do what you can to help your friends, who are tossing on the waves of argument, and at the last gasp: you see our extremity, and may save us and also settle your own opinion, if you will tell us what you think about courage.

SOCRATES: Come on, Nicias, do what you can to help your friends. We are tossed about on the waves of argument and gasping for our last breath. You see how desperate we are. You may save us and settle your own opinion, if you will tell us what you think courage is.

NICIAS: I have been thinking, Socrates, that you and Laches are not defining courage in the right way; for you have forgotten an excellent saying which I have heard from your own lips.

NICIAS: I’ve been thinking, Socrates, that you and Laches aren’t defining courage correctly. That’s because you’ve forgotten an excellent saying I heard from you yourself.

SOCRATES: What is it, Nicias?

SOCRATES: What is it, Nicias?

NICIAS: I have often heard you say that 'Every man is good in that in which he is wise, and bad in that in which he is unwise.'

NICIAS: I have often heard you say, 'Every man is good at what he understands and bad at what he does not understand.'

SOCRATES: That is certainly true, Nicias.

SOCRATES: That’s certainly true, Nicias.

NICIAS: And therefore if the brave man is good, he is also wise.

NICIAS: So if a brave man is good, he is also wise.

SOCRATES: Do you hear him, Laches?

SOCRATES: Do you hear him, Laches?

LACHES: Yes, I hear him, but I do not very well understand him.

LACHES: Yes, I hear him, but I don't understand him very well.

SOCRATES: I think that I understand him; and he appears to me to mean that courage is a sort of wisdom.

SOCRATES: I think I understand him. And he seems to mean that courage is a kind of wisdom.

LACHES: What can he possibly mean, Socrates?

LACHES: What could he possibly mean, Socrates?

SOCRATES: That is a question which you must ask of himself.

SOCRATES: You must ask him that question yourself.

LACHES: Yes.

LACHES: Yes.

SOCRATES: Tell him then, Nicias, what you mean by this wisdom; for you surely do not mean the wisdom which plays the flute?

SOCRATES: Then tell him, Nicias, what you mean by this wisdom. Surely you don’t mean the skill needed to play the flute?

NICIAS: Certainly not.

NICIAS: Certainly not.

SOCRATES: Nor the wisdom which plays the lyre?

SOCRATES: Nor the skill of playing the lyre?

NICIAS: No.

NICIAS: No.

SOCRATES: But what is this knowledge then, and of what?

SOCRATES: But what is this knowledge, then, and what is it about?

LACHES: I think that you put the question to him very well, Socrates; and I would like him to say what is the nature of this knowledge or wisdom.

LACHES: I think you asked him the question very well, Socrates. And I’d like him to explain what this knowledge or wisdom is.

NICIAS: I mean to say, Laches, that courage is the knowledge of that which inspires fear or confidence in war, or in anything.

NICIAS: I mean, Laches, courage is knowing what inspires fear or confidence, whether in war or in anything else.

LACHES: How strangely he is talking, Socrates.

LACHES: He’s talking so strangely, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Why do you say so, Laches?

SOCRATES: Why do you say that, Laches?

LACHES: Why, surely courage is one thing, and wisdom another.

LACHES: Surely courage and wisdom are two different things.

SOCRATES: That is just what Nicias denies.

SOCRATES: That is exactly what Nicias denies.

LACHES: Yes, that is what he denies; but he is so silly.

LACHES: Yes, that's what he denies. But he's so silly.

SOCRATES: Suppose that we instruct instead of abusing him?

SOCRATES: What if we teach him instead of insulting him?

NICIAS: Laches does not want to instruct me, Socrates; but having been proved to be talking nonsense himself, he wants to prove that I have been doing the same.

NICIAS: Laches doesn’t want to teach me, Socrates. But since he’s been shown to be talking nonsense, he wants to prove I’ve been talking nonsense too.

LACHES: Very true, Nicias; and you are talking nonsense, as I shall endeavour to show. Let me ask you a question: Do not physicians know the dangers of disease? or do the courageous know them? or are the physicians the same as the courageous?

LACHES: Very true, Nicias. And you're talking nonsense, as I'll try to show. Let me ask you a question: Don't doctors know the dangers of disease? Or do courageous people know those dangers? Or are doctors and courageous people the same?

NICIAS: Not at all.

NICIAS: Not at all.

LACHES: No more than the husbandmen who know the dangers of husbandry, or than other craftsmen, who have a knowledge of that which inspires them with fear or confidence in their own arts, and yet they are not courageous a whit the more for that.

LACHES: No more than farmers who know the dangers of farming. The same goes for other craftsmen who know what gives them fear or confidence in their own work. Yet that knowledge makes neither farmers nor craftsmen any more courageous.

SOCRATES: What is Laches saying, Nicias? He appears to be saying something of importance.

SOCRATES: What is Laches saying, Nicias? He seems to be saying something important.

NICIAS: Yes, he is saying something, but it is not true.

NICIAS: Yes, he is saying something, but what he says isn't true.

SOCRATES: How so?

SOCRATES: How so?

NICIAS: Why, because he does not see that the physician's knowledge only extends to the nature of health and disease: he can tell the sick man no more than this. Do you imagine, Laches, that the physician knows whether health or disease is the more terrible to a man? Had not many a man better never get up from a sick bed? I should like to know whether you think that life is always better than death. May not death often be the better of the two?

NICIAS: Well, because he fails to see that a doctor's knowledge covers only the nature of health and disease. The doctor can tell a sick man nothing beyond that. Do you imagine, Laches, that a doctor knows whether health or disease is more terrible for a man? Wouldn't many men be better off never recovering from an illness? I'd like to know whether you think life is always better than death. Might death not often be better?

LACHES: Yes certainly so in my opinion.

LACHES: Yes, certainly, in my opinion.

NICIAS: And do you think that the same things are terrible to those who had better die, and to those who had better live?

NICIAS: And do you think the same things frighten people who would be better off dead and people who would be better off alive?

LACHES: Certainly not.

LACHES: Certainly not.

NICIAS: And do you suppose that the physician or any other artist knows this, or any one indeed, except he who is skilled in the grounds of fear and hope? And him I call the courageous.

NICIAS: And do you think a doctor or any other skilled practitioner knows this? Does anyone, except someone who understands the reasons for fear and hope? That is the person I call courageous.

SOCRATES: Do you understand his meaning, Laches?

SOCRATES: Do you understand what he means, Laches?

LACHES: Yes; I suppose that, in his way of speaking, the soothsayers are courageous. For who but one of them can know to whom to die or to live is better? And yet Nicias, would you allow that you are yourself a soothsayer, or are you neither a soothsayer nor courageous?

LACHES: Yes, I suppose soothsayers are courageous, according to his way of speaking. For who else can know who would be better off dead or alive? And yet, Nicias, would you say you yourself are a soothsayer? Or are you neither a soothsayer nor courageous?

NICIAS: What! do you mean to say that the soothsayer ought to know the grounds of hope or fear?

NICIAS: What! Are you saying the soothsayer should know the reasons for hope or fear?

LACHES: Indeed I do: who but he?

LACHES: Of course I do. Who else but him?

NICIAS: Much rather I should say he of whom I speak; for the soothsayer ought to know only the signs of things that are about to come to pass, whether death or disease, or loss of property, or victory, or defeat in war, or in any sort of contest; but to whom the suffering or not suffering of these things will be for the best, can no more be decided by the soothsayer than by one who is no soothsayer.

NICIAS: I would much rather say the person I am speaking of. For a soothsayer should know only the signs of what is about to happen. These may be death, disease, loss of property, victory, or defeat in war or any kind of contest. But who will benefit most from experiencing or avoiding these things? A soothsayer can judge that no better than someone who is not a soothsayer.

LACHES: I cannot understand what Nicias would be at, Socrates; for he represents the courageous man as neither a soothsayer, nor a physician, nor in any other character, unless he means to say that he is a god. My opinion is that he does not like honestly to confess that he is talking nonsense, but that he shuffles up and down in order to conceal the difficulty into which he has got himself. You and I, Socrates, might have practised a similar shuffle just now, if we had only wanted to avoid the appearance of inconsistency. And if we had been arguing in a court of law there might have been reason in so doing; but why should a man deck himself out with vain words at a meeting of friends such as this?

LACHES: I cannot understand what Nicias is getting at, Socrates. He says the courageous man is neither a fortune-teller nor a doctor, nor anyone else of any kind. Unless he means to say the man is a god. I think he is unwilling to admit honestly that he is talking nonsense. Instead, he keeps dodging the issue to hide the difficulty he has got himself into. You and I, Socrates, could have dodged the issue in the same way just now. We could have done so if we had only wanted to avoid seeming inconsistent. And if we had been arguing in a court of law, there might have been reason to do so. But why should anyone dress himself up in empty words at a gathering of friends like this?

SOCRATES: I quite agree with you, Laches, that he should not. But perhaps Nicias is serious, and not merely talking for the sake of talking. Let us ask him just to explain what he means, and if he has reason on his side we will agree with him; if not, we will instruct him.

SOCRATES: I completely agree with you, Laches, that he should not. But perhaps Nicias is serious and isn't just talking for the sake of talking. Let's ask him to explain what he means. If his reasoning is sound, we'll agree with him. If not, we'll teach him.

LACHES: Do you, Socrates, if you like, ask him: I think that I have asked enough.

LACHES: Socrates, ask him yourself if you like. I think I’ve asked enough.

SOCRATES: I do not see why I should not; and my question will do for both of us.

SOCRATES: I don’t see why I shouldn’t. And my question will serve both of us.

LACHES: Very good.

LACHES: Very good.

SOCRATES: Then tell me, Nicias, or rather tell us, for Laches and I are partners in the argument: Do you mean to affirm that courage is the knowledge of the grounds of hope and fear?

SOCRATES: Then tell me, Nicias. Or rather, tell us, since Laches and I are partners in this discussion. Are you saying that courage is knowing the reasons for hope and fear?

NICIAS: I do.

NICIAS: I do.

SOCRATES: And not every man has this knowledge; the physician and the soothsayer have it not; and they will not be courageous unless they acquire it—that is what you were saying?

SOCRATES: And not everyone has this knowledge. Neither the doctor nor the soothsayer has it. And neither will be courageous unless they gain this knowledge. Is that what you were saying?

NICIAS: I was.

NICIAS: I was.

SOCRATES: Then this is certainly not a thing which every pig would know, as the proverb says, and therefore he could not be courageous.

SOCRATES: Then this is certainly not something every pig would know, as the proverb says. So he could not be courageous.

NICIAS: I think not.

NICIAS: I don't think so.

SOCRATES: Clearly not, Nicias; not even such a big pig as the Crommyonian sow would be called by you courageous. And this I say not as a joke, but because I think that he who assents to your doctrine, that courage is the knowledge of the grounds of fear and hope, cannot allow that any wild beast is courageous, unless he admits that a lion, or a leopard, or perhaps a boar, or any other animal, has such a degree of wisdom that he knows things which but a few human beings ever know by reason of their difficulty. He who takes your view of courage must affirm that a lion, and a stag, and a bull, and a monkey, have equally little pretensions to courage.

SOCRATES: Clearly not, Nicias. You would not call even a pig as big as the Crommyonian sow courageous. I am not joking. Your view is that courage means knowing the reasons for fear and hope. I think anyone who accepts your view cannot call any wild animal courageous unless they also accept something else. They must accept that a lion, a leopard, or perhaps a boar, or any other animal, has extraordinary wisdom. Such an animal must know things so difficult that only a few human beings ever know them. Anyone who shares your view of courage must say that the following animals have equally little claim to courage: a lion, a stag, a bull, and a monkey.

LACHES: Capital, Socrates; by the gods, that is truly good. And I hope, Nicias, that you will tell us whether these animals, which we all admit to be courageous, are really wiser than mankind; or whether you will have the boldness, in the face of universal opinion, to deny their courage.

LACHES: Excellent, Socrates! By the gods, that is truly good. And Nicias, I hope you will tell us whether these animals are really wiser than humans. We all agree these animals are courageous. Or will you dare to deny their courage, against everyone's opinion?

NICIAS: Why, Laches, I do not call animals or any other things which have no fear of dangers, because they are ignorant of them, courageous, but only fearless and senseless. Do you imagine that I should call little children courageous, which fear no dangers because they know none? There is a difference, to my way of thinking, between fearlessness and courage. I am of opinion that thoughtful courage is a quality possessed by very few, but that rashness and boldness, and fearlessness, which has no forethought, are very common qualities possessed by many men, many women, many children, many animals. And you, and men in general, call by the term 'courageous' actions which I call rash;—my courageous actions are wise actions.

NICIAS: Laches, I do not call animals or anything else courageous when they fear no dangers because they know nothing of them. I call them only fearless and senseless. Do you imagine I would call little children courageous because they fear no dangers, knowing nothing of them? To my mind, fearlessness and courage are different. I believe very few possess thoughtful courage. But rashness, boldness, and fearlessness without forethought are very common among many men, women, children, and animals. You and most people call actions 'courageous' when I call those actions rash. The actions I call courageous are wise actions.

LACHES: Behold, Socrates, how admirably, as he thinks, he dresses himself out in words, while seeking to deprive of the honour of courage those whom all the world acknowledges to be courageous.

LACHES: Look, Socrates, how he shows off with words, thinking he's doing it so admirably. Yet he is trying to deny the honor of courage to those whom the whole world recognizes as courageous.

NICIAS: Not so, Laches, but do not be alarmed; for I am quite willing to say of you and also of Lamachus, and of many other Athenians, that you are courageous and therefore wise.

NICIAS: No, Laches, but don't be alarmed. I'm quite willing to say that you, Lamachus, and many other Athenians are courageous and therefore wise.

LACHES: I could answer that; but I would not have you cast in my teeth that I am a haughty Aexonian.

LACHES: I could answer that. But I don’t want you to accuse me of being an arrogant Aexonian.

SOCRATES: Do not answer him, Laches; I rather fancy that you are not aware of the source from which his wisdom is derived. He has got all this from my friend Damon, and Damon is always with Prodicus, who, of all the Sophists, is considered to be the best puller to pieces of words of this sort.

SOCRATES: Don’t answer him, Laches. I rather suspect you don’t know where his wisdom comes from. He got all of it from my friend Damon, and Damon is always with Prodicus. Of all the Sophists, Prodicus is considered the best at picking apart words of this kind.

LACHES: Yes, Socrates; and the examination of such niceties is a much more suitable employment for a Sophist than for a great statesman whom the city chooses to preside over her.

LACHES: Yes, Socrates. Examining such fine points is much better suited to a Sophist than to a great statesman chosen to lead the city.

SOCRATES: Yes, my sweet friend, but a great statesman is likely to have a great intelligence. And I think that the view which is implied in Nicias' definition of courage is worthy of examination.

SOCRATES: Yes, my dear friend, but a great statesman is likely to be highly intelligent. And I think the idea implied by Nicias' definition of courage is worth examining.

LACHES: Then examine for yourself, Socrates.

LACHES: Then look into it yourself, Socrates.

SOCRATES: That is what I am going to do, my dear friend. Do not, however, suppose I shall let you out of the partnership; for I shall expect you to apply your mind, and join with me in the consideration of the question.

SOCRATES: That is what I’m going to do, my dear friend. But don’t think I’ll let you out of our partnership. I’ll expect you to think carefully and join me in considering the question.

LACHES: I will if you think that I ought.

LACHES: I will if you think I should.

SOCRATES: Yes, I do; but I must beg of you, Nicias, to begin again. You remember that we originally considered courage to be a part of virtue.

SOCRATES: Yes, I do. But please, Nicias, let’s start again. You remember that we originally considered courage to be part of virtue.

NICIAS: Very true.

NICIAS: Absolutely true.

SOCRATES: And you yourself said that it was a part; and there were many other parts, all of which taken together are called virtue.

SOCRATES: And you yourself said it was one part, and there were many other parts. All these parts together are called virtue.

NICIAS: Certainly.

NICIAS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Do you agree with me about the parts? For I say that justice, temperance, and the like, are all of them parts of virtue as well as courage. Would you not say the same?

SOCRATES: Do you agree with me about the parts of virtue? I say justice, self-control, and similar qualities are all parts of virtue, along with courage. Would you say the same?

NICIAS: Certainly.

NICIAS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Well then, so far we are agreed. And now let us proceed a step, and try to arrive at a similar agreement about the fearful and the hopeful: I do not want you to be thinking one thing and myself another. Let me then tell you my own opinion, and if I am wrong you shall set me right: in my opinion the terrible and the hopeful are the things which do or do not create fear, and fear is not of the present, nor of the past, but is of future and expected evil. Do you not agree to that, Laches?

SOCRATES: Well then, we agree so far. Now let us take another step and try to agree about what causes fear and what gives hope. I do not want you to mean one thing while I mean another. Let me tell you what I think, and if I am wrong, correct me. In my view, frightening things cause fear, while hopeful things do not. Fear is not about the present or the past, but about harm we expect in the future. Do you agree with that, Laches?

LACHES: Yes, Socrates, entirely.

LACHES: Yes, Socrates, completely.

SOCRATES: That is my view, Nicias; the terrible things, as I should say, are the evils which are future; and the hopeful are the good or not evil things which are future. Do you or do you not agree with me?

SOCRATES: That is my view, Nicias. I would say that what we fear is future evil. And what we hope for is something good, or at least not evil, in the future. Do you agree with me or not?

NICIAS: I agree.

NICIAS: I agree.

SOCRATES: And the knowledge of these things you call courage?

SOCRATES: And you call knowing these things courage?

NICIAS: Precisely.

NICIAS: Exactly.

SOCRATES: And now let me see whether you agree with Laches and myself as to a third point.

SOCRATES: Now let me see if you agree with Laches and me on a third point.

NICIAS: What is that?

NICIAS: What is that?

SOCRATES: I will tell you. He and I have a notion that there is not one knowledge or science of the past, another of the present, a third of what is likely to be best and what will be best in the future; but that of all three there is one science only: for example, there is one science of medicine which is concerned with the inspection of health equally in all times, present, past, and future; and one science of husbandry in like manner, which is concerned with the productions of the earth in all times. As to the art of the general, you yourselves will be my witnesses that he has an excellent foreknowledge of the future, and that he claims to be the master and not the servant of the soothsayer, because he knows better what is happening or is likely to happen in war: and accordingly the law places the soothsayer under the general, and not the general under the soothsayer. Am I not correct in saying so, Laches?

SOCRATES: I will tell you. He and I believe there are not separate sciences for the past, the present, and the future. That includes knowing what is likely to be best and what will be best in the future. Instead, one science covers all three periods. For example, medicine is a single science that examines health equally in the present, past, and future. Likewise, farming is a single science concerned with what the earth produces in all periods. As for a general’s skill, you yourselves can confirm that he has excellent knowledge of what will happen. He also claims to command the soothsayer, rather than serve him. This is because the general knows better what is happening or is likely to happen in war. Accordingly, the law puts the soothsayer under the general’s command, not the general under the soothsayer’s. Am I not right, Laches?

LACHES: Quite correct.

LACHES: Exactly right.

SOCRATES: And do you, Nicias, also acknowledge that the same science has understanding of the same things, whether future, present, or past?

SOCRATES: And do you also agree, Nicias, that the same field of knowledge covers the same things, whether future, present, or past?

NICIAS: Yes, indeed Socrates; that is my opinion.

NICIAS: Yes, absolutely, Socrates. That is my opinion.

SOCRATES: And courage, my friend, is, as you say, a knowledge of the fearful and of the hopeful?

SOCRATES: And courage, my friend, is knowing what to fear and what to hope for, as you say?

NICIAS: Yes.

NICIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And the fearful, and the hopeful, are admitted to be future goods and future evils?

SOCRATES: And do we agree that what we fear and hope for are future goods and evils?

NICIAS: True.

NICIAS: True.

SOCRATES: And the same science has to do with the same things in the future or at any time?

SOCRATES: And does the same field of knowledge deal with the same things in the future or at any time?

NICIAS: That is true.

NICIAS: That's true.

SOCRATES: Then courage is not the science which is concerned with the fearful and hopeful, for they are future only; courage, like the other sciences, is concerned not only with good and evil of the future, but of the present and past, and of any time?

SOCRATES: Then courage is not just knowledge of what we fear or hope for, since both concern only the future? Like other kinds of knowledge, courage concerns good and evil not only in the future, but also now and in the past? So courage concerns good and evil at any time?

NICIAS: That, as I suppose, is true.

NICIAS: I suppose that's true.

SOCRATES: Then the answer which you have given, Nicias, includes only a third part of courage; but our question extended to the whole nature of courage: and according to your view, that is, according to your present view, courage is not only the knowledge of the hopeful and the fearful, but seems to include nearly every good and evil without reference to time. What do you say to that alteration in your statement?

SOCRATES: Then your answer, Nicias, covers only a third of courage. But our question was about the whole nature of courage. According to your view, or at least your current view, courage is not just knowing what to hope for and fear. It seems to include knowing nearly every good and evil, whether past, present, or future. What do you say to that change in your statement?

NICIAS: I agree, Socrates.

NICIAS: I agree, Socrates.

SOCRATES: But then, my dear friend, if a man knew all good and evil, and how they are, and have been, and will be produced, would he not be perfect, and wanting in no virtue, whether justice, or temperance, or holiness? He would possess them all, and he would know which were dangers and which were not, and guard against them whether they were supernatural or natural; and he would provide the good, as he would know how to deal both with gods or men.

SOCRATES: But then, my dear friend, suppose a man knew all good and evil. Suppose he knew how good and evil arise, how they arose in the past, and how they will arise. Wouldn't he be perfect, lacking no virtue, whether justice, self-control, or holiness? He would possess every virtue and know what was dangerous and what was not. He would guard against dangers, whether supernatural or natural. And he would secure what was good, since he would know how to deal with both gods and people.

NICIAS: I think, Socrates, that there is a great deal of truth in what you say.

NICIAS: Socrates, I think there’s a lot of truth in what you say.

SOCRATES: But then, Nicias, courage, according to this new definition of yours, instead of being a part of virtue only, will be all virtue?

SOCRATES: But then, Nicias, doesn’t your new definition make courage all of virtue, rather than just a part of virtue?

NICIAS: It would seem so.

NICIAS: It seems so.

SOCRATES: But we were saying that courage is one of the parts of virtue?

SOCRATES: But weren't we saying that courage is one part of virtue?

NICIAS: Yes, that was what we were saying.

NICIAS: Yes, that's what we were saying.

SOCRATES: And that is in contradiction with our present view?

SOCRATES: And does that contradict our current view?

NICIAS: That appears to be the case.

NICIAS: That seems to be true.

SOCRATES: Then, Nicias, we have not discovered what courage is.

SOCRATES: So, Nicias, we haven't figured out what courage is.

NICIAS: We have not.

NICIAS: We haven't.

LACHES: And yet, friend Nicias, I imagined that you would have made the discovery, when you were so contemptuous of the answers which I made to Socrates. I had very great hopes that you would have been enlightened by the wisdom of Damon.

LACHES: And yet, my friend Nicias, I thought you would have found the answer. You were so scornful of the answers I gave Socrates. I had very high hopes that Damon’s wisdom would have enlightened you.

NICIAS: I perceive, Laches, that you think nothing of having displayed your ignorance of the nature of courage, but you look only to see whether I have not made a similar display; and if we are both equally ignorant of the things which a man who is good for anything should know, that, I suppose, will be of no consequence. You certainly appear to me very like the rest of the world, looking at your neighbour and not at yourself. I am of opinion that enough has been said on the subject which we have been discussing; and if anything has been imperfectly said, that may be hereafter corrected by the help of Damon, whom you think to laugh down, although you have never seen him, and with the help of others. And when I am satisfied myself, I will freely impart my satisfaction to you, for I think that you are very much in want of knowledge.

NICIAS: I see, Laches, that you don’t care that you’ve shown your ignorance about the nature of courage. You only look to see whether I’ve shown the same ignorance. And if we’re both equally ignorant of what any man worth anything should know, I suppose that doesn’t matter. You certainly seem to me very much like everyone else, looking at your neighbor rather than yourself. I think we’ve said enough about the subject we’ve been discussing. And if anything has been poorly expressed, we may correct it later with help from Damon and others. You think you can make Damon look foolish by laughing at him, although you’ve never even seen him. And when I’m satisfied with my own understanding, I’ll gladly share it with you. I think you badly need knowledge.

LACHES: You are a philosopher, Nicias; of that I am aware: nevertheless I would recommend Lysimachus and Melesias not to take you and me as advisers about the education of their children; but, as I said at first, they should ask Socrates and not let him off; if my own sons were old enough, I would have asked him myself.

LACHES: I know you are a philosopher, Nicias. Still, I would advise Lysimachus and Melesias not to ask us for advice about their children’s education. Instead, as I said at first, they should ask Socrates and insist that he help. If my own sons were old enough, I would have asked Socrates myself.

NICIAS: To that I quite agree, if Socrates is willing to take them under his charge. I should not wish for any one else to be the tutor of Niceratus. But I observe that when I mention the matter to him he recommends to me some other tutor and refuses himself. Perhaps he may be more ready to listen to you, Lysimachus.

NICIAS: I completely agree, if Socrates is willing to take charge of them. I would not want anyone else to tutor Niceratus. But I notice that whenever I bring it up, Socrates recommends another tutor and refuses to teach Niceratus himself. Perhaps he may be more willing to listen to you, Lysimachus.

LYSIMACHUS: He ought, Nicias: for certainly I would do things for him which I would not do for many others. What do you say, Socrates—will you comply? And are you ready to give assistance in the improvement of the youths?

LYSIMACHUS: He should, Nicias, because I would certainly do things for him that I would not do for many others. What do you say, Socrates? Will you agree? And are you ready to help the young men improve?

SOCRATES: Indeed, Lysimachus, I should be very wrong in refusing to aid in the improvement of anybody. And if I had shown in this conversation that I had a knowledge which Nicias and Laches have not, then I admit that you would be right in inviting me to perform this duty; but as we are all in the same perplexity, why should one of us be preferred to another? I certainly think that no one should; and under these circumstances, let me offer you a piece of advice (and this need not go further than ourselves). I maintain, my friends, that every one of us should seek out the best teacher whom he can find, first for ourselves, who are greatly in need of one, and then for the youth, regardless of expense or anything. But I cannot advise that we remain as we are. And if any one laughs at us for going to school at our age, I would quote to them the authority of Homer, who says, that

SOCRATES: Indeed, Lysimachus, I would be very wrong to refuse to help anyone improve. Suppose I had shown in our conversation that I knew something Nicias and Laches did not. Then I admit you would be right to ask me to take on this task. But since we are all equally puzzled, why should any one of us be preferred over the others? I certainly think none of us should. Under these circumstances, let me offer some advice (and we can keep this advice between ourselves). My friends, I insist that each of us should find the best teacher he can. We should seek a teacher first for ourselves, since we badly need one, and then for the young people. We should spare no expense or anything else. But I cannot advise us to stay as we are. And if anyone laughs at us for going to school at our age, I would appeal to Homer's authority. Homer says that

'Modesty is not good for a needy man.'

'Modesty is no good for a man in need.'

Let us then, regardless of what may be said of us, make the education of the youths our own education.

So, no matter what people may say about us, let’s make educating the young part of our own education.

LYSIMACHUS: I like your proposal, Socrates; and as I am the oldest, I am also the most eager to go to school with the boys. Let me beg a favour of you: Come to my house to-morrow at dawn, and we will advise about these matters. For the present, let us make an end of the conversation.

LYSIMACHUS: I like your proposal, Socrates. And since I am the oldest, I am also the most eager to go to school with the boys. Let me ask you a favor: Come to my house tomorrow at dawn, and we will discuss these matters. For now, let us end the conversation.

SOCRATES: I will come to you to-morrow, Lysimachus, as you propose, God willing.

SOCRATES: I’ll come to you tomorrow, Lysimachus, as you suggest, God willing.